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Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression

Volume VIII

Document M-2

“Document M-2: Speech of Julius Streicher from Fraenkische Tageszeitung No. 108, Friday, 5/10/1935 [partial translation]”, pp. 1-2.

Julius Streicher spoke:

“The Jews came to Germany, came to all countries, and everywhere the same thing happened. The peoples used to be led by their own nationals, by natives of their countries, they had a leadership of their own blood. And then slowly the Jews came to power, divided all peoples into parties, into religions, and thus it became possible for the Jewish world regime to be, one can ay, the determining factor in world history during the last 150 years. Thus the German people had to withstand the whole world. It withstood for 4.5 years and we can proudly say we are the greatest people, for the others together did not manage to destroy us. Such a people is not meant to be completely destroyed under Jewish domination and to be sacrificed once more. It is meant to live and to see to it that the other peoples return to a free life.

The other day I had cause to congratulate Mosley, the leader the British Fascists, on a speech he had made. He thanked me in writing and concluded by saying: As long as the Jews still govern the peoples, as long as the world has not liberated itself from Jewish domination, peace is unthinkable. You see, therefore, that the development which will give the other people their freedom will originate from Germany.

We were right and we now look from the Third Reich towards the big historical happenings of the present time and the future and we see universal peace shaping, but only after a universal judgment to which all Jewry will be compulsorily submitted.

You see what happened here is still happening in all other countries today. Everywhere parties, parliaments, baptized Jews are in government. It is the Jew in Great Britain, the Jew in France, the Jew in Russia, the Jew in Italy, the Jew all the World over (applause) who does not want peace to come to this world.

This the French front-line soldier should take with him to France: The German people have taken a new lease of life, they want peace, but if anyone tries to attack them, if anyone tries to torture them again, if anyone tries to push them back into the past, then the world would see another heroic epic, then heaven will decide where righteousness lieshere, or where the Jew has the whiphand, where he instigates massacres, one could almost say the biggest ritual murders of all times.

If the German people are to be slaughtered according to the Jewish rites, the whole world will be thus slaughtered at the same time. The French people are being shaped by its rulers into an instrument for those people who destroyed the Russians. Now they arearming, arming to possess an army to re-establish domination, a Jewish domination not only over Germany, but the final Jewish domination over the whole world. You see, my dear compatriots, anyone knowing the racial question, anyone knowing the Jewish question realizes all Jewry is the universal enemy.

As you have drummed morning and evening prayers into your children’s heads, so now drum this into their heads, so that the German people may gain the spiritual power to convince the rest of the world which the Jews desire to lead against us.”

“Document M-4: Streicher’s Speech On 9/5/1937 Commemorating The Opening Of The Wilhelm-Gustloff-Bridge In Nurnberg [partial translation]”, pp. 3-5.

(Reported in the Fraenkische Tageszeitung 9/5/1937).

“With the memorial which has just been unveiled we honour, in the town of the Reich-Party rallies, the fighter who was murdered by a member of the Jewish people. In a plain and simple way it says on the bronze plaque “Wilhelm Gustloff, 1/30/1895-2/1936. Murdered by a Jew.”

I believe Nurnberg is the first town to have the courage to write on a monument “Here a man is honoured who was killed by a Jew.”

The Legacy of Wilhelm Gustloff

This inscription should always remind us of our task of saying before the whole world: This monument was not only built to honour a murdered man of the movement. Nay, it must be a real admonition. All those who walk or drive over this bridge should cast their eyes upon this beautiful monument with a quiet prayer. Bring your children here and let them pray, not to saints of the Jewish people, but to those who were murdered by the Jewish people.

And this inscription should further admonish us not to tire in our work of enlightenment that we began here 15 or more years ago. We told the workmen time and time again: Don’t let the Jew lead you astray. The Jewish serpent tells the peoples: You are all equal. And millions believed the Jews and the disaster occurred.

We repeatedly said: Rid yourselves of that enormous fraud. It is not true that all peoples are equal. Nothing in nature is the same and men are not the same either. God created inequality in nature and men. But the inequality which the Jewish people introduced among the peoples by creating enormous wealth on one side and unspeakable misery on the otherthat is unnatural. This inequality created by the Jews must be exterminated.

The man who murdered Wilhelm Gustloff had to come from the Jewish people, because the Jewish text-books teach that every Jew has the right to kill the non-Jew, and, indeed, that it is pleasing to the Jewish God to kill as many non-Jews as possible.

Look at the way the Jewish people have been following for thousands of years past; everywhere murder, everywhere mass murder. Neither must we forget that behind present-day wars there stands the Jewish financier who pursues his aims and interests. The Jew always lives on the blood of other nations; he needs such murder and such victims. For us who know, the murder of Wilhelm Gustloff is the same as ritual murder.

We must tell our children!

It is our duty to tell the children at school and the bigger ones what this memorial means. And to the many who today still do not know what it is all about we must explain: The security which we have now created for ourselves will only last for centuries if we never more lose the knowledge which we have made clear to the people.

The Jew no longer shows himself among us openly as he used to. But it would be wrong to say that victory is ours. Full and final victory will have been achieved only when the whole world has been rid of Jews.

Every man or woman should be taken in to see the Anti-Bolshevist exhibition which has now been opened here, and then in front of this memorial. Then perhaps many would understand why we always say: The Jew is our misfortune.

We are here doing honour to a man who died bravely. You know that a Jew came into his house and shot him treacherously. When a German kills a German he has the whole nation against him. But when a Jew kills a non-Jew the whole Jewish people is on his side. All the Jews stood together and collected money for the defence of this murderer. This shows what sort of a people the Jews are and what we can still expect from this people.

We must leave this place with a sacred vow to be hard of heart. Peace has not come for us yet. Those who come after us may perhaps live to see it, if what we preached, hammered into people’s heads, and planted in their hearts is never forgotten, if we who know plant hatred against the Jews in the hearts of youth, if we do not get soft any more but remain strong. Then we will overcome the dragon and crush beneath our heel the head of the serpent which has wound itself round the globe for many thousands of years.

We want to stand together.

We have dedicated our lives to the fight against the murderers of Christ and we are proud that we did not spend the last years in idleness, but by hard fighting carried enlightenment into the German people and furthermore into the other nations. From this town enlightenment was carried into the world. In this place let us say to ourselves: We want to stand side by side in the towns with the men, under whose care it is, and we want to take it for granted that they are doing their job as it should be done; and we want to stand together in the Gau because we have to fulfil a task. This task is not yetcompleted but we will continue working in this spirit and belief to the last gasp. And if we always think of Adolf Hitler, then we cannot fail to receive strength and benediction from heaven.

Adolf Hitler also made this man, Wilhelm Gustloff, a follower of his, and Wilhelm Gustloff remained faithful to the Führer unto death. We salute Adolf Hitler, the creator of the Third Reich, the Saviour of the German people.”

“Document M-6: Leading Article By Julius Streicher From Der Stuermer 9/1936 (No. 39)

To Everybody! The “Stuermer” Was Right [translation]”, pp. 6-7.

The battle against the devil.

When in 1933 National Socialism came to power in Germany, many people thought that they could say that the “Stuermer’s” task was now finished. During the ensuing period striking events brought about by Jews made it clear to these know-alls. that they had been talking nonsense. When the Nurnberg decrees for the protection of German blood and the German people were decided upon at the Reich Party Rally in 1935, there were again people who believed that with the creation of these laws the Jewish question was solved. Those who thought and talked along these lines were again given a lesson within the year by world events. Only those who had but a superficial knowledge of what the Jewish question means to those who know, could speak of a solution of this question. At the Reich Party Rally in Nurnberg which has just ended, it must have become clear even to the most simple-minded that the Jewish question is a question of world importance, the solution of which depends on a course of events which stretches out beyond the frontiers of the Third Reich. The speeches made at the Reich Party Congress in Nurnberg have finally put a spoke in the wheel of those who, consciously or unconsciously, were against the work of the “Stuermer.” Dr. Wagner, the Reich Medical Chief, said in his speech of 9/12/1936word for word:

“However, to those who believe that the Jewish question has been finally solved and the matter thus settled for Germany by the Nurnberg decrees, be it said: The battle continuesworld Jewry itself is seeing to that anyhowand we shall only get through this battle victoriously if every member of the German people knows that their very existence is at stake. The work of enlightenment carried on by the party seems to me to be more than ever necessary today, when even many party members seem to think these matters no longer real or urgent.”

Dr. Wagner, the Reich medical chief, thereby said what the Stuermer ‘ has always saidto those who did not want to understand its work. At the Reich Party Rally of 1936 National Socialism declared war to the death on the Bolshevist Jews who are setting fire to the world. But wars can only be won if the combatants know for what they are fighting. The “Stuermer’s” 15 years of work of enlightenment has already led an army of bose who knowmillions strongto National Socialism. The continued work of the “Stuermer” will help to ensure that every German down to the last man will, with heart and hand, join the ranks of those whose aim it is to crush the head of the serpent PanJuda beneath their heels. He who helps to bring this about helps to eliminate the devil. And this devil is the Jew.

Julius Streicher.

“Document M-8 [partial translation]”, pp. 8-9.

“Voelkischer Beobachter” dated 2/13/1935, vol. 48 No. 44, page 2, column 3.

The Führer congratulates Julius Streicher on his 50th birthday.

Adolf Hitler spoke to his old comrades in battle and to his followers in words which went straight to their hearts. By way of introduction he remarked that it was a specific pleasure to be present for a short while in Nurnberg, the town of the national-socialist community which had been steeled in battle, at this day of honour of Julius Streicher, and to be within the circle of the standard bearers of the national-socialist idea during many years.

Just as they all of them had during the years of oppression unshakeably believed in the victory of the movement, so his friend and comrade in the battle, Streicher, had stood faithfully at his side at all times. It had been this unshakeable belief that had moved mountains.

For Streicher it would surely be a solemn thought, that this fiftieth anniversary meant not only the half-way point of a century, but also of a thousand years of German history to him. He had in Streicher a companion of whom he could say that here in Nurnberg was a man who would never waver for a single second and who would unflinchingly stand behind him in every situation.

“Document M-10: Der Stuermers Answer To The Archbishop of Canterbury [partial translation]”, pp. 9-10.

An Article which appeared in a special edition of the “Stuermer” in 5/1939.

This special edition must not be concluded before the “Stuermer” has had it out with Dr. Lang, the Archbishop of Canterbury (England). As has already been reported previously, this churchman participated in the general outcry of protests against the Stuermer and its publisher, Julius Streicher

This senile priest, however, has by virtue of his protest, joined forces with a company which must expose him to shame and contempt. At the same time he has, with this protest, offended against the laws of decency and against the most elementary principles of Christianity.

The Archbishop of Canterbury therefore sides with the money bag, with the lying world press, with the Jewish crooks and financial hyenas, with the Jewish-Bolshevist mass-murderers. It is a fine company which the Archbishop of Canterbury has joined They are flayers of mankind, criminals, gangsters, murderers. In short, they are Jews.

By choosing their side, the Archbishop of Canterbury committed a further, even more contemptible crime. He committed the crime of betraying Christianity. The crime of betraying non-Jewish mankind.

The Archbishop of Canterbury insults Julius Streicher. He calls him an “odious inciter.” The Archbishop cannot hurt Julius Streicher by this. This man stands so high in the battle which he is conducting against world Jewry that the Archbishop of Canterbury cannot reach him. But let this be said to the Archbishop: To fight for the Jews is easy. To fight against the Jews is difficult. It is the most difficult and the greatest of battles. Julius Streicher has been fighting this battle for 20 years. In doing this, he had to risk his name, his existence, and his life a thousand times. Again and again he had to go into the prisons of the Republic. And he did all this only because he knows that the battle against world Jewry is after all nothing but the battle of good against bad. The Archbishop of Canterbury, who, surrounded by a halo, stands at the head of the Church of England, would ever have had the courage to fight the battle. He would never have had the courage to use all his resources and to sacrifice everything in order to be able to oppose the enemy of the world with all his might.

“Document M-11: Streicher’s Speech In The Central Hall Of The Coliseum In Nurnberg, 11/23/1922 [partial translation]”, p. 10.

[Taken from “Kampf dem Weltfeind”, pages 1-20.] “I see thousands of workers poorly dressed passing me by after a hard day’s work carrying a pot of soup … They speak of their hard life and of their unbearable misery. But other people also pass me by clad in valuable fur coats, with fat necks and paunchy stomachs. These people do not work. They are Jews taking an evening walk. They speak of their business and their profit. … The Jew is born for driving hard bargains and doing nothing. … people that is born for bargaining has no right to live amongst the people which for thousands of yeas has made its living by honest work. The whole German people works, but the Jews live at the expense of the Germans.”

“It is wrong to say that France, England and the remaining Allies won the World War. The only victor was the international Jew.

“We know that Germany will be free when the Jew has been excluded from the life of the German people.”

“Document M-12: Streicher’s Speech 11/20/1924 [partial translation]”, pp. 10-11.

[Taken from “Kampf dem Weltfeind”, pp. 30-34.] “I beg you and particularly those of you who carry the cross throughout the land to become somewhat more serious when I speak of the enemy of the German people, namely, the Jew. Not out of irresponsibility or for fun do I fight against the Jewish enemy, but because I bear within me the knowledge that the whole misfortune was brought to Germany by the Jews alone.”

“I ask you once more, what is at stake today? The Jew seeks dominion not only among the German people but among all peoples. The Communists paved the way for him. … Do you not know that the God of the Old Testament orders the Jews to consume and enslave the peoples of the earth?”

“The government allows the Jew to do as he pleases. The people expect actions to be taken … You may think about Adolf Hitler as you please, but one thing you must admit! He possessed the courage to attempt to free the German people from the Jew by a national revolution. That was action indeed.”

“Document M-13: Streicher’s Speech In Nurnberg, 4/3/1925 [partial translation]”, p.11.

[Taken from “Kampf dem Weltfeind,” p. 42.] “You must realize that the Jew wants our people to perish. That is why you must join us and leave those who have brought you nothing but war inflation and discord. For thousands of years the Jew has been destroying the nations. Let us make a new beginning today so that we can annihilate the Jew.”

“Document M-14: Streicher’s Speech In The Hercules Hall In Nurnberg 4/21/1932 [partial translation]”, p. 11.

[Taken from “Kampf dem Weltfeind,” p. 134.] “For 13 years I have fought against Jewry.

“But I know that the German worker can only be won back if these words are continually hammered into him: the Jews are our misfortune.

“All Jews have one common aim: World dominion.”

“We know that the Jew whether he is baptized as a Protestant or as a Catholic, remains a Jew. Why cannot you realize, you Protestant clergymen, you Catholic priests, you who have scales before your eyes and serve the god of the Jews who is not the God of Love but the God of Hate? Why do you not listen to Christ who said to the Jews: ‘You are children of the devil.’”

“Document M-20: German People’s Health from Blood and Soil [Deutsche Volksgesundheit aus Blut und Boden] [partial translation]”, p. 12.

[New Year’s Issue 1935.] “It is established for all eternity: alien albumen is the sperm of a man of alien race. The male sperm in cohabitation is partially or completely absorbed by the female and thus enters her bloodstream. One single cohabitation of a Jew with an Aryan woman is sufficient to poison her blood forever. Together with the alien albumen she has absorbed the alien soul. Never again will she be able to bear purely Aryan children, even when married to an Aryan. They will all be bastards, with a dual soul and the body of a mixed breed. Their children will also be crossbreeds, that means ugly people of unsteady character and with a tendency to illness. Now we know why the Jew uses every artifice of seduction in order to ravish German girls at as early an age as possible, why the Jewish doctor rapes his patients while they are under anaesthetic. He wants the German girl and the German woman to absorb the alien sperm of a Jew. She is never again to bear German children. But the blood products of all animals right down to the bacteria like serum, lymph, extracts from internal organs, etc. are also alien albumen. They have a poisonous effect if directly introduced into the bloodstream either by vaccination or injection. By these products of sick animals the blood is ravished, the Aryan is ‘impregnated’ with an alien species.… The author and abettor of such action is the Jew. He has been aware of the secrets of the race question for centuries and therefore plans systematically the annihilation of the nations which are superior to him. Science and ‘authorities’ are his instruments for the enforcing of pseudo-science and the concealment of truth.”

“Document M-25: The Stuermer In The Youth Hostel [translation]”, p. 14.

LETTER FROM “DER STUERMER”, No. 16, 4/1936, page 8.

How German boys and girls are being made familiar with the Jewish question.

Dear “Stuermer”,

The children of the “National Socialist Youth Hostel” at Grossmoellen in Pomerania also want to send you their greetings. We read your reports every week with great interest. The “Stuermer” is and will be a welcome guest in our house. With its help we get to know the Jew as he is. We also have a simple “Stuermer” case. We cut out the pictures from the “Stuermer” and fix them to a special notice board in our day room. There the boys and girls can get to know exactly what the Jews look like.

Now we want to tell you of another method, which we use to expose the Jew to all children. Every Sunday night the leader of our hostel presents a play about the Jews with his hand puppet show. We have a puppet which represents a proper Jew. He has a nose like the Devil. When the Casper comes we call on him to chase away the nasty Jew. But whenever during the game the Jew asks us to help him, we then simply call forCasper.

Today we saw a play on how the devil persuades the Jew to shoot a conscientious National Socialist. In the course of the play the Jew did it too. We all heard the shot. We would have all liked to jump up and arrest the Jew. But then the policeman came and after a short struggle took the Jew along. You can imagine, dear “Stuermer”, that we heartily cheered the policeman. In the whole play not one name was mentioned. But we all knew that this play represented the murder by the Jew Frankfurter. We were very sick when we went to bed that night. None felt like talking to the others. This play made it clear to us how the Jew sets to work.

Now we act regularly in plays about the Jews which the leader of our home reads to us from the “Stuermer”. We can hardly wait for the next Saturday to come around again. We greet you, dear “Stuermer” with a loud “Heil Hitler.”

The boys and girls of the National Socialist Youth Hostel, Grossmoellen.

“Document M-30: Speech By Julius Streicher On 6/26/1925 In The Bavarian Diet [translation]”, pp. 16-18.

[Taken from “Kampf dem Weltfeind”, Page 49.] We National-Socialists demand that our children are instructed by German teachers only. Even if the diet does not agree to our demand, we shall not relinquish it. We know that Jewish children are being educated quite differently by their parents from German children. The Jewish children are being taught that they belong to a chosen race but that the German children belong to a race which is equal to cattle. Considering this fact, it is obvious to us National Socialists that we shall never place German children in the same classroom with Jewish children.

And now how does this method of education operate in daily life? The Jew considers not only the individual but the whole nation as cattle. These workers who are in the Communist party do not know yet that they with all their idealism, are tools of this race, which strives after nothing else but world domination: There is no need for you to tell me that the Jew has lived for ages in Germany and that he is a citizen of this country. With equal rights, in the course of a couple of centuries, our descendants would have to look upon the Negro who is at present with the troops of occupation on the Rhine as upon a citizen of equal quality and with equal rights. The mere fact that the Jew has been living in Germany for ages does not mean a thing. The Jew belongs to a foreign race and his aims are of alien character. Therefore, he must not have the same rights as we have. The Jew should educate his children in Jewish schools. Later on you will realize how important it is to have these demands carried out.

Mr. Kultusminister (Minister of public worship and instruction), in the same way as you cannot prevent us refusing to accept the Negro on the Rhine, you cannot deprive us of our knowledge that the Jew is a foreign element in our midst. You can solve the anti-semitic problem only when you have eliminated the Jew from the life of the German people.

Recently the German Academy opened in Munich. Two members of this institution are pure Jews, Theodor Wolf of the “Berliner Tageblatt” and Georg Bernhardt of the “Vossische Zeitung”. an one, under such circumstances, still describe an Academy as “German” ?

Mr. Kultusminister, do create German schools and German Academies! Take away from the Jew the possibility of influencing the soul of our German youth! It is you, Mr. Kultusminister, who should, as a responsible person, be the first to set a good example! But you continue to carry on in the same old way until it will be too late. Mr. Kultusminister: You yourself are contributing to the fact that Germany is on her way to destruction. I repeat: We demand the transformation of the school into a National-German institute of education. If we let German children be taught by German teachers then we shall have laid the foundations for the National-German school. This National-German school must teach racial doctrine. At the present moment our youth is still being educated according to the freemason principle: “All that has human face is equal.” It is a ridiculous expression. Just as animals belong to various races so are human beings different from one another. The distinction has been made by God. The motto of the future should be: “Not all that has a human face is the same.” Our compatriots in the Palatinate can see daily the difference between Germans and Negroes. But it is not only the color which decides the difference between us and other races, it is the blood. We National Socialists demand that all pupils from the grammar to high school be enlightened regarding the differences between the races. This will clear the way for the realization that the Jew is not a German but a man of alien race. People say now that the Jew has merely a different religion and in 200 years people will say that the Negro on the Rhine has merely a different color. It is the task of a Kultusminister to make a clean sweep of this view. We demand, therefore, the introduction of racial doctrine into the school.

There are people who are still in favor of confessional schools. When we demand that the children be educated in German schools, the answer is always that religion is in danger on account of children of different confessions sitting side by side. If the clergy do their duty as teachers of religion, then religion is not being endangered. In the factories workers of both confessions are earning their living. You will not be asked there whether you hold the hammer in a catholic or protestant fist. Let us at last stop differentiating between Protestants and Catholics! Let us be Germans! To my mind a good German is also a good Christian! I would like to conclude! In his speech a communist deputy has just spoken about reconciliation between nations. I am giving him his reply: It is impossible to speak about reconciliation between nations without dealing with the Jewish question first. Whoever has recognized the baneful influence and the aims of Jewry in the world will understand our stubborn struggle and our resistance. Mr. Deputy of the Communist Party: You cannot deny the fact that wherever you may go, in China, in Africa, in America, Soviet agents are at work! They are agents of the Jews who are ruling Russia today. The results will be apparent in not far distantfuture. The final battle with the international power of the world Jewry is imminent. We shall win the battle only when we give up the petty party struggle and become a united nation. It will become a fact when we Germans realize the extent of the damage already caused by the Jewish fungus. At the moment when we have freed ourselves internally from the Jewish power as well as from the Jewish idea of domination the way to reconciliation with other non-Jewish nations will lie open. We can now already feel that many nations, the same as ourselves, are longing for the liberation from the Jewish oppressor. You too, gentlemen, will understand one day the reason why there were National Socialists who were prepared to be abused, reviled, or to be imprisoned for their ideology! I have always been firmly convinced that we deserve our future only when we have the courage to describe the race which crucified Christ as the enemy of the world.

“Document M-32: Don’t Trust The Fox In The Green Meadow Nor The Jew On His Oath: A Picture Book For Grown-Ups And Little Ones [partial translation]”, p. 20.

[By Elvira Bauer published by the printing dept. of “Der Stuermer”, 1936 Page 6]

“Jesus Christ says, ‘The Jew is a murderer through and through’. And when Christ had to die the Lord didn’t know any other people who would have tortured him to death, so he chose the Jews. That is why the Jews pride themselves on being the chosen people.”

[Page 18 (see illustration)]

The Jewish butcher. “He sells half refuse instead of meat. A piece of meat lies on the floor, the cat claws another. This doesn’t worry the Jewish butcher since the meat increases in weight. Besides, one mustn’t forget, he won’t have to eat it himself.”

[Page 24 (see illustration)]

“What a poor specimen the Jew is. He doesn’t like his own women and thinks himself clever if he steals a German woman for himself. Yet look at the Jew: He doesn’t even fit her.”

[Page 30 (see illustration )]

Shows Streicher as friend and educator of German boys and girls. “We have a fighter in the German Gau of Franconia whom we have to thank that our country remains healthy and free of Jewish residue.”

[Page 32 (see illustration)]

Shows German children reading the “Stuermer”. “Read the Stuermer! Dirty Jews!”

[Page 36 (see illustration)]

Expulsion of Jewish children from the schools whilst German children jeer. “Now it is going to be nice at school, for all Jewish children have to go, big ones and little ones. Crying, weeping, fury and anger doesn’t help. Away with the Jewish brood!”

“Document M-34: Safeguard Of German Blood And German Honour Gauleiter Streicher Speaks At A DAF [German Labour Front] Mass-Demonstration, For The Nurnberg Laws. Berlin, 10/5/1935 [partial translation]”, p. 24.

“Voelkischer Beobachter” South-German edition, 279 edition 48th year Sunday 10/6/1935.

Gauleiter Julius Streicher spoke in Berlin on Friday for the second time within a few weeks.

Often interrupted by tempestuous applause he laid down in effect: “If the misfortunes are to be removed from the world, they must be torn out by the roots; the cause of all misfortune in the world, is after all, due to one people, which for centuries has carried on disorder in all other lands. The Jew has understood how to camouflage himself to such an extent, that even today, in so-called educated circles, there are some who do not understand the Jewish question, and still speak of so-called “decent” Jews. We have therefore, to unmask the Jew, and that is what I have been doing for the past 15 years! (Tempestuous applause.)

If one realizes, the Gauleiter continued, what enormous injury to peoples’ property is caused by bastards, one will understand, why National-Socialism on the day of the Reichsparteitag of freedom, has created the law for the safeguarding of German blood and German honour. Is it not our just right to protect the German woman? Just in that way do we justify the culture, which the Jews for the very same reason, dishonestly wish to deny to us. In 100 or 200 years time the German people will have become a new people, just because we have kept from it all strange and bad blood.”

“Document M-42: Report On Anti-Jewish Pogroms In Nurnberg And Fuerth On 11/9-10/1938 [partial translation]”, p. 28.

Fraenkische Tageszeitung No. 265, dated 11 Nov. 38.

… In Nurnberg and Fuerth it resulted in demonstrations by the crowd against the Jewish murderers. These lasted until the early hours of the morning. Far too long had one watched the activities of the Jews in Germany. Not a single hair from their head had been disturbed, they had not been touched. But with the terrible murder of Party member von Rath the patience of the German people was exhausted. The fury of the population against the Jewish murderers had reached its peak and could no longer be restrained, and particularly, when it was observed, that the Jews were sitting and grinning spitefully in their homes, listening to the news over the radio of the death of the German legation-counsellor. This was a act of provocation which could no longer be tolerated. After midnight the excitement of the populace reached its peak and a large crowd marched to the synagogues in Nurnberg and Fuerth and burned these two Jewish buildings, where the murder of Germans had been preached.

The fire-brigades, which had been notified immediately, saw to it that the fire was confined to its original outbreak. The windows of Jewish shopkeepers, who still had not given up hope of selling their junk to the stupid Goims, were smashed. Thanks to the disciplined behaviour of the S.A. men and the police, who had rushed to the scene, there was no plundering.

“Document M-43: Do Not Become Ladies, But Remain German Girls And Women [partial translation]”, pp. 28-29.

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT M-43

“FRAENKISCHE TAGESZEITUNG” 3/19/1934.

At a celebration at the Preisslerstrasse, Frankenführer Julius Streicher spoke to the girls at the passing out ceremony after finishing their vocational course.

A celebration, unique of its kind, was experienced on Saturday morning last by the girls of district 7 in the schoolroom of the technical school in the Preisslerstrasse.

Then Julius Streicher spoke about his life and told them about a girl who at one timewent to his school and who fell for a Jew and was finished for the rest of her life.

“German girls,” the Frankenführer continued, “when you go out into the world you are in great danger. The Jew, to whom according to his laws you are free game, will try to approach you in various ways. Repulse him, stay honest and good. It is not beautiful frocks, lipstick and the powder-box that make you into German women. See that you remain clean spiritually and eventually become good German mothers.”

Then Julius Streicher gave a few typical examples of how the Jew carefully plans to break up the lives of the people; how he tries, by raping German women and girls, to lower the level of a race so as to render it unable to offer any resistance and thus helps to establish his world domination.

At the end the Frankenführer requested the girls in a true fatherly manner to come to him whenever they should be in need of help. He would help anybody who is willing to be helped.

“Document M-44: Report Of Streicher’s Address To 2000 Children At Nurnberg, Christmas 1936, From Fraenkische Tageszeitung, 12/22/1936 [partial translation]”, pp. 29-30.

Two thousand children rejoiced with Julius StreicherThe Frankenführer at the Xmas celebrations of the Nurnberg children in the Hercules Hall and the Coliseum.

Nurnberg, 21st. December.

Julius Streicher began to tell them about the Child Christ and God above in Heaven, who then always help, if people are good and have a compassion for the sorrows of their brothers and sisters. The Gauleiter told the little ones of the terrible times after the war, when the Devil dominated mankind. “Do you know who the Devil is,” he asked his breathlessly listening audience. “The Jew, the Jew,” resounded from a thousand children’s voices. Julius Streicher continued:

“Yes, the Jew was the Devil. After the war he took away everything from the people. Distress became worse and worse. The people starved. Even then people prayed, but God could not help, because the people had become so bad. They did everything, which the Jew, the Devil asked them to do. Today everything has changed. Today, people don’t do what the Jew wants anymore, today they do what Hitler wantswho of you has seen Hitler yet?” … “I have, I have.”

All have already seen Hitler, thousands of fingers are raised.

“I believe that,” the Gauleiter continued, “you boys and girls from Nurnberg you all have already seen the Führer. And who has seen him, must say: you can see that he has a good heart, therefore God helped him and therefore He helps us all through Hitler. Well, you see; because there are again good people in Germany, God helps us again”

“Document M-45: Letter Written By Baldur Von Schirach, Reich Youth Leader [translation]”, p. 30.

[PUBLISHED BY “THE STUERMER” No. 3, 1/1938.] “It is the historical merit of the Sturmer to have enlightened the broad masses of our people in a popular way as to the Jewish world danger. The Sturmer is right in refusing to fulfill its task in the tone of the aesthetic drawing room. Jewry has shown no regard for the German people. We have, therefore, no cause to be considerate and to spare our worst enemy. What we fail to do today our youngsters of tomorrow will have to suffer for bitterly. Heil Hitler.”

“Document M-46: Pamphlet: The Jewish Question And School Instruction: By Municipal School Inspector [Stadtschulrat] Fritz Fink, Published And Printed By Der Stuermer, 1937 With A Preface By Streicher [partial translation]”, pp. 30-32.

Preface

The National Socialist state brought fundamental changes into all spheres of life of the German People.

It has also presented the German teacher with some new tasks. The national socialist state demands that its teachers instruct German children in social questions. As far as the German people is concerned the racial question is a Jewish question. Those who want to teach the child all about the Jew must themselves have a thorough knowledge of the subject. School Inspector Fritz Fink, with his publication “The Jewish Question and schools instruction,” will help the teacher in acquiring some knowledge of the subject. He can and is entitled to do this, for he himself has been called upon by circumstances to take part in a struggle which enabled him to gain experience andknowledge concerning Jewish blood and its influence on the German People. Those who take to heart all that has been written with such feeling by Fritz Fink who for many years has been greatly concerned about the German People, will be grateful to the creator of this outwardly insignificant publication.

City of the Reich Party Rallies Nurnberg in the year 1937.

(Sgd) Julius Streicher

Introduction

“Racial and Jewish questions are the fundamental problems of the national socialist ideology. The solution of these problems will secure the existence of National Socialism and with this the existence of our nation for all time. The enormous significance the racial question is recognized almost without exception today by all the German people. In order to attain this recognition, our people had to travel through a long road of suffering. In order that the coming generation be spared this suffering, let the German educators of our youth, instill in their hearts, from their early childhood, all there is to know about the Jews. No one should be allowed to grow up in the midst of our people without this knowledge of the monstrous character and dangerousness of the Jew.

Knowledge of racial and Jewish questions must grow organically out of our general system of school education. The racial doctrine and the Jewish question must be like a red thread marking the education of all age groups in our school education. There is no subject from which cannot be drawn an unsuspected full measure of valuable knowledge of the Jewish question.

The attached pamphlet, “The Jewish question and School Instruction,” was brought out in an urgent desire to show up some of these possibilities.

“From the ranks of the teachers comes now the question: How should we represent the Jew to our pupils ?’ Only one answer can be given to this question: ‘In all his monstrosity ; horror and dangerousness.’ Such as he is.”

A teacher who has come to a thorough understanding of the Jewish question will make use in his work of the “Stuermer.” He reads to the class extracts from an Article which describes how a Jew deceived a peasant etc.

Thus we glide from the purely outward appearance of the Jew to his inner nature. Our fight against the Jew is not for the reason that he is different in body to ourselves. The bodily difference is not the dangerous part of the Jew. We must make it clear to a child that in the strange appearance of a Jew, which is immediately conspicuous to us, lies a soul, which is fundamentally different in all its emotions and manifestations, from our souls. We must point out that the Jew thinks, feels, and behaves in a different manner from ourselves. That his way of thinking, of feeling and of behaviour is diametrically opposed to our morals and our laws.”

Jewry is Criminality

” … But the fact, that in deceit, usury, murder, etc. Jews see no crime but consider them as acts pleasing to their God when they are directed against non-Jewswill appear most monstrous to our children. At first it will frighten the children and they will shake their heads incredulously. In the same way as millions of people in Germany scornfully shook their heads when the national socialists and foremost of all the “Stuermer” exposed the criminal methods and criminal laws of the Jews. “But deceit, usury, falsehood are sins.” A boy in the class will cry out, “We are forbidden to commit them!” The teacher will ask: “Who forbade you to commit them?” “Our conscience. The laws of the State, God.”

But if deceit, usury, falsehood, etc. are not crimes, not sin in the eyes of the Jews, then a Jew must have a different conscience, different laws, and a different God than we have, and thus the teacher and his pupils will suddenly find themselves thoroughly involved in the Jewish question and in its most serious aspect.

The manner in which he (the teacher) pursues the question with the children should make clear to them the fundamental reason for all Jewish acts.

One who has reached this stage of understanding, will inevitably remain an enemy of the Jews all his life and will instill this hatred into his own children.

“Document M-102 [partial translation]”, pp. 32-33.

“NATIONAL ZEITUNG,” 4/27/1941

A long while agoit was still before the outbreak of war Rudolf Hess was once called the “Conscience of the Party.” If we ask why the Führer’s Deputy was given this undoubtedly honourable title the reason for this is plain to see; there is no phenomenon of our public life which is not the concern of the Führer’s Deputy. So enormously many-sided and diverse is his work and sphere of duty that it cannot be outlined in a few words. And it lies in the nature of the obligation laid on the Führer’s Deputy that wide publicity hears little of the activity of Rudolf Hess. Few know that many Government measures taken, especiallY in the sphere of war economy and the party, which meet with such hearty approbation when they are notified publicly … can be traced back to the direct initiation of the Führer s Deputy.

“Document M-104: No Compulsory System, No Marks System, Rudolf Hess on the Food Question: An Appeal to Housewives [partial translation]”, pp. 33-34.

FRANKFURTER ZEITUNG, 10/13/1936.

HOF. 12th October

On Sunday evening Reichsminister Hess inaugurated a newly built Adolf Hitler Hall at Hof in the Bavarian Ostmark district. During the festivities Reichsminister Rudolf Hess made a speech, in which he dealt with the problem of supplying the German people with food and the question of standardizing prices for agricultural products in daily use.

According to the report of the “German News Bureau” he then explained in detail: …

We are prepared, in the future tooif need beat times to eat a little less fat, a little less pork, a few eggs less, since we know that this little sacrifice is a sacrifice on the Altar of the Freedom of our People. We know that the foreign exchange which we thereby save expedites the output of armament.

The phrase still holds good today “GUNS instead of Butter!”

“Document M-105: On The National Holiday Of The German People, At A Solemn Meeting Of The Reich Chamber Of Labour Which Took Place In The Messerschmitt Works In Augsburg, Were Proclaimed The Distinctions Bestowed By The Führer, National Socialist Model Factory And Pioneer Of Labour [partial translation]”, pp. 34-35.

VOELKISCHER BEOBACHTER, 5/2/1941.

The centerpoint of the celebration was the address by the Führer’s Deputy, Rudolf Hess, in which he honoured the distinguished merits of the newly nominated Pioneers of Labour.

If the Führerthus Rudolf Hess began his speechhonours in regular sequence on the National holiday of the German people, the representative German undertakings by the bestowal of the Golden Ensign and the distinction National Socialist Model Factory, not only is the National Socialist spirit of the individual industrial combines characterized, but the performances of workers and Managing Directors are Publicly honoured beforethe whole people.

The German soldier must understand: for the uniqueness and the abundance of his weapons and of his material, for these he must thank the untiring efforts for many years of Adolf Hitlerbut for their uniform reliability and excellence, for these things he must thank the German creators. And the German soldier is as little likely to forget them as the creators will forget his struggle and his victory.

If already by today, at the termination of the fourth German industrial production campaign, continued Rudolf Hess, so many German factories could be distinguished with the Golden Ensign, it is the emblematical pledging of personality to the conception of the National Socialist Industry and the National Socialist industrial combines which has gained this success. Here, as everywhere, it is the strong individual personality which stands as prototype and involves its surroundings with it. We must never forget that it is not the organization or the type of organization, not the essential conception of the undertaking or the industry which is decisive, the decisive factor is personality, the personality of the Managing Director, the personality of the workman. The organization does not create personality, but the creative and productive personalities make for themselves the organization within which they can develop.

“Document M-107: Rudolf Hess Answers Chamberlain: We Stand By The Führer’s Banner, Come What Will! [partial translation]”, pp. 35-37.

VOELKISCHER BEOBACHTER, 8/28/1939.

The Führer’s deputy again gives proof of England’s responsibility.

GRAZ, August 26th.

The 7th Reich session of “Germans abroad”, as already reported in another section of this issue, was opened in Graz on Friday evening with a great demonstration on the Trabrennplatz (Racecourse). A culminating point in the proceedings which took place with strong support from the population of Graz was a speech by the Führer’s deputy, Reich Minister Rudolf Hess.

Rudolf Hess, constantly interrupted with strong applause from the Auslandsdeutschen (German citizens living abroad) as well as fellow countrymen from the district of Styria, who were their hosts, stressed the unexampled forbearance shown by Germany towards Poland, and the magnanimous offer of the Führer that had endured peace between Germany and Poland.

An offer that Mr. Chamberlain seems to have forgotten. For he says he has heard nothing of Germany’s having tried to solve certain acute present day questions by peaceful discussions. at else was German offer then if it was not such an attempt?!

Poland, continued the Führer’s deputy, had however not once made the attempt even to negotiate over this offer. On the contrary, it abused Germany, agitated for war, demanded new German land as far as beyond the Oder, violated the frontiers again and again, and shot down German transport planes.

The responsibility for Poland’s lack of responsibility is England’s.

And when, cried Rudolf Hess, “the English Prime Minister speaks of ‘alleged’ ill-treatment of Germans living in Poland, and when he finds it extraordinary that these statements bear a striking similarity to similar statements last year, we can only say that England’s attitude this year has unfortunately also a striking resemblance to her attitude last year! And her attitude this year as last year has been construed as giving license to ill-treat Germans living under foreign nationalities, to plunder their possessions and to drive them out of the country. Go to these refugee camps yourself, Mr. Chamberlain, and you will see with your own eyes and hear with your own ears: it is not a question of ‘alleged’ ill-treatmentit is a question of grim realty.

Here is bloodshed, Mr. Chamberlain! People are being killed! Innocent people are dying! You can see it for yourself. You will then realize the better what you said in your speech, that nothing can arouse so much indignation in a country as the ill-treatment of one’s own fellow-countrymen in another land.

The responsibility however (he said) was England’s, who spoke of peace, and stirred up war. England, who in all the years had soundly rejected all the Führer’s proposals for peace; and not only rejected these proposals, but before and after the Munich agreement built up threat to Germany by arming Czecho-Slovakia. After the Führer had eliminated this seat of conflagration, England induced Poland not to accept the Führer’s offer of peace, and to appear as a new threat to Germany from the east.

The more reasons England blares forth as justification of her enmity towards Germany, the less we believe her. There is only one real reason:

Jews and Freemasons want a war against this hated Germany, against the Germany in which they have lost their power.

In spite of all England’s efforts she has not succeeded in prevailing upon Soviet Russia to complete the encirclement by the aggressors.

Germany and Soviet Russia have made their contribution to the peace of the world by their Non-aggression and Consultation Pact.

“We Germans”, said the Führer’s deputy, as he concluded his address which had been received with fervent enthusiasm, “we Germans face the future in a calm and steadfast frame of mind, whatever it may bring us! In former years all that came; both good and bad, was necessary to the life and development of our people. And we believe that itwill be so in the future.

We know that everything undertaken against the new Germany and its Führer always turned out in favour of the new Germany and of the Führer. So it will be in the future also, for we hold e belief that the Almighty is on the side of Germany and her just cause. For we believe that the Almighty sent us the Führer to save us in our direct need. When we stand by the Führer we carry out the will of Him who sent us the Führer.

We Germans: we stand by the Führer’s bannercome what may!

“Document M-122: German Basic Handbook: The Problem of German Minorities [partial translation]”, p. 48.

[Part III, Chapter IV, Para. B.1, Page 79.]

Hitler’s racial policy and the vast propaganda machine which was unleashed by this multitude of organizations soon became a menace to the whole of Europe. The creation of fifth columns in all states where German colonies or German minorities were settled was not only the work of such organizations as the A.O. or the VDA, but also of the minority leaders. They collaborated (often without the knowledge of most of their members) with the agents of the Gestapo and of German espionage. The cumulative effect of their propaganda, their persuasive arguments, lavish hospitality, bribery and threats, was generally decisive. It was the task of the AO, in conjunction with other German agencies, to disrupt the political forces of countries where there were no German minorities in strength, countries such as Holland, Belgium, Norway and France. It was the task of the German minorities, together with representatives of the AO and forces in opposition to the existing regime (fascist organizations, other non-German minorities), to disrupt the Eastern and South Eastern European states. “One of the main causes of the rapid Polish collapse was the perfection with which the extensive espionage system of the German minority in Poland carried out its functions. Numerous short-wave transmitters kept the German Army Command continually informed,” said a leading Swiss military expert [Colonel Bircher’s lecture on the Polish campaign, reported in “Neue Zurcher Zeitung.” 3/7/1940.]

“Document M-153: Yearbook Of The Foreign Organization [Jahrbuch der AO], 1942: Article: Our War Diary [partial translation]”, pp. 48-49.

[By Landesgruppenleiter WREDE] [This gives an almost day-to-day account of the doings of the German colony in Athens between the date of the invasion of Greece by Germany (4/6/1941), when they were interned, and the 4/27/1941, when the German army reached Athens.]

“Sunday, 27th April: Swastika on the Acropolis.”

I set out immediately, and quickly visited the other quarters. (N.B. where the German colony had been interned), the Philadelphia and the Institute. I enjoined upon the inmates of the house in Academy street that they were to renounce returning home today as well, and that they were to hold themselves in readiness. After all, we did want to help the German troops immediately with our local and linguistic knowledge. Now the moment had come. We must start in immediately.

I returned to our quarters in Academy street. Here things became very active during the midday hours. Soldiers and officers came and went continually. Interpreters and guides were asked or.

Meanwhile I organized the employment of all Party members to do auxiliary service for the armed forces. Soon our boys and girls could be seen riding proud and radiant in their Hitler Youth uniforms beside the German soldiers on motor bicycles and dustcarts.

“Document M-156: Yearbook Of The Foreign Organization [Jahrbuch Der AO] 1942: The Work Of The Norway Branch Of The AO Of The NSDAP In The War [partial translation]”, pp. 49-51.

Therefore soon after the outbreak of war in 9/1939, the enlargement and extension of the German legation in Oslo, of the consulates in Bergen, Drontheim, Stavanger, Kristiansand, Haugesund, Narvik and Kirkenes, as the official representative of German interests in all spheres, proved to be of primary importance. This enlargement of the Reich agencies resulted in the local organization of the NSDAP in Norway having increase its field of activity, too, in the same proportion, in order to support the work of the Reich agencies, in particular with Party members and other Germans who had a thorough knowledge of the country and the language.

The choice and appointment of these supplementary collaborators was carried out bythe local leader of the organization in close collaboration with the representatives of the Reich. Therefore, from the first moment of the outbreak of war a great number of Party members were taken away from their jobs and employed in the service of the nation and Fatherland. Without any hesitation and without considering their personal interests, their families, their careers or their property, they joined the ranks and devoted themselves body and soul to the new and often dangerous tasks.

And the successful results of their work which was done with all secrecy were revealed when, on 4/9/1940, German troops landed in Norway and forestalled the planned flank attack of the Allies.

The Altmark incident in 2/1940, and the way the Norwegian Government and press dealt with it, suddenly showed what a dangerous zone the entire northern part of Europe had already entered as a result of the unscrupulous policy of the Allies. This incident, which, without doubt, was merely a ballon d’essai by the British to find out what the Norwegian reaction to this aggression would be, was the signal for the leaders of the local organization to go ahead with the conscious work of collecting and organizing all the Germans in Norway with still greater determination and very quietly to plan and make preparations for the eventuality of dangerous events in the seemingly neutral North as well.

Already on the 4/7/1940, after the British and French ambassadors had handed in to the Norwegian Government notes concerning the mining of important Norwegian territorial waters, the leaders of the local organization, without any noise or excitement, took all preventive measures in order to be able to cope with any eventuality. According to the task-plan which had been prepared since the-outbreak of the war, the leadership of the local organization gave orders on the 7th April for phase one of the state of employment, and every Party member and other Germans took up the post allotted to him according to this plan.

At 9.30 a.m. a guard of honour took up a position in front of the German Embassy and then largish infantry columns came marching smartly into the Drammensveien of Fornebo.

It was up to the local organization to support the fighting troops at first by putting at their disposal Party members who knew the country and the language, to advise and help the military administrative offices in the execution of their tasks of supply, organization and administration.

Late in the afternoon the leader of the Nasjonal Samling, Vidkun Quisling, declared by wireless that he was taking over the government with his men. Liaison personnel, people to find out the state of public opinion, etc. had to be provided.

… The post and telegraph censorship came forward with a demand for people with a knowledge of all sorts of languages. From fifty to a hundred reliable men and women were required for these purposes alone and most of them were actually produced in a very short time. The general feeling and attitude of the population required continuous checking, as did the wireless and the press.

“Document M-158 [translation]”, p. 51.

Telegram (Secret Code V.

Madrid, 10/23/1939. Arrived 10/23/1939 23.10 hours. No. 1654 of 23rd 10.

The Landesgruppenleiter (head of the group in a country) can obtain a very suitable house for accommodating the Landesgruppe including the DAF (German Labour Front), the Ortsgruppe (local group), the Hitler Youth and the German House Madrid, also room available in case of embassy having to spread out, and especially very suitable shut-off room for possible erection of second secret radio sender, which can no longer be housed at the school because of reopening.

Landesgruppenleiter requests me to rent the house through embassy, in which way very considerable tax expenses will be avoided. Have no hesitation, in view of anticipated partial use by embassy as mentioned above. If you are not agreeable I request re by return.

Please submit also to Gauleiter Bohle. 6 copies executed Distribution.

No. 1 to Pers (arb St.) (Personal) (Working Staff)

No. 2 R.A.M. (Reich Foreign Secretary)

No 3. St. S. (Secretary of State)

No. 4 B.R.A.M.

No. 5 V. St.Pol. (Under Secretary of State (Policy)

No. 6 Dir. Pers. (Director Personal Department)

This is No. …

“Document R-92: Instruction for Internal Use on the Application of the Law concerning Property of Poles of 9/17/1940 [partial translation]”, pp. 61-63.

The Reich Leader SS Commissioner for the Consolidation of German Nationhood

Berlin-Halensee, 15.4.41 Kurfuerstendamm 142/143.

1. Where the Act is to be applied: The Act is applicable not only within the incorporated areas in the East, but in the entire area of Greater Germany, excluding the General Government of the occupied Polish areas; in the latter area the Decree of the Governor General concerning the Confiscation of Private Property located within the General Government of 24.1.40 (VBLT GG.I No. 6, pp 23 ff.) is applicable.

2. With regard to which persons it is to be applied: The act is to be applied with regard to every national of the former Polish 1, State. Alterations of nationality completed after 1.9.1939, as may result for instance from the division of Poland or from naturalization of Poles in enemy or neutral countries are not to be considered. Therefore anyone who was a Polish National on 1.9.1939 is subject to the Act unless the exception of section 1, ss. 2 applies.

3. According to section 1, ss.3, No. a of the Law concerning the List for Repatriation of German Ethnic Groups [Deutsche Volksliste] and the German nationality in the Incorporated Eastern Areas of 4.3.1941 (RGBl.I 118) those stateless persons of on-German race who had their domicile or permanent residence within the frontiers of the former Polish State, are in the same position as nationals of the former Polish State. There is nothing against applying this principle when applying this Act.

5. “Where on 1.9.1939 nationals of the former Polish State were at the same time nationals of another state (for instance America) the Act is applicable in principle, but before any action may be taken, there has to be a report to me via the Central Estate Office in order to negotiate an agreement with the Foreign Office or the Custodian of Enemy Property.

6. The important exception in section 1, subs. 2 will permit practical action and especially definitive measures on the basis of the Act only after determination of the race to which the person belongs (see my Decree regarding Races of 12 9.40, the Circular of the Minister for the Interior concerning Acquisition of German German Nationality by former Polish and Danzig Nationals of 3/19/1941) (Ie 5125/41). Regarding the groups III and IV of the “List for the Repatriation of German Ethnic Groups (see my decree of 9/12/1940) the law of 3/4/1941 provides despite their incorporation in the List that persons belonging to these two groups acquire German nationality only by individual naturalization. Moreover the persons in Group IV (renegades) when individually naturalized will acquire German nationality only with the provision that it may be revoked. As long as they are not irrevocably naturalized, the exception of section 1 subs. 2 does not apply to them because it presumes that German nationality has been acquired. Until this has taken place, i.e. until these persons are irrevocably German nationals,-their property is subject to the measures of the Law, concerningProperty of Poles.

This possibility though will not be used until further notice since we intend to Germanize the members of these groups as far as possible. More detailed instruction with regard to these groups will be issued later.

7. Section 1, subs. 2 part 2 allows further exceptions to be made with regard to the persons affected; I shall decide upon such exceptions in the individual case.

Ad section 2

1. The provisions of subs. 1 and 2 apply only where the conditions as to personal status set out in section 1 are present as well.

2. The conditions permitting seizure according to section 2, subs. 2 are always present if the property belongs to a Pole. For the Polish real estate will be needed without exception for the consolidation of the German nationhood.

3. The Estate Offices primarily will make use of the possibility to restrict the seizure to parts of the property, since the seizure of real estate is the main task. It is not necessary, therefore, to seize the entire property of a person at once. This is not even desirable in each case since the seizing authority acquires some responsibility by a seizure.”

Ad section “Ad section 9

1. In contrast to seizures which have only the character of preparatory measure, confiscation transfers the property in question finally to the German State.”

7. Since I reserve for myself any confiscation of real estate (until further notice) I expressly forbid the making of promises as to the subsequent disposition of the real estate which is confiscated, unless I decree differently as the case may be.

Ad section 10

“On treatment of Church Property I shall decide later.”

Ad section 14

1. “The rule that the order issued in the particular case has to be put in writing and to be served on the person concerned is obligatory so that the validity of the order depends on compliance with it.

2. On the other hand since compliance with this order would mean considerable trouble for me and my Estate Offices, and may moreover cause unrest among the population, I herewith empower the Estate Offices to replace this service according to section 14 subs. 2 by posting up the decree or by public notice, unless service on the person concerned seems indispensable owing either to the size of the real estate in question or to doubts about the racial status of the person concerned. In applying this surrogate for service there is again to be taken into consideration that unrest among the population,especially among the small -holders and peasants has to be carefully avoided.”

By Order (signed) [illegible signature] SS Brigadeführer

Draft

The Superior SS and Police Leader Danzig-West Prussia Commissioner of the Reich Commissioner for the Consolidation of German Nationhood Estate Office

(Reference No.)

Gdynia, …19 Count Spee Street 7.

Order of Seizure

According to the Law concerning the Treatment of Property belonging to Nationals of the former Polish State of 17.9.1940 (RGBl. I p.1270) herewith the whole of the agricultural property belonging to the persons named in the enclosed list, especially the agricultural farms and estates specified in that list including all appurtenances are seized for the benefit of the German Reich represented by the Reichsführer SS and Reich Commissioner for the Consolidation of German Nationhood.

This seizure does not invalidate any official administration introduced under section 1 of the law concerning official administration of agricultural or forestry estates in the occupied countries of the East of 12.2.1940 (RGBl I p.355) conducted by the General Administrator (East German Corporation for Estate Administration) or any other authorized administration.

The Chief of the Estate Office signature rank

Note: Served acc. to section 14 Act of 17.9.40 by public notice The Superior SS and Police Leader DanzigWest Prussia Commissioner of the Reich Commissioner for the Consolidation of German Nationhood Estate Office (Reference No.)

Gydnia, …19…

Confiscation Order

Under sections 9 and 12 of the Law concerning the Treatment of Property belonging to Nationals of the former Polish State of 17.9.1940 (RGBl r p. 370) herewith is confiscated for the benefit of the German Reich represented by the Reich Leader SS-, Reich Commissioner for the Consolidation of German Nationhood, the entire agricultural property, especially thefarmestateincluding all appurtenances of District … name and last domicile) … (name of farm) (no. of farm) situated at … (locality) (village) District … The confiscation of the agricultural estate is necessary for the public benefit, especially for the consolidation of the German Nationhood.

Seizure has been ordered the … (the property was seized after 5 October, add:) and the decree has been served to the person affected the … Service has been replaced by public notice in the Estate Office (ss. 2, Act 14 of 17.9.1940)

3 VIII/A8 02Froe/Zp Re: Monthly report Your Ref: Encl.1 To the Reich Commissioner for the Consolidation of German Nationhood

— Staff Headquarter statistics Department

BerlinHalensee : 142/143 Kurfuerstendamm

Enclosed I submit report on our activities for 5/1943. The 14635 schedules concerning 103598.31 hectares still pending at the Central Estate Office are under the jurisdiction of the Estate Office, Posen.

Altogether 969 schedules comprising 6725.81 hectares have been transferred to the Register. Besides 197 schedules were treated as concerning A-estates. Owing to corrections-received, 6,910 schedules were corrected and the Register changed accordingly. The Registry departments therefore treated in May altogether 8076 schedules. Moreover a great number of corrections had to be made regarding the racial status, owing to entries in the List for Repatriation of German Ethnic Groups [“Deutsche Volksliste”]: the confiscation decrees when received were entered in the Register, the same applies to reports of the Country Courts on entries in the Lang Register. Where the Estate Offices had corrected their schedules, the entries concerning seizures had to be corrected as well.

Only for official use A8 02FrOE/Zp

Farms and Estates scheduled, seized, and confiscated by the Estate Offices Danzig-WestPrussia, Poznan, Zichenau, Silesia

State of affairs on 5/31/1943 Reported by: Central Estate Office

Estate Office: 5/1/19435/31/1943 Danzig-

Listed on questionnaire of Central Estate Office, Estates: West Prussia: 751 Poznan: 50 Zichenau: -3 Silesia: 42 Total: 840; Hectares: West Prussia: 8858.19 Poznan: 675.39 Zichenau: -28.24 Silesia: -793.03 Total: 8712.31

Transferred to index, Estates: West Prussia: 654 Poznan: 2 Zichenau: 273 Silesia: 40 Total: 969; Hectares: West Prussia: 4739.43 Poznan: 4.85 Zichenau: 1766.98 Silesia: 214.55 Total: 6725.81

Seized, Estates: West Prussia: 8 Poznan: 529 Zichenau: 261 Silesia: 316 Total: 1114; Hectares: West Prussia: 1316.30 Poznan: 920.92 Zichenau: 1503.84 Silesia: 2794.72 Total: 6535.78

Confiscated, Estates: West Prussia: 155 Poznan: 261 Zichenau: 4869 Silesia: 37 Total: 5322; Portion of Estates: West Prussia: — Poznan: 2 Zichenau: -1 Silesia: 29 Total: 30

Hectares: West Prussia: 6,726.81 Poznan: 12,728.29 Zichenau: 46,486.56 Silesia: 3,764.50 Total: 69,706.15

State of affairs on 31.6.1948: Danzig-

Listed on questionnaire of Central Estate Office, Estates: West Prussia: 131,628 Poznan: 404606 Zichenau: 141935 Silesia: 262732 Total: 940901; Hectares: West Prussia: 2130145.91 Poznan: 4036319.18 Zichenau: 1654730.48 Silesia: 1027640.58 Total: 8,848,836.15

Transferred to index, Estates: West Prussia: 129004 Poznan: 377396 Zichenau: 140715 Silesia: 260726 Total: 907841; Hectares: West Prussia: 2123943.03 Poznan: 3463875.97 Zichenau: 1614481.79 Silesia: 1026579.37 Total: 8228880.16

Seized, Estates: West Prussia: 91396 Poznan: 342228 Zichenau: 119687 Silesia: 139941 Total: 693252; Hectares: West Prussia: 1441064.42 Poznan: 2893250.04 Zichenau: 565838.44 Total: 6097525.68

Confiscated, Estates: West Prussia: 531 Poznan: 1513 Zichenau: 5841 Silesia: 1623 Total: 9508 Portion of Estates: West Prussia: — Poznan: 23 Zichenau: 1 Silesia: 585 Total: 609

Hectares: West Prussia: 63303.16 Poznan: 91194.71 Zichenau: 63246.68 Silesia: 52702.14 Total: 270446.69

To be treated still at Central Estate Office, Estates: 14635 Hectares: 103598.31

Grand Total Estates: 955536 Hectares: 8952434.46

Copy

C Z VIII b/28.3.40/Goe/Wo. Re: How the property of the persons belonging to groups III and IV of the List for repatriation of German Ethnic Groups [Deutsche Volksliste] ought to be dealt with.

[Reported to Reich Leader SS on: 2/23/1941] The Reich Führer SS Berlin SW 11 8 Prince Albrecht Street

Reich Führer!

After having issued your carrying-out decree concerning the treatment of the population in the Eastern occupied countries of 9/12/1940, you will find it necessary to issue instructions concerning the treatment of property belonging to persons included in Groups III and IV of the “List for the Repatriation of German Ethnic Groups” and this for the agricultural as well as for the trade sections.

A solution of this problem is becoming more urgent because business establishments and farms which belong to members of Groups IV and V of the list are urgently needed for the use of German resettlers.

In the interest of Germanizing the country as fast and as effectively as possible and of separating from both these groups their property located in the occupied Eastern territories as soon as feasible, my office is of the opinion that real estate situated in the annexed Eastern areas, and belonging to members of Groups III and IV of the List should be expropriated, and this against full compensation to members of Group III, but against compensation which would have to be decided upon in each single case with regard to members of Group IV.

On this basis I have the honor to submit the following proposal for the treatment of property belonging to members of Groups III and IV of the List for your consideration.

I. Treatment of Property of Members of Group III (Germans who had not resisted Polonisation)

Since the members of this group ought to be fully compensated on principle, I see no objection against allowing them to sell privately their real estate to appropriate corporations or persons. The intention guiding the treatment of these persons ought tobe to transfer them to the old Germany. This intention can be realized, as a rule, by police measures or labor restrictions. The Germanization of the country will therefore not be endangered if we first allow the members of this group to liquidate their real estate situated within the annexed areas according to their own wishes. It will be recommendable, though to set them a time limit of about three months during which they are to liquidate their real estate. In case they have not sold their real estate within that time, it would have to be taken into administration by the East German Estate Administration Corporation, and afterwards the Reich Commissioner should confiscate the real estate and decide upon compensation.

In these cases the real estate can be dealt with in the manner et out above under the law concerning appropriation of real estate for the use of the German Armed Forces, provided that this law will have been declared applicable in the annexed areas, owing to the recent alteration of the Feuhrer’s decree.

II. Treatment of Group IV of the “Volksliste” (Renegades)

[pencil note: no compensation]

In view of the principle that the numbers of Group IV are not to receive full compensation, they should not be allowed to sell privately their real estate, nor can the law concerning appropriation of real estate be applied since it provides for full compensation.

My office proposes to expropriate the property of these persons under the law concerning the treatment of property belonging to -nationals of the former Polish State of 9/17/1940. There is no objection against that since in fact the members of Group IV of the List do not obtain German nationality immediately on their entry onto the List, but are only entitled to hope for a labor naturalization, after having proven their worth.

Now the confiscation under the law of 9/17/1940 does not exclude the grant of compensation as such. On the contrary, decision for compensation and the amount for confiscation of property is expressly reserved by section 9, subs. 5 of the Act. There ought to be an administrative decree (which presupposes consent of the Reich Finance Minister) empowering the Reich Commissioner to grant to renegades a partial compensation in money for their ; confiscated property, the amount of which is to be decided by him at his discretion.

Such a procedure has the following advantages:

a. No new legislation is necessary,

b. This procedure of confiscation is much simpler than expropriation proper,

c. Since the granting of compensation would rest on the discretion of the Reich Commissioner, there could be no competence for the courts to examine and decide upon its appropriateness.

This would allow to treat each one of the renegades according to his behavior in thepast.

(signed) Greifelt SS Brigade Leader.

“Document R-95 [partial translation]”, pp. 70-72.

Army High Command copy H.Q., Army High Command, 3/30/1941 Army Gen. Staff, Dept. Op. (I) No. 540/41 top secret, chiefs only 9000664

Deployment Instructions for “Action 25” and supplementary instruction for action “Marita”

1. The political situation in the Balkans having changed by reason of the Yugoslav military revolt, Yugoslavia has to be considered as an enemy even should it make declarations of loyalty at first.

The Führer and Supreme Commander has decided therefore to destroy Yugoslavia as quickly as possible. For camouflaging purposes the operation shall be called “Action 25”.

2. The intentions of the Army High Command are to break into Yugoslavia by means of a concentric operation emerging from the area KlagenfurtGraz and near N. Kanizsa on one side (2nd Army) and from the area near Sofia on the other side (12th Army). General direction should be Belgrade and south of it. By these operations the Yugoslav Army should be destroyed and the southern part of Yugoslavia should be captured as early as possible, so that communications to the Italian army group in Albania can be opened and a basis be created for the continuation of the German-Italian offensive against Greece.

An early opening of traffic on the Danube river and the capture of the copper mines at Bor are of importance for the military economy.

3. Enemy situation:

In northern Yugoslavia defensive conduct of war may be expected. The fact that the races there are in opposition to each other may even induce the Yugoslav Command to defend only the Serbian crown lands. In this case numerous efficient bolt-positions may be expected both in Slovene and Croation parts of the country.

It is presumed that the enemy will defend the Eastern border in southern Yugoslavia by means of numerous bolt positions. At the same time he will try to keep his rear free byinvading Albania in cooperation with Greek-British forces.

When the German attack succeeds in severing the coherence of the Yugoslav defence by capturing the main roads of communication, the Yugoslav army may be expected to defend itself strongly in the mountain area so long as sufficient ammunition d food are available. The problem of nationalities may play a decisive part with regard to duration and toughness of this resistance.

Details with regard to the enemy situation see enclosure 1.

4. The orders issued with regard to the operations against Greece remain valid so far as not affected by this order. This applies especially to the capture of the islands in the North Aegean sea though the Führer has reserved for himself the issuing of the order to capture the island of Lemnos. The protection of the Turkish border is left to the Bulgarians for the time being. One armored divisions has to be put in readiness as support.

5. Timetable for the operations.

a. On 5th April as soon as sufficient forces of the Air Force are available and weather permitting, the Air Forces shall attack continuously by day and night the Yugoslav ground organization and Belgrade.

Simultaneouslyby no means earlierthe attack of the 12th Army (except for the North Group, i.e., Armored Group 1) begins against Yugoslavia and Greece.

It should be assured that in ease of unfavorable weather the Army High Command (AOK) is able to stop the attack at least 10 hours before the time of the planned air attack.

8. Cooperation of other States: a. Cooperation by Italy:

b. Cooperation by Hungary: Hungary will participate in the invasion of Yugoslavia.

Dividing Lines:

c. Cooperation of Rumania: Active participation of Rumania in the attack on Yugoslavia may not be expected. The Rumanians, however, will strengthen their border protection forces. The main duty of Rumania will be the protection against Russia.

d. Cooperation of Bulgaria: Should Bulgarian forces participate actively in the attack on Yugoslavia, Army High Command 12 has to make the necessary arrangements with the Bulgarian Army Command. Bulgarian forces to be deployed against Yugoslavia are to be subordinated to the German military authorities.

9. Cooperation of the Air Force:

No air raids should be made against Croat areas, unless Yugoslav forces in this area are the targets. Army High Command 12 shall cooperate with VIII Air Corps, Army HighCommand with Air Fleet 4, High Command Air Force will send sufficient anti-aircraft protection from Graz, Klagenfurt, Villach, and Leoben, and from/Vienna.

signed von Brauchitsch

“Document R-96 [partial translation]”, pp. 72-75.

Copy

The Reich Minister of Justice 9170 Ostgeb. 2IIa 2 996.41

Berlin, 4/17/1941

To the-Reich Minister and Chief of the Reich Chancellery

Subject: Penal law against Poles and Jews in the annexed Eastern territories.

Reference: Letter dated 11/28/1940RK 17 428 B. 1 enclosure (file notice) to a21826.41

It has been my opinion from the outset that the special conditions prevailing in the annexed Eastern territories require special measures of penal law and penal procedure against Poles and Jews. When the special courts were introduced in the Eastern territories by the ordinance of the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, dated 9/5/1939, I immediately endeavoured to make these courts, with their particularly swift and vigorous procedure, a center for the fight against all Polish and Jewish criminality. Proof that I have succeeded in this is provided by he impressive statistical figures of the special courts for the first ten months of their activity in the Eastern territories. Thus, for instance, the special court at Bromberg passed death sentences on 201 defendants and sentences for hard labor for life on 11 defendants; 93 defendants were sentenced to 912 years of hard labor in all, averaging 10 years each. Only minor offences were prosecuted before the “Amtsgerichte” [ordinary lower courts]. The “Strafkammern” [Criminal High Courts] have not been employed so far as possible, because their sentences are subject to appeal [Revision] to the “Reichsgericht” [Highest court of Appeal]. I wished to avoid that any court which is not fully acquainted with the special conditions prevailing in the Eastern territoriesand be it the highest court of the Reichshould decide in these matters.

The aim to create a special law for Poles and Jews in-the Eastern territories was pursued further according to plan by the ordinance dated 6/6/1940. By this ordinance German Penal Law, which had been used in the Eastern territories already from the outset, was formally made applicable. In the sphere of criminal procedure the obligation to prosecute no longer applies; the public prosecutor instigates prosecutions only in caseswhere he considers the infliction of penalty to be in the public interest. The procedure for enforcing a prosecution (Art. 172 ff. of the Code for Penal Procedure) has been abrogated. For it seems intolerable that Poles or Jews should be able to force the German public prosecutor to instigate an indictment. Poles and Jews have also been deprived of the right to prosecute in their own names or to join the public prosecutor in an action.

In addition to this special law in the sphere of law procedure some special conditions have been included in Art. II of the introductory ordinance. These provisions were established in agreement with the Reich Minister for the Interior on the basis of needs which had made themselves felt. From the beginning it was intended to augment these special conditions in case of need. This need, which had become apparent in the meantime, was to be met by an executive and supplementary order, which was added to the original ordinance and which was referred to in the letter from the Führer’s deputy. This letter also mentioned the ordinances concerning the introduction of the law of extradition and of the law concerning the use of arms by authorized persons in the forest and wild life protection service, which however, are only loosely connected with the criminality of the Poles and Jews and were to serve merely the progress of general adjustment of law in the Eastern territories. As regards these two latter ordinances, as well as the executive ordinance concerning the law for the annulment of penalties and the ordinance concerning the penal register, I shall try to bring about an agreement with the deputy of the Führer.

Later I was informed of the express wish of the Führer that, as a matter of principle, the Poles (and I presume the Jews) are to be treated differently from the Germans within the sphere of Penal Law. After preliminary discussions with the presidents of the high courts of appeal [Oberlandesgerichte] and the presiding public prosecutors of the annexed Eastern territories, I drew up the enclosed draft concerning criminal law and procedure against Poles and Jews within the annexed Eastern territories and within the area of the former Free City of Danzig.

This draft represents an altogether special law both in the sphere of penal law and penal procedure. The suggestions of the deputy of the Führer have been taken into consideration to a far reaching extent. No. 1, par. 3 contains a general crime formula on the basis of which any Pole or Jew in the Eastern territories can in future be prosecuted and any kind of punishment can be inflicted on him for any attitude or action which is considered punishable and is directed against Germandom. This provision is supplemented by No. 1, par. 2 which is already contained in the introductory ordinance, and which threatens the death sentence as the absolute punishment far any act of violence committed against a German because of his belonging to the German race. The cases under No. I, Par. 4, which are already contained in the introductory ordinance, are merely amendments, which perhaps would have been unnecessary in view of the new general crime formula. I have included them nevertheless, in order not to give rise to the erroneous opinion that the limits of criminal liability as defined in this draft are narrower than those of the law hitherto in force. Finally, No. II, makes it clear that, apart from everything a German renders himself liable to punishment. In addition, the regulation permits a far reaching application of the law (Par. 2. of the Penal Code) in tune with the requirements of the Eastern territories.

In accordance with the opinion of the deputy of the Führer I started from the point of view that the Pole is less susceptible to the infliction of ordinary imprisonment. Therefore I had already taken administrative measures with the aim of keeping Poles and Jews separate from other prisoners and to inflict punishment on them in a more severe manner. No. III goes a step further and replaces imprisonment, viz. the penal camp and the severe penal camps. Under these new kinds of punishment the prisoners are to be lodged outside prisons in camps and are to be forced to do heavy and heaviest labor. Further administrative orders are envisaged, concerning specialities in the sphere of disciplinary punishment (dark cells, transfer from penal camps to severe penal camps etc.)

The new kinds of punishment under No. III are applicable to all offences committed by Poles and Jews, even if the offence falls under a provision of the German Penal Code. On the other hand, No. III, Par. 3, makes sure that less than the minimum period of punishment and less than any obligatory punishment prescribed in any German criminal law may be inflicted if the offence was directed exclusively against the offender’s own race.

The section concerning procedure contains first of all special provisions of the introductory ordinance already in force. But in future it will no longer be permissible for a Pole or a Jew, on whom sentence has been passed by a German court, to lodge an appeal against the sentence. He has no right to complain, nor ay he apply for a retrial. All sentences should be open to execution at once. In future Poles and Jews may no longer challenge German judges as biased; nor may they be put under oath. The conditions under which measures of compulsion may be used against them have been eased. It is also important that according to No. X Par. 2 the local higher court decides on applications for annulment on technical grounds [Nichtigkeits Beschwerdem]; this will prevent any court not located in the Eastern territories from passing judgment in a case against Jews and Poles. For the rest No. XII gives both the court and the public prosecutor every freedom they can possibly require vis-a-vi the “Gerichtsverfassungsrecht” [law concerning the constitution of the courts] and the Reich Law of Criminal Procedure.

It is the purpose of No. XIII to ensure the applicability of the special laws for Poles and Jews and of the abrogation of prosecution enforcement even in cases, where the Polish or Jewish offender, though domiciled in the Eastern territories, has committed an offence in some other part of the Great German Reich. A criminal law of this kind directed especially against Poles and Jews would not, in my opinion, restrict the freedom of action of the German authorities and officials; nor would the Poles andJews take advantage of its issuance by making unjustified accusations or complaints against German officials. The penal law provides threats of punishment of such increased severity that the deterent effect is assured to the strongest degree. Any hole in the law by which a Polish or Jewish criminal might escape, has been closed. As far as criminal procedure is concerned, the draft constitutes a clear expression of the political inequality of Germans on the one hand, and Poles and Jews on the other.

The introduction of corporal punishment, which the deputy of the Führer has brought up for discussion, has not been included in the draft, either as a form of criminal punishment or as a disciplinary punishment. I cannot agree to this type of punishment, because its infliction does not, in my opinion, correspond to the cultural level of the German people.

The main features of the criminal procedure proposed by the draft are greatest speed together with immediate execution of sentences; thus it will not be inferior to the procedure in courts martial. Those administering criminal justice will have the opportunity of inflicting even the heaviest penalties in every suitable case, and thus be able to cooperate actively in realizing the political aims of the Führer in the Eastern territories.

I intend to submit the bill for approval to the Council of Ministers for the Defence of the Reich. Before so doing, I wish, however, to discuss the matter with you, Sir, personally, and to ask you to obtain the decision of the Führer as to whether he agrees to the basic principles of the bill.

signed: Dr. Schlegelberger The Reich Minister of Justice 9170 Ostgeb/2IIa 21826.41

Express Letter To the Reich Führer SS and Chief of the German Police in the Reich Ministry of the Interior.

Subject: Administration of Criminal Justice in the annexed Eastern territories.

Reference: Letter to the Reich Minister and Chief of Reich Chancellery, dated 5/16/1941II A 2 (new) No. 127/41 173/1 and the letter addressed to me by the Main Office of Reich Security, dated 5/29/194111 a 2 (new) No. 205141 176-7.

2 enclosures.

In the enclosure I transmit the following documents on which I would ask you to give your opinion at an early date:

1. draft of an ordinance concerning the administration of criminal justice against Poles and Jews in the annexed Eastern territories and the area of the former Free City of Danzig;

2. copy of my letter to the Reich Minister and Chief of the Reich Chancellery, dated 4/17/19419171 Ostgeb. 2 IIa 2 996/41giving the reasons for this draft.

The draft has now been supplemented by Article XIII concerning the procedure ofcourts-martial. This supplementary article is based on a decision of the Führer, of which I was informed through a letter from the Reich Minister and Chief of the Reich Chancellery dated 5/27/1941Rk 7760 13; according to this decision the Reich Governor in the Reich Gau Wartheland is to be empowered to introduce courts-martial against Poles in his district.

In order to obtain a quick settlement of this urgent matter which is of importance for the war, I should be grateful if a personal discussion could be arranged. I ask for telephone call to fix the time for a conference.

Charged with the conduct of affairs

Reich Main Security Office Il A 2No. 342/41170

Berlin W.8, 6/30/1941 Berlin SW 11, 7/11/1941 8 Prinz-Albrecht Street

Subject matter: Administration of Criminal Justice in annexed Eastern Territories. The ordinance draft, which was sent to us for consideration by the Reich Minister for Justice with a covering letter of 6/30/1941 (pages 161 ff. of the file), was discussed at an informative meeting of the competent officials of the Reich Main Security Office and of the Reich Civil- Police Main- Office, Reich Führer SSReich Commissioner for the Consolidation of the German Racetook part in the discussions, because the invitation, dated 7/7/1941, arrived late.

The discussion had the following results:

I. The general lines of the provisions of chapter 1 (criminal law) and chapter 2 (criminal procedure) are to be approved. They correspond to the principles followed by the police in dealing with Poles.

It should however, be suggested to the Ministry of Justice to insert in Chapter 2, Paragraph XII, a minimum of legal guarantees for the legal procedure; this might be done by adding to the present version the following sentences:

“In any case however, the defendant should be granted a hearing, if need be with the help of an interpreter.

The names of the judges and of the defendant, the evidence on which the sentence is based, and the offence, the sentence with a brief opinion, and the date of the sentenceshould be taken down in writing in each case.”

II. Chapter 3 (procedure under martial law) requires several modifications or clarifications:

1. The Reich Governors (Statthalter) are to be bound not only by the consent of the Reich Minister for Justice, but also by the consent of the Reich Minister of the Interior. This amendment is needed to safeguard the influence the police must have on introduction and procedure of martial law. Under the present provision, which requires only the consent of the Minister of Justice, there is the risk that the intended martial law becomes a martial law under the supervision of the administration of justice and not a martial law for the purposes of the police.

2. The Reich Governors must have authority to declare martial law uniformly for the whole area [Gaue] under their administration. The present wordingBezirke [districts] does not make it quite clear whether they have such authority.

3. The persons who are subject to the procedure under martial law should be the same as those to whom the other provisions of the ordinance refer. Therefore in Par. XIII Jews as well as Poles must be mentioned.

4. The jurisdiction of the courts-martial as stated in the bill is too narrow. They must be given authority:

a. to pass judgment under martial law on all excesses, not only on more serious ones against Germans,

b. to pass judgment under martial law, even on minor offences which seriously endanger the German reconstruction work because of their frequency.

The words “more serious” before “excesses” and before “punishable offenses”, must therefore be deleted from the draft.

5. Confinement to a concentration camp is, by definition, not a punishment but a measure of precaution. The provision whereby the court acting under martial law may sentence an offender to confinement in a concentration camp must therefore be amended.

The courts acting under martial law need, however, the authority to punish by imprisonmentthough in this case it is for the Secret State Police and not for the law administration to carry out the sentence. The present wording of Paragraph XIII, sec. 2 must therefore be changed to read as follows:

“The penalties to be inflicted by the courts acting under martial law are the death penalty or imprisonment (penal camp). The execution of the penalty of imprisonment is the duty of the Secret State Police.”

6. It must be made clear whether the Reich Governors are authorized to implement independently the provisions regarding the nomination of judges for the procedure ofcourts-martial, or whether the Reich Minister for Justice intends to reserve the right to withhold his consent for a declaration of martial law unless the Reich Governors refer to him any steps they take in these matters.

III. The present wording of chapter 4 (extension of jurisdiction and authorization) does not take into consideration that the police is authorized at present to inflict penalties for minor offences of Polish civilian workers within the territory of the Reich. This power is based upon an authorization granted to the Reich Führer SS by the Reich-Marshal. The provision as drafted would therefore mean a deterioration of the legal position of the police in favor of the judiciary.

Provision must therefore be made for one of two alternatives:

a. either the competence of the police as defined hitherto, must be maintained expressly,

b. or martial law must be made applicable to Poles within the whole territory of the Reich.

The latter proposal is preferable because it should be the ultimate goal to make Poles subject to the jurisdiction of the police.

IV. The items mentioned under No. IIII are to be discussed by department II A 2 with the Reich Ministry- of Justice. It should be ascertained to what extent the Ministry of Justice is prepared to meet the wishes of the police. Thereafter the draft embodying the final position of the police toward the Reich Minister of Justice is to be submitted to the Reich-Führer SS. The draft is to be signed by all police departments who participate in the discussion. a. Main Office Civil Police, c/o Ministerial Counselor Dr. Daemper,

b. Reich-Führer SS, Reich Commissioner for the Consolidation of the German Race,

c. Office IIIIII A 3 of the Reich Main Security Office

d. Office IVIV D 2 of the Reich Main Security Office

e. Office VV A 1 of the Reich Main Security Office

following my letter of the 7/7/1941II A 2 No. 205 VIII/41 176-7, for information.

by order: signed: Neifeind. [Stamp]

The Reich-Führer SS, Reich Commissioner for the Consolidation of the German Race Received: 7/14/1941 4 W File No.: COI/28R/8/5/1940.

1. Dr. Bilfinger Office II V informs me on enquiry that the draft has been amended by agreement with the Reich-Minister of Justice and has been submitted to SS-Group Führer Wolff for signature. The draft will be forwarded to the Reich-Minister of Justice and will be described as the final opinion of the Police.

We shall receive copy.

2. To be submitted again 19th August. initialled: 30th July. The Reich-Führer SS and Chief of the German Police in the Reich-Ministry of the Interior SII A 2 No. 342/41176.

Berlin SW 11, 8/1/1941 8 Prinz-Albrecht Street

I have no objections against the proposals.

Signed: Dr. Kr 27th Aug. c3/1-3

To the Reich Minister for Justice Berlin, W.8. Wilhelmstr. 65

Subject Matter: Administration of Criminal Justice in the Annexed Eastern Territories.

Reference: Express letter dated 6/30/19419170 Ostgeb/2 II a 21826.41

With reference to the discussion held by our respective officials on 7/14/1941, I wish to make the following comments on the draft you have submitted:

Generally I agree to the draft and welcome the special conditions to which Poles and Jews are to be subject both with regard to criminal law and criminal procedure. The reintroduction of martial law in the annexed Eastern Territories conforms with the wishes I have expressed several times.

1, I request you, however, to take into consideration the following specific points:

1. According to Paragraph XII the procedure is to be arranged by the court and the public prosecutor as they think fit in consideration of their duty. On principle I agree with this. However, in the earlier draft for a court-martial procedure which was worked out with your collaboration, a minimum of legal guarantees was provided for. This Iwould like to see preserved in future also. The present wording of Paragraph XII would result in an unusual situation whereby the rules for ordinary procedure would be less stringent than those.for the procedure under martial law. Therefore, please amend the wording of Paragraph XII accordingly.

2. In Paragraph XIII (procedure under martial law) please provide for the consent of the Reich Minister of the Interior in addition to consent of the Reich Minister of Justice.

3. During the discussion of the bill by the officials concerned, it became clear that the Reich-Governors [Reichsstatthalter] should be authorized to declare martial law for any parts of their area as well as for the whole of their area. The present wording is open to doubt, I propose therefore the following wording:

” … for the area of his administration or specified parts thereof”.

4. Although it may safely be assumed that in the future there will be no more Jews in the annexed Eastern territories, I am of the opinion that under present circumstances it is very urgent to provide martial law not only for Poles but for Jews as well. Therefore please insert in Paragraph XIII after the word “Poles” the words “and Jews”.

5. Concerning the clause “and for other more serious offences which gravely endanger the German reconstruction work”, please delete the word “more serious” so that martial law may be applied also to those cases which in themselves are not particularly serious but which might become a serious danger to the German reconstruction work because of their frequency, (e. g. smuggling), and which urgently require immediate and draconic action for purposes of intimidation.

6. So far, the Secret State Police alone imposes protective custody. Furthermore, protective custody is by definition not a punishment but a measure of precaution and education. Therefore please amend section 2 of Paragraph XIII to read perhaps as follows:

“The penalty to be inflicted by the courts under martial law is the death penalty. The courts proceeding under martial law may, however, dispense with punishment and order transfer to the Secret State Police instead.”

In this way due consideration would be given to the wishes of the Führer and the aforementioned difficulties of terminology would be avoided.

7. I agree also to the extension of jurisdiction as provided in Paragraph XIV. But as you know, Reich-Marshal Göring, in his ordinance of 3/8/1940, has delegated to me the responsibility for the proper conduct of the Poles. He has authorized me to issue the legal and executive provisions necessary for this purpose. I have made use of this authorization by issuing the ordinances dated 3/8/1940S IV D 2 No. 382/40and 9/8/1940 IV D 2 No. 3382/40. These ordinances are also known to you. The present wording of Paragraph XIV does not make it quite clear whether this arrangement will remain unaffected. I note that the draft is not intended to bring about any change in this arrangement; I consider it necessary nevertheless, to make it quite clear by means of a brief remark in Paragraph XIV, that the aforementioned authorization granted to me by Reich-Marshal Göring and the ordinances issued by me remain unaffected. Signed: Heydrich.

Reich Main Security Office II A 2 No. 42/41176

Berlin, 8/11/1941

Copy to Reichs-Führer SSReich-Commissioner for the Consolidation of the German Race c/o attorney Dr. Kraeuteror his deputyin Berlin Signed: Neifeind.

Certified (signed) Heybutzki, secretary.

Stamp of: The Reich-Führer SS and Chief of the German Police in the Reich-Ministry of the Interior. The Chief of the Security Police and the SD (Security-Service).

Stamp of: The Reich-Führer SS, Reich Commissioner for the Consolidation of the German Race. B Received: 8/14/1941. File No: 3/1// 8/1/1941.

Submitted to Dr. Kraeuter for action 15 Aug. [initials].

“Document R-100: Information Given To The Supreme Commander Of The Army [Von Brauchitsch] By The Führer On 3/25/1939: Danzig Problem [translation]”, pp. 83-85.

L. [Lipski?] will return from Warsaw on Sunday, 26 March. He was commissioned to ask whether Poland would be prepared to come to some terms with regard to Danzig. The Führer left Berlin during the night of 25 March; he does not wish to be here when L. returns. R. (Ribbentrop) shall negotiate at first. The Führer does not wish, though, to solve the Danzig problem by the use of force. He would not like to drive Poland into the arms of Gt. Britain by doing so.

A military occupation of Danzig would have to be taken into consideration only if L. gives a hint that the Polish Government could not take the responsibility toward their own people to cede Danzig voluntarily and the solution would be made easier for them by a fait accompli.

Problem Poland.

For the time being, the Führer does not intend to solve the Polish question. However, it should now be worked on. A solution in the near future would have to be based on especially favorable political conditions. In that case Poland shall be knocked down so completely that it need not be taken into account as a political factor for the next decades. The Führer has in mind as such a solution a borderline advanced from the Eastern border of East-Prussia to the Eastern tip of Upper Silesia. Evacuation and resettlement are questions that remain open. The Führer does not want to go into the Ukraine. Possibly one could establish a Ukrainian State. But these questions also remain open.

Slovak question.

How long the Führer considers himself bound by the Treaty concluded with Slovakia is open to doubt. The Supreme Commander of the Army has the impression as if the Führer wanted to free himself of this obligation when the time comes, and that he will use Slovakia as an asset for bargaining between himself, Poland and Hungary. For the time being, however, brakes should be put on Hungary.

The Führer agrees to the border line proposed (line of the river Waag). In case Slovakia should be divided, the eastern border (line of the Neutra river) should be the border, including Bratislava. For Bratislava possibly a plebiscite; the Führer does not expect difficulties because the town is not tending toward Hungary.

Engerau shall become a permanent Garrison.

Col. Gen. Keitel shall inform Slovak Government via Foreign Office that it would not be allowed to keep or garrison armed Slovak units (Hlinka Guards) on this side of the border formed by the river Waag. They shall be transferred to the new Slovak territory. Hlinka Guards should be disarmed.

Slovakia shall be requested via Foreign Office to deliver to us against payment any arms we want and which are still kept in Slovakia. This request is to be based upon agreement made between Army and Czech troops. For this payment these millions should be used which we will our anyhow into Slovakia.

Czech Protectorate.

H. Gr. [translator’s note: probably Army groups] shall be asked again whether the request shall be repeated again for the delivery of all arms within a stated time limit and under the threat of severe penalties.

We take all war material of former Czechoslovakia without paying for it. The guns bought by contract before 15 February though shall be paid for.

Officers of the Czech Army shall be cared for. This has to be done in accordance with the discussions between General Reinecke, Colonels Wagner and Burgsdorf of the Supreme Command of the Army. The pensions shall warrant a good standard of life, so as to prevent discontent. Maybe we shall take over the payment of the pensions or of a part of themso to speak as instalment on the captured war loot. Negotiations should be conducted on this basis.

The problems should be solved, at least on general lines, before the cession of the executive power. Supreme Command of the Army has proposed the limit of 6 April for the cession of executive. Führer agrees.

H. [translator’s note: Hacha] shall be requested to change his residence, to a place where he can do no harm. The respective request, though, is to come from Hacha.

If the Czechs intend to establish a labor service, the problem should be dealt with in a dilatory manner. The Czech people should not be strengthened by such concentrations. The settlement of this question falls under German jurisdiction.

A certain financial sovereignty shall be granted to the Czech State; maybe similar to that of Bavaria in former times. Führer does not yet see way clear with regard to the adjustment of debts. Conversion into mark will be made in due time.

Bohemia-Moravia have to make annual contributions to the German treasury. Their amount shall be fixed on the basis of the expenses earmarked formerly for the Czech Army.

Führer does not object to the removal of the military forces after disarmament has been completed. He should not like, though, to prejudice the Polish problem which is not yet cleared up.

He wishes to be asked again with regard to this on Monday.

At the time when Neurath takes over, there should be a few more troops than shall remain permanently. He assents, therefore, to dislocation.

Führer will have a talk with Friderici ? etc., Supreme Commander of the Army, beforeNeurath takes over.

England-France.

Relations seems to have cooled off a bit because France perceived that Gt. Britain intends to harness her to her own wagon.

Gt. Britain is said to have told France she should comply with the Italian desires regarding the Mediterranean. Führer wishes to make armament deals with the Balkan countries. But only against payment in foreign exchange or goods of similar currency value. Becker shall report on equalization of calibres and Skoda. (Original has been written by hand by Lt. Col. Siewert, first General Staff Officer).

Correctness certified:

Signed [illegible] Col. of the General Staff.

“Document R-102: Activity And Situation Report No. 6. Of The Task Forces [Einsatzgruppen] Of The Security Police And The SD In The USSR [partial translation]”, pp. 96-97.

[Rubber Stamp] TOP SECRET 100 copies Copy No. 42.

(Time covered by report: 10/1-31/1941)

Table of Contents

I. Stations. … Page 1

II. Activities.

A. Eastern Territory (Ostland) a. Partisan activity and counteraction … Page 1 b. Situation in Leningrad … Page 2 c. Jews … Page 7

B. White Ruthenia.

a. Partisan activity and counteraction … Page 8 b. Arrests and executions of communists, officials and criminals … Page 11 c. Jews … Page 12 d. Enemy propaganda activity … Page 14 e. Material seized … Page 15

C. Ukraine a. Partisan activity and counteraction … Page 16 b. Arrests and executions ofcommunists, officials’ and criminals Page … Page 17 c. Jews … Page 18 d. Enemy propaganda activity … Page 19 e. Material seized … Page 20

III. Economy. Commerce and Culture.

A. White Ruthenia a. Economy and commerce … Page 20 b. Supplies and provisions … Page 21 c. Agriculture … Page 21 d. CultureChurch … Page 22

B. Ukraine a. Economy and commerce … Page 23 b. Supplies and provisions … Page 24 c. Agriculture … Page 25 d. Culture 1. Schools … Page 25 2. Church … Page 26

IV. Attitude of foreign groups

A. White Ruthenians Attitude towards Germanism. … Page 27

B. Ukrainians a. Attitude towards Germanism … Page 28 b. Tendencies to autonomy. … Page 29 c. Attitude towards Bolshevism. … Page 29

V. The German Racial Group in the area around Landau. … Page 30

I. STATIONS.

During the period covered by this report the stations of the Task Forces of the Security Police and the SD have changed only in the Northern Sector.

The present stations are:

Task Force A: since 10/7/1941 Krasnowardeisk. Task Force B: continues in Smolensk. Task Force C: since 9/27/1941 in Kiew. Task Force D: since 9/27/1941 in Nikolajew.

The Action and Special Commandos [Einsatz und Sonder Commandos] which are attached to the Task Force continue on the march with the advancing troops into the sectors which have been assigned to them.

II. ACTIVITIES.

A. Eastern Territory (i. e. Baltic area) a. Partisan activity and counteraction.

The activity of the Bolshevist partisans in area of task force A has quieted down somewhat. Nevertheless, intelligence work as been further extended through the dispatching civilian agents, and the enlistment of the village elders and of the population. The results of the preliminary intelligence work served as a basis for several actions in the active combatting-of the partisans. From a captured activity report of a partisan group, it can be ascertained that the partisans anticipate, in view of the approaching winter season, that they will not be able to hold out longer than the middle of November.

c. Jews. In 1940 there were in Estonia approximately 4500 Jews almost exclusively in Reval, Dorpot, Narwa and Pernau. There were only a few Jews in the country districts. After the occupation of the Eastern territory by German troops there were still approximately 2000 Jews. The larger part had left the country in an easterly direction together with the Soviet authorities and the Red Army.

Spontaneous demonstrations against Jewry followed by pogroms on the part of the population against the remaining Jews have not been recorded, on account of the lack of adequate indoctrination.

However, the Estonian Protective Corps [Selbstschutz], formed at the time of the entry of the Wehrmacht, immediately started a comprehensive arrest action of all Jews. This action was under the direction of the task force of the Security Police and the SD.

The measures taken were:

1. Arrest of all male Jews over sixteen.

2. Arrest of all Jewesses from 16-20 years, who lived in Reval and environments and were fit for work; these were employed in peat cutting.

3. Comprehensive detention in the synagogue of all Jewesses living in Dorpot and its environments.

4. Arrest of the Jews and Jewesses fit for work in Pernau and environments.

5. Registration of all Jews according to age, sex, and capacity for work for the purpose of their detention in a camp is being prepared.

The male Jews over 16 were executed with the exception of doctors and the elders. At the present time this action is still in progress. After completion of this action, there will remain only 500 Jewesses and children in the Eastern territory.

As an immediate action the following has been ordered by the task force of the Security Police and the SD:

1. Identification of all Jews.

2. The prohibition to carry on a public trade.

3. Prohibition of use of sidewalks and public transportation as well as of visits to theaters, cinemas and restaurants.

4. Prohibition of attendance at schools.

5. Seizure of all Jewish property.

B. WHITE RUTHENIA

a. Partisan activity and Counteraction.

Contrary to the situation in the North sector, the activity of the partisans in the area of task force B has increased slightly. In Welikij Luki alone, 19 reports of attacks by partisans were received. However, the main weight of partisan activity lately has been shifting over to the perpetration of acts of sabotage. It has been noted, that the strongest groups divide themselves into smaller ones. This results in a better camouflage and mobility. How far this camouflage goes, is shown by three cases where partisans married into three villages, in order to appear unsuspected. Furthermore, Red Army men were unmasked as partisans; they had obtained certificates surreptitiously from units of the Wehrmacht, showing them to be unsuspected as political prisoners who were to be left at large. When interrogated by the Action Commandos of the Security Police and the SD, they admitted after long denials that the had received the order to pass themselves off as political prisoners or as forced laborers, and to take up the fight again as partisans behind the front.

Again and again it can be observed, that the population refuses to support the partisans, and in several instances they have even acted actively against the partisans, if by this action the destruction of their property could be prevented.

In several actions against smaller partisan groups, a number of partisans would be shot.

At Choslawitschi 4 partisans who had shot at a German soldier were apprehended and liquidated.

Southeast of Demidow, five partisans were captured after a search of the forests; they admitted to have killed 14 German soldiers. They were liquidated.

In several actions northwest of Welish 27 partisans were apprehended and shot.

In the village Michalowo, after careful reconnaissance through civilian agents, 8 partisans were surprised in a house by the same Commando of the Security Police and the SD, they were arrested and hanged the next day in this particularly partisan-infested village.

The president of the District Region Soviets in Tarenitsch and his secretary were shot because of their connections with partisans.

During an action approximately 70 kilometers south of Mogilew, 25 Armenians, Kirghizs and Mongols were apprehended with false identification papers with which they tried to conceal the fact that they belonged to a partisan group. They were liquidated.

In the same district two partisan leaders were captured and shot.

An Action Commando of the Security Police and the SD shot 3 partisans at Iwniki, who shortly before capture had thrown their weapons into a brook.

In Wultschina 8 juveniles were arrested as partisans and shot. They were inmates of a children’s home. They had collected weapons which they hid in the woods. Upon search the following were found: 3 heavy machine guns, 15 rifles, several thousand rounds of ammunition, several hand grenades, and several packages of poison gas Ebrit.

b. Arrests and executions of Communists, Officials and Criminals.

A further large part of the activity of the Security Police was devoted to the combatting of Communists and criminals. A special Commando in the period covered by this report executed 63 officials, NKVD agents and agitators.

In the vicinity of the Tytschinino railway station 4 girls were shot because they attempted to derail a train by loosening the fish-plates.

Three communist officials and one Politruk were liquidated at Gorodnia.

18 persons were executed at Mogilew; they had acted as political officials and Politruk. Weapons were found in their possession.

An Action Commando convicted a member of the Supreme Council of the White Russian Soviet Republic of arson in Witebsk. He was shot.

Blood-Cellar in Tschernigow. In the NKVD building in Tschernigow a blood cellar was discovered. It was soundproof and lightproof. One room served as the place for executions. The wall was covered with boards serving as butts with sawdust strewn in front of it which was completely soaked with blood.

Lunatics. The Red Troops had opened the insane asylum at their departure and hadarmed some of the inmates. 21 insane persons were apprehended in the meantime and liquidated. In Minsk 632 and in Mogilew 836 persons were shot.

In Mogilew in addition 33 looters were executed.

The liquidations for the period covered by this report have reached a total of 37,180 persons. Now as ever, it is to be noted that the population on their own part refrains from any action against Jews. It is true that the population reports collectively of the terror of the Jews to which they were exposed during the time of the-Soviet regime, or they complain about new encroachments of the Jews, but nevertheless, they are not prepared to take part in any pogroms.

All the more vigorous are the actions of the task forces of the Security Police and the SD against the Jews who make it necessary that steps be taken against them in different spheres.

In Gorodnia 165 Jewish terrorists and in Tschernigow 19 Jewish Communists were liquidated. 8 more Jewish communists were shot at Beresna.

It was experienced repeatedly that the Jewish women showed an especially obstinate behavior. For this reason 28 Jewesses had to be shot in Krugoje and 337 at Mogilew.

In Borissow 321 Jewish saboteurs and 118 Jewish looters were executed.

In Bobruisk 380 Jews were shot who had engaged to the last in incitement and horror propaganda (Hetz- und Greuelpropaganda) against the German army of occupation.

In Tatarsk the Jews had left the Ghetto of their own accord and returned to their old home quarters, attempting to expel the Russians who had been quartered there in the meantime. All male Jews as well as 3 Jewesses were shot.

In Sadrudubs the Jews offered some resistance against the establishment of a Ghetto so that 272 Jews and Jewesses had to be shot. Among them was a political Commissar. In Mogilew too, the Jews attempted to sabotage their removal to the Ghetto. 113 Jews were liquidated. Moreover, four Jews were shot on account of refusal to work and 2 Jews were shot because they had ill-treated wounded German soldiers and because they didnot wear the prescribed markings.

In Talka 222 Jews were shot for anti-German propaganda, and in Marina Gorka 996 Jews were shot because they had sabotaged orders issued by the German occupation authorities.

At Schklow 627 more Jews were shot, because they had participated in acts of sabotage. On account of the extreme danger of an epidemic, a beginning was made to liquidate the Jews in the ghetto at Witebsk. This involved approximately 3000 Jews. a. Partisan activity and counteraction.

Although partisan activity in the south sector is very strong too, there is nevertheless the impression that spreading and effective partisan activity are strongly affected by the flight of higher partisan leaders, and by the lack of initiative of the subordinate leaders who have remained behind. Only in one case a commando of the Security Police and the SD succeeded in a fight with partisans in shooting the Secretary of the Communist Party for the administration district of Nikolajew-Cherson, who was at the the Commissioner of a partisan group for the district Nikola-jew-Cherson-Krim.

The leader of a partisan group of five was captured after an exchange of shots near Odessa. He had the task of spotting artillery positions and of reporting them to a Soviet command post.

An action against partisans near Kostromka resulted in the arrest of 16 persons, among them a Politruk, a Unit leader of an annihilation brigade, as well as 3 communist revolutionaries.

The Jew Herschko Salomon, who had belonged to a parachute Defense-Assault battalion, was located at the city hospital in Nikolajew. The screening of PWs resulted in the discovery of 3 Jews who were members of a partisan company.

In Belabanowka the former president of the village soviet, who had attempted to form a partisan group of his own, was arrested.

Furthermore a member of the Polit. Bureau and president of a workers union, at present organizer of partisan groups, was arrested and liquidated.

14 partisans were shot at Kiew.

In the course of an action at Cherson, 2 persons were apprehended who attempted to carry information behind the Bolshevist lines. At the same time the leader of a band of partisans was shot after a lengthy fight.

b. Arrests and Executions of Communists and Officials.

The search for leading communists resulted in the arrest of Kaminski, former GPU chief of Cherson. In the years 1919/21, he had carried out the liquidation of the Czarist officers. The head of the prison work shops of the NKVD was also caught.

In Kiew a number of NKVD officials and political commissars were rendered innocuous. The embitterment of the Ukrainian population against the Jews is extremely great, because they are thought responsible for the explosions in Kiew. They are also regarded as informers and agents of the NKVD, who started the terror against the Ukrainian people. As a measure of retaliation for the arson at Kiew, all Jews were arrested and altogether 33,771 Jews were executed on the 29th and the 30th September. Money, valuables and clothing were secured and put at the disposal of the National-Socialist League for Public Welfare [NSV], for the equipment of the National Germans [Volksdeutschen] and partly put at the disposal of the provisional city administration for distribution to the needy population. In Shitomir 3145 Jews had to be shot, because from experience they have to be regarded as bearers of Bolshevist propaganda and saboteurs. In Cherson 410 Jews were executed as a measure of retaliation for acts of sabotage. Especially in the area east of the Dnjepr the solution of the Jewish question has been taken up energetically by the task forces of the Security Police and the SD. The areas newly occupied by the Commandos were purged of Jews. In the course of this action 4891 Jews were liquidated. At other places the Jews were marked and registered. This rendered it possible to put at the disposal of the Wehrmacht for urgent labor, Jewish worker groups up to 1000 persons.

“Document R-103: Situation of the Polish Workers in the Reich [partial translation]”, pp. 104-106.

Polish Main Committee 5 Vischer Street Cracow

Cracow, 5/17/1944

To the Administration of the General Government, Main Department Home Administration, Dept. Population and Welfare, Cracow 13 University Street. No. Pa 1/724, 6699/44

The conditions of life for about 2 millions of Polish male and female workers in the Reich have given rise to difficulties which are to a large extent lowering the will and the power to work of many workers, endangering their health and even their lives, and also having a strong influence on the situation of their families within the General Government, thus even directly affecting the sphere of our own work.

These bad conditions are felt especially by those groups of workers who have been assigned for work in factories and have been lodged in large camps. With regard to workers on the land they only occur for individual cases which are easily dealt with. The conditions have become worse since whole families often with many children were brought into the Reich and, defenseless and unprotected against the outrages of Ukrainian murder gangs, were placed in camps for Eastern workers.

The sanitary and moral effect of the bad conditions is for us too far reaching to be considered with indifference; we beg therefore to draw attention to them and to ask to consider the elimination of these bad conditions.

They concern housing, feeding, clothing, care of children and their education, sanitary conditions, and finally separation of families.

Question of housing

First consideration is due to the situation of families who have been inducted into camps for Eastern workers, together with numerous younger and older children … Once arrived in the camps they have been deprived of any liberty of movement and are being treated as prisoners without any rights. The privileges of voluntary workers, which are due to them, are not granted. Nobody is asked what work he is suited for. Land workers are assigned to factories where they are unused to the work and unable to accomplish as much as they could on the land …. Husband, wife and older children are called to work in factories, the younger children remain without due supervision in the camp areas, behind barbed wire, without any opportunities of exercising in the open air and not subject to any discipline.

The cleanliness of many overcrowded camp rooms is contrary to the most elementary requirements. Often there is no opportunity to obtain warm water for washing, therefore the cleanest parents are unable to maintain even the most primitive standard of hygiene for their children or often even to wash their only set of linen. A consequence of this is the spreading of scabies which cannot be eradicated.

Help in Feeding.

We receive imploring letters from the camps of Eastern workers and their prolific families beseeching us for food. The quantity and quality of camp rations mentioned thereinthe so-called fourth grade of rationsis absolutely insufficient to maintain the energies spent in heavy work. 3, 5 kg of bread weekly and a thin soup at lunch time, cooked with swedes or other vegetables without any meat or fat, with a meager addition of potatoes now and then is a hunger ration for a heavy worker.

Sometimes punishment consists of starvation which is inflicted e.g. for refusal to wearthe badge “East”. Such punishment has the result that workers faint at work(Klosterteich Camp, Gruenheim, Saxony)The consequence is complete exhaustion, an ailing state of health and tuberculosis. The spreading of tuberculosis among the Polish factory workers is a result of the deficient food rations meted out in the community camps because energy spent in heavy work cannot be replaced.

The food and bread fixed for Polish children in the camps are by no means sufficient for building up the substance for growing and developing their organism. In some cases children up to the age of 10 and more are allotted 200 gr. of bread weekly, 200 gr. of butter or margarine and 250 gr. of sugar monthly and nothing else(Zeititz near Wurzen, Saxony).

Prices in the open market are far too high. The call for help which reaches us, brings to light starvation and hunger, severe stomach and intestinal trouble especially in the case of children resulting from the insufficiency of food which does not take into consideration the needs of children. Proper medical treatment care for the sick are not available in the mass camps.

Care of Children

In addition to these bad conditions, there is lack of systematic occupation for and supervision of these hosts of children which affects the life of prolific families in the camps. The children, left to themselves without schooling or religious care, must run wild and grow up illiterate. Idleness in rough surroundings may and will create unwanted results in these children. (Suggestions follow to remedy the situation.) An indication of the awful conditions this may lead to, is given by the fact that in the camps for Eastern workers(camp for Eastern workers “Waldlust”, Post Office Lauf, Pegnitz) there are cases of 8 year old delicate and under nourished children put to forced labor and perishing from such treatment.

Sanitary Treatment.

The fact that these bad conditions dangerously affect the state of health and the vitality of the workers is proved by the many cases of tuberculosis found in very young people returning from the Reich to the General Government as unfit for work. Their state of health is usually so bad that recovery is out of the question.

The reason is that a state of exhaustion resulting from overwork and a starvation diet isnot recognized as an ailment until the illness betrays itself by high fever and fainting spells.

Although some hostels for unfit workers have been provided as a precautionary measure, one can only go there when recovery may no longer be expected(Neumarkt in Bavaria). Even there the incurables waste away slowly, and nothing is done even to alleviate the state of the sick by suitable food and medicines. There are children there with tuberculosis whose cure would not be hopeless, and men in their prime who, if sent home in time to their families in rural districts, might still be able to recover.

Protection of the Community of Families.

Grave depression is caused among the Eastern workers by the ordinance forbidding marriage among them within the borders of the Reich. … No less suffering is caused by the separation of families when wives and mothers of small children are torn away from their families and sent to the Reich for forced labor.

There are also fathers who occasionally volunteered for labor and who have already been working for four years in the Reich, without ever getting any leave, from whom their own children have been alienated because of their long absence, who often do not even know their own children born after their departure, 4 because they have had no opportunity of visiting their families on leave.

Religious Care.

If under these bad conditions there is no moral support such as is normally provided by regular family life, then at least such moral support which the religious feelings of the Polish population require should be maintained and increased. The elimination of religious services, religious practice and religious care from the life of the Polish workers, the prohibition of church attendance at a time when there is a religious service for other people and other measures show a certain contempt for the influence of religions on the feelings and opinions of the workers.

[signed] The Polish Central Committee [signature illegible] President

“Document R-110 [translation]”, pp. 107-108.

[stamp] Personal Staff Reichsführer SS Document Administration, Secret, ref. no. 212/21 The Reichsführer SS Personal Staff Diary No. 48/16/43 g, Bra/Bn Field Hq, 8/10/1943

To all Senior Executive SS- and Police Officers [Hoeheren SS- und Polizeiführer]

At the request of the Reichsführer SS I am sending you the enclosed order, with the request that the Chief of the Regular Police [Ordnungspolizei] and of the Security Police be informed; they are to make this instruction known to their subordinate offices verbally.

In addition the Reichsführer SS requests that the Gauleiters concerned be informed verbally of this order.

Brand SS — Obersturmbannführer

The Reichsführer-SS RF/Bn 48/16/43 g Field Hq, 8/10/1943

It is not the task of the Police to interfere in clashes [Auseinandersetzungen] between Germans and English and American terror fliers who have bailed out.

H. Himmler

“Document R-112 [translation]”, pp. 108-109.

[DOCUMENT A.]

Berlin, 2/16/1942

The Reichsführer SS and Chief of the German Police The Reich Commissioner for the Consolidation of German Nationhood. S II A 2 Nr. 420/VII/41176 The Reich Governors in the Reich “Gaue” Wartha Country and Danzig-West Prussia, The Province Presidents at Breslau, Katowice and Koenigsberg, The State Police District Offices at Danzig, Poznan and Katowice, The State Police Offices at Tilsit, Zichenau, Allenstein, Grudziaz, Bydgosz, Inowrazlaw, Litzmannstadt, Oppeln. The Reich Commissioners for the Consolidation of German Nationhood-Staff Headquarters, Department I, Reich Ministry of the Interior, The Higher SS and Police Führer at Koenigsberg, Danzig, Poznan, Breslau, The Security Service Districts at Inowrazlaw, Lwow, Torun Tilsit, Zichenau, The Security Service Districts at Danzig, Katowice, Poznan, The Security Service Main Local Branches at Allenstein, Oppeln, Departments III B 1, IV C 2, IV D 2 of the Security Service Main Office

Subject: Racial Germans who do not apply for entry in the List for Repatriation of German Ethnic Groups (“German Ethnical List”)

I. Where Racial Germans have not applied for entry in the -”German Ethnical List”, you will instruct the subordinate agencies to turn over their names to the State Police (Superior) Office. Subsequently you will report to me.

II. The Local State Police (Superior) Office, will charge the persons whose names are turned over to them to prove within eight days that they have applied for entry in the “German Ethnical List”. If such proof is not submitted, the Person in question is to be taken into protective custody for transfer into a Concentration Camp.

(signed) HIMMLER

[seal] A true copy (signed) Kippsch Clerk

[DOCUMENT B.]

The Reichs Führer SS and Chief of the German Police Reich Commissioner for the Consolidation of German Nationhood

II A 2 Nr. 420 VII/41176 Berlin, Feb.16.1942

To a. The Supreme Reich Authorities, 10 copies

b. The Governments of the German States, Prussia excepted, 10 copies

c. The Reich Governors, 10 copies

d. The “Gauleiters”, 10 copies

e. The Presidents of Provinces and Districts in Prussia, 10 copies

f. The Higher SS and Police Führer, 10 copies

g. The State Police (Superior) Offices, 3 copies

INFORMATION TO

h. Department I, Reich Ministry of the Interior, 10 copies

i. The Reich Commissioner for the Consolidation of German Nationhood,StaffHeadquarters, 10 copies

j. Main Trustee Office East, 10 copies

k. The Inspectors of Security Police and Security Service, 5 copies.

l. Reich Main Security Office for distribution sub-C

m. The Security Service (Superior) Districts

n. The Criminal Police (Superior) Offices.

Subject: Treatment of persons entered in Division 4 of the German Ethnical List.

According to the powers given to me by the Decree of the Führer and Reich Chancellor concerning the Consolidation of German Nationhood of 7.10.89, and exercising furthermore the powers held by me as Reichsführer SS and Chief of the German Police, and attributed to me by the Decree of the Führer’s Deputy A 7/41 of 26.2.1941, and with the consent of the Party Chancery, the Finance Minister and the Main Trustee Office East, I order as follows:

I. In Division 4 of the German Ethnical List (Ordinance concerning the List for the Repatriation of German Ethnic Groups and the German nationality within the incorporated areas in the East of 4.3.1941(German Law Gazette I p. 118))will be entered those racial Germans who had been Polandized on their own instigation. They may acquire German nationality by naturalization with a proviso for revocation. These Germans who were Polandized on their own application and their children are to be won back for Germany. Where this aim cannot be attained, they must at least be prevented from assisting the Polish nation in the future. Numerous persons among those entered in Division 4 deserve to be called “renegades” in the strict sense of the word. Since however, to call them “renegades” might render more difficult the process of winning them back, the term “renegade” will not be used in official communications. The persons in question are rather to be called “Polandized Germans.”

The Polandization of these persons took different form, but in every case resulted in persons becoming active enemies of Germany. In particular the following groups have to be distinguished:

a. German Racials living in mixed marriages with foreigners,

b. Children from mixed marriages with foreigner,

c. Persons influenced by the Catholic Church,

d. Persons influenced by the Augsburg Church of Bishop Bursche

e. Persons who renounced their German nationality for the sake of social advance,

f. Persons who renounced their German nationality for reasons of class (nobility,owners of large estates, clergy)

g. Persons who renounced their German nationality because they were isolated in purely Polish surroundings.

II. The Re-Germanization of the Polandized Germans presupposes their complete separation from Polish surroundings. For that reason the persons entered in Division 4 of the German Ethnical List are to be dealt with in the following manner:

A..They are to be resettled in Old Reich territory.

1. The Superior SS and Police Leaders are charged with evacuating and resettling them according to instructions which will follow later.

2. Asocial persons and others who are of inferior hereditary quality will not be included in the resettlement. Their names will be turned over at once by the Higher SS and Police Führer (Inspectors of Security Police and Security Service) to the competent State Police (Superior) Office. The latter will arrange for their transfer into a Concentration Camp.

3. Persons with a particularly bad political record will not be included in the resettlement action. Their names will also be given by the Higher SS and Police Führer (Inspectors of Security Police and Security Service) to the competent State Police (Superior) Office for transfer into a Concentration Camp. The wives and children of such persons are to be resettled in old Reich territory and to be included in the Germanization measures. Where the wife also has a particularly bad political record and cannot be included in the resettlement action, her name too, is to be turned over to the competent State Police (Superior)

Office with a view of imprisoning her in a Concentration Camp. In such cases the children are to be separated from their parents and to be dealt with according to III, Par. 2, of this Decree. Persons are to be considered as having a particularly bad political record who have offended the German nation to a very great degree (e.g. who participated in persecutions of Germans, or boycotts of Germans, etc.)

B. How these persons are to be dealt with prior to resettling them.

1. Persons who hitherto had professions involving leadership of men (educators, clergymen, works’ managers, Master artisans etc.) will be reeducated for otherprofessions that do not involve the leadership of men. The Higher SS and Police Führer will order and control the reeducation.

2. On application these persons will be received into the German Labor Front. They are not to be received into the Party, any of its organizations, or an affiliated organization.

3. The children will be admitted to the local German Elementary Schools and have to join the Hitler Youth. They are not to be admitted to a local Secondary School. Should such children enter a Secondary School, they would have to enter a boarding school in the old Reich territory, provided that the Higher SS and Police Führer who has jurisdiction over the parents’ domicile gives his consent. They are forbidden to enter a University, with the exception of children who have attended a German Boarding School for at least three years and have. been designated by the school as suitable for University attendance.

4. The property of these persons remains seized. In order to enable them to support themselves and to pay their necessary expenses they will receive instalments, the amount of which will be fixed by the competent SS and Police Führer according to instructions of the Authority competent by virtue of section 12 of the Law of 17.9.1940 (German Law Gazette I p. 1270), which will be issued later.

6. They will be on an equal footing with other Germans as regards distribution of rations, textiles, etc, admission to German inns and meetings, and the receipt of pensions etc. Their dwelling houses are not to be seized, unless they are of a disproportionate size, so that the housing shortage calls for dividing up the house and seizing one part of it.

C. How they are to be dealt with following resettlement in Germany proper.

1. Their property remains seized and will be liquidated according to instructions now in force by the Authorities competent by virtue of section 12. of the Law of 17.9.40 (German L.G.I. p. 1270). The proceeds will be paid into a Special Account. After final liquidation of the property, the administration of the Special Account will be handled by the locally, competent Higher SS and Police Führer. After the transfer to the locally competent SS and Police Führer the persons concerned may draw from the account up to RM 2000.per year. Above this amount they may draw only with the consent of the Higher SS and Police Führer. The release of the special Account is up to the Reich Commissioner for the Consolidation of German Nationhood State Headquarters. Application for it has to be made by the Higher SS and Police Führer as soon as the Person concerned is considered to have been re-Germanized.

2. The locally competent State Police (Directing) Office will impose on them the following duties:

a. to join without delay an organization associated with the NSDAP and to make their children join the Hitler Youth.

b. not to change their domicile in the first 5 years following the resettlement, unless the Higher SS and Police Führer agrees,

c. not to marry without permission by the Higher SS and Police Führer,

d. to refrain from accepting a guardianship, not to start studies at a University, unless the Higher SS and Police Führer agrees,

f. not to assume a new German name for a non-German one.

3. On their application they will be received into an organization affiliated with the NSDAP, unless there are special objections in a particular case. They will not be received into the Party or any of its formations, apart from the children being received into the Hitler Youth.

4. The competent Higher SS and Police Führer will appoint for each resettled family, resp. for each independent single person, a “Counsellor”. This counsellor has to assist the person who is to be re-Germanized, in reverting to his original nationhood, to report every 6 months to the competent SS and Police Führer and the competent State Police (Superior) Office on the progress of the Germanization and to give his opinion on measures intended by the State Police, if any. The Party has promised to recognize service as a “Counsellor” as service for the Party.

5. Apart from the exceptions stated in Nrs. 1-4 the persons concerned are on equal footing with other German nationals.

III. The Higher SS and Police Führer will further the Re-Germanization actions with every means at their disposal and continuously take stock of their success. In case they find that obstacles are put in the way of a re-Germanization action, they will report on their findings to the competent State Police (Superior) Office for appropriate measures. Where it proves to be impossible to attain re-Germanization even by forcible measures taken by the State Police, they will apply for a revocation of the naturalization through the Reich Führer SS, Reich Commissioner for the Consolidation of German Nationhood and give notice to the competent State Police (Superior) Office.

The Superior SS and Police Führer will take particular care that the re-Germanization of children will not be hindered by adverse influence of their parents. In case such adverse influence has been found to exist, and that it cannot be removed by forcible measures taken by the State Police, the children have to be placed with families against whose ideological and political opinion there are ;no objections, provided they are prepared to receive them as foster children without reservation, moved by love for the good blood flowing in the children’s veins, and to treat them as their own children. The same applies to children who have been separated from their parents by virtue of Nr. II A 3 of this decree.

IV. In the course of fulfilling their duties imposed on them by this Decree the competent State Police (Superior) Offices will take in particular the following measures:

1. They will take into protective custody the persons named to them under Nr. II A 2 and 3 of this Decree and will order their imprisonment in a concentration camp.

2. They will start a dossier on every person entered in Division 4 of the German EthnicalList. One dossier will be enough for a whole family. The dossier will contain a photo of the persons in question and every communication received, which may be of value for judging the persons in question.

3. They will impose the obligations as provided in Nr. II C 2 and keep watch on their being fulfilled, and take appropriate measures for enforcing them.

4. They will assist the Higher SS and Police Führer in their tasks of re-Germanization, particularly in removing obstacles by forcible measures whenever there is opposition to re-Germanisation. Before ordering forcible measures by the State Police they will give the Counsellor of the person in question an opportunity to state his opinion.

5. They will take into protective custody all persons, with regard to whom the Higher SS and Police Führer has applied for revocation of their naturalization and will order their imprisonment in a Concentration Camp.

signed H. HIMMLER

(STAMP) F.f.c. Kippsch, Office Employee.

[DOCUMENT C.]

The Reichsführer SS and Chief of the German Police, Reich Commissioner for the Consolidation of German Nationhood

Berlin, 7/1/1942.

II B 1 e -IV- a. The Higher SS and Police Führer, 3 copies

b. The Inspectors of Security Police and Security Service, 3 copies

c. The State Police (Superior) Offices in the incorporated Eastern areas, 5 copies

d. The Security Service (Superior) Office in the incorporated Eastern areas, 5 copies

e. The Criminal Police (Superior) Office in the incorporated Eastern areas, 3 copies f. Dept. I of the Reich Ministry of the Interior, 5 copies

g. The Reich Commissioner for the Consolidation of German Nationhood-StaffHeadquarters, 3 copies

h. The Reich Commissioner for the Consolidation of German Nationhood-Communication Centre to Racial Germans, 3 copies

i. Main Office for Questions of Race and Settlement, 5 copies

j. Reich Main Security Officefor distribution sub. B.

Subject: Resettlement of members of Division 4 of the “Deutsche Volksliste”.

According to the Decree of the Reich Leader SS, Reich Commissioner for the Consolidation of German Nationhood, dated 16.2.42, Ref.Nr. II A 2 Nr. 420 VII/41-176 concerning “Treatment of persons entered in Division 4 of the German Ethnical List” these persons are to be resettled in Old German territory. Evacuation and resettlement have to be effected by the Higher SS and Police Führer on instructions to be issued later.

Since conditions at the moment are difficult in every part of the war economy, and especially since there is a considerable shortage of housing in the whole of the Reich, the former intention of resettling at once the members of group 4 of the German Ethnical List in Germany proper, cannot generally be accomplished.

This is why for the time being only individual persons or individual families can be resettled; in the first place they are persons whose resettlement for political and for reasons laid down by the Security Police seems to be particularly urgent.

Whereas there should be no difficulty in dealing with the asocial and biological inferior persons mentioned in II A 2 of the Decree of 16.2.42, the State Police (Superior) Offices ought to pay particular attention to the persons mentioned under II A 5 as having a particularly bad record. Even if the greater part of these persons are already imprisoned in a Concentration Camp, some of them still reside in the Incorporated Eastern Areas. With-regard to.the persons entered in Div. 4 of the German Ethnical List I hereby order the following:

I 1. The State Police (Superior) Office will demand from the local branches of the German Ethnical List, the Security Service (Superior) Offices and the Criminal Police (Superior) Offices their dossiers dealing with members of Division 4.

2. Decisive for the further treatment of members of Div. 4 will be the result of a racial test. As soon therefore as it will be possible to examine a larger number of members of Div. 4, the competent examiner of the Head Office for Race and Settlement has to be informed, and place and time for the racial test have to be fixed.

3. The leaders of the State Police (Superior) Offices and the leaders of the Security Service (Superior) Offices (or their Deputies) will take personal part in the examinations, in order to inspect personally the persons to be tested. The result of the test is to be added to the dossier.

The persons not passing the racial test (hereditarily inferior persons etc.) will be excluded from the German Ethnical List on application to the competent branch. Their certificate of having been entered into the list will be taken away by the State Police (Superior) Office. After having been excluded from the list they are to be treated as non-German subjects. In case they have been found asocial, they have to be imprisoned in a Concentration Camp.

4. The racial tests having been completed, the leaders of the State Police (Superior) Offices and the leaders of the Security Service (Superior) Offices, resp. their permanent deputies (in the Security Service the IIIB officials) will together examine the material available and will apply in case of necessity to the Reich Main Security for an Order for Custody and Concentration Camp Imprisonment. In cases presenting particular difficulties the dossiers are first to be submitted to the Reich Security Office, Dep. III B. The decision of the latter office then will be forwarded to the competent State Police (Superior) Office for further action.

5. Those persons, with regard to whom Imprisonment in a Concentration Camp has been decided upon will be transported at once by the competent State Police (Superior) Office to a Concentration Camp, on the specified order of Dept. IV of the Reich Main Security Office. The competent State Police (Superior) Office then will send their dossiers to the competent Camp Administrative, enclosing an appropriate communication and quoting the decision reached.

II 1. Persons with regard to whom it was decided to resettle them will be reported by the Sate Police (Superior) Office to the competent Superior SS and Police Leader in the Incorporated Eastern areas to whom the dossiers will be handed over.

2. The Superior SS and Police Leaders in the Incorporated Eastern Areas will request the Superior SS and Police Leaders in these parts of Germany proper which have been designated for such settlements, to assign the settlers a place of work and appropriate housing; the dossiers will accompany the request.

The Staff Headquarters will designate to the Higher SS and Police Führer in the Incorporated Eastern areas certain larger areas suitable for resettlement.

3. The Higher SS and Police Führer in Germany proper acting on their own responsibility, will decide on the settlement on the basis of the dossier sent to them and taking into consideration the conditions as a whole.

In other respects the settlement follows the rules of the procedure used in the resettlement of persons suitable for re-Germanization.

4. The Higher SS and Police Führer in the Incorporated Eastern Areas report to the following Authorities whenever a transport leaves, enclosing a list of names and places of departure:

a. Reich Commissioner for the Consolidation of German Nationhood,Communication Centre for Racial Germans

b. Reich Commission for the Consolidation of German Nationhood,Staff Headquarters

c. Reich Commissioner for the Consolidation of German Nationhood, Reich Main Security Office III B,

d. The Superior SS and Police Leader in Germany proper.

e. The State Police (Superior) Offices competent in Germany proper,

f. The Security Service (Superior) Offices, competent in Germany proper,

9. The State Police (Superior) Office, competent in the Incorporated Eastern Areas.

5. For further dealings with the resettled persons the Reich Commissioner for the Consolidated German NationhoodCommunication Centre for Racial Germans assumes jurisdiction; he will act through the Higher SS and Police Führer.

6. In fulfillment of their duty to examine continually the success of the re-Germanization action (cp.III of the- Decree of 16.2.42) the Security Service (Superior) Offices in Germany proper have to intervene in the same way as they do in continuously reporting on the Poles suitable for Germanization to the Reich Main Security Office and the Higher SS and Police Führer. They have to assist the appointed “Counsellors” as to questions of race (In Charge: Dep.III B) whenever possible. (signed) Streckenbach SS Group Leader

A true copy (g) Klimsch Employee

[DOCUMENT D.]

Ref. 1-3/4-1 (21.6.41 Foe/La Berlin, 7/28/1942

Subject: Evacuation and Resettlement of the members of Division 4 of the German Ethnical List.

Your Ref: Decrees of Reichsführer SS and Chief of German Police, Reich Commissioner for the Consolidation of German -Nationhood of 16.2.1942, Ref. Nr. II A 2 420 VII/41 176, and of 1.7.42, Ref. Nr. III B 1 e IV. Higher SS and Police Führer for the districts: Alpine Country, Danube, Elbe, Fulda-Werra, Contre, North East, North Sea, Baltic Sea, Rhine, Spree, South, South East, South West, Wartha, Danzig-West Prussia, West, Western Area, Katowice. 1. The Reich Minister of the Interior Dept. I 72 Unter den Linden Berlin NW 7

2. The Reichsführer SS, Chief of the German Police 8 Prince Albrecht Street Berlin SW 11

3. The Reich Commissioner for the Consolidation of German Nationhood, Communication Centre for Racial Germans, 29 Keith Street Berlin SW 68

4. The Chief of the Main Office SS. for Race and Settlement 8 Prince-Albrecht Street Berlin SW 68

5. The Reich Main Security Office 102 Wilhelm-Street Berlin SW 68

Supplementing the Decree of the Reichsführer SS and Chief of the German Police, dated 1.7.42quoted above I hereby order the following:

For the reasons mentioned in the Decree quoted above resettlement will for the moment be effected only for individual persons or families in cases where their resettlement seems to be urgent for reasons of policy or security Police.

Where this action assumes larger proportions, I request immediate report.

I. Regional Distribution.

a. The members of Div. 4 of the German Ethnical List who are to be evacuated from the area within the competence of the Representative for Danzig-West Prussia of the Reich Commissioner for the Consolidation of German Nationhood at Danzig will be resettled in the area under the jurisdiction of

1. The Higher SS and Police Führer Centre at Braunschweig (the transit camp being at the Castle, Ilsenburg.)

2. The Higher SS and Police Führer Fulda-Werra at Kassel (the transit camp being at Hann. Muenden.)

b. The members of Div. 4 of the German Ethnical List to be evacuated from the area under the competence of the Representative for the Wartha District of the Reich Commissioner for the Consolidation of German Nationhood at Poznan will be resettledin the area under the competence of

1. The Higher SS and Police Führer for Alpine Country at Salzburg (the transit camp being at Parsch/Salzburg)

2. The Higher SS and Police Führer for South West at Stuttgart (the transit camp being at Schelklingen)

3. The Higher SS and Police Führer for the Rhine at Wiesbaden, (the transit camp being in “Highway-House”, Wiesbaden)

c. The members of Div. 4. of the German Ethnical List who are to be evacuated from the area under the jurisdiction of the Representative for Katowice of the Reich Commissioner for the Consolidation of German Nationhood at Katowice will be resettled in the area under the jurisdiction of

1. The Higher SS and Police Führer Baltic Sea at Stettin (the transit camp “Major Schill” being at Belgard/Pomerania.)

2. The Higher SS and Police Führer West of Duesseldorf, (the transit camp being at Bochum/Westphalia, 30, Kloster-street.)

3. The Higher SS and Police Führer Western Area at Metz, (the transit camp “Brown House” being at Kaiserslauter.)

d. The members of Div. 4. of the German Ethnical List who are to be evacuated from the area under the jurisdiction of the Representative for North East of the Reich Commissioner for the Consolidation of German Nationhood Koenigsberg will be resettled in the area under the jurisdiction of

1. The Higher SS and Police Führer for the Reich Capital of Berlin at Berlin.

2. The Higher SS and Police Führer for North Sea at Hamburg. The transit camp will be designated later.

I reserve the right to enlarge the areas of resettlement in case of necessity.

II. Assignment of labour.

The members of Div. 4. of the German Ethnical List will be distributed in Germany proper, since they are persons suitable for re-Germanization. They are not allowed to return to the Eastern Areas. Their settlement is effected under the exclusive responsibility of the Higher SS and Police Führer, who are bound by the rules concerning persons suitable for re-Germanization.

III. Certificates.

The members of Div. 4 of the German Ethnical List acquire German nationality with a proviso for revocation. They will be given Re Certificates of the “Deutsche Volksliste”. For the time being they have not to apply for Identity Cards.

IV. Treatment after resettlement in Germany proper.

In this respect I refer to the Decree of the Reich Leader SS and Chief of the German Police, Reich Commissioner for the Consolidation of German Nationhood of 16.2.1942, Ref. Nr. II A 2 420 VII/41 176 and of 1.7.42, Ref. Nr. III B le IV, from which I quote the following: (follow excerpts from these Decrees, already translated)

The remaining contents of the decrees quoted have to be kept in mind with diligence.

V. Statistically the persons entered in Div. 4. of the German Ethnical List will be treated in accordance with my Order of 7.8.1941, I-3/4-14 (13.3.41). These persons will be taken separately from members of Div. 3 of the “Deutsche Volksliste.”

The Chief of Staff Headquarters.

[signed] Greifelt SS Group Leader

“Document R-114: General Directions for the Treatment of Deported Alsatians [translation]”, pp. 122-123.

I-1/7 Fls. 4 Dr. St/Ha Berlin, 8/7/1942

Memo on meeting of 8/4/1942. SS.”Hauptsturmführer” Dr. Stier, SS.”Hauptsturmführer” Petri, “RR” Hoffmann, Dr. Scherler, SS.Untersturmführer Foerster: Staff Headquarters

SS.”Obersturmführer” Dr. Hinrichs, SS.”Sturmbannführer” Brueckner: Chief of Estate Office and Settlement Staff, Strasbourg [Leiter des Bodenamtes und Ansiedlungsstabes Strasbourg] Intermediate Office for Racial Germans [Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle]

SS.”Hauptsturmführer” Hummisch: Main Office for Reich Security [Reichssicherheitshauptamt]

SS.”Untersturmführer” Dr. Sieder: Main Office for race and settling [RuS Hauptamt]

Dr. Labes: D.U.T. 1. State of deportation in Alsace.

the starting point of the conference was a report on the deportation effected so far and further plans for resettlement in Alsace.

1. The first expulsion action [Ausweisungsaktion] was carried out in Alsace in the period from 7-12/1940; in the course of it, 105000 persons were either expelled or prevented from returning. They were in the main Jews, gypsies and other foreign racial elements, criminals, asocial and- incurably insane persons, and in addition Frenchmen and Francophiles. The Patois-speaking population was combed out by this series of deportations [Aussiedlungswelle] in the same way as the other Alsatians.

1. Referring to the permission the Führer had given him to cleanse Alsace of all foreign, sick or unreliable elements Gauleiter Wagner has recently pointed out the political necessity of new deportations [zweiten Aussiedlungsaktion] which are to be prepared as son as possible. The following classes of people are to be affected by this measure:

A. Colored persons and their offspring: Negroes and colored hybrids Gypsies and their offspring, Jews, from half-Jews on, Mixed Jewish Marriages [juedische Mischehen] B. people of foreign race and their offspring C. the patois-speaking population, D. Asocial persons, E. incurably insane persons

2. The following persons are designated for immediate deportation by order of the Reichsstatthalter:

a. Families whose.children have shirked their labor services and prospective military service by fleeing to France. So far 8 families have been discovered in which this situation exists.

b. Resettlement [Umsiedlung] of special cases in the interior of the Reich for purposes of Germanization. e.g. families or individuals, who celebrated the French National day, 7/14/1942, in a manner deliberately hostile to German ideas and the present day state. There are about 20 of these persons.

c. In special cases as a means of punishment, e.g. individuals who have been designated by the Security Police as insufferable in Alsace and suitable for deportation. These are persons who, though racially of value have been some time previously in a concentration camp for grave offenses against the German nation. The number of these persons is estimated at 150 heads.

d. The following are scheduled for further deportation:

Members of the patois-group. The Gauleiter wishes to retain only such persons in thepresent patois-area who adhere to Germanism in their customs, in their language, and in their general attitude with regard to cases under headings a to d above, it is to be noted that the problem of race will be given first consideration, and this in such a manner that persons of racial value will be deported to Germany proper and racially inferior persons to France.

B.

The representatives of the SS Main Offices present were united in this opinion:

1. In order to ensure a uniform terminology, the following expressions will be used in future:

a. Shifting [Absiedlung] means: Removing persons from districts in which they have hitherto lived, while keeping them within the Reich.

b. Evacuation [Evakuierung] means: Expelling persons from the Reich.

c. Resettlement [Umsiedlung] means: Removing racial Germans from foreign areas in order to bring them within the Reich. II. 1. The Gauleiter’s plans for evacuation can be approved in principle, since they confine themselves in fact to a class of persons, whose presence in the Reich would be insupportable for racial and political reasons.

2. The shifting [Absiedlung] of the patois-population should as a rule be deferred until the end of the war, except in so far as it concerns persons who cannot be tolerated in Alsace because of their political activity.

3. The shifting [Absiedlung] of persons mentioned under headings I and IIa should be approved in principle. It should be noted that the class of persons affected is confined to these cases, whose immediate expulsion [Abschiebung] is absolutely necessary. There is a general agreement on the view that more persons may be expected to try to escape to France, when compulsory military service is introduced. The families of such persons will have to be shifted [abgesiedelt] in the same way as those of shirkers of labor service unless the family is actually not an accessory to the escape of its member, his guardian is to be shifted [abzusiedeln] instead of the family.

A distinction is to be made with regard to the relatives of shirkers of labor or military service, according to whether the guilt of the family is greater or lesser. In order todifferentiate sharply between measures for Germanization and measures of punishment, it is provided that at first they be dealt with in camps by the Security Police. Type and duration of this treatment will depend on the conduct of the family. At the conclusion of this penal imprisonment, the family is to be released and handed over for Germanization. It is conceivable that in special cases the Germanization may be started at once. Persons politically tainted to a lesser degree may be settled [angesiedelt] in West, or Central Germany, but as a general rule East of the Rhine. The worse the political record and the francophile conduct of a person, the farther away he is to be settled from his old locality. It is to be made clear to the shifted persons that their being shifted was the necessary consequence of their relatives escape but their further treatment depends on the conduct of the shifted family members themselves.

4. For the use in deciding whether a person is to be shifted or evacuated and as a basis for subsequent settlement and treatment, there should be drafted (in addition to racial and political screening) a general assessment of his work and conduct. A person specially qualified for this task is to be charged with making this assessment.

5. The property of shifted persons shall be dealt with in substantially the same way as the property of members of Section 4 of the German Ethnic List. Personal chattels are as a rule to be left in the possession of the shifted persons. Under the existing law the remainder of the property would have to be confiscated and handed over to the Chief of the Civilian administration. Efforts should be made to have this property transferred to the Reichsführer-SS in his capacity as Reichskommissar for the consolidation of German Nationhood [f.d.F.d.v.] Prospects of compensation for property if good conduct is shown, should as a rule, be given. This compensation will be granted according to conduct and degree of re-Germanization, after a certain period of probation. The estate of the shifted persons is to be charged with appropriate expenses for removal and transport. In the case of paupers these expenses, like those of the other measures for shifting [Absiedlung] or evacuation [Evakuierung] must be borne by the Reichskommissar. Filing Notice

In re: Shifting of Alsatians into Germany proper.

On Monday, 8/17/1942 SS.-Gruppenführer Kaul held a conference at the Reichsstatthalter’s in Karlsruhe concerning the matter mentioned above, to which the undersigned were called.

In regard to the question of shifting [Absiedlung] Alsatians from the Reich the Gauleiter said the following:

The report to the Führer was made at the Führer’s Headquarters in the presence of the Reichsführer-SS. The Führer went into detail in giving his opinion on the political reorganization and political reconstruction of the West, especially of Alsace. The Führer explained in so many words that “asocial and criminal persons” were to be expelled to France (the Gauleiter reckons on perhaps 20000 persons). Beyond this it would be possible to expel to France everybody who is “inferior” or not related to us by blood. Everyone belonging by blood to the German nation and everybody who is not allowed; o go to France ought, regardless of his political attitude or any other attitude to be resettled [umgesiedelt] in the Reich, if he cannot be permitted in Alsace. In any casethere would be no room for large scale resettlements. Shifting could be effected, however, in individual and special cases. The persons or families to be resettled would be placed by the “CdZ” [which probably refers to the Security Police] at the disposal of the Reichskommissar. The latter would provide for the evacuation [Absiedlung] ad disposition of the resettled persons. The Reichsführer-SS had promised the Gauleiter to dispatch SS.-Gruppenführer Greifelt to us for that purpose. (The Gauleiter infers from this that a larger conference dealing with the entire action will soon take place here at Strasbourg). The resettlement will be carried out under the code-name “Reich”. In the opinion of the Reichsführer-SS the resettlement action should in no respect bear the character of punishment. The resettlers are to be treated perfectly decently. They should be told they will find much better living conditions in the Reich than they had in their former environment. In addition, the patois population is still, as before, to be resettled. At the moment, however, a resettlement on a large scale is not possible.

To a question of the undersigned the Gauleiter replied that the action (already begun) of shifting about 290 persons was to be completed. He furthermore desires that further announcements on the subject be published in the daily papers. Unauthorized crossings of the- frontier must in any case be prevented. The Gauleiter then expressed himself further in regard to the foreign racial elements in Alsace. Ultimately they are all to be removed from Alsace, including those Polish nationals suitable for Germanization. This action also would have, on the whole, to be postponed. In individual cases, however, resettlement actions [Umsiedlungen] would be possible just as in the case of patoi people or any other groups of the population. As to the foreigners no exemptions whatever would be made with regard to the Italians. The Gauleiter had spoken with the Italian Consul. The Gauleiter also would not hesitate to deport, if necessary, the Alatian partner of a mixed marriage as well.

The Gauleiter intended to offset the loss of population as far is possible with people from Baden, in order to create a uniform race mixture. The Führer had already agreed to the transplanting of inhabitants of Baden into Alsace.

The Chief of the Land Office [Bodenamt] and Settlement Branch [signature illegible] SS.-”Obersturmführer”

29.8.1942

“Document R-124: Shorthand Minutes of the 54th Conference of the Central Planning Board: Labor Supply on Wednesday, 3/1/1944, 10 o’clock at the Ministry for Air Transport [partial translation]”, pp. 146-149.

Sauckel: Field Marshal, Gentlemen, it goes without saying that we shall satisfyas far as possible the demands agreed upon by the Central Planning Board. In this connection I wish to state that I call such deliveries as can be made by the Plenipotentiary for Labor “possible” by stressing every nerve of his organization. Already on January 4th I had to report to the Führer with the greatest regret that for the first time I was not in a position to guarantee delivery of the grand total of 4.05 million men then calculated in the Führer’s Headquarters for the year 1944. In the presence of the Führer I emphasized this several times. In the previous years I was able to satisfy the demands, at least with regard to the number of laborers, but this year I am no longer able to guarantee them in advance. In case I can deliver only a small number, I should be glad if those arriving would be distributed by percentage within the framework of your program. Of course I shall readily agree if I am now told by the Board: Now we have to change the program; now this or that is more urgent. It goes without saying that we will satisfy the demands whatever they may be, to the best of our ability, with due regard to the war situation. So much about figures!

We have no reason to contest the figures as such, for we ask nothing for ourselves. We are not even able to do anything with the laborers we collect; we only put them at the disposal of industry. I only wish to make some general statements and ask for your indulgence.

In autumn of last year the supply program, inasmuch as it concerns supply from abroad was frustrated to a very great extent; I need not give the reasons in this circle; we have talked enough about them, but I have to state: The program has been smashed. People in France, Belgium, and Holland thought that labor was no longer to be directed from these countries to Germany because the work now had to be done within these countries themselves. For monthssometimes I visited these countries twice within a monthI have been called a fool who against all reason travelled around in these countries in order to extract labor. This went so far, I assure you, that all prefectures in France had general orders not to satisfy my demands since even the German authorities quarreled over whether or not Sauckel was a fool.

If one’s work is smashed in such a way, repair is very very difficult. Now for the first time I have been reproached by officers stationed in the East, which was very hard on me, that it was the Plenipotentiary for Labor who did not extract enough men from the East during the last year and thus was responsible if now our soldiers had to fight against the same men whom I should have taken away; for these had become an essential part of the Russian divisions. Thus I have been reproached several times by front officers; and I wish to protest here and now. For the East last year was barred to me. In large areas I was forbidden to take anything from agriculture. I was told: You don’t get any men since we have to organize agriculture here, the Donets area too was barred to me, and I was not allowed to extract anything I had to struggle hard for every individual man whom I wished to extract from the East. Therefore I wish to state expressly here and now that the reproaches Enade by the front that the men whom I did not extract now fight on the side of the enemy are unjust, since I was entirely kept out of these areas. Such was he situation at the end of the year.

At that time I was very much concerned: we discovered a decrease in the amount of labor employed. Today I am able to report that we stopped that decrease. According to most accurate statistics, which I had ordered, we have today again including foreignworkers and prisoners of war, the same number of 29.1 millions which we had in September. But we have added nothing since that time. Thus we dispatched to the Reich in those two moths no more than 4500 Frenchmen which amounts to nothing. From Italy only 7000 civilians arrived. This, although from 1.12 until today I have had no hour, no Sunday, and no night for myself. I have visited all these countries and travelled through the whole Reich. My work was terribly difficult, but not for the reason that no more workers are to be found. I wish to state expressly, in France and in Italy there are still men galore. The situation in Italy is nothing but a European scandal, the same applies to a certain extent to France. Gentlemen, the French work badly and support themselves at the expense of the work done by the German soldier and laborer, even at the expense of the German food supply, and the same applies to Italy. I found out during my last stay that the food supply of the northern Italians cannot suffer any comparison with that of the southern Italians. The northern Italians, viz. as far to the south as Rome are so well nourished that they need not work; they are nourished quite differently from the German nation by their Father in Heaven without having to work for their bread. The labor reserves exist but the means of touching them have been smashed.

The most abominable point made by my adversaries is their claim that no executive had been provided within these areas in order to recruit in a sensible manner the Frenchmen, Belgians, and Italians and to dispatch them to work. Thereupon I even proceeded to employ and train a whole batch of French male and female agents who for good pay just as was done in olden times for shanghaiing” went hunting for men and made them drunk by using liquor as well as words, in order to dispatch them to Germany. Moreover I charged some able men with founding a special labor supply executive of our own, and this they did by training and arming with the help of the Higher SS and Police Führer a number of natives, but I still have to ask the Munitions Ministry for arms for the use of these men. For during last year lone several dozens of very able labor executive officers have been shot dead. All these means I have to apply, grotesque as it sounds, to refute the allegation there was no executive to bring labor to Germany from these countries.

I have to tell you, Field Marshal, after repeated inquiry: There is no longer a genuine German direction of labor. I have just issued the well known proclamation which the Führer himself had inspired, corrected, and adapted concerning voluntary honorary service. What success this step will have, I don’t know yet; it will be very little. But I shall enlarge this voluntary honorary service. The Führer wishes it to be administered exclusively by the Women’s Service. Therefore I shall go tomorrow and see the Women’s Service and the Women District Leaders of the Women’s Service of Germany, in order to insist on the most extensive recruitment by the Women’s Service of women above the ages of 45 and 50 years. Something will be attained in that way. There are quite good beginnings in some of the districts. But recruitment must be continuous and uninterrupted, and such things need some time before they run smoothly. Out of the German labor reservoir, however, 60000 new laborers have been found in the first two months of the year, and the start as a whole has functioned better than I expected. The grand total so far is 262000. Of these from the East alone there are 112000. Thus the satisfactory statement can be made that the authorities in charge of what remains of the occupied areas have acknowledged the fact that better results are expected if the available labor is used in Germany than if it is used abroad. The supply of these 112000new Eastern workers, mainly men, has made it possible for us to hope for the arrival within the first two months of 262000 workers.

Then some words about the question of women’s labor. I have asked one of my assistants to give you later a survey comparing the English regulations on the national service of women with the German ones. It is perfectly correct to state that England, even if we take into account the difference in the total number available, does not use as many of her women as we do. One ought to abstain therefore from the reproach which is still made against me, that we didn’t do enough with regard to the use of women’s labor. On January 4th I told the Führer expressly and repeatedly; if he gave me the power to recruit laborers a la Stalin, I should be able to put at his disposal perhaps a million more women. The Führer brusquely and repeatedly refused this. He used the expression that our German long-legged slender women could not be compared with the “kurz-stampfeten” [Austrian dialect term for short-legged, used in a derogatory sense] and healthy Russian women. I for my part also wish to warn against setting too much hope on the usefulness of these women. But I wish to ask you to be sure that I am doing everything in order to put to work everybody who is fit for work, as far as I am able to do within the framework of the Führer’s permission, and this by exercising some soft moral pressure as well. In the same way I have directed all my assistants to examine continuously the results of the action of January of last year concerning the duty to register and to make sure that the labor exchanges continuously find out and call up the women whose children grow beyond the age in question, and the girls who reach the age groups in question. Thus we do everything possible.

In order to enable me to reach these numbers, two conditions must be fulfilled. First it is indispensable that all authorities which administer the occupied countries must recognize the necessity of fulfilling the demand for labor in the Reich. This so far is not the case everywhere. Especially the protected factories in the occupied countries make my work very difficult. According to reports received within the last days these protected factories are to a great part filled to capacity, and still labor is sucked up into these areas. This strong suction very much obstructs our desire to dispatch labor to the Reich. I wish to-emphasize that I never opposed the use of French labor in factories which had been transferred from Germany to France. I am still sound of mind, and as recently as last summer I-charged Mr. Hildebrandt with an inquiry in France which had the following result: It would be easy to extract from French medium and small factories (80% of all French factories are small enterprises with only 36-40 working hours)1 million laborers for use in the transferred factories, and 1 million more fordispatch to Germany. To use 1 million within France should be quite possible unless the protected factories in France artificially suck up the labor completely and unless their number is continually increased, as happens according to my reports especially in Belgium, and unless new categories of works are continually declared protected, so that finally no labor is left which I may use in Germany. I wish here and now to repeat my thesis: A French workman, if treated in the right way, does double the amount of work in Germany that he would do in France, and he has here twice the value he has in France.

I want to state clearly and fearlessly: The exaggerated use of the idea of protected factories in connection with the labor supply from France in my submission implies a grave danger for the German labor supply. If we cannot come to the decision that my assistants, together with the armament authorities, are to comb out every factory, this fountain of labor too in the future will remain blocked for the use of Germany, and in this case the program described to me by the Führer may well be frustrated. The same applies to Italy. In either country there are enough laborers, even enough skilled workers; only we must have enough courage to step into the French plants. What really happens in France, I do not know. That a smaller amount of work is done during enemy operations in France, like in every occupied country, than is done in Germany seems to me evident. If I am to fulfill the demands which you present to me, you must be prepared to agree with me and my assistants, that the term “protected factory” is to be restricted in France to what is really necessary and feasible by reasonable men, and the protected factories are not, as the Frenchmen think, protected against any extraction of labor from them for use in Germany. It is indeed very difficult for me to be presented to French eyes as a German of whom they may say: Sauckel is here stopped from acting for German armament! The term “protected factory” means in France nothing, but that the factory is protected against Sauckel! This is what the Frenchmen think, and they cannot be blamed for it; for they are Frenchmen and before their eyes the Germans disagree in their opinions and actions. To what degree the creation of protected works is expedient and necessary at all is not for me to decide. I can only state how the effect of creating them touches the work expected to be done by me. On the other hand, I have grounds for hoping that I shall be just able to wriggle through, first by using my old corps of agents and my labor executive, and secondly by relying upon the measures which I was lucky enough to succeed in obtaining from the French Government. In a discussion lasting 5-6 hours I have exerted from M. Laval the concession that the death penalty will be threatened for officials endeavoring to sabotage the flow of labor supply and certain other measures. Believe me, this was very difficult. It required a hard struggle to get this through. But I succeeded and now in France Germans ought to take really severe measures, in case the French Government does not do so. Don’t take it amiss, I and my assistants in fact have sometimes seen things happen in France that I was forced to ask: Is there no respect any more in France for the German lieutenant with his 10 men? For months every word I spoke was countered by the answer: But what do you mean, Mr Gauleiter, you know there is no executive at our disposal; we are not able to take action in France! This I have been answered over and over again. How, then, am I to regulate the labor supply with regard to France. There is only one solution: The German authorities have to cooperate with each other, and if the Frenchmen despite all their promises do not act, then we Germans must make an example of one case, and by reason of this law if necessary put Prefect or Mayor against the wall, if he does not comply with the rules; otherwise no Frenchman at all will be dispatched to Germany.During the last quarter the belief in a German victory and in all propaganda statements which we were still able to make, has sunk below zero, and today it is still the same. I rather expect the new French ministers, especially Henriot, will act ruthlessly; they are very willing and I have a good impression of them. The question is only how far they will be able to impress their will on the subordinated authorities. Such is the situation in France. In Italy the situation is exactly the same, perhaps rather worse. We have no executive, we are told, and the Italian nation is morally so hopelessly corrupted that only pure force gives any hope for success.

Moreover, I am insulted, and this grieves me most, by the statement that I was responsible for the European partisan nuisance. Even German authorities reproached me thus, although they were the last ones who have the right to make such statements. I wish to protest against this slander, and I can prove that it is not I who is responsible. From the General District of Kiev, and this from the town itself and the near surroundings I extracted 100000 men for labor, and in Kiev there were no partisans. The Kiev district was the quietest of all. In 1942-1943 I hardly extracted one man from the Minsk District, and was not able to do so, since I was to a great extent barred from this district. The Minsk district, however, was the chief partisan area, and even a Gauleiter has been murdered there. If there had been no measures of labor supply, many more partisans would be in action than there are now; for there would be many more unemployed among the foreign nations. These countries are indeed not able to exist unless they produce the things which Europe wants from them, and since the planning of production for the whole of Europe is done exclusively and solely by Germany, all these nations are indebted to Germany alone and to nobody else for the fact that they have bread and work. The measures increasing the labor supply for Germany and the occupied countries therefore has the effect of giving useful work to gangs of unemployed men.

If this had not been done, the gangs would have become partisans. Furthermore, partisan warfare has appeared in every Eastern revolution for centuries and Stalin did nothing but incorporate into his strategic plans in a masterly way the assistance offered by partisans of the Polish, Ukrainian, and other areas known from history. Similar considerations apply to France. I have been answered that such things never had happened in France, that it was nothing but a consequence of German labor measures that these bands made their appearance there. To which I can only reply that those who say so obviously forget the whole of France’s history, e.g. what happened in the 1870-71 war. Then too franc-tireurs operated in France. Even if there were no labor measures, the English would drop arms from their planes and would certainly find unemployed willing to pick them up.

Indeed, we too commit mistakes, this is only human. I only intended to acquaint you, Air Marshal, with the actual difficulties used by enemy and German authorities alike to oppose the German labor measures. It goes without saying that the ideal solution would consist in transferring the whole of manufacturing in these countries, and, as the saying goes, in bringing the work to the workers.

Numerous German authorities, even such as had no connections with economics and labor supply, inquired of me: Why do you fetch these people to Germany at all? You make trouble for this area and render our existence there more difficult. To which I can only reply, it is my duty to insist on it that labor supply comes from abroad. There is no longer a German labor supply. That the latter is exhausted I already proved by my famed manifesto of April of last year. But I am not able to transfer the German soil to France. Nor can I transfer the German traffic to France nor the German mines. Nor can I transfer German armament works which still have to release part of their workers, if fit for war service, nor their machines. Here alone 82.5 million men are in question as has been calculated in the Führer conference. This is the flower of German workers who go to the front and must go there. I have always been one of those who say: if only energetic measures are applied in fetching labor from abroad, then we want to release in God’s name everybody from armaments work whom we can, in order to strengthen our companies. The 1st and 7th Armored Divisions are frequently mentioned in the War Report. I can only tell you that the number of soldiers killed in battle in some Thuringian villages has surpassed for some time already the number of soldiers killed in the World War, by twice that amount. This I mention in my capacity as Gauleiter. It is for this reason that we have to do our duty. The best kind of German men, and men in the prime of life, have to go to the front, and German women of more than 50 years of age cannot replace them. Therefore I have to continue to go to France, Belgium, Holland and Italy, and there will be a time again when I shall go to Poland and extract workers there as fit and as many of them as I can get. In this circle I only wish to urge that you spread it around that I am not quite the insane fellow I have been said to be during the last quarter of a year. Even the Führer has been told so. It goes without saying that just this slander has had the effect that I was unable to deliver in the last quarter at least 1 1/2 million workers whom I would have been able to deliver as long ago as last year, had the atmospheric conditions been better. It was due to that “artificial atmospheric screen”, that they did not arrive. I am aware that they simply have to arrive this year. My duty to the Führer, the Reich Marshal, Minister Speer, and towards you, gentlemen, and to agriculture is apparent, and I shall fulfill it. A start has been made, and as many as 262000 new workers have arrived, and I hope and am convinced to be able to deliver the bulk of the order. How the labor is to be distributed will then have to be decided according to the needs of the whole of German industry, and I shall always be prepared to keep the closest contact with you, Gentlemen, and to charge the labor exchanges and the district labor exchanges with intimately collaborating with you. Everything is functioning if such collaboration exists.

Milch: I now proceed to the important question where we will still be able to get greater amounts of laborers from you, and without a doubt the answer is, from abroad. I have asked Mr. Schieber to make a short appearance here in order to give his opinion onItaly. I agree with your statement, Gauleiter, that it is only the bad organization of our work abroad which is responsible for the fact that you can’t do your job. Too many people meddle in your work. If someone tells you, there is no executive in France and Italy, I consider it an impudence, a foolish and stupid lie uttered by people who either are unable to think or consciously state an untruth. This kind of person is not interested in giving a clear lead in this respect and in analyzing the situation, probably because he is not smart enough. In this way, however, your work is rendered more difficult or frustrated, and all armament work at the same time. For we have it before our eyes what close relations exist between the situation in the occupied countries and that in the armaments industry. A more foolish policy can hardly be conceived. In case the invasion of France begins and succeeds only to a certain degree, then we shall experience a rising by partisans such as we have never experienced either in the Balkans or in the East, not because this would have happened in any case, but only because we made it possible by not dealing with them in the right manner. Four whole age groups have grown up in France, men between 18 and 23 years of age, who are therefore at that age when young people moved by patriotism or seduced by other people are ready to do anything which satisfies their personal hatred against usand of course they hate us. These men ought to have been called up in age groups and dispatched to Germany; for they present the greatest danger which threatens us in case of invasion. I am firmly convinced and have said so several times; if invasion starts, sabotage of all railways, works, and supply bases will be a daily occurrence and then it will be really the case that our forces are no longer available to survey the execution of our orders within the country, but they will have to fight at the front, thereby leaving in their rear the much more dangerous enemy who destroys their communications, etc.

If one had shown the mailed fist and a clear executive intention, a churchyard peace would reign in the rear of the front at the moment the uproar starts. This I have emphasized so frequently, but still nothing is happening, I am afraid. For if one intends to start to shoot at that moment, it will be too late for it; then we have no longer the men at our disposal to kill off the partisans. In the same way, we are aware of the fact that their supply of arms in the west is rather ample since the English are dropping them from planes. I consider it an idiotic statement if you, Gauleiter, are accused of having made these men into partisans. As soon as you arrive, the men run away to protect themselves from being sent to Germany. Then they are away, and since they do not know how to exist, they automatically fall into the hands of the partisan leaders; but this is not the consequence of the fact that you wish to fetch them, but of the fact that your opposite number, the executive, is not able to prevent their escape. You simply cannot act differently. The main crux of the problem is the fact that your work is made so extremely difficult, and this is why you cannot deliver the 4.05 million workers. As long as it is feasible for these men to get away and not be caught by the executive, as long as the men are able not to return from leave and not to be found out on the other side, I do not think Party Comrade Sauckel, that you will have a decisive success through employing your special corps. The men even then will be whisked away unless quite another authority and power is on the watch, and this can only be the army itself. The army alone can exercise effective executive authority. If some say they cannot do this kind of work, this is incorrect for within France there are Training Forces stationed in every hole and corner town and every place which could at all be used for this work. If this would be done in time, the partisan nuisance would not emerge, just as it would not have done in the East if one had only acted in time. Once I had this task atStalingrad. At Taganrog there were then 65000 men of the Army, and at the front one lieutenant and 6 men were actually available for each km, and they would have been only too glad if they had 20-30 for their assistance. In the rear there were a great mass of men who had retreated in time and squatted down in the villages, and who now were available neither for fighting at the front nor for fighting the partisans. I am aware that I am placing myself in opposition to my own side, but I have seen such things happen everywhere, and can find no remedy but that the army should assert itself ruthlessly. You, Gauleiter Sauckel, the Reich Marshal, and the Central Planning Board ought to report on this question to the Führer, and then he ought to decide at the same time on the duties of the Military Commanders. There ought to be orders of such lucidity that they could not be misunderstood, and it is then that things will be in order. It never can be too late to do so, but these duties and this work will be more difficult to perform with every passing day. The same applies to Italy as well.

Schieber: The Gauleiter some time ago discussed this question in detail with General Leiters, and they succeeded in reaching quite a comprehensive agreement. In my opinion there are still a considerable number of people in Italy who could be extracted there, especially if it is possible, which is not for me to decide, to increase vastly the method, so much recommended by your collaborators of transferring whole firms. It was only a few days ago that 200 to 400 men were transferred together with very little difficulty. I am favoring this method especially for the reason that in my opinion it will nip in the bud any tendency to take to the woods and to become partisans. Where the Plenipotentiary for Labor transfers the entire personnel of a firm, this personnel is being transferred as an entity; this also presupposes the existence of some human solidarity between the members of that entity. The Gauleiter will meet even more difficulties in the transfer of these Italians than he has to overcome in France because the Italians have extraordinarily strong family ties. We notice this fact more all the time. One has to meet these difficulties half-way. On the whole we of the production 1 branch in Italy are quite agreeable to extract laborers from Italy. Our collaboration with your offices is functioning without friction. We attach special importance to our desire that these workers for whom we no longer have work in Italy, ought not to be left to loaf about for too long, but ought to be caught and sent to Germany. Outside the protected factories, too, there still remains in Italy a relatively vast reservoir of labor, and if this reservoir is drawn upon in the way arranged by the Plenipotentiary for Labor by the people from the armaments authority, and by our special commissioner, if especially the problem of transfer of wages is solved, I consider the transfer of a nice amount of labor from Italy as being quite possible. I should be glad, however, if right from the beginning any discussion by offices concerned or not concerned with it, about the possible consequences of the action should be prohibited; such a discussion could only disturb the peaceful development of production in Italy.

Sauckel.-I wish to insist on combing out the protected factories in the future also, for the protected factories are working like a suction pump; and since it is known everywhere in Italy and France that every worker if he works in a protected factory is protected against any attempt of mine to extract him, it is only too natural that the men are pouring into these factories. How difficult my task becomes thereby is proved by the following fact. I intended to extract from Italy a million workers within the quarter ending May 30th. Hardly 7000 arrived in the two months which expired so far. This is indeed the difficulty. The bulk enters the protected factories, and only the chaff remainsfor my purpose to send them to Germany. At least I hope to accomplish that with regard to larger enterprises as the number of protected factories is restricted in Italy, i.e. the number of protected factories will not be further increased.

Sauckel: This indeed is the decisive question, the one we are dealing with now. If half of the program for 4 million workers to be brought to Germany (this means 2 million) cannot be fulfilled, the employment of labor in Germany will fall off this year. The more useful workers, however, are in France, and of course in Italy too, employed in the protected factories. Therefore if I am not to touch the protected factories which are situated in these countries, this will have the effect that the less valuable workers instead of the more valuable type will arrive in Germany. And here we have to ponder about what is in fact more important and expedient. If we give up using these people in Germany, where we effectively rule the factories, where moreover we keep to a different labor discipline and reach better labor results than in France proper, then we give up the valuable kind, and then I shall only be able to transport to Germany the less valuable kind of people who still can be found on the streets of France or Italy, or people like waiters, hairdressers, small folk from tailor shops etc.

Milch: What is the percentage of protected factories in Italy compared with the whole of Italian labor?

Scheber: I think 14% but I have not got the figures here.

Milch: Would not the following method be better? We could take under German administration the entire food supply for the Italians and tell them: Only he gets any food who either works in a protected factory or goes to Germany.

Sauckel: True, the French worker in France is better nourished than the German worker is in Germany; and the Italian worker too, even if he does not work at all, is better nourished in the part of Italy occupied by us than if he works in Germany. This is why I asked the German food authorities over and over again to improve also the food of the German worker introducing the “factory sandwich”. When I am in Paris of course I go to Maxim’s. There one can experience miracles of nourishment. He still thinks that in these countries only very rich men, who can go to Maxim’s are well provided with food. Thereupon I sent my assistants to the Paris suburbs, to the estaminets and lunch restaurants and was told that the Frenchmen who eat there did not feel the shortage caused by the war to any degree comparable with what our nation has to experience.The average French citizen too can still buy everything he wishes.

(Interruption: This is still more so in small places!) Yes Moreover, the Frenchman can pay for what he can get. There fore he has no reason for wishing to go to Germany in order to get better food.

This unfortunately is the case.

Milch there nothing we can do? True, we might not be able to control the distribution to the customer, but we ought to be able to intervene at an earlier stage of distribution.

Koerner: We have requested from France really immense amounts of food, these requests have always been fulfilled; often after some pressure, but they have been fulfilled.

Milch: But there is a simple remedy: let us cease supplying the troops from Germany, but tell them to provide the food for themselves from France. Then in a few weeks they will have everything eaten up, and then we can start distributing the food to the Frenchmen.

Koerner: In France there still is for the time being a rationing system. The Frenchman had his ration card on which he receives the minimum. The rest he provides in other ways, partly by receiving food parcels which we cannot touch at all. Every year we increased our food demands to the French Government who always satisfied them, though very frequently yielding to pressure, and in proportion o the harvest results, were they good or bad. In Italy the situation is that food is not rationed at all. The Italian can buy and eat what he wants, and since an Italian has always money and deals in the black market, he is in much better situation than our German worker who practically has nothing but what he gets on his card.

Milch: But don’t we even send food to Italy?

Koerner: We are exchanging certain goods.

Sauckel: Moreover we are now at the point that the families of French and Italian workers are no longer in a better position owing to the money transfer if their bread-winning members are working in Germany than if they remain abroad; now nothing remains to induce them to go to Germany.

Milch: And the second question is this: Will it be possible at all to catch and transfer the 80% who are not employed in protected factories considering the lack of a so-called executive and divergence of opinions with regard to that problem. Wouldn’t you be in a position with the political and organization conditions in France being what they are to transfer as much as about 10-15% who are the most valuable out of this 80%.

Sauckel: I simply have to extract them.

Milch: But are you able to?

Sauckel: Today I can’t promise anything. Today I can only do my duty.

Milch: What I mean is, whether or not all your attempts to get this 80% must necessarily fail, by reason of the several adverse facts: first that there is nothing which could induce the men to go to Germany; secondly, that the.men expect Germany to be defeated within a measurable space of time; thirdly, that they cling to their family and country; fourth, that they are work-shy anyway, since they are able to exist without working for their bread and anyway look upon this time as a transitional stage which they will be able to survive. And on our side the fact that the Army does not assist you, and that the German authorities disagree with each other, which fact the Frenchmen ably use for their advantage.

Sauckel: This is no longer correct since my last visit. All German authorities, the Military Commander, Field Marshal Rundstedt, Field Marshal Sperrle assisted my task with fervor.

Kehrl: May I explain in brief the opinion of my Minister ? Otherwise the impression might be created that the measures taken by Minister Speer had been unclear or unreasonable and I do wish to prevent this from happening. Seen from our viewpoint the situation is as follows: Up to the beginning of 1943 manufacturing for the use of Germany was done in France-only to a relatively modest extent, since generally only such work was transferred for which German capacity did not suffice; these were some few individual products, and moreover some basic industries. During all this time a great number of Frenchmen were recruited and voluntarily went to Germany.

(Sauckel: Not only voluntarily, some were recruited forcibly.) The calling-up started after the recruitment did no longer yield enough results.

Sauckel: Out of the 5 million foreign workers who arrived in Germany, not even 200000 came voluntarily.

Kehrl: Let us forget for the moment whether or not some slight pressure was used. Formally, at least, they were volunteers. After this recruitment did no longer yield satisfactory results, we started calling-up according to age groups, and with regard to the first age group the success was rather good. Up to 80 of the age group were caught and sent to Germany. This started about June of last year. Following developments in the Russian war and the hopes raised thereby in the Western nations, the results of this calling-up of age groups became considerably worse, as can be proved by the figures noted; vis. their men tried to dodge this call-up for transport to Germany, partly by simply not registering at all, partly by not arriving for the transport or by leaving the transport on its way. When they found out through these first attempts that the German executive either was not able, or was not willing to catch these shirkers and either to imprison them or take them forcibly to Germany, the readiness to obey the call-up sank to a minimum: Therefore relatively small percentages were caught in the individual countries. On the other hand, these men moved by the fear the German executive might after all be able to catch them, did not enter French, Belgian, or Dutch factories, but took to the mountains where they found company and assistance from the small partisan groups existing there.

Secret

Stenographic report of the 58th discussion of the Central Planning: Coal on Thursday, 5/25/1944, 1600 hours Berlin, Pariser Platz 4

Dr. Koppert/Lm. 5/25/1944.

Pleiger: Will you please look at the diagram No. 3, it shows the whole personnel in the pit-coal mines. There you can see at what time we began using foreign labor. That was at the end of 1941. Furthermore, you can see how, consequently, the use of German labor declined and the share of the eastern workers and the Russian Ps/W rose. On the top is added a further large proportion of Italians. But if you take the next diagram on the number of scheduled personnel and the number of actual personnel you can see clearly how steeply the curve drops; the same with lignite. It would be necessary to find here some means of improvement. If you note that 800000 Russians Ps/W are working at places in Germany where Italians could be used just as well, it would be possible to transfer from among those 800000 s/W about 150000-320000 people to the mines. Italians are of no use in the mines; the Italians cannot stand it, they are physically not strong enough, it won’t even work if strong arm methods are used. The Russians, however, are developing excellently. In any case such a solution should be tried. If the situation in the West deteriorates, if we can do no more in Belgium and the North of France we shall be able to overcome the difficulties in Lorraine and Luxembourg only by a very big increase in the direction of labor to the Ruhr region.

Kehrl: I believe there are 2 possibilities to solve the difficulties. Contrary to Pleiger, I believe that we cannot do entirely without the Italians, and especially because we can procure trained Italian miners. We have stopped practically all mining in central Italy because we have no transportation for the material anyhow. As far as the Italians there who worked as miners are concerned, they should be transferred and used sensibly in our mining industry, because the physical strain in Germany is not substantially different from that in Italy. We could free at least 20000 miners. Perhaps one could adjust the proportion between lignite and pit-coal by transferring miners accordingly. Of course, we would then have to X-ray the Ps/W. By an exchange system something could be achieved.

Kehrl: Will you please look at page 29 of the report. You can see from it how the reduction which represents a considerable amount, has been worked out. The reductions are: among the Germans 4.5%, among the foreigners 5, and among the recruited.

Pleiger: Those are Bulgarians, Hungarians, Belgians, etc. They do not stay put as a matter of course. It is impossible to make them stay.

Kehrl: They go away their time expires. Among the eastern Ps/W workers one reckons with a loss of 20% of the total, among Immi (?) with a 40% loss.

Pleger: Among the eastern workers the loss has increased so much because we received these people from the land. They were with farmers before they were sent to the mines. When they came from the farmers each of them had a package containing sausage, bacon and bread, etc. In this way the farmers thought they would return to them. In fact, the result was staggering in favor of agriculture. The people simply cannot be kept in the mines in the long run. If they have once been on the land, they leave us again. This tendency is to be noted all along the line, in the Ruhr even worse than in the Upper Silesian region.

Rohland: Is there no possibility of sending all foreign fugitives to educational camps for 2-3 months? About 30000-40000 people per month would be involved. These are quite considerable figures. The result of the education is fantastic. I have the firm conviction that these people could be used in the mines.

Speer: We shall consider that later.

Speer: Now, the labor problem in Germany. I believe it is still possible to transfer some from the western territories. The Führer stated only recently he wishes to dissolve these foreign volunteers as he had the impression that the army groups were carting around with them a lot of ballast. Therefore, if we cannot settle this matter ourselves, we shall have to call a meeting with the Führer to clear up the coal situation. Keitel and Zeitzler will be invited to attend in order to determine the number of Russians from the rear army territories who can be sent to us. However, I see another possibility; we might organize another drive to screen out workers for the mines from the Russian Ps/W in the Reich. But this possibility is none too promising.

Speer: We have come to an arrangement with the Reichsführer SS as soon as possible so that Ps/W he picks up are made available for our purposes. The Reichsführer SS gets from 30000-40000 men per month. First of all, they have to be divided up. From what classes do these people come, anyhow? There certainly is a certain percentage of miners among these people who are picked up. These few thousand men have to go to the mines automatically. Certainly, some educational work has to be done. The men should be put into the factories as convicts. But they have to return to the factories where they were before. Furthermore, we could perhaps bring the people from agriculture to the mines. A great number leave, and the people do not go to the mines, but go home.

Dr. Jaenicke/ Secret

State Secret

36th Conference of the Central Planning concerning: Plan for 1943/44 regarding coal economy on Thursday, 4/22/1943, 1550 hours at the Festival Hall at the Zoo, Jebenstr.

Speer: Throughout the winter we have seen that in the last instance it is coal which provides the basis for all plans we wish to execute in other respects, and most of you are also aware of our intention to increase the manufacture of iron. Here also it will again be coal which in the last instance will tip the scales, whether or not we shall be able to accomplish this increase of iron production. Seen from the Central planning, we are of the opinion that the demand for coal as well as the demand for iron ought to be coordinated in a separate plan, and that this plan ought to receive about the same degree of urgency as the Krauchplan, and that with regard to labor, the conditions required for the execution of that plan must be established.- Perhaps Mr. Timm will be able to state how he expects the question of the miners to be developed; unfortunately the miners cannot be taken from the German reservoir, in their place we shall have o use very strong foreigners.

Timm: At the moment, 69000 men are needed for hauling that coal. We want to cover this by finding within the Reich 23000 men, viz. healthy prisoners of war, etc. who are especially suitable for miningand by dispatching 50000 Poles from the General Government. Out of these about 30000 men have been supplied up to April 24th, so that about 39000 men are still outstanding for January to April. The demand for May has been reported to us as being 35700. The difficulties existed especially with regard to recruitment in the General Government, since in every district surrounding Germany there is an extraordinary resistance to recruitment. In all countries we have to change over more or less to registering the men by age groups and to conscripting them in age groups. They do appear for registering as such, but as soon as transport is available, they do not come back so that the dispatch of the men has become more or less a question for the police. Especially in Poland the situation at the moment is extraordinarily-serious. It is well known that vehement battles occurred just because of these actions. The resistance against the administration established by us, is very strong. Quite a number of our men have been exposed to increased dangers, and it was just in the last two or three weeks that some of them were shot dead, e.g. the Head of the Labor Office at Warsaw who was shot in his office, and yesterday another man again. This is how matters stand presently, and the recruiting itself even if done with the best will remain extremely difficult unless police reinforcements are at hand.

It was expected that at the end of the month 50000 men should have arrived from the General Government. Unfortunately this could not be done. Only 3000 men of them have arrived, and 8000 more are on the way, so that the gap is rather considerable.

Speer: Of those men one can indeed only absorb a portion each month.

Sogemeier: We have provided a plan for stages: April 26000, May 30000, June 30000, July 50000, and September 56000. If the men arrive in these stages and numbers, we should be able to reach the 290 millions of tons, provided that no miners are otherwise called up.

Speer: Are these additional labor supplies? Are these numbers which you wish to build up?

Timm: Yes, they include the losses which we expect!

(Milch: Yes, including the 70000!)

Speer: I take it that the losses are included in these numbers?

Timm: Yes, this is not building-up, but distribution, if I understand rightly. As said before, we hope to dispatch within the next month 50000 men from the General Government. Including the men shifted from other districts there will be 73000 which should cover the first two months. It would be very difficult for us to increase the number in the next two months, since we have to provide agriculture with the remaining requirements which are due within the next two months, whereas in the months beginning with June the need of agricultural labor can be satisfied much easier by measures taken inside Germany. In the harvest months German labor can be called up for assistance. Only during the season for the harvesting of root vegetables is the situation difficult.

After what General Commissioner Sauckel found out in the East during his now completed tour of inspection, it would be possible to dispose of more Russian labor again in the ensuing months. How many of them will be men, can at the moment hardly be guessed, since it is the army especially who wish to release from the East women, but to keep the men there, because they are needed for all kinds of urgent work.

Speer: May I propose an inquiry on the question as to what Russian laborers are used at the moment as auxiliary laborers in the armament factories, in essential war business or otherwise; this should be done separately from these who in the meantime have learned a trade. We can indirectly exchange auxiliary industry workers with Russian women, and we will be able in this way to provide the mining industry with Russian prisoners of war who now do clearing up labor in the court-yards.

Timm: I would also propose such indirect exchange for the essential industry as well.

Speer: The towns also were provided some time ago with Russian Ps/W for sweeping roads, etc.

Timm: Not many will be found there. If we look for greater numbers of Ps/W, we shall find them repairing tracks at the railways, and it will not be easy to extract them there, since they need grown-up and vigorous men.

(Speer: But the Russian women do that kind of work!)

Ganzenmueller: We need the men, and it is out of the question to extract men from there. We use them now as railway guards also, and we have to do this, since no other people are available.

Timm: Then we are going to draw up a statement showing where Russian prisoners of war and civilians are still used anywhere in the industry, except those who are employed after having gone through training.

Speer: Including also agriculture. Trained people cannot be extracted. I should object at once in my capacity as General Commissioner for Armaments, if now trained men would be extracted again from the armament factories. The works manager will go slowly mad if he has to train new people over and over again. But to extract in order to send them to the mines. But their employers must receive other laborers in exchange.

Rohland: This would be impossible for the foundries. We need 35000 additional women, whom we could employ at once, but we do not get them. We have already assented to the exchange of 35000 eastern laborers, but we must get them as soon as the mining industry gets its men. This is understood.

Sogemeier: This labor demand applies solely to pit-coal. As to lignite, we need an additional 25000 men.in the course of the next months.

Speer: This is exactly the same in the other mining industries including re.

Kehrl: 85 are needed for coal pits, the remaining mining industry ought to get additions in proportion.

Speer: You should add up the numbers. We cannot approach the Reich Marshal with numbers for a single industry.

Timm: Altogether it amounts to 70000 for coal and 14000 for the remaining mines, potassium included.

Speer: We do it this way: Kehrl collects the demands for labor necessary to complete the coal-and-iron-plan and communicates the numbers to Sauckel. Probably there will be a conference at the Reich Marshal’s in the next week, and an answer from Sauckel should have arrived by then. The question of recruitment for the armaments industry will be solved together with Weger.

Kehrl: I wish to urge that the allotments to the mines should not be made dependent on the recruitment of men abroad. We were completely frustrated these last three months because this principle had been applied. We ended December with a deficit of 25000, and we never get replacements. The number must be made up by men from Germany.

Speer: No, nothing doing!

Kehrl: We are completely stuck. I wish to point out that for a year now we feed the mining industry with promises only, and always are we pressed by the pits. They have received only half 1 of the amount they were promised last year.

Speer: That they were only put off is not true. It was something too which they got in the meantime. Let us not hide our candle under the bushel!

Kehrl: If all is said and done, we are in such a precarious situation that trouble is certain if one considers the ever increased program of the armaments industry. No we have drawn the plan for May. This plan cannot in fact be executed, since the 1st of May is a holiday. The other day already we did not know how we could make it right. 800000 T of coal fall out by reason of observing the 1st May. Compared with such numbers we are not served by a slow increase in haulage. The mines must receive their allotment in one stroke.

Speer: Out of the question! If Sauckel is able to promise the amount which he tries to get,

Timm: He quite expressly stated he cannot promise to dispatch

50000 men from the General Government.

Speer: But Russia has to be added to it!

Timm: Owing to the military events the influx which we had up to December has stopped at once. We received formerly 10000-12000 men in the three last months 60000 altogether. This is how the number has gone down.

Kehrl: We now have to touch the reserve which we cannot miss on the other side. Pleiger some time ago wired Sauckel, and reports like that from the Foundry East also came from other works.

Speer: This has been clarified already by an ordinance and a letter from me to Sauckel; from the coal pits, the foundries and the Ivan-program as such no labor will be extracted, and from the age groups only the auxiliary laborers who can be taken at thespot from the 3-4 age groups in question.

Kehrl: In this case the labor again will be taken from agriculture.

Speer: In relating to the whole of the population the number employed by the “Mountain Foundry East” is immaterial.

Timm: The Gauleiter returned this morning after he spent 7 days on the other side, and told me on the telephone he had spoken there with all competent authorities and they promised him to deliver until August a number not far below 1 million, consisting of men and women. Nobody can predict how many will be men.

Kehrl: The far greater number will be women.

Speer: These women we can use in the Reich. There are a great number of Russian Ps/W and laborers who are employed at places where they need not be employed. There can be an exchange. The only thing is to do this with unskilled workers, and not to take the workers from the industry where they were trained with difficulty.

Kehrl: Where we are late in completion of a task, or where we lose an opportunity, we can make up for it. But any coal which we cannot haul at once, is definitely lost for use in this war. This is why we cannot do enough to force the allotment to the pits.

Speer: But not by forcible actions in smashing what we toilsomely built.

(Kehrl: We need not do that!) You ought to add the conscripted labor.

Timm: We must endeavour to get German men for working at the coal-face.

Kehrl: We subsist on foreigners who live in Germany.

Timm: These men are concentrated within a very small area. Otherwise there might be trouble in this sector.

Speer: There is a specified statement showing in what sectors the Russian Ps/W have been distributed, and this statement is quite interesting. It shows that the armaments industry only received 300. I always complained about this.

Timm: The highest percentage of Ps/W are Frenchmen, and one ought not to forget, that it is difficult to employ them at the coal-face. The number of Russians living within the Reich is small.

Rohland: In the mines one should exclusively use eastern people, not western ones.

Speer: The western men collapse!

A 98105, USA] =====================================================================_

Sogemeier: May I point out how much we are on the way down? In comparison with the end of February, before the start of the SE-action, we lost every day 40000 T of pit-coal, only because we did not get replacements for the allotment promised to us; we were supposed to have our losses replaced in the proportion of 2 for 0. The proportion is still 1 for 1.

Speer: I have been given a note according to which the mines received in the’ first quarter of 1943, therefore at the same time when the call-ups took place, an additional 18000 men.

Sogemeier: At the beginning of the year we had still to receive out of earlier demands about 26000 men. To that number there are to be added 26000 men owing to the SE-action, if we take a proportion of 1 for 1. The Central Planning had promised us in March 15000 men for use in a planned increase of haulage. Altogether we received only 18000 men. This means that in fact we had not even the remainder of the request for the preceding year, and moreover that we had not yet received replacements for the SE-action in proportion of 1 for 1. Now Field Marshal Keitel wants to know whether the mining industry was in a position to release another 14000 men. In our present situation this is entirely out of the question. If we lose another 14000 men they could be taken only from the most vigourous age groups of the coal face workers. It is easy to calculate to what extent the haulage would go down in such a case. We urgently ask to protect us from further calling-up in the mining industry.

Speer: At least it cannot be undertaken until replacement labor is available in such a way that they all have been trained. It cannot be done at a moment’s notice.

Kehrl: Before August we cannot discuss such a thing. A decrease of 40000 tons a day means a yearly deficit of 14 million tons.

Speer: Timm will find out in collaboration with Weger and the District Economic Offices [Landeswritschaftsaemter] where Russians suitable for mining are still employed as auxiliary laborers. They will be exchanged man for man against Russian women or other replacements received by us and suitable for their work, and the Russians will be turned over to the mining industry. It would only be preferable to make a preliminary examination of these men, since of the people engaged we always found only one half of them to be really suitable. The pre-examination of these men in the factories should set a stricter standard. After the final numbers have been found outand discussed with Timm, a detailed statement has to be prepared for use in the Reich Marshal’s conference.

Sogemeier: May I put a question connected with this matter? Russians are still being combed-out from the mining industry who had been more or less trained metal-workers. This leads to difficulties, since Russia prisoners of war, when they learn of this fact, come forward at once and state they had been metal workers.

Speer: The intention was to comb out these Russians solely for use in the industry which services the needs of the mining industry. This is clearly stated with regard to the mines. In that case you surely have no objections?

Sogemeier: No, if the industry which serves the mines, is receiving them, I do not object.

Kehrl: In case of doubt the serving industry is not getting them! As soon as they are discovered, the Russians are snatched away for more urgent work. For instance, we have experienced that people while being on their way to us, have been redirected when they had arrived in Cologne. Only a certain percentage of them arrives as a rule, a rather high percentage is taken away for different use.

Speer: But the number of men released as metal workers is established. Therefore, it must be possible to find out how many of these men have arrived at the serving industry. You are able to find that out, Mr. Sogemeier. We on our part had agreed with Sauckel that they are to be extracted solely for the serving industry. This was in compliance with Pleiger’s express request to that effect.

Speer: In any case we ought to force the coal production with all our power. I now have here a statement on the distribution of the Soviet prisoners. There are 368000 altogether. Of these are: 101000 in agriculture, 94000 in the mining industrywho are not available in any case,15000 in the building materials industry, 26000 in iron and metal production where they cannot be extracted either, 29000 in the manufacture of iron, steel, and metal goods, 63000 in the manufacture of machines, boilers, and cars, and similar appliances, which means in armaments industry and 10000 in the chemical industry. Agriculture thus has received by far the most of them, and the men employed there could in the course of time be exchanged for women. The 90000 Russian Ps/W employed in the whole of the armaments industry are for the greatest part skilled men. If you can extract 8000-10000 men from there, it would already be the limit.

Kehrl: Would it not be possible to add Serbians, etc.?

Sogemeier: We ought not to mix too much.

Rohland: For God’s sake, no Serbians! We had very bad experiences with mixing.

Speer: We distribute by starting from a production of 290 million tons which is quite considerable. If the conditions on which such a production can be reached cannot be fulfilled this will influence the supply of household coal to a very great extent. This we ought to point out to Sauckel, viz. that the psychological effect on the population will be a considerable one in case he can not provide the necessary labor.

Meinberg: Especially since the transports of laborers always arrive 1 1/2 months later than promised; for this means a loss of 10% production intended to be accomplished by the additional laborers. In that case the 290 million tons can never be reached, but 280 million at the most. The delay alone in supplying the labor has that effect.

Speer: What are your proposals for our further action, Kehrl?

Kehrl: If the labor supply is secured by appropriate measures we have no problem as to its distribution. This problem of distribution, however, is insoluble, if we have to distribute the labor for a production of less than 295 million tons, i. e., if we produce less than 282 million tons. According to what Timm just said and what we have discussed, we shall not reach our goal. He wants to take 22000 men from inner Germany, moreover 10000 Russians Ps/W, altogether 32000. To supply the rest, we wait for God in h Heaven and the Government General. Judging by our earlier experience we shall not get them. The gentlemen of the Government General had to cancel the recruitment owing to the danger for their lives, since they were unable to recruit at all in certain areas. The least we have to reckon with are therefore great delays, and each delay means great loss of production because there is less hauling.

Timm: All these numbers are estimates, and nobody can guarantee their correctness. I made a point of mentioning the difficulties. But I am enough of an optimist to believe that we shall be able to attain these numbers. I also said we hope to supply in May the outstanding labor from the Government General despite all the difficulties. If one estimates pessimistically one never arrives at a conclusion.

Kehrl: Our risk with regard to coal, however, is too great. All honor to the optimist, but it seems out of the question that we could get as much as we need. We cannot afford to take a risk in this matter.

Speer: Who is in a position to give you a guarantee for a 100 certainty ?

Kehrl: We have to employ the men who are already in this country. This is the only possible guarantee.

(Speer: Absolutely out of the question.) In relation to the number of men already working for us the 20000-30000 men whom we wish to extract are a very small number. They are of decisive importance for the entire industry. We employ altogether 24 million men. If we extract 25000 directly from our people, this does mean nothing for the manufactures, but would decisively benefit the whole of industry.

Speer: Out of the question!

Schieber: In my opinion the Commissioner General for Labor ought to proceed in the following manner: action to bring about the immediate release of at least 30000 laborers from agriculture who will be supplied to the coal mines. In exchange, agriculture which is anyway in urgent need of additional female labor, receives any female labor who arrive. In my opinion the mines today can be supplied only from the sole real reserve of vigorous foreign men which we still have, viz. from agriculture. These men are also well fed and able to do real work.

Speer: Everything depends on the amount of the influx from abroad.

Schieber: If anyway nothing arrives, the mines certainly will get nothing.

Timm: Gauleiter Sauckel is perfectly convinced that the transports will be on their way within a short time. Now the front has been consolidated at last.

Schieber: We ought to be grateful that the weather has allowed the farmer to keep things going in some way despite the little labor being available to him. For the farmer, the coal supply is just as important as for the whole of the armaments industry. When we discuss tomorrow the nitrogen problem we shall see the same: our first need is coal.

Koerner: On the 1st of April we had in agriculture a deficit of about 600000 laborers. It had been planned to cover it by supplying labor from the east, mainly women. These laborers will first have to be supplied until other laborers are released from agriculture. We are just entering the season where the heaviest work in the fields has to be done, for which many laborers are necessary. Much labor is needed for the hoeing of the fruits, and it is to be hoped that this year the harvest can be started early which would be rendered much more difficult if an exchange of labor would have to take place.

Kehrl: Relatively considered, agriculture is much better provided with labor than the mines. They are still able to undertake improvements which they could not have undertaken in peace-time. We of the mines, on the other hand, have to fight for 20000-30000 men. It should not be possible to raise this number out of the 24 millions? The mines are in a bad position because they can use only certain categories of workers. They are fed with hopes of the men promised from the Government General or of Russians. But if these men do not arrive?

Sogemeier: The 30000 men are but replacements for the men extracted by the SE-action. If we get them we can just haul 260 million tons, in the best possible case, 275 tons. Therefore, we need more men than the 30000.

Kehrl: I meant this number in an additional sense: added 30000 men to those expected from the Government General.

Speer: How is the situation in the Protectorate, Mr. Timm? Can we not extract anything from there?

Timm: Discussions on this question had been planned, but were cancelled because of the intended shifting of orders for manufacture in the Protectorate.

Speer: Despite this shifting, the manpower reservoir is still of such size that some could be extracted. Apart from this, we are not in a position to shift orders at wish, but we are already hampered by the power question.

Timm: This is exactly what we expected. But the discussions planned to take place in Prague, have been cancelled.

Speer: The local authorities always maintain that nothing can be released.

Timm: We wanted the discussions in Prague, since we had examined the position and found out that there are far too many skilled workers in some places and that many workers could be extracted. But subsequently we were told by the Ministry, the conference was cancelled because the shifting made it necessary to employ all available labor.

Weger: General Daluege and Gauleiter Sauckel especially wished that you, Mr. Minister, took part in the conference. I agree with Timm, and told Hoersekamp that I do not doubt he could release labor from the General Government despite the shifting because the power question will not be solved in the Protectorate until next year and the year after. Until that time he cannot even use so much labor. Therefore he ought to release some in any case.

Milch: We ought to except certain areas of the Protectorate to which the orders are being directed, and extract nothing there until a surplus is found out subsequently. For the time being it cannot be ascertained. There are enough other areas of the Protectorate which are not affected by the industry plan and some labor could be extracted from them at once. We ought to name the places which are excepted from our action.

Timm: In this the authorities on the other side ought to participate; they are in the best position to tell the places from where nothing must be extracted.

Milch: If one proceeds as I proposed, and Timm agreed to it, no damage can be done. This ought to be done in any case. For the rest I completely agree: we must now supply the mines with labor. The greatest part of labor which we can supply from the East will indeed be women. But the eastern women are quite accustomed to agricultural work, and especially to the type of work which has to be done these coming weeks, the hoeing and transplanting of turnips etc. The women are quite suitable for this. One thing has to be considered: first you must supply agriculture with the women, then you can extract the men, laborer for laborer. It is not the right thing if first the men are taken away and the farmers are left without labor for 4 to 6 weeks. If the women arrive after such time they arrive too late.

Speer: Beyond this we are prepared to release from all parts of the war economy, in exchange for women, any Russian Ps/W or other Russian who is employed as auxiliary laborer.

The Commissioner for the Four-Year Plan Central Planning Berlin W 8, 6/24/1943 3 Leipziger Strasse 24 copies 17th copy

State Top Secret

Results of the 42nd session of the Central Planning Board, on 6/23/1943. 16 hrs.

Coal situation

The man-power situation in the coal mining industry, particularly in the hard coal mining industry, is still unsatisfactory, and necessitates an extension of the measures decided upon at the 36th session of the Central Planning Board, held on 4/22/1943.

The intensive discussion yielded as the most expedient solution the use of Russian prisoners of war to fill the existing vacancies. The more homogeneous character of the shifts will bring about the necessary higher output resulting both from an increased capacity of such shifts and particularly from a restriction of fluctuations.

1. The present drive, which is to be carried out throughout the German economy proper, aims both at freeing Russian labor, fit for work in the mining industry and actually not employed as semi-skilled workmen, and at replacing it by additionally imported labor consisting of Eastern workers, Poles, etc. Thus, about 50000 workmen are expected to be made available up to the end of 7/1943. This drive is to be accelerated.

Furthermore as an immediate measure it should be suggested to the FührerRVK Reichvereinigung Kohle, Reich Coal Association] and GBA [Generalbevollmaechtigter fuer den Arbeitseinsatz, Plenipotentiary General for Labor] submitting the necessary figures for the statement to the Führer, that 200000 Russian prisoners fit for the heaviest work be made available from the Wehrmacht and Waffen SS through the intermediary of the Chiefs of the Army Groups [Heeresgruppenchefts]. The prisoners will be selected on the spot by medical officers of the mining industry and officials of the office of the Plenipotentiary General for Labor Control (GBA) will take charge of them there and then. Provisions are to be made for an extension of this program in order to satisfy any demand for man power, which will have accumulated up to the end of the year 1943.

The man power needed by the mining transport industry [Begbau-Zubringer-Industrie] and by the iron producing industry [Eisenschaffende Industrie] may be supplied from that same source provided that the necessities of the coal mining industry have previously been adjusted.

The performance of the Soviet Russians so employed is to be raised by a premium system [Praemien-system]. For this purpose, the ban on pay restrictions is to be lifted and the manager [Betriebsführer] be allowed to distribute amongst the workmen, according to his duty and discretion, RMI.per head per day as premium for particular services rendered.

Furthermore, care will be taken, that workmen can exchange these premiums, which will be paid out in camp money [Lagergeld] for goods. It is intended to put at their disposal various provisions (e.g. sunflower seeds, etc.) beer, tobacco, cigarettes and cigars, small items for daily use, etc.

The Reich Ministry of Food [Rem-Reichs-Ernaehrungs-Ministrium] in conjunction with the Reich Association “Coal” [RV “Kohle”] and the Reich Ministry of Economic Affairs [RWM-Reichs Wirtschafts-Ministerium] will clarify the question whether further improvement can be granted as far as rations are concerned.

2. Equally in occupied countries, labor is to be tied more securely to the varioUs factories by means of the distribution of additional ration cards as premium for good services. This refers in particular to the Government General and the occupied territories in the east [Ostgebiete]. The output demanded of the Government General is to be fixed at the proposed amount, and the additional rations for armament workers may then be rated accordingly.

Dr. Gramsch [typewritten signature] Reichsminister Speer

Generalfeldmarschall Milch

Staatsrat Schieber Reich Ministry for Armament and Ammunition

Oberburgmeister Liebel Reich Ministry for Armament and Ammunition

Major General Waeger Reich Ministry for Armament and Ammunition

Dr. Ing. Groener Reich Ministry for Armament and Ammunition

Praesident Kehrl Reich Ministry of Economic Affairs

Min. Dir. Gramsch Four Year Plan

Min. Dirig. Timm Office of the Plenipotentiary General for Labor Control [GBA]

Staatsrat Pleiger Reich Association “Coal” [RVK]

Dr. Sogemeier Reich Association “Coal” [RVK]

Dr. Rosenkranz Reich Association “Coal” [RVK]

Stenographic Transcript of the 53rd Conference of the Central Planning

Concerning Supply of Labor on 2/16/1944 10 o’clock in the Reich Air Ministry

Present: Milch (for Central Planning), Dehrle, Berk, etc.)

Milch: The armament industry employs foreign workmen to a large extent: according to the latest figures400. The new directions by the Plenipotentiary General for Manpower are mostly foreigners and we lost a lot of German personnel which was called up. Specially the air industry being a young industry employs a great many young people who should be called up. This will be very difficult as is easily seen if one deducts those working for experimental stations. In mass production the foreign workers by far prevail. It is about 95% and higher. Our best new engine is made 88% by Russian prisoners of war and the other 12% by German men and women. 50-60 Ju 52’s which we now regard only as transport planes are made per month. Only 6-8 German men are working on this machine. The rest are Ukrainian women who have beaten all the records of trained workers:

Milch: The list of the shirkers should be entrusted to Himmler’s trustworthy hands who will make them work all right. This is very important for educating people and has also a deterrent effect on such others who would likewise feel inclined to shirk.

It is, therefore not possible to exploit fully all the foreigners unless we compel them by piece work or we have the possibility of taking measures against foreigners who are not doing their bit. But if the foreman lays hands on a prisoner of war or smacks him there is at once a terrible row, the man is put into prison etc. There are sufficient officials in Germany who think it their most important duty to stand up for human rights instead of war production. I am also for human rights. But if a Frenchman says: “You fellows will all be hanged and the chief of the factory will be beheaded first” and if then the chief says “I am going to hit him” then he is in a mess. He is not protected, but the “poor fellow” who said that to him is protected. I have told my engineers “I am going to punish you if you don’t hit such a man; the more you do in this respect the more I shall praise you. I shall see to it that nothing happens to you”. This is not yet sufficiently known. I cannot talk to all factory-leaders. I should like to see the man who stays myarm because I can settle accounts with everybody who stays my arm. If the little factory-leader does that he is put into a concentration camp and runs the risk of losing the prisoners of war. In one case two Russian officers took off with an airplane but crashed. I ordered that these two men be hanged at once. They were hanged or shot yesterday. I left that to the SS. I expressed the wish to have them hanged in the factory for others to see.

State Top Secret Stenographic Notes of the 22nd Conference of the Central Planning

Concerning the Direction of Labor on Monday 11/2/1942 at 1200 hours in the Air Ministry.

“Milch: I believe that agriculture must get its labor quota. Assuming we could have given agriculture 100000 more men, we would now have 100000 more men who would be more or less well fed, while actually the human material which we receive generallyabove all the Ps/Ware not in good enough condition for work” Stenographic Transcript of the 23rd Conference of the Central Planning concerning Iron Quotas Held on 11/3/1942, 1600 hours in the Reich Ministry for Armament and Munitions, Berlin, Pariser Platz 3

Speer: Well, through the industry, we could deceive the French by telling them that we would release for their use all prisoners of war who are rolling mill workers and smelters if they would only give us the names.

Rohland: We have established our own office in Paris. I see, you mean, the French should report the smelters who are prisoners of war in Germany.

Milch: I would simply say you get two men in exchange for one of these.

Speer: The French firms know exactly which prisoners of war are smelters. Unofficially, you should create the impression that they would be released. They give the names and then we have them. Do that.

Rohland: That is an idea! Top State Secret!

Shorthand Minutes of the 33rd Conference of the Central Planning Board concerning: Labor Supply on 2/16/1943 at 16 hrs. at the Reich Ministry for Armament and Munitions. Pariser Platz, Berlin

Timm: I should like to say something about the labor supply possibilities. Perhaps you will permit me to emphasize the negative side a little. The greatest difficulties result from the fact that the supply of labor outstanding could not be fully dispatched from the East, but came in in ever diminishing numbers. One may say that they have almost become completely exhausted. Eastern laborers during the last six weeks arrived only in smaller numbers than in former times, so that they can hardly be included to an appreciable amount on the credit side of the supply account. In any case their numbers are small. The foremost reason is that in former months most transports were dispatched from the Ukraine while the main recruitment areas were those which in the meantime had become operational areas, or even were no longer in our hands. Theforecasts we made applied to a large extent to the transport of people from the Caucasus district, the Kuban, from areas like Stalingrad etc. These possibilities no longer exist. We have prepared measures which should enable us to draw more Eastern workers again during the following months. I venture to think that we should be able, on a conservative calculation, to transfer during the month of March between 150000-200000 laborers from the East to the West.

(Speer: Including or exchanging those needed for agriculture?) Including those needed for agriculture. But in my opinion it will be necessary to apply much pressure, since just those districts are concerned which have been pacified to a certain extent, and for the same reason will not be very much inclined to release labor. This is calculated on the assumption that some labor has to be released also from the eastern and northern parts of the East.

The second area, capable of releasing a considerable amount of labor is the Government General, and that for the January estimate which has been drawn up with particular caution as I again wish to emphasize. We expect that the figures will rather be surpassed than not reached. I think we can expect a number of 40,000, of which, it is true, a part will have to be given to agriculture, if we intend no more than to cover the losses which we had to inflict last autumn.

Beyond this it ought to be possible in my opinion, to employ within the Reich, and especially for the mining industry, part of the Polish Building Service. I venture to think one ought to enlarge this organization in such a way that more age groups than so far are called up for it, since this procedure is functioning. The younger age groups which in fact are especially suited for mining could be dispatched to the Reich. In this case the supervisors who are provided for the greatest part by the Building Service, will be needed only in very small numbers in the Reich. The next area would be the Protectorate on which I cannot make a final statement today. We have been promised for the month of March about 10000 laborers. But I am of the opinion that some loosening-up is possible. The Commissioner will soon in a personal visit take in hand the possibility of this loosening-up.

France is included in the account with 100000 laborers for March. Messages which I received permit us to hope that this number will be increased in the middle of March. Belgium is included with 40000, Holland with 30000, Slovakia with 20000, who, it is true, are exclusively suited for agriculture, since their share of individual workers hasbeen completely delivered. This item consists exclusively of agricultural laborers, owing to a State treaty. For the remaining part of the foreign areas I included another 10000. This amounts altogether to 400000 laborers who should arrive in March. One might be entitled to add for the last month altogether 10000 prisoners of war. These are men to be drawn from the East. It can be expected that this number might under certain conditions be surpassed, since the High Command intends especially for operational reasons, to take the prisoners of war back to the Reich, particularly from the areas threatened by the enemy. A former item concerns the fluctuation of labor which certainly amounts to about 100000 laborers. Then there are items which at the moment cannot be estimated: the yield-from the threatened areas and from the “Stoppage-action”. Here I cannot venture to name final figures, but I hope to be able -to do so next month.

Sauckel: Of course we regret very much that last autumn we were unable to recruit as much as we would have liked in the areas which now are again in enemy hands. This is partly due to the fact that we were not assisted in the degree we had expected. Moreover we were not able to effect the removal of the civil population which had been planned. These events are an urgent reminder of the fact that it is necessary to employ foreign laborers at once and in great numbers in Germany proper and in the actual armaments industry. You may be certain that we wish to achieve this. We have not the slightest interest in creating difficulties for an armaments office, even for those working for German interest abroad, by taking labor away from them to an unreasonable extent. But on this occasion I should like to ask you to try and understand our procedure. We Germans surely have sent to the front between 50-75% of our skilled workers. A part of them has been killed while the nations subjugated by us need no longer shed their blood. Thus they can preserve their entire capacity with regard to skilled workers, inasmuch as they have not been transferred to Germany which is the case only for a much smaller percentage than all of us supposed, and in fact they do use them partly for manufacturing things which are not in the least important for the German war economy. If we proceed energetically against this abuse, I ask you to give me credit for so much reason that I do not intend to damage the foreign interests of the German armaments industry. The quality of the foreign worker is such that it cannot be compared with that of the German worker. But even then I intend to create a similar proportion between skilled and workers trained for their job, as it exists in Germany by force of tradition, since it has come about that we had to send men to the front in much larger numbers than we requested France or any other country to do. Moreover we shall endeavour increasingly to bring about on a generous scale the adaptation of the French, Polish, and Czech workers. I do not see for the moment any necessity for limiting the use of foreign labor. The only thing I ask for is that we understand each other, so that the immense difficulties and friction between the respective authorities disappear and the program drawn up by us will by no means be frustrated by such things.

There are without a doubt still enough men in France, Holland, Belgium, the Protectorate, and the Government General to meet our labor demands for the next months. I confess that I expect more success from such a procedure with respect to heavier work or for work where shifts of 10 or more hours are customary, than from relying on the use of German women and men exclusively. We shall have better success by proceeding this way provided the foreign workers still obey, which remains a riskwe always run, than by using weaker German women and girls as labor in places of very important armament work, where foreigners may be used for security reasons.

The situation in France is this; after I and my assistants had succeeded after difficult discussions in inducing Laval to introduce the Service Act this act has now been enlarged, owing to our pressure so that already yesterday three French age groups have been called up. We are now therefore legally and with the assistance of the French government entitled to recruit laborers in France from three age groups, whom we can use in French factories in the future, but of whom we may choose some for our use in Germany and send them to Germany. I think in France the ice is now broken. According to reports received they now have begun to think about a possible break through by the Bolsheviks and the dangers which thereby threaten Europe. The resistance which the French Government has hitherto shown, is diminishing. Within the next days I shall go to France in order to set the whole thing into motion, so that the losses in the East may be somewhat balanced by increasing recruitment and calling-up in France.

If we receive comprehensive lists in time, we shall, I think, be able to cover all demands by dispatching in March 800000 laborers.

Speer: Recruitment abroad as such is supported by us. We only fear very much that the skilled workers extracted from the occupied countries do not always reach the appropriate factories in Germany. It might certainly be better if we acted in such a way that the parent firms of Germany which work with the French and Czech factories would comb out the foreign works more than before for their own use.

Sauckel: We made an agreement with Field Marshal Milch. You will get the factories which are urgently needed for your airplane motors, etc.; these will be completely safeguarded. In the same way I promised Grand Admiral Doenitz today that the U-Boat repair firms proper are absolutely safeguarded. We shall even be able to provide our own armament factories on French soil with labor extracted from French factories, in the main from the unoccupied territory where there still are metal works which have their full complement of skilled workers without even having been touched so far.

Hildebrandt: May I point out at this point that we have to put up with the loss of the Italian workers this year. This, according to present discussions, concerns 300000 men altogether, or 15000-20000 a month. If we deduct the first installment, the remaining ones to a great part are just highly skilled metal workers.

Sauckel: This is a request of the Führer, but he has not yet finally decided.

Hildebrandt: But we have been told to be prepared to lose these men.

Speer: We ourselves quite support the combing-out abroad. On the other hand we must be entitledand this was agreed to exclude or prefer particular kinds of work, e.g. the armour factories. In France we are more and more turning towards giving up finishing processes, and stressing the sub-contracting. It is the foundries and similar works, e.g. for the use of the aluminum industry, which we wish to use to capacity. We could force the production of Opel, so that in this case Peugeot who manufacture the forged partsfor Opel, the parent firm, might demand more labor for this while the rest of their workers would be taken over by Opel.

Milch: With regard to France there is in France-an industry which manufactures complete aeroplane motors and spare parts. We have transferred to France the manufacture of everything which can be made there without impairing secrecy. These are training planes, transport planes, etc. However since we wish to make better use of these possibilities we have transferred to a great extent the manufacturing of parts. The complete product must be kept secret from the French; but in every secret appliance there are only a few parts which in fact are to be kept secret. The bulk is made up of the other parts; their manufacture has been transferred to France to a great extent, in the same manner we have started the employment of many construction engineers there. Today there is continuous work in France for several thousand construction engineers. The industry which works in France for our benefit,-needs today 20000 men who must be provided by us, in order to fulfill the program. The production lags far behind the program agreed upon. While we fulfill in Germany the whole of the program, it is being met in France by only 300. True, it is now on the increase since we intervened during the last weeks and months. On principle we have kept the State out of this collaboration with French industry, and have had the German firms deal with the French (firms). They are called sponsor firms so that now this system works. This system has not been completed everywhere, but it is on the way all over, and we have had rather good results. We are often told we have almost the whole of Europe at our disposal. But the production which we receive from France is insignificant, except for army cars. The whole potential French production is not used by us so far, but only a small percentage. If we were not forced to produce in France, since many facilities, rooms, machines, etc., cannot be transferred to Germany, if the housing of workers were not so difficult, etc., then we might prefer to transfer everything to Germany and let all work be done here. But we would have too great losses in production apart from the restiveness of the men. Yesterday we made an agreement. I am very grateful that this matter will now be put right on the spot by you, Gauleiter Sauckel, together with General Von Der Heyde and Colonel Brueckner. It is most difficult to get French laborers to Germany. These things cannot be decided or regulated by authorities, but only a sponsor firm has the necessary means of finding out about it. I therefore propose to make use of sponsor firms, especially since in France the system of sub-contracting is very much developed. Behind a factory which organizes the whole business, as far as is known from the outside, there are in fact other factories employed in preparation and semi-fabrication. But our sponsor firms would be able tocomb-out these sub-contractors as well. We ought to charge our people with combing out all these firms and to find out what men work for our program. Who does not will be snatched by us.

Of course a front exists somewhere in the East. This front will be held for a certain time. The only thing which the Russians inherit, if we evacuate an area is the population. The question is whether we had not better make it a rule to take the population back first as far as 100 km. to the rear of the front. All the civil population will be taken back 100 km. behind the front. There are no trenches now for which labor would be needed.

Timm: We tried to take the population of Kharkov back. But the officer commanding the fortress of Kharkov requested 90000-120000 people only for the construction of field works so that we had to provide even complete railway trains.

Weger: They were even undertaking demolitions.

Milch: But this is done by the Engineers. Any hope of getting prisoners of war from the East, hardly exists today.

Sauckel: If any prisoners are taken there, they will be needed.

Milch: We have made a request for an order that a certain percentage of men in the A. A. Artillery must be Russians. 60000 will be taken altogether; 30000 are already employed as gunners. This is an amusing thing that Russians must work the guns. The last 20000 are still outstanding. Yesterday I received a letter from the Army High Command, in which they say they could release not a single man, they themselves have not enough. Thus this measure will not be successful for us.

[Extracts on the Subject of Deportations and Forced Labor From Speer’s Minutes of his Meetings with Hitler] Führer-Protokolle 1942 [Page 514] Record of conferences with the Führer on 8/10-12/1942

42. Gauleiter Sauckel promises to make Russian labor available for the fulfillment of the iron and coal program and reports thatif requiredhe can supply a further million Russian laborers for the German armament industry up to and including 10/1942. So far, he has already supplied 1 million for industry and 700000 for agriculture. In this connection the Führer states that the problem of providing labor can be solved in all cases and to any extent; he authorizes Gauleiter Sauckel to take all measures required.

He would agree to any necessary compulsion [Zwangsmassnahmen] in the East as well as in the West if this question could not be solved on a voluntary basis.

Signed: Speer

Berlin, 9/29/1942

Führer-Protokolle 1942 [Pages 477-478] Minutes of conferences with the Führer on 9/20-22/1942.

36. I pointed out to the Führer that, apart from an insignificant amount of work, no possibility exists of organizing armament-production in the concentration camps, because

1. the machine tools required are missing

2. there are no suitable premises.

Both these assets would be available in the armaments industry, if use would be made of them by a second shift.

The Führer agrees to my proposal, that the numerous factories set up outside towns for ARP reasons, should release their workers for supplementing the second shift in town factories and should in return be supplied with labor from the concentration campsalso two shifts.

I pointed out to the Führer the difficulties which I expect to encounter if Reichsführer SS Himmler should be able, as he requests, to exercise authoritative influence over these factories. The Führer, too, does not consider such an influence necessary.

The Führer however agrees that Reichsführer SS Himmler should draw advantages from making his prisoners available; he should get equipment for his division.

I suggest to give him a share in kind (war equipment) in ratio to the working-hours done by his prisoners. A 3-5 share is discussed, the equipment also being calculated according to working hours. The Führer would agree to such a solution.

The Führer is prepared to order the additional delivery of this equipment and weapons to the SS, according to list submitted to him.

Signed: Speer

STATE TOP SECRET

Berlin 7/10/1943

[Pages 252-253] Discussion with the Führer 7/8/1943

17. The Führer laid down in the coal discussion that 70,000 Russian prisoners of war fit for mining work should be sent each month to the mines. He also pointed out that an approximate minimum of 150,000-200,000 fit Russian prisoners of war must be earmarked for the mines in order to obtain the required number of men suitable for this work.

If the Russian prisoners of war cannot be released by the Army, the male population in the partisan infested areas should without distinction be proclaimed prisoners of war and sent off to the mines.

The Führer ordered at the same time that these prisoners of war who are not fit for the mines should immediately be placed in the iron industry, in manufacturing and supply industries and in the armament industry.

The Führer further ordered that he should receive a monthly report giving

A. the total number of Russian prisoners of war.

B. the number of Russian prisoners of war fit for mining, who have been made available for the mines and a report addressed to Field Marshal Keitel as to why the remainder could not be used.

The joint report of Sauckel and Pleiger is also to be sent to me.

Signed: Speer

[Page 168] Ministeramt (Minister’s Office)

Records of the discussions in the Führer Headquarters on 12/6-7/1943

22. Reported to the Führer on a proposal worked out by Dr. Carl, relating to “Aktion Russland” (Action Russia) and left detailed data to him for examination. The Führer points out again that my suggestion was good, that only a surprise-action is worthwhile and that subdivision into three separate actions, as proposed by the Luftwaffe, does not appear suitable.

Signed: Speer

[Page 139] State Top Secret

Points from the Conference (Saur) with the Führer on 3/5/1944, jointly with General Field Marschall Milch, General der Flieger Bodenschatz, Oberst Von Below

Berlin, 3/6/1944

18. “Told the Führer of the Reich Marshal’s wish for the further utilization of the production power of prisoners of war by giving the direction of the Stalags to the SSwith the exception of the English and Americans. The Führer considers the proposal good and has asked Colonel Von Below to arrange matters accordingly.”

Prepared by Saur Seen by Speer

[Page 132] Minutes of Discussions with the Führer on 4/6-7/1944

State Secret

The Director of the Technical Office TA Ch S/Kr.

Berlin, 4/9/1944.

17. “Suggested to the Führer that, due to lack of builders and equipment, the second big building project should not be set up in German territory, but in close vicinity to the border on suitable soil (preferable on gravel base and with transport facilities) on French, Belgian or Dutch territory. The Führer agrees to this suggestion if the works could be set up behind a fortified zone. For the suggestion of setting this plant up- in French territory speaks mainly the fact that it would be much easier to procure the necessary workers. Nevertheless, the Führer asks an attempt be made to set up the second works in a safer area, namely in the Protectorate. If it should prove impossible there too, to get hold of the necessary workers, the Führer himself will contact the Reichsführer ‘SS’ and will give an order that the required 100000 men are to be made available by bringing in Jews from Hungary. Stressing the fact that the building organization of the Industriegemeinschaft Schlesien] was a failure, the Führer demands that these works must be built by the O.T. exclusively and that the workers should be made available by the Reichsführer ‘SS’. He wants to hold a meeting shortly in order to discuss details with all the men concerned.

Signed: Speer

[Extracts on the Subject of Deportations and Forced Labor from Speer’s Minutes on Meetings of “Central Planning”]

Reichsminister Speer Minister’s Office

Berlin, 7/24/1942 Dr. Goe/W

Report on the 11th Conference of the “Central Planning” on the 7/22/1942

Present: Reichsminister Speer General Field Marshal Milch State Secretary Koerner Commercial Advisor Roechling Reich Iron Association Dr. Rohland Reich Iron Association Dr. Von Bohlen u. Halbach Reich Iron Association Dr. Langen Reich Iron Association Bergass A.D. Sohl Reich Iron Association Gauleiter Sauckel Commissioner for Labor Control State Secretary Backe Reich Food Ministry General Director Pleiger Reich Coal Association Dr. Fischer Reich Coal Association Major General V. Gablenz Reich Air Ministry Herr Kranefuss Reich Air Ministry Ministerial Director Gramsch 4 Years Plan Ministerial Advisor V. Normann 4 Years Plan Dr. Schieber Ministry for Armament and Munitions Dr. Stellwaag Ministry for Armament and Munitions Major Wagner Ministry for Armament and Munitions Major General Becht Reich Ministry for Armament and Munitions Lieutenant Colonel V. Nicolai Reich Ministry for Armaments and Munitions Ministerial Advisor Dr. Wissmann Ministry for Armament and Munitions Herr Schlieker Ministry for Armament and Munitions Dr. Goerner Reich Ministry for Armaments and Munitions

At the conference following on the 10th meetingthe provisions for he increased iron production were discussed. Assurance of Food Supplies.

A net influx of one million foreign workers is estimated. This figure has not been achieved in the previous months. Even with an intake of more than one million in the coming months the million-boundary will not be overstepped in view of current departures. For this food supply is assured. How far an improvement of the food supplies positions can be made possible through sharper grasp of the production outside Germany … [every?] day a train load of the forces working in the east [will be] directed to the coal mines until the figure of 6000 is achieved. Prisoners of war are being obtained, at present, from camps in the Government General. 51000 prisoners of war in the Senne-Camp. In the district east of the Government General there are 74000 prisoners of war available. Up till now an elimination quota of 50 of unemployable people has been reckoned with in the allocations to coal mining. It is considered necessary that not too high demands should be placed on the choice of prisoners of war. The Miners’ Union Doctors are to be informed that a different standard is to be laid down for the prisoners of war than for German miners.

For the consecutive order in which the prisoners of war are to be put to work, it will be laid down, that before the metal workers are chosen, the coal mining in the first place and requirements for the loading and unloading-commands in the second place are to be considered.

General Field Marshal Milch undertakes to accelerate the procuring of the Russian prisoners of war from the camps.

Signed: Dr. Eng. Goerner [Typewritten]

The Trustee for the Four Years Plan

Central Planning Z.P. 6.

Berlin, 10/30/1942. Results of the 17th meeting of Central Planning on 10/28/1942, 9.30 a.m.

Increase of Coal Production

1. Allocation of Labor.

Coal production in the Ruhr district has increased to 390000 tons per day. Any further increase depends on whether the requirements for labor are being met. About 104000 men are required. Furthermore, 7800 menoriginally 16000-17000, requirements having been brought down by rationalizationare needed for the supplying industry, 6800 of these for the machine industry. 5000 more unskilled workers are furthermore required to secure the transport of mine-timber which is essential for reason of variety [Sortimmentsgruenden].

The intake capacity of the mining industry for the month of November is 44000 prisoners of war of which 25000 are for the Ruhr district, and 12600 Eastern workers, 7500 of whom are for the Ruhr district. Total requirements so far amount to 191000 laborers of whom 90700 were wanted by the Ruhr district. Up to October 24th a total of 123000 was allocated. These numbers are still to be checked up by the Transport Committee (R(eics) V(erkehrs) K(ommission)) and Mr. Sauckel.

According to the Commissioner of Labor (G(eneral) B(eauftragter der) Arbeit)) the following number of prisoners of war is at present at hand.

Within the Reich on the way and in camp: 30000 Remainder of prisoners of war (outstanding from a total of 150000 and promised up to the beginning of December): 60000 At camps in the General Government: 15000 Of these up to December 1st the following can be regarded as available: Within the Reich: 15000 Of the remainder of prisoners of war: 10000 From the General Government: 7500 total: about 32000

Therefore, as compared to the required 44000 there is a deficit of about 12000. Moreover, 10000 civilian laborers from the East can be put up by exchanges from the agricultural sector which is 2000 less than required so that the November deficit amounts to 14000 and, in comparison with the total requirements of the mining industry of 104000, there is a deficit of 62000. The deficit increases by the loss figures of prisoners of war the number of which is still to be ascertained by the Commissioner-ofLabor.

The mining industry is in a position to use any amount of Eastern labor instead of prisoners of war. Therefore, it is to get preference at the combing out of the agricultural sector. There is no objection to a temporary accommodation of Eastern labor at prisoner of war camps (without barbed wire, etc.).

The requirements of the supply industry are to be met by the Red Label method [Rotzettelverfahren]. Constructors [Konstrukteure] are to be provided by canvassing at the French prisoner of war camps for officers.

(typed signature) Dr. Steffler

Present: Reichsminister Speer Generalfeldmarschall Milch Staatssekretaer Koerner Staatsrat Schieber RM. f.B.u.Mun. Gen. Maj. Becht RM. f.B.u.Mun. Oberstltn. v. Nicholai RM. f.B.u.Mun. Herr Schlieker RM. f.B.u.Mun. Oberberghauptmann Gabel RWM Oberst Dr. Krull RWM Oberbergrat Otto RWM Staatssekretaer Ganzenmueller RVM Staatsrat Meinberg RVM Min. Dir. Gramsch V.P. Min. Rat Steffler V.P. Min. Dirig. Timm GBA Oberreg. Rat Hildebrandt GBA Gen. Dir. Pleiger RV Kohle Dr. Sogemeier RV Kohle Dr. Fischer RV Kohle Dir. Winkaus Beauftr.f.d. Bergbaubedarf.

State Secret

Stenographic Transcript of the 17th Conference of the Central Planning

Concerning: Requirements for the increase of Coal Production held on 10/28/1942, 0930 hours at the Reich Ministry for Armament and Munition, Berlin, Pariser Platz 3

Dr. Eggeling/Sgt.

Hildebrand: Our promises were made on the basis of the 150000 prisoners of war whom Fieldmarshall Keitel had promised us for this purpose. Of these 60000 are still missing. Several departments are passing the buck in this matter. General Wagner, the chief of supply, called on me and told me they could not supply them now and wanted time until January. They are now promised for the beginning of December.

As for the quality of the now incoming transports, apparently a weeding out already takes place in the East. The good workers among the prisoners of war are kept back and only those of inferior quality are passed on so that I cannot estimate the value of these 60000 as high. I think we shall be able to use hardly 60 in mining.

There are, furthermore, 15000 men in the P/W camps in the General Government. They are all right and will come as soon as the 30000 have been expedited. Gauleiter Sauckel promised Mr. Pleiger for the coal-industry 10000 civilian Russians who would be freed by re-directions of labor in agriculture. This was discussed yesterday with Dr. Fischer. There 10000 men, we think, will be at the disposal of the coal industry in about a fortnight. The total will, therefore, be 115000. We have, however, to allow for certain reductions according to the physical conditions of the men.

The recruiting of suitable civilian workers over there i very much hampered because we were repeatedly told that our recruiting personnel should give up the whole department Stalino or the Don-Donetz area because the men there were all needed. That a small number of workers from the Eat would remain because, at present, most of the civilian workers come just from these districts, few from others. In the new territories, among these the Caucasus district, it is still very difficult to come near but the first transports are arriving already.

Pleiger: I have seen that with my own eyes. I have seen the new prisoners building the briquette-factory near Stalino. I have noticed that those from the Stalino district are first of all deprived of their overcoats and clothing by the Rumanians and Italians. And if one sees these figure they are too weak to pass even a brick. They are completely down. It can serve no purpose if we send them to a resthome even before we can employ them on the coal surface.

Speer: You must not complain that the Führer ha taken away the grain basis from these districts.

Pleiger: No, I state only facts. They demand the coal from us.

Speer: In any case, it is quite possible to replace those prisoners of war who do not come by civilian workers from the East.

Winkhaus: At once, provided that they do not exceed 12,600. If they should be more we would have to prepare camps, remove the barbed wire, etc.

Speer: What about the mixed working. You cannot let Russian prisoners of war work side by side with civilian workers.

Winkhaus: We need not keep them so separate any more to-day.

Fischer: There is still this question. Yesterday we had a call from Austria: they could, of course, adapt Ps/W camps to civilian camps. The coal industry could overcome this question. The workers, however make difficulties when we put the workers from the East in stables. But if Central Planning sponsors the use of civilian workers from the East then I think we could solve this problem.

Speer: Temporarily, in the long run we must find for them better accommodation than that for Ps/W.

We can, therefore, expect 32,560 Ps/W. Then we have a need of 12000 civilian worker from the East as mentioned before and 12000 mentioned now, i.e., a total of 24000 for the mine proper in November less 10000 from agriculture. That is a deficit of 14000 plus 7500 for industry.

State Secret

Stenographic Transcript of the 21st Conference of the Central Planning concerning Supply and Direction of Labor held on 10/30/1942, afternoon at the Reich Ministry of Armament and Munition, Berlin, Pariser Platz 3

Dr. Doerr Bucholz/G

[In the discussion of the labor situation in which Speer, Sauckel, Milch and Timm participated]:

Speer: We must also discuss the slackers. Ley has ascertained that the sicklist decreased to one fourth or one fifth in factories where doctors are on the staff who are examining the sick men. There is nothing to be said against SS and Police taking drastic steps and putting those known as slackers into concentration camps. There is no alternative. Let it happen several times and the news will soon go around.

Sauckel: We talked of taking the waiters out of the restaurants in Germany. But in this respect we have absolutely an abundance in France, the General Government and the Protectorate. As long as we have not skimmed that off, we could not take the responsibility towards the German people for such a measure. Again a cable of the Foreign Minister has burst into my recent negotiations in France stating that under no circumstances should the/Laval Ministry be put into peril. The Führer has said: If the French show no good will, then I shall re-take the 800000 French Ps/W. If they show good will, then the French wives can follow their husbands to Germany and work there. Of course, he said, I have an interest that Laval remains in power. The Laval Ministry will remain, it depends only on us. And Laval cannot go back after he has reproduced in his speech and spoken before the French passages which he has taken verbally out of my appeal. Only Petain could bring him to fall. I wish to draw your attention to the fact, however, that in France there is a surplus of young men all of whom we could use in Germany. If we expect our people to accept severest restrictions then we cannot admit such luxuries in Paris as e.g. small restaurants with bands of 25 musicians and two waiters per table. I am firmly convinced: If we are brutal also against the others then we can extract quite a considerable number of men out of the General GovernmentI sent an efficient man, President Struwe, over there and of the Protectorate. This need not interfere with-the armament industry over there. There is, therefore, no fear that the demand could not be met.

The Commissioner for the 4 Years Plan, Berlin 10/31/1942 Central Planning Z.P.10

Results of the 21st session of the Central Planning (board) on 10/30/1942

Labor Allocation 11/1942

2. Supply. The October program including 300000 men has been carried out; during November 400000 have to be provided. The transfer from agriculture involving 200000 is excluded, so that altogether 600000 will be available (the transfer from agriculture to forestry (50000) and the assignment of domestic personnel (140000) will be separately accounted for).

Concerning the position of prisoners of war, it was decided that the army is not to dispose of units of prisoners of war, which were put into the Todt Organization as whole units. In future, the GBA [Generalbevollmaechtigte fuer den ArbeitseinsatzPlenipotentiary General for Labor Control] will take care of the prisoners of war from the moment they enter a stalag. The cooperation between the GBA and the Todt Organization is to be organized by discussions between TimmDr. Fraenck-SchmelterBrugmann. The prohibition of recruiting of manpower in the area to the left bank of the river Don is to be applied less vigorously [Staatssekretaer Koerner]. The Führer’s decree concerning the prohibition in force in the Caucasus area is to be taken to mean that Gauleiter Sauckel has the order to ensure priority of the man power claim of agriculture and the crude oil exploitation in this region.

Finally, the GBA (Plenipotentiary General for Labor Control) points out that large man power reserves still exist in France, in the General Government and in the Protectorate, which must be utilized before more stringent measures are taken inside the Reich itself. An energetic combing out process will be carried out inside these regions. A further important reserve exists in the possibility of increasing the capacity for work, which may be expected particularly as a result of a better treatment of the Russians.

Dr. Steffler

Present: Secretary of State Speer General Field Marshal Milch Secretary of State Koerner Gauleiter Sauckel GBA Ministerialdirigent Timm GBA Ministerialrat Letsch A Ober-Regierungsrat Hildebrant GBA Staatrat Schiber-Reichs Ministry for Armament an Munitions Major Gen. Waeger-Reichs Ministry for Armament and Munitions Lt. Col. von Nicolai-Reichs Ministry for Armament and Munitions Dr. Ing. Goerner-Reichs Ministry for Armament and Munitions Dr. Mommsen-Reichs Ministry for Armament and Munitions Dipl. Kfm. Teuscher-Reichs Ministry for Armament and Munitions Ministerial Director Grammsch V. P. (Voraus Personal Advance Echelon) Ministerial Rat Steffler V. P. Colonel Engineer Sellschopp RIM Reich Air Ministry) Colonel Rueckner (Reich Air Ministry) and Lt. Col. Betz (Reich Air Ministry)

“Document R-129: Attachment of the Inspectorate of the Concentration Camps to the SS-Main-Office Economics and Administration [translation]”, pp. 198-199.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT R-129

[Stamp] Personal Staff Reichsführer SS Document Administration File No. AR 1/24

The Chief of the SS-Main-Office Economics and Administration Berlin, 4/30/1942 Ch.Po/Ha 2192/42 g.

The Reichsführer-SS Berlin, W 11. Prinz Albrechtstr 8

[pencilled note] education and supervision remain the same [initials] HH [?]

[Stamp]: Secret

Reichsführer!

Today I report on the present situation of the concentration camp and on measures I have taken in order to carry out your order of 3/3/1942.

1. At the outbreak of war there existed the following concentration camps:

a. Dachau: 1939: 4000 prisoners, today 8000

b. Sachsenhausen: 1939: 6500 prisoners, today 10000

c. Buchenwald: 1939: 5300 prisoners, today 9000

d. Mauthausen: 1939: 1500 prisoners, today 5500

e. Flossenburg: 1939: 1600 prisoners, today 4700

f. Ravensbrueck: 1939: 2500 prisoners, today 7500

In the years 1940-1942 nine further camps were erected, viz: a. Auschwitz b. Neuengamme c: Gusen d. Natzweiler e. Gross-Rosen f. Lublin 9. Niederhagen h. Stutthof i. Arbeitsdorf

3. These 15 camps conformed to the organization of the old concentration camps in regard to duties, work, composition of the commanding staffs, an discipline of camps for protective custody. Besides these 15 camps the following special duties have been assigned:

a. to SS-Special Camp Hinzert: Commanding staff and guards are under my orders. The camp for protective custody is attached to the Reich-Main-Office-Security. No work-shops, no opportunity.

b. Camp for the protection of youthMoringen: No workshops.

c. Camp for the protection of youthUckermark: Is being erected.

d. Camp for the protection of youth Litzmannstadt: is planned.

4. In the last weeks the Reich-Main-Office-Security and the Command-Authority of the Waffen-SS have applied for SS-Commanders for the Camps planned by these authorities in Riga, Kiew, and Bobruisk.

I think it right to submit such plans to the SS-Main-Office-Economics and Administration, so that they may be planned and carried out uniformly by one authority for SS and Police, so as it is now. There may easily be lack of collaboration and consequently ensuing muddle.

II

1. The war has brought about a marked change in the structure of the concentration camps and has changed their duties with regard to the employment of the prisoners. The custody of prisoners for the sole reasons of security, education, or prevention is no longer the main consideration. The mobilization of all prisoners who are fit for work, for purposes of the war now, and for purposes of construction in the forthcoming peace, come to the foreground more and more.

2. From this knowledge some necessary measures result with the aim to transform the concentration camps into organizations more suitable for the economic tasks, while formerly they were merely politically interested.

3. For this reason I have gathered together all the leaders of the former inspectorate of Concentration camps, all Camp-Commanders, and all managers and supervisors of work on 4/23-24/1942, I have explained personally to them this new development. I have compiled in the order attached the main essentials which have to be brought into effect with the utmost urgency if the commencement of work for purposes of the armament industry is not to be delayed.

4. The transfer of the Inspectorate of the Concentration Camps to the Main-Office Economics and Administration has been carried out under full agreement of all Main-Offices concerned. The collaboration of all authorities goes on without any friction, the abolishment of lack of coordination in the concentration camps is hailed everywhere as the shedding of the fetters hindering progress.

Heil Hitler!

Signed: POHL SS-Obergruppenführer and General of the Waffen-SS.

1 enclosure.

Stamp: Personal Staff Reichsführer SS Document Administration File No. AR/1/24

The Chief of the SS-Main-Office-Economics and Administration Ch. Po/Ha. Berlin, 4/30/1942

Distribution: Chief Department D all Camp-Commanders all work-managers all authorities economics

[pencilled note] agreed [initials] HH [?] The instructions and advices given to the camp-commanders and work managers at the occasion of the discussions of 4/24-25/1942, are herewith issued as an order to become applicable as from 5/1/1942.

1. The management of a concentration camp and of all the economic enterprises of the SS within its sphere of organization is in the hands of the camp-commander. He alone is therefore responsible that the economic enterprises are as productive as possible.

2. For the management of the economic enterprises the camp commander avails himself of the services of the work-manager. The work-manager is bound to report to the camp-commander whether he expects any risks or disadvantages in carrying out an order of the camp-commander with regard to the work or the economic results.

3. By this duty the work-manager becomes jointly responsible if any damages of failures ensue with regard to the work or the economic results.

4. The camp-commander alone is responsible for the employment of the labor available. This employment must be, in the true meaning of the word, exhaustive, in order to obtain the greatest measure of performance.

Work is allotted by the Chief of the Department D centrally and alone. The camp-commanders themselves may not accept on their own initiative work offered by third parties and may not negotiate about it.

5. There is no limit to working hours. Their duration depends on the kind of working establishments in the camps and the kind of work to be done. They are fixed by the camp-commanders alone.

6. Any circumstances which may result is a shortening of work hours (e.g. meals, roll-calls) have therefore to be restricted to the minimum which cannot be condensed any more. It is forbidden to allow long walks to the place of working and noon intervals only for eating purposes.

7. Guard-duties have to be freed from their traditional rigidity and to be made more flexible having regard to the coming tasks of peace. Sentries on horseback, watchdogs,movable watch towers and movable obstacles are to be developed.

8. Much more than before is required from each and every camp-commander if they carry out his order correctly. Hardly any camp is like any other one, therefore no uniform instructions shall be issued. But the whole responsibility is shifted on to the initiative of the camp-commander. He needs a clear professional knowledge of matters military and economic and he must be a clever and wise leader of men, whom he ha to weld into a big potential of performance.

Signed: POHL SS-Obergruppenführer and General of the Waffen-SS

For correct copy: Schiller SS-Obersturmführer and Adjutant

“Document R-133: Note on a conference on 7/25/1939 with the General Field Marshal [Göring] in Westerland [translation]”, pp. 202-204.

SECRET

LF 1 Az. 57 h LF 1 No. 3598/39 secret

Berlin 7/27/1939.

Present: Generaloberst Milch State Secretary Koerner State Secretary Neumann State Secretary Dr. Landfried State Secretary v. Burgsdorf Lt. Col. (Gen. Staff) Huenermann Col. (Gen. Staff) Ploch Min. Rat Mueller Air Chief Staff Engineer Tschersich Air Staff Engineer Diederichs Ob. Reg. Rat v. Wedelstedt and Lt. Col. Conrad Generalmajor Thomas

1. In a rather long statement the Field Marshal explained that the incorporation of Bohemia and Moravia into the German economy had taken place, among other reasons, to increase the German war potential by exploitation of the industry there. Letters, as the decree of the Reich Minister for Economics S 10 402/39 of 7/10/1939as well as a letter with similar meaning to the Junkers firm, which might possibly lower the kind and extent of the armament measures in the Protectorate, are contrary to this principle. If it is necessary to issue such directives, this should be done only with his consent. In any case, he insists, in agreement with the directive by Hitler, that the war potential of the Protectorate is definitely to be exploited in part or in full and is to be directed towards mobilization as soon as possible.

Since, with full use of the industry of the Protectorate, difficulties of money transfer would exist until the change to the same currency, a way out must be found. Accordingto State Secretary Dr. Landfried the same procedure as in Slovakia might be applied, i.e. “Deposit of Reich treasury notes to cover the amounts of Kronen which are not balanced.” But anyway, the change to Reichmarks is planned for 4/1/1940.

2. As regards the question of leaving foreign currency of export firms in the Protectorate, which was brought up by a letter of the Reich protector to the Field Marshal because of a sale of the firm Walter, the Field Marshal consented to its remaining in the Protectorate, provided it is used 100 for the furtherance of the German war potential. In this connection State Secretary v. Burgsdorf explained that two weeks ago a supervisory office for foreign currency traffic had been established in the Protectorate, whose activity could direct the use of foreign exchange. State Secretary Dr. Landfried proposed further to appoint a plenipotentiary for the Czech National Bank who should regulate the foreign exchange allotment for armament purposes only. State Secretary v. Burgsdorf was doubtful about this regulation.

3. In order to arrange the mutual merchandise traffic for armament purposes with the least possible friction, the Field Marshal emphasized the necessity of leaving this merchandise free of duty.

4. The Field Marshal underscored first of all the following principle for export questions:

a. Investigation concerning necessity of secrecy

b. Investigation of the receiving country

c. Investigation of “what is offered”

d. Investigation of the own need for the merchandise to be given.

The offer to Italy regarding delivery of 88mm AA was outlined by the Field Marshal as follows:

Deliveries are only permissible to a certain extent after reach ing the peak of capacity ordered for our purposes. It is necessary that Italy deliver to us the raw materials necessary for Italian deliveries, i.e. somewhat more than is necessary for production.

Concerning the various countries, the Field Marshal consented to the work on the following contracts on the basis of the talk by Ministerialrat Mueller, and made the following decisions respecting them:

a. Bulgaria: Delivery of Czech planes (about 148 and ground equipment) is to be made quickly. The contract for German equipment (10 Me-109 and 10 DO-215) can be worked on in 4-6 weeks, since Bulgaria cannot be excluded from this equipment be cause of the deliveries to Rumania and Yugoslavia,

b. Rumania and Yugoslavia: The Field Marshal was first informed that the Czech equipment is refused and that, due to the situation, the ordering countries cannot suffer postponement of the date of delivery to Spring 1940. Because of the special agreementconcerning petroleum deliveries, the Field Marshal therefore permitted the planned contract with Rumania, i.e. delivery of the samples, which was announced already earlier to the Field Marshal, to begin in Autumn of this year.

The Field Marshal makes the contract with Yugoslavia dependent on the answer to certain questions which had remained unanswered by the Prince Regent and the Yugoslav government resp. Concerning these he would write to the Prince Regent personally. They concern the fact that Yugoslavia did not leave the League of Nations, and fortification works at the Italian and German frontiers in the presence of French officers. However, he-was not opposed to deliver at first 5 Me-109 to show our basic willingness. For the rest, the Field Marshal expressly empowered the Ministerialrat Mueller to instruct the Yugoslav military attache in Berlin that his consent to the contract would have to depend on the reply to certain questions which he would transmit by letter to the Prince Regent.

c. Turkey: The Field Marshal made no negative decision regarding the delivery of five Me-109 to Turkey till the final clearance of the situation. His declarations about that were to be understood thus: that the delivery could be made if it seemed opportune according to the situation.

Finally, the Field Marshal stated about the treatment of exports generally that the buying countries should be informed that the political situation had changed very markedly, and they would have to understand that Germany would now have to look out for itself first. The recurring objections lately expressed by foreign countries about offers of English Spitfires, etc., should be answered in the vein that we are not angered by such buys, and that we could only recommend making them.

(signed) MUELLER.

“Document R-135 [translation]”, pp. 205-207.

Copy

The Reich Commissar for the Eastland [Der Reichs Kommissar fuer das Ostland] Diary No. 3628/43 secret

stamp: Personal Staff-Reichsführer SS Documents-Administration File No. Secret/227 Riga, 6/18/1943 To the Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territory Berlin

The attached secret reports received from General Commissar Kube deserve special consideration.

The fact that Jews receive special treatment requires no further discussion. However it appears hardly believable that this is done in the way described in the report of the General Commissar of 6/1/1943! What is Katyn against that? Imagine only that these occurrences would become known to the other side and exploited by them. Most likely such propaganda would have no effect only because people who hear and read about it, simply would not be ready to believe it.

The fight against bands also is taking on forms which are highly questionable if pacification and exploitation of the several territories are the aims of our policy. Thus, the dead who were suspected of belonging to bands and whose number was indicated in the report of 6/5/1943 about the “Cottbus” project to have amounted to 5000, in my opinion, with few exceptions would have been suitable for forced labor in the Reich.

It should not be ignored in this connection that in view of the difficulties of making oneself understood as generally in such clean-up operations, it is very hard to distinguish friend from foe. Nevertheless, it should be possible to avoid atrocities and to bury those who have been liquidated. To lock men, women and children into barns and to set fire to these, does not appear to be a suitable method of combatting bands, even if it is desired to exterminate the population. This method is not worthy of the German cause and hurts our reputation severely.

I am asking that you take the necessary action.

(signed:) [signature illegible]

[stamp] Personal Staff Reichsführer SS Document Administration File No. Secret/227

The General Commissar for White Ruthenia Gauleiter /BA Diary No. 428/43 Secret

Minsk 6/5/1943 Secret To the Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories

Berlin Through the Reich Commissioner for the Eastland Riga Subject: Results of police operation “Cottbus” as reported so far for the period of 6/22-7/3/1943

SS Brigadeführer, Major General of Police von Gottberg reports that the operation “Cottbus” had the following result during the period mentioned:

Enemy dead: 4500 Dead suspected of belonging to bands: 5000 German dead: 59 German wounded: 267 Dead of foreign racial stock: 22 Wounded of foreign racial stock: 120 Captured members of bands: 250 Destroyed enemy camps: 57 Destroyed enemy positions: 261 Apprehended male labor: 2,062 Apprehended female labor: 450 Sunk larger boats: 4 Sunk floats: 22

Booty consisted of: 1 airplane, 12 tow-gilders, 10 15 cm guns, 2 anti-tank guns, 9 grenade throwers, 23 heavy machine guns, 28 light machine guns, 28 machine pistols, 492 rifles, 1028 grenades and bombs, 1 000 mines, 31 300 rounds rifle ammunition, 7 300 rounds pistol ammunition, 1 200 kg explosives, 2 complete radio installations with transmitter, 1 picture establishment, 30 parachutes, 67 wagons, 530 horses, 1 field kitchen, 430 sleighs, great amounts of medical drugs and propaganda material.

The operation affects the territory of the General District White Ruthenia in the area of Borissow. It concerns in particular the two counties Begomie and Pleschtschamizy. At present the police troops together with the army have advanced to Lake Palik and have reached the whole front of the Beresina. The continuance of the battles takes place in the rear zone of the Army.

The figures mentioned above indicate that again a heavy destruction of the population must be expected. If only 492 rifles are taken from 4 500 enemy dead, this discrepancy shows that among these enemy dead were numerous peasants from the country. The battalion Dirlewanger especially has a reputation for destroying many human lives. Among the 5 000 people suspected of belonging to bands, there were numerous women and children.

By order of the Chief of Band-Combatting, SS Obergruppenführer von dem Bach, units of the armed forces have also participated in the operation. SS Standartenführer Kunze was in command of the armed forces detachments, among whom there were also 90 members from my office and from the District-Commissariat Minsk-City. Our men returned from the operation yesterday without losses. I decline the use of officials and Reich employees of the General Commissariat in the rear zone of the army. The men who work for me were not deferred from army service in order to actively participate in combat against bands in the place of the armed forces and of the police.

Of the armed forces personnel, 1 railroader has been wounded (shot in lungs). The political effect of this large-scale operation upon the peaceful population is simply dreadful in view of the many shootings of women and children. In December, the town of Bagomie was evacuated by the armed forces and the police. At that time, the population of Begomie was preponderantly on our side. In the course of the fighting, Begomie, which was built up as a strong point by the partisans, has been destroyed by German air attacks.

The General Commissar in Minsk (signed:) [signature illegible]

[stamp] Personal Staff Reichsführer SS Document Administration File No. Secret/227 The General Commissar for White Ruthenia Gauleiter/Wu. Diary No. 414/43 secret.

Minsk, 6/1/1943 Secret

To the Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories Berlin Through the ReichCommissioner for the Eastland Riga

Subject: Actions against Jews in the Prison of Minsk.

The enclosed official report from the warden of the prison in Minsk is submitted to the Reich Minister and the Reich Commissar for information.

The General Commissar in Minsk (signed:) [signature illegible]

Enclosure ad. I/1168/43 secret.

[stamp] Personal Staff Reichsführer SS Document Administration File No. Secret/227

Court Prison

Minsk 5/31/1943

To the General Commissar for White Ruthenia Minsk

Subject: Actions against Jews.

Reference: Oral report on 5/31/1943.

On 4/13/1943 the former German dentist Ernst Israel Tichauer and his wife, Elisa Sara Tichauer, nee Rosenthal, were committed to the court prison by the Security Service (SD) (Hauptscharführer Ruebe). Since that time all German and Russian Jews who were turned over to us, had their golden bridgework, crowns and fillings pulled or broken out. This happens always 1-2 hours before the respective action.

Since 4/13/1943, 516 German and Russian Jews have been finished off. On the basis of a definite investigation, gold was taken only in two actions, on 4/14/1943 from 172, and on 4/27/1943 from 164 Jews. About 50 of the Jews had gold teeth, bridgework or fillings. Hauptscharführer Ruebe of the Security Service (SD) was always personally present and he took the gold along too.

Before 4/13/1943 this was not done.

(signed) Guenther Prison Warden

“Document R-140 [partial translation]”, pp. 221-224.

The Reich Air Minister and Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force Aide-de-Camp Major Conrath

Berlin, W.8, 7/11/1938 3 Leipziger Str. Staff Headquarters Telephone 12 00 44 Staff HQDept II No. 134/38 secret

To General Udet

Enclosed I transmit a copy of the shorthand minutes on the conference with the airplane manufacturers on 7/8/1938 at Carinhall.

(signed) Conrath Major

1 Enclosure.

Dr. Eggeling/Ba Conference with the gentlemen of the airplane industry at Karinhall 7/8/1938. 1130

Field Marshal Göring:

Gentlemen: May I first welcome you here and express my satisfaction that we have come here together again to discuss our problems. Today I invited you into the country, in order to have you later on as my guests, thus giving expression to the feelings of solidarity between us.

Before we start our discussions I am in duty bound to commemorate here too the man who, being one of you, always was among the first to press for the development of German aviation and of the German Air Force. It is a grievous loss which the aviation industry has suffered through the departure of your member, Mr. Hellmut Hirth. (Those present rise from their seats.) I thank you.

Gentlemen: The situation today does not differ from that which existed at the time of my last address except perhaps for the fact that it is even more serious today. You are aware that today it is no longer Germany on whose attitude the continuance of peace depends. It is Czechoslovakia who threatens the peace like the sword of Damocles. We do not know what will happen. But you are aware, Gentlemen, that, in case something happens there, Germany will not be able to be disinterested. As long ago as May it became manifest that raving individuals of Czechoslovakia thought the time had come to provoke Germany while hoping that such provocation would start a world war, in which one side was probably to consist of France and England, Russia, America as the main forces, while Germany perhaps assisted by small countries interested in areas of Czechoslovakia on the other side. They hoped to catch just the last moment when conditions were still favorable enough to overwhelm Germany. We have not been provoked, and probably the other side also was too anxious for peace after all to allow further provocation. There can be no doubt that England does not wish for war nor does France. As to America, there is no certainty on this question. The economic situation of America is hopeless. Therefore the Americans might hope to do big business again by providing all the munitions for the enemies of Germany, while not themselves actively intervening for the time being, but by dispatching many airmen atleast as volunteers.

The Jew furthermore agitates for war all over the world. So much is clear: Antisemitism has risen now in every country as a logical consequence of the over-increase of the number of Jews in these countries, and the Jew can expect salvation only if he succeeds in letting loose a general world war. If I mention the Jewish agitation for war, I have a good reason to do so, since the Jew who dominates the bulk of the world press is in a position to use it for psychological propaganda.

With regard to England too, we have to acknowledge the existence of some, I don’t want to say, readiness for war, but of a certain feeling of the unavoidability of war which is widespread. To be added is the fact that wide circles in England take this stand the last thing we are prepared to bear is the incorporation of Austria, but we are not ready to allow any further enlargement of Germany’s power. Beyond this they fear that once we have pocketed Czechoslovakia, we will attack Hungary, the Rumanian oil wells etc. Moreover since there are democratic countries on the one hand, and authoritarian ones on the other, there is enough inflammable matter in the world anyway. When, how and where this inflammable matter will explode, no one among us can say. It may happen within some months, but it may also take some years. At present the situation is this that Czechoslovakia has promised the Sudeten Germans to meet them half way. I am convinced that they will satisfy no more than some of their unimportant demands. Such action on their part would probably suit our policy best, since in this case we could put the entire responsibility on England because she has engaged herself so deeply in this business.

Briefly, gentlemen, this is what is happening on the political plane. In this circle, however, we have less to do with politics. I told you these things only in order to provide some background. What we have to discuss are the conclusions which have to be drawn, especially with regard to the air force. Everywhere we observe indeed immense preparations for mobilization, and I expect nobody to become frightened to death. If I judge the preparations for mobilization which are undertaken by other nations by their press publications, in which these countries, I dare say, shoot their mouth off, one might feel inclined to get the jitters. But if they write there: “England is to produce within the next year so and so many thousands of first line planes of which so and so many will be ready a month, France will build this and that, Russia is now again to produce another 100000 planes an to train so and so many airmen”, then think of the difficulties which we have to overcome and translate what we have into a democratic system, and then you will be able to make a correct guess. I am perfectly convinced gentlemen, that what we can produce of new goods within a year, England is able to produce with the utmost pains in two, perhaps three years. This is how I judge the situation, taking into consideration the establishment of factories etc.

You heard tall stories about the English shadow factories. But what happened in fact? These people did not even complete the conversion of their existing factories, let alone the erection of shadow factories, the essence of which is that they are not working today, but may be switched on tomorrow. And how far have they gone with their second great project for the motor-or-plane industry which this Automobile King Nuffield has set up? The latest report is this that this honorable lord now has made up in his mind, and almost decided where he will build these shadow factories, thereforein the best possible case has chosen their location. You know how much it takes to build a big factory, and I think, it cannot be done in such a hurry. If on the one hand they introduce the 40 hour week or even go down to 35 hours a week, and on the other hand we are working 10 or 11 or 12 hours a day instead of 8 hours, then this discrepancy must at the end favor the man who works longer, and work is what matters for results.

But still we have to keep in mind that from the long term view these people too certainly will have some results, and before all, that England and France do not stand alone on the opposite side, but are always in a position to draw upon the immense reservoir for raw materials in America.

If I compare the Air Forces of the principal countries which may become our enemies (by which I always mean England and France), I am bound to say: we have’ done marvellous work indeed! In 1933 we were at zero, today, 1938, at the end of the year, Germany will have a complete first line strength equal to that of England’s strength plus … Thus we are superior in quantity, too, and as to quality we are equal, even superior. This is an enormous success. It is a miracle that we were able to do it.

And here you deserve great credit, gentlemen, for having succeeded in establishing factories from nothing, and finally producing in them planes and motors which are equal today and partly superior.

Altogether, I consider the German air force as being ahead compared with the English as well as with the French. Our task is, not only to keep, but also to increase this advantage. For if it comes to the decision, we shall again be opposed by a great multitude, considering the world reservoir at the disposal of the enemies. We have to endeavor, therefore, to increase our advantage, at least in the air, by producing highest quality and at the same time in enormous masses, and I am firmly resolved to take every measure which can and will provide us with permanent superiority in the air.

It is for this reason that I have to approach you again, gentlemen, with a demand to provide loyally and passionately those conditions which will allow me to increase that advantage. I am aware that there are great difficulties, and one of these difficulties consisted and still consists in the so-called shortage of raw materials. Gentlemen, shortage of raw materials! Indeed, everyone has less iron than he needs. But if you come to think of it that we now manufacture almost 2.000 tons of raw iron a month, then that is something immense. We are today producing more iron than France and England combined. only our needs are so immensely great. The same applies to aluminum. I increased our requirements for aluminum under the Air Ministry plans, later in theframe of the Four Year Plan, from 32000 tons a year to 150000 tons a year as of today, then after the end of this year 180000 tons, and by the end of 1939, to 288000 tons. And even this will not be quite enough. Now you can roughly estimate, if you compare the aluminum quota at the disposal of the rest of the world, how much they can produce from aluminum. Although one should not forget that there are many cases where we are forced to use aluminum, while other people can use other materials owing to their richness in raw materials. Yet much has been done also with regard to raw materials, and if I just altered the contingents again and allotted to the armed forces 500000 and lately even 550000, possibly even 600000 tons, these are also enormous figures.

We shall make it all right. What matters is only that everybody knows he has to be careful, that material is short, but that the manufacture must not be impeded. Everything often depends on the right distribution of materials, in order to balance temporary shortages and prevent stoppages of work. Moreover the demands often are for much more than is really needed or is said to be needed.

Now, if I touch once more on the political problem, this is because you felt the consequences of the political situation in the increase of the program, and that we have to request that everybody do his best, and that.all our labor supply must be used. We are fully embarked on the way to mobilization-capacity and shall not be able for years to deviate from it; on the contrary, we may have to increase our speed under certain conditions until we reach full mobilization capacity.

Gentlemen, please consider the far reaching consequences; you ought to be aware that the smallest faults and omissions cannot be caught up with, and repaired, if we work with such speed. I have to ask you therefore to be in a state of the greatest readiness. It is the fate of Germany which is at stake. Your job is not to be politicians. But if you sometimes have a quiet half hour to ponder on the history of the era after the world war, you will become convinced that, in case a combination of powers today would succeed a second time in overwhelming Germany, the end of the Reich would be there. These people have been forewarned now, they know what a Germany totally prostrated can create anew, if she only remains united. This is what they have learned, and they will act accordingly.

Gentlemen, the following is my personal belief: Wherever the conflagration may beginif then Germany must go to warthis will be the greatest hour of destiny ever since there has been a German history, And the possibility of victory indeed exists. It depends solely on our own power, on the manner in which we mobilize that power, and on the degree to which everybody is resolved to do his bit, convinced s he is that afterwards every individual will experience personally the advantages as well as the disadvantages of the situation. Believe me, gentlemen: once Germany has again lost a new war, it will be no use for you to go and say: Yes, I did not want this war, I was always opposed to it, moreover I was opposed to the system and never wanted to collaborate with it. You will be dismissed with. scornful laughter. You are Germans: the others don’t care two hoots whether you wanted to collaborate or not.

We have to see things as they are. The situation being what it is, I believe there is still a 10-15% possibility for a relatively small scale action, but I am convinced that a 80-90% chance exits that a greater disaster will occur anyhow, and that we shall have to fightthe great battle of which I am not afraid. The only thing that matters is that we shall not collapse again. What matters is that everybody knows: Vicary can be ours only if we work to an immensely higher extent. We have to replace by men everything of which the other side has more in raw materials. This is why the determination of ever single German has to be much stronger than that of the enemy in question. And the determination of a nation that knows its very existence is at stake, will necessarily be stronger than that of people who are only half resolved and only go along in the war, and the agitation, etc.

Those are not phrases, gentlemen. For God’s sake do not understand them as nationalistic blusterings, you would do me a great injustice. I am passionately convinced that everything I tell you is an absolute, gigantic truth. I am truly of the opinion: we shall not be able to save our fatherland unless we stake all our passions.

Believe me, gentlemen, I have now learned during these years, what it means to bear continually the responsibility for a nation. If you are concerned about your work, this is indeed a grave responsibility. But what it means if a man is aware that on his own counsel, decision, judgment, and deliberation lastly depends the fate of the nation, this is beyond your imagination. You may be certain, seldom indeed do I have any other thought in my mind.

Actually I have to force myself to think of other things; all the time my thoughts are circling around one thing: When will war come? Shall we win? What can we do? I assure you, gentlemen, it is hour after hour that I ponder: What can we do? I am well aware that there are still infinitely more things we could do. I am aware that many things are not yet ready, I am aware of the many obstacles in our way, and I am very sorry-that I am unable to do everything as quickly as I would like. I wished, however, I might be able to say later on with regard to the task which has been given to me: Well, every preparation which a man can make has been made by us. It is a bad thing if a man has to confess, when the battle has started: Damn it, you could have done this before. This responsibility rests heavily on me, you may believe me.

This is why I again beg of you with all my heart, gentlemen: Consider yourself an industry which has the duty to create an air force, which is most intimately connected with that air force. Do understand that all personal interests take second place. What does your work mean compared with the fate of the nation? What value-have after all the considerations which will often occur to you: Well, what are we to do afterwards, if now the caPacities become so much inflated? Would it not be better to go a little more slowly in order to distribute the work better ? Such thoughts would prove nothingdon’t take this amiss, gentlemen, but an extremely petty character. What does it matter, if there will come a day when you have to manufacture chamber pots instead of planes? That is of no importance if there is only now a chance for Germany to win the struggle.

For if I spoke so far briefly of the fate which would befall us if we lost the war, I may be allowed now to mention what will happen if we win it. Then Germany will be the greatest power in the world, then it is Germany who dominates the world market, then will be the hour when Germany is a rich nation. For this goal, however, we have to undertake risks, we have to stake out bets. This is why I once again demand of you: all the questions ruminating in your heads, all ideas of external or internal importance, anydoubts whether you can obtain higher prices, whether you might make insufficient profits, etc., all this is perfectly beside the point. What matters is only this: What is the production of the work; how many motors are being made and in what time, and of what quality are these motors and planes ? Only this is important. And even if you know what you are doing now may mean that within three years your firm will collapse, you will have to do it all the same. For if Germany collapses, who will dare to tell me to my face that his shop will go on? Out of the question! If only this fact would be understood by the whole of the German economy-although the dictate of Versailles in 1918 should indeed have been a good teacher to themand if all would understand that nobody here exists by himself, but that everybody stands and falls with Germany’s existence! It does not matter if someone says: I disapprove entirely of the National Socialist system. I don’t care, let him disapprove, it is still the system which at this moment decides Germany’s fate. This is why he has willy-nilly to cooperate. Therefore I repeat once more: Only that nation which stakes everything on its armaments and draws all consequences from this fact, will be able to continue its existence.

Gentlemen, I have no reason, and this is gratifying to me, to complain of the airplane industry but to praise, to acknowledge, and to thank. You went my way on the whole, though at the start one or the other did not quite catch what it meant and you did really wonderful work, in some factories quite extraordinary things were done. Thus, just with regard to the airplane industry, I have no reason for complaints, thank God. Just this fact permits me to say, especially as it cannot happen in this industry, not for a second, and I mean second, would I hesitateas I proved with regard to another matterto intervene at once and to confiscate at once the whole business in case I should come to the conclusion that he does not understand that he can see the world only under the toilet-seat perspective of his own enterprise, and cannot look farther. Such a fellow is a ne’er-do-well. That fellow must go. By a stroke of my pen he would lose his business and his property. But as I said before, and I am very gratified to state this once again, that the airplane industry performed quite excellent work.

But, gentlemen, we must not rest on our laurels, our performance must encourage us to perform still more. If I said some moments ago that the raw material situation is and will remain difficult, the situation regarding labor supply is perhaps still more difficult. This is by no means surprising. Imagine, in 1933 we had almost 7 million unemployed, and today the greatest problem of Germany is where to find enough workers to complete the most urgent tasks. I believe, a leadership which led to such results has some justification for its existence. If today some degree of prosperity exists in other countries, if for instance a country like Sweden is in excellent circumstances, then it is very wrong if this country scoffs on Germany, since it is indebted for its prosperity tonobody but Germany and her re-armament. Anyway this labor supply problem is difficult indeed. It was with difficulty that I decided on the law enacted recently, a law which intervenes to a truly enormous extent in the freedom of movement of every individual. If a worker can be told today you are finished here, pack up your things and start tomorrow at such and such a place, this means indeed quite something! If despite this fact I resolved to issue this law, you ought to be able to comprehend how difficult the situation is, but also that we shall dodge no issue. As long as there are any chances of balancing the situation, I shall take these chances.

As for the airplane industry, here again of course the most difficult problem is that of providing skilled workers. But we have devised means and ways to attain our goal.

Beyond this, gentlemen, I want you to be perfectly clear, today already, how you will run your business when war comes. The earlier you can make clear proposals on this to me, the earlier you know yourselves what you want, including the changes in personnel, what people you want to get rid of, and what people you want to have, the earlier you will be all right, and the less danger there will be of work being held up. If you act in this way, we should be able to apply in time to the Inspectorates for Recruiting for deferments on the basis of your claims, so that the moment mobilization starts, everything will have been arranged already. You will then be in a position to know; when mobilization starts, so-and-so will be taken away, but you will also know who will replace him. I should like to have this arranged almost by names. I want every man and woman to know: on the first, the second, the third day of mobilization I shall have to do this and that, so that the order of events will not be: the airplane industry will be allotted a certain number out of the bulk of available labor, etc., and then the allotments will be altered four or five times. No, this will have to be done from the beginning, by names. I want the airplane industry to take again the first place and go ahead by appointing a special employee in each factory who has nothing to do but to make the arrangements for mobilization, so that every shop knows accurately: I shall lose so-and-so, he will be replaced by so-and-so. But with regard to those people who cannot be spared by any mean you must apply for deferment already, so that I can order their deferment. If this is being done accurately and executed carefully, you will see what a help that will be. For it is quite clear: there will be a great to-do the day of the mobilization, and every man will then have to know what he will have to do. And with regard to juvenile labor, to apprentices, I want you to make your decisions also with regard for the mobilization; it might be advisable to accept already many more apprentices than you would accept normally.

At this point I want to prevent the spreading of a fairy tale in case it should exist. If you’d think that since I have so much to do, I am more or less above things, do not trouble about the and do not know what is going on, you are mistaken; first of all I am seeing the chief of the C.-Office once a week if not more frequently, and I can assure you that nothing of importance is being ordered, really nothing which has not been discussed with, and agreed upon by me first. No sample is dispatched, no order given without my consent, I-decide personally upon each piece to be delivered on the basis of these conferences. Every measure, therefore, which the chief of the C-Office takes, has been previously discussed in conference lasting many hours.

You know of the new method which General Udet wishes to apply. This methodnaturally calls for sacrifices. They are necessary however. For what is it which matters? We must have, firstly the best types, secondly, as few of them as possible. Thirdly, types which can be built within a short time, which can be built in good quality, and which can be built cheaply. This is, I believe, the result of planning for almost a year. For it has been almost a year since I started the deliberations which led to the method we wish to apply now.

It goes without saying, gentlemen, we shall communicate to you the demands which we have with regard to the machines we want. You shall have a chance to build that machine in free competition. Then we shall have to decide what machine it is which suits us. And this today is often very difficult to decide. Often we had to ponder very long when we had to decide between two types. Either machine had its advantages, the one these, the other one those. If one has to choose between two machines of which one is good, the other less good,- the choice is easy; but to decide on one of them, if both machines are good, this is difficult. And if we chose one, and refused the other, this in marly cases did not mean that the one refused was not good; perhaps it was just as good, but some small advantage of the chosen machine tipped the scale after we had considered everything.

But I cannot allow the manufacture of several types. I am well aware of the objections to this opinion. They have been known to me already since the last war.

One should not create monopolies, and I don’t want to do so. I never asked you, gentlemen, to work in your construction offices in a given direction, i.e. to do everything by order, but there you are free, and every firm is free to produce something better at any moment. But if I made up my mind after the most thorough deliberations and discussions with all responsible people, to choose the bomber, which is to be the backbone of the air force, which is to be produced in greatest numbers, then I have the duty to arrange that this type is also produced in the shortest possible time. Gentlemen, the kind of licensing method which we had so far, was never very pleasing to me, for we were forced to acknowledge that a series of accidents to mention a minor detailwas caused for the following reasons: that wit the firms which had licensed things did not quite fit in some place, something stuck, and they gave it one more little jerk, and the part just got in; by such methods tensions were created which later had fatal results. It cannot go on like it did so far, that we say we gave them the license, and let the firm construct and fit the licensed parts. If we have now chosen a certain type, the firm which developed this type carries the central responsibility for the construction and the completion of this type, even where part of the work is done by licensed firms. And the other firms shall produce this type until another type appears in our factories which may perhaps have been constructed by a different firm and which may replace the older type. But the firm which has developed the type chosen by me is responsible to me for the following: that first it will provide the gadgets [Vorrichtungen] drawings, materials and everything else which is necessary in order to deliver at the end of the manufacturing process the same type in every factory. And this, gentlemen, is the more important because I no longer order: you, please produce license 88, and. the other produce the so-and-so license, but I shall tell you: You produce nothing but the right wing, you nothing but the left wing, you nothing but the glider appliance, you the rump, etc. and at the end everything must fit together. And if I proceed to produce the highest possible number of planes, then, gentlemen, you will have to understand thateverybody has to march in step. For these small parts are to be produced in various places, and then they must fit and the firm which developed that type will be responsible to me that they do fit. Not the greatest profit ought to matter for you, but before all more work and better results. There can be no doubt about that.

Gentlemen, I am aware that there are quite a number of objections against this method. But there are objections against every method. But if I balance the advantages and the disadvantages, taking into due consideration the security problem which is so important, I finally come to the conclusion that for the time being this is the right way, which is bound absolutely to bring superiority over the enemy, and I should like to add here over the democratic, the leaderless enemy, for in England it is possible that Lord Nuffield says any plane will be built, if I am not to produce the plane which I want then I shall not produce at all. Yes, such things he can say in England, but not in Germany, thank God, and I only hope he says such things: may God preserve him in this condition. In such a case it goes without saying that one day he will fly around at the front with the most varied types. This is just what will make him inferior. Since we are provided with the principle of organization, I really would be quite insane if I did not organize these powers and made use of the chance which fate allowed me to have.

Above all, gentlemen, and you will remember that I told you this already in 1933, if you are planning for a new type, the serial manufacture of the current type must not be disturbed by it. Never! These two tasks must be entirely separated from each other. For I know the difficulties inherent in the development of a new type. If I allow this work to interfere, at any stage, with the manufacturing of the serial type, then disadvantages to the serial type are unavoidable. Therefore, full separation must be provided and care must be taken that the serial manufacture never suffers from the work for new development, and neither must the new development be hampered by serial production. For you are fully aware how important it is to develop the new types. It is always decisive that a plane which has been constructed, must be flown as soon as possible. For not until it has been flown, and calculations with which it was flown are made, does a basis for further development really exist.

Gentlemen, if later on a history of the German Air Force and its development is written, the writer will call the step which General Udet made with regard to the Ju 88 and in which we followed him, a magnificent action undertaken by the German aviation technique. This is perfectly clear to me. This is why I ask you again to forget your personal ambitions for the benefit of this greatest task of all. You may well be proud, gentlemen, that today we are already in a position to entrust industry with such a task. For I hope I may be sure without any reserve that after adopting this system, even ifyou were sorry that you had to do it, you will work for it loyally, and that our work will not slacken or be hampered by some dislike on your partto be careful in my expression. I hope I may rather be convinced that you will tell yourselves, well, I should have preferred a different way, but since the decision was made, there is only one thing: to take up this method with all the power and force at my command.

I mentioned already how glad I am to be able to express my deep satisfaction with what you have created up to now. What is it that we have brought about? We have succeeded in changing a small airplane industry which barely existed, with a few types, which was not in a position to keep step with modern development, which had to stop production altogether for some years, etc., into an efficient airplane industry of our very own without foreign patents, foreign licenses, and by using exclusively tools of our own. And then came the reorientation which was completed in a single year, moreover the production of modern planes, produced now already in serial types. I believe, gentlemen, we can be proud of the way which the airplane industry has progressed, and this is just what entitles,me to trust you and to request of you what I had to request today.

And finally one more thing. You will not be able to fulfill your duties unless you have a staff which collaborate enthusiastically, and workers who are fully prepared to assist in your task, and I beg of you, consider your workers your colleagues, men by whose intensified zeal alone you will be able to reach your goal. Provide me with this great joy as well, that I may be able to call the German airplane industry an example for the right treatment of the workers. We shall not be able to solve our great problems and to use all this capacity for work unless the worker feels that he is indeed valued at his full worth and treated as a member of the team. On the other hand, gentlemen, you must not close your eyes with regard to certain nihilistic plans if such should become evident. Less than anywhere else can we afford in the airplane industry to allow propaganda hostile to the state. For where does verbal propaganda end and action begin? True, if I address the forces, I have of course to deny every time that sabotage ever occurs. For if I did not do so, if I would allow such considerations to be seriously considered by the forces, I should shake and undermine all their confidence. The forces must not even start such considerations. But your duty gentlemen, is to take care of it that ideas of sabotage etc. disappear entirely from the brains of your personnel even should the individual not agree with our state of today. It is here that we have to be very careful so that nothing can happen for this is where, as I said before, the confidence in your products stands or falls.

If I finally touch the problem of female labor, this is because I am of the opinion that we have to-tackle the problem of female labor again in case of mobilization. Gentlemen, here you must use your brains. A woman is not a man, and it is not enough to say, instead of 600 men, I now employ 500 women, and at this or that place, a worker is a worker whether man or woman. You will have to calculate rather: if you have to lose in case of war this or that number of men, but may receive this or that number of women, you must today already make all preparations for making your factory suitable for female labor. Not in your industry but in another industry I noticed the other day the following: Owing to a reorientation 90 women had been taken on. In the whole factory there was not a single lavatory for women. This isn’t the thing. This may be a small matter, simply nobody thought of it, what does it matter? There are other things wherewe simply have to think of the difference. You must establish separate wash rooms and other things. One cannot simply put the women into the men’s wash rooms. One has to acknowledge when women come to work, there must be preparations for them.

One thing is clear, in general you cannot ask as much from a woman as from a man. There are certain spheres where the opposite applies, but working in a factory is not one of them. Above all you must be clear on where you can use female labor at all, and where this would be impossible. Accordingly, you must make your arrangements in case of mobilization. This goes without saying. And I imagine that, if things like the one mentioned before are done right, the dreaded sudden decrease of work need not occur at all, and that I won’t have to wait for months for the curve to go up again. Gentlemen, I think I have opened my heart enough. As to certain details you know already from the conference with Udet. I only need to know whether you (to General Udet) wish to add anything (‘no’) or whether everything has been discussed.

Gentlemen, I have still one thing to ask. I think it goes without saying that everything which I told you with regard to the political situation and preparations for mobilization has to remain entirely among ourselves. This goes without saying, and I need hardly add anything. I chose the participants for this address in such a way that I am entitled to trust entirely their discretion. I should not like to experience the same disappointment which I had when I invited the German industry to the Herrenhaus, when the contents of my speech were already known in a wider circle the same evening.

Later on I shall confer with some gentlemen in order to receive from them some information on certain things. The air tents industry is informed. The same applies in general to the airplane motor industry. Here the main task will be to produce Mercedes “GOIs” in large numbers. As to BMW I put great hopes on the future air … as an enormous step forward. Until then the most intensified production of the present type has to be continued of course. Juno 211 also has to be produced with the great intensity. Moreover I hope that the motor industry too will not rest content with the fact that they have produced a good motor, but I ask them to prepare and further new developments.

Gentlemen, here again I should like to give some advice. In our branch, in aviation and production for the needs of an air force, you cannot attain much without some imagination. This is the sphere where many new developments and inventions can be expected to appear and where one has to reorientate oneself without end. I ask you not to shrink from new thoughts and not to say: but this is impossible! Rather you ought to travel into thin air over and over again, and tell yourselves: here it is, where there mustbe room for imagination, where my ideas must go on a long voyage. I hope, this is my private wish and dream, a miracle will-happen. I still hope that I am shown some day a motor or a weapon or a plane or a bomb, the qualities of which will be fantastic. I still hope for something which has the same importance in the struggle with the enemy as had the needle gun in the war of 1870-71. If I had such a needle gun (to use a metaphor) against an enemy who has nothing but muzzle-loaders our advantage naturally would be great. With these remarks I wish to express my sympathy with boldness in experimenting. I still am not yet in the possession of the stratosphere bomber which overcomes space at a height of 25 to 30 km. This problem has not been solved yet in the sense that practical use is possible. I still am lacking rocket motors which would enable us to effect such flying. I still am missing entirely the bomber which flies with 5 tons of explosives as far as New York and back. I should be extremely happy to have such a bomber so that I would at last be able to stop somewhat the mouth of the arrogant people over there. Thus you see, gentlemen, there is still a large field for your work, and what matters is only how high you aim, you will have success in the same proportion.

Admiral Lahs answers in the name of the industry:

I want to thank you also for the remarks in which you acknowledge that we did our best. You, Field Marshal, today opened our eyes to the seriousness of the situation, and you gave us directives in those units and in that direction; and it will naturally be a matter of honor for us to march cheerfully that way. I am of the opinion that our airplane industry will be able to fulfill it without any friction provided it gets the semi-fabricated goods and there will not be too much alteration of plans.

“Document R-142 [translation]”, pp. 243-246.

Kochem, 5/7/1938.

Security Service Reichsführer SS Unterabschnitt Koblenz Branch Kochem II 225-0/1 M

Note forwarded 5/7/1938 [initialled] M. [?]

1. To the Security Service (SD)Unterabschnitt Koblenz, Koblenz

Subject: Plebiscite of 4/10/1938. 913/38

Ref.: Your letter II, dated 4/22/1938 Our letter II 220/1, dated 4/22/1938.

Copy of a schedule is attached herewith enumerating the persons who cast “No” votes or invalid votes at Kappel, district of Simmern. The invalid votes are listed first, endingwith thereafter come the No-votes.

The control was effected in the following way: some members of the election committee marked all the ballot papers with numbers. During the ballot itself, a voters’ list was made up. The ballot-papers were handed out in numerical order, therefore it was possible afterwards with the aid of this list to find out the persons who cast No-votes or invalid votes. One sample of these marked ballot papers is enclosed. The marking was done on the back of the ballot papers with skimmed milk.

The ballot cast by the Protestant parson Alfred Wolferts is also enclosed.

The identification of two persons was impossible because there are several persons of the same name in the village and it was impossible to ascertain the actual voter.

Security Service Branch Kochem initialled: Staffelscharführer

2. for filing II 225-0/1 Security Service Reichsführer SS Unterabschnitt Koblenz Branch Kochem

Kochem, 4/22/1938. Note forwarded 4/22/1938 II 225 0/1 M

To the Security Service Unterabschnitt Koblenz, Koblenz

Subject: Plebiscite of 4/10/1938 Ref.: Your letter of 4/22/1938 Enclosures: 4in duplicate.

Supplementing the telephone conversation with SS-Oberscharführer Heinrich of 4/21/1938, schedules showing the polling results of the villages in the area of this branch are forwarded herewith in accordance with No. 1 of your letter.

The high percentage of No-votes and invalid votes has its reason in nearly all cases in the religious attitude of the population, irrespective of whether they are Catholics or Protestants The district manager of the District Kochem gave the assurance that it was mostly women who voted “no” or “invalidly”. As became known here a supervisory control was ordered at several localities of the district which has confirmed the assertion of the district manager. In one village, Fronhofen, district Simmern, see enclosure 3, several inhabitants were fined in the fall of last year because they had shown forbidden church banners at the occasion of a festival at the first ordination of a priest. The bad result in the village Riesweiler in the same district is obviously the result, as the district manager there states of squabbles between the leader of the local party group and several inhabitant In spite of many endeavors, even on the part of the Gau-leadership, these squabbles could not so far be settled. A report on the village of Kiesselbach has already been made over the phone: in this connection, it must be taken into consideration that the result given has to be corrected because the percentage reported included the no votes, but did not include the invalid votes. Aside from religious questions, the following reasons were at the root of the matter. For some time already the consolidation of private property had been under way. The Reich Food Estate had promised the peasants in the beginning that the individual plans would not exceed 4 “Morgen” to 1 Hektar (about 2.47 acres). Afterwards it appeared, however, that plans had been made for up to 24 Morgen. Some peasants received property situatednear the village while other peasants who formerly had their landed property near the village, now received property at the border of the area. Apart from some individual cases where “no” votes or invalid votes may be attributed to an anti-social attitude, no further reasons beyond those enumerated above, can be found.

Only two cases of direct incorrectness in carrying out the ballot have so far come to our knowledge as may be gathered from enclosures 1 and 2. They affected the localities of Pommern, district of Kochem, and Boppard, district of St. Goar. At the village of Kappel, district of Simmern, an inconspicuous supervisory control of the votes cast was effected without, however, altering the actual results. A special report about this case will follow soon.

Security Service Branch Kochem

initialled: N Staffel-Scharführer Kochem district: Locality: Lieg: Votes cast: 286 No-votes: 14 Invalid votes: 2 Percentage: 5.6 Beuren: Votes cast: 277 No-votes: 24 Percentage: 9.5 Urschmitt: Votes cast: 198 No-votes: 14 Percentage: 7.1 Pommern: Votes cast: 145 No-votes: 5 Invalid votes: 14 Percentage: 13.1 Poltersdorf: Votes cast: 495 No-votes: 4 (40) Invalid votes: 1 (10) Percentage: 1.01 (10.1). The figures inserted in () in Pommern [sic] give the actual voting results, the published figures give the official result. St. Goar district: Locality: Boppard Votes cast: 4,178 No-votes: 11 (130) Invalid votes: 2 Percentage: 0.31 (3.1). The figures in () show the actual result of the ballot.

“Document R-145: State Police Order Concerning The Sanction Of Denominational Youth And Professional Associations And The Distribution Of Publications In Churches And Through Church Publishing Houses [translation]”, pp. 248-249.

Copy

The President of the Government, State Police Office for the District of Duesseldorf, Branch 11/67.

On the basis of paragraph 1 of the law of the Reich President for the Protection of People and State of 2/28/1933 [Reichsgesetzblatt I, p. 83] as well as on the basis of the law for Police Administration of 6/1/1931 [G.S. p. 77] the following state police regulation will take effect within the Duesseldorf district.

1. Denominational youth and professional organizations as well as those created for special occasions only are prohibited from every public activity outside the church and religious sphere.

Especially forbidden is: Any public appearance in groups, all sorts of political activity. Any public sport function including public hikes and establishment of holiday or outdoor camps. The public display or showing of flags, banners, pennants, or the open wearing of uniforms or insignia. Still permissible is the holding of closed denominational youth and professional associations in church buildings without uniform or insignia; particularly at traditional processions, pilgrimages and church burials. On these occasions the public display of banners and flags blessed by the church is permitted.

2. The distribution and sale of published items of any sort in connection with worship or religious instructions in public streets or squares near churches is forbidden. In the same sense the distribution and sale of published items on the occasion of processions, pilgrimages, and similar church institutions in the streets or squares they pass through or in their vicinity is prohibited. For every incident of non-compliance with this law there will be a fine imposed up to 10 Reichsmarks, in the event that this imposition cannot be met imprisonment up to 3 months will be threatened. This does not exclude punishment according to other penal provisions on such subjects. This ordinance comes into effect on the day of publication. On the same day my police regulations of 2/1/1934, 2/20/1934 Governmental Journal, Executive Part 67, p. 169, no. 332, as well as for 4/27/1934Part II/67 Governmental Journal, p. 169, no. 333are rescinded.

Duesseldorf, 5/29/1934

The President of the Government State Police Office for the Duesseldorf district, Signed: Schmid.

“Document R-146: Sequestration [Beschlagnahme] Of Church Properties (Properties Of Monasteries, Etc.) [translation]”, pp. 250-251.

National Socialist German Worker’s Party The Deputy of the Führer Chief of Staff

Muenchen, 3/20/1941 Brown House

Personal! Secret Circular Letter No. 59

To all Gauleiters.

Valuable church properties had to be sequestered to a large extent lately, especially in Austria; according to reports of the Gauleiter to the Führer these sequestrations were frequently caused by offenses against ordinances relating to war economy (e.g.hoarding of food stuffs of various kinds, textile, leather goads etc.) In other cases they were caused by offenses against the law relating to malicious attacks against the state [Heimtueckegesetz] and in some cases because of prohibited possession of firearms. Obviously no compensation is to be paid to the churches for sequestrations made because of the above mentioned reasons.

With regard to further sequestrations- several Austrian Gauleiters have attempted to clarify the question who should acquire such sequestered properties at the-occasion of the Führer’s last visit to Vienna. Please take note of the Führer’s decision, as contained in the letter written by Reich Minister Dr. Lammers to the Reich Minister for the Interior, dated 3/14/1941. I enclose copy of extracts of same.

(signed) M. Bormann

1 Enclosure Certified: [signature illegible] Berlin, 3/14/1941. At present Führer-Headquarters

The Reich Minister and Chief of the Reich Chancellery Rk. 3884 B

To the Reich Minister for the Interior.

Subject: Draft of an ordinance supplementing the provisions on confiscation of property of persons inimical to people and state. Re. letter of this office dated 1/27/1941. Rk. 19291 B II

The Reich governors and Gauleiter von Schirach, Dr. Jury, and Eigruber complained recently to the Führer that the Reich Minister of Finance still maintains the point of view that confiscation of property of persons inimical to the people and state should be made in favor of the Reich and not in favor of the Reich Gaue. As a consequence the Führer has informed me that he desires the confiscation of such properties to be effected in favor of the respective Reich Gau, in which area the confiscated property is situated, and not in favor of the Reich. Should the property be situated in several Reich Gaue, a reasonable division of the property should be attained between the Reich Gaue concerned, insofar as possible.

(signed) Dr. Lammers

Copy certified :- [signed] Hall

“Document R-150: Plan Secret 1938 [partial translation]”, pp. 268-269.

Top Secret By officer’s hand only To: Air Force Group Command 3 Az. Plst. 38/Ia op No. 450/38 Top Secret Top Secret Matter of 6/2/1938

38 copies Copy No. 16

Main Part III Instruction for Deployment and Combat “Case Red” Place Names according to Geo Survey-Map 1:1 million

Arrangement of Main Part III, “Case Red,” of Plan Study 1938 Part A General principles for combat in the event of “Case Red”.

Part B Air attack against the west.

Part C Instructions for deployment and first employment of air defense forces in the event of “Case Red”.

Part D Instructions for signal communications service in the event of “Case Red”.

Part E Formations of air force group 3 which in the event of “Case Red” are to be attached to the army, and airdromes in the area of air force group 3 which are to be taken over by the army.

Part F Instructions concerning suppl.

Part G Instructions for preparation of marches and railroad movements.

Part H List of signals and method of transmission.

Part J Deadlines.

Part K Supply with target information and maps.

Enclosure 1 First employment of ground crew companies.

Enclosure 2 French Air Force: Deployment areas, ground organization, supply installations.

Enclosure 3 French deployment routes: Targets for interference.

Enclosure 3a French deployment routes: Stretches in open country favorable for cutting.

Enclosure 4 First priority power and transformer stations, oil refineries, oil depots, disembarkation ports.

Enclosure 5 “Case Red”, “Air Defense Red”.

Enclosure 6 Air force group 3Telephone communications (Net Ludwig).

Enclosure 7 Air force group 3Teleprinter communications (Net Ludwig).

Enclosure 8 Air force group 3Telegraph communications (Net Ludwig).

Enclosure 9 Survey map of networks for leadership and command; Radio communications.

Enclosure 10 Flight control and radio navigation.

Enclosure 11 Static ground network for flight signals and employment of flight signal companies in air force group 3, including Tyrol and Vorarlberg, with attachment “List of places with their numbers”. 1. In order to elaborate the preparations for “Case Red”, formations will base individual maneuvers and field discussions on assignments corresponding to this case of action. They will bear in mind the restrictions prescribed in Main Part I, Part B I, 2. The officers of attack formations and reconnaissance groups F must be familiar with the possible priority targets; they will also inform themselves about all targets within the combat area which are of interest to the air force.

3. Necessary reconnaissance on the subject of air defense will be assigned to the troops as individual reconnaissance tasks for the air defense target file and will be treated as top secret matter. The troops must not be able to deduce from the assignments a picture of the total deployment planned.

Part A. General principles for combat in the event of “Case Red”. 1. Military-political situationOpening move of war:

If war threatens between France and Germany, it is expected that hostilities will be started by France. France will:

a. either interfere in the struggle between the Reich and Czechoslovakia in the course of “Case Green”, or

b. start hostilities simultaneously with Czechoslovakia.

c. It is possible but not likely that France will begin the fight, while Czechoslovakia still remains aloof.

It may be assumed that France will begin the war with her air force, probably without a declaration of war. England’s entry into the war and the employment of English air forces, even from continental bases, must be reckoned with. Belgium’s participation is uncertain. It is doubtful whether France and England will respect a possible Belgianneutrality. It is unlikely that France will respect the neutrality of Luxembourg.

German formations will not fly over Belgian and Luxembourg territory until they receive specific orders from the supreme command of the Air Force.

[Translator’s note: here follow speculations as to the probable deployment and strategic plan of the French Air Force.]

11. Intention of the commanding general and of the commander of Air Force Group 3

a. Combat area: The whole area of France.

[Translator’s note: here follows delineation of combat area of Air Force Group 3 as against that of Air Force Group 2.]

Combat (including reconnaissance, but excluding contact with enemy formations which have carried out attacks in form of raids) will not be started until the supreme commander of the Air Force has given the signal: “Western frontier clear for flight”.

b. Intention: Regardless of whether France enters the war as a result of “Case Green” or whether she makes the opening move of the war simultaneously with Czechoslovakia, in any case the mass of the German offensive formations will, in conjunction with the army, first deliver the decisive blow against Czechoslovakia.

Until the main forces employed in the southeast become available, it will be the task of Air Force Group 3 to prevent France from obtaining complete freedom of action in the air. For this purpose, attacks will be carried out continuously, in varying strength and in irregular sequence; air defense will be mobile and will be concentrated on focal points. In addition it may be necessary in exceptional cases to relieve Army Group West through concentrated use [Translator’s note: of the air force] at threatened parts of the front or through attacks against the deploying French armies, the deployment routes and the supply service.

It is intended to use parachute sabotage troops, which will be assigned by the supreme command of the Air Force from case to case, for the purpose of destroying suitable targets, against which bombing raids cannot guarantee decisive success.

By means of simulated activities on as many peacetime airports as possible and on other airdromes known to the enemy, further by installing new dummy airdromes and bydistributing our own forces in small units over a wide area, we intend to create a deceptive impression of great fighting strength and to split up the enemy’s combat forces.

Later phase:

If stronger forces are assigned in the course of the operations, the main task will be:

To break up the French flying formations on their airdromes, to destroy their supply depots and the vital installations on the airdromes.

In addition, preparations will be made for:

aa. Attacks against power and transformer stations which are indispensable for the supply of power to the armament industries in and around Paris (the most important stations which are to be destroyed first are marked on Enclosure 4).

bb. Attacks against the French fuel supply, especially the refineries and oil depots (for the most important installations see Enclosure 4).

cc. Attacks against [translator’s note: troops and cargoe] unloading in the French Mediterranean Ports (see Enclosure 4).

These attacks, as well as attacks on airdromes and supply depots in the Paris zone will not be carried out until a specific order is received from the Supreme Commander of the Air Force.

24. Preparatory measures or employment against the West of further aggressive air forces freed from service in the Southeast.

a. As the enterprise against Czechoslovakia progresses, aggressive air forces freed from service in the Southeast will, in the event of “Case Red”, be transferred to the West and employed against France with as much sudden force [Schlagartig] as possible.

Depending on the development of the situation in the Southeast, the transfer of reinforcements to the West may become possible already a few days after “Case Red” starts.

The strength of these forces cannot be determined exactly be forehand. The following are the maximum forces which may be counted upon (additional to the forces already employed in the West by the Commanding General of Air Force Group 3):

3 Air Division Commanders with, on the average:

2 combat “geschwader”, 1 dive-bomber group and 1 reconnaissance

“Staffel” or Group F) each.

(Therefore total strength roughly up to 30 combat and divebomber Groups).

For combat objectives of the Commanding General of Air Force Group 3 after receipts of reinforcements, see Part A, Ar

Part J Deadlines

7/15/1938: Luftgau Commands will: Report that the preparations ordered in Plan Study 1938 Main Part III for the event of “Case Red” have been completed (cf. Article 2 of covering letter (Anschreiben) of Decree Lw. Gruppenkommando 3 Az. Plst.38/Ia op No.450/38 Top Secret 6/2/1938 concerning Plan Study 1938).

7/15/1938: Luftgau Commands will:

Effect change of distribution of Air Defense forces in accordance with Part C, Article 16 a, Submit marching orders in accordance with Part C, Article 16 e and f, Report that the issue of assignment orders has been completed, in accordance with Part C, Article 16 e and f

8/1/1938; 3/1/1939: Report concerning substitute field airdromes in accordance with Part E, Article J 8, by Luftgau Commands VII, XII and XIII.

“Document TC-22: Agreement Between The German Government And The Government Of The Federal State Of Austria, 7/11/1936 [translation]”, pp. 369-270.

[Translation of Official Communique broadcast from Vienna on 7/11/1936.]

It is officially announced: In the conviction that they are making a valuable contribution towards the whole European development in the direction of maintaining peace and in the belief that they are thereby best serving the manifold mutual interests of both German States, the Governments of the Federal States of Austria and of Germany have resolved to give their relations once more a normal and friendly form. In this connection it is declared:-

1. The German Government recognizes the full sovereignty of the Federal State of Austria in the sense of the pronouncements of the German Leader and Chancellor of 5/21/1935.

2. Each of the two Governments regards the inner political order (including the question of Austrian national socialism) obtaining in the other country as an internal affair of the other country, upon which it will exercise neither direct nor indirect influence.

3. The Austrian Federal Government will conduct its policy in general and in particulartowards Germany always on that fundamental line corresponding to the fact that Austria regards herself as a German State.

In this respect neither the Rome protocols of 1934 and their additions of 1936, nor the relationship of Austria to Italy and Hungary as partners in these protocols, are affected. Considering that the detente desired by both sides can only become really effectual if certain preliminary stipulations on the part of the Governments of both countries are carried out, the Austrian Federal Government and the German Government will pass a number of particular measures to bring about the requisite preliminary state of affairs.

“Document TC-28: German Assurance To Czechoslovakia Of 9/26/1938 [translation]”, p. 378.

[Documents of German Politics (Dokumente der deutschen Politik) Part VI, Pages 345-346.]

I have a little to explain. I am grateful to Mr. Chamberlain for all his efforts, and I have assured him that the German people want nothing but peace; but I have also told him that I cannot go back beyond the limits of our patience.

I assured him moreover, and I repeat it here, that when this problem is solved there will be no more territorial problems for Germany in Europe. And I further assured him that from the moment when Czechoslovakia solves its other problems, that is to say when the Czechs have come to an agreement with their other minorities peacefully and without oppression, I will no longer be interested in the Czech State. And that, as far as I am concerned, I will guarantee it. We don’t want any Czechs! But I must also declare before the German people that in the Sudeten German problem my patience is now at an end. I made an offer to Herr Benes which was no more than the realization of what he had already promised. He now has peace or war in his hands. Either he will accept this offer and at length give the Germans their freedom, or we will get his freedom for ourselves.

“Document TC-29: German Assurance To Poland, 9/26/1938 [translation]”,378-379.

[Documents of German Politics (Dokumente der deutschen Politik) Part VI, Page 336.]

The most difficult problem with which I was confronted was that of our relations with Poland. There was a danger that Poles and Germans would regard each other as hereditary enemies. I wanted to prevent this. I know well enough that I should not have been successful if Poland had had a democratic Constitution. For these democracies which indulge in phrases about peace are the most bloodthirsty war agitators. In Poland there ruled no democracy but a man; and with him I succeeded in precisely twelve months, in coming to an agreement which, for ten years in the first instance, entirely removed the danger of a conflict. We are all convinced that this agreement will bring lasting pacification. We realize that here are two peoples which must live together and neither of which can do away with the other. A people of 33 millions will always strive for an outlet to the sea. A way for understanding, then, had to be found; it has been found, and it will be ever further extended. Certainly things were hard in this area. But the main fact is that the two Governments, and all reasonable and clear-sighted persons among the two peoples and in the two countries, possess the firm will and determination to improve their relations. It was a real work of peace, of more worth than all the chattering in the League of Nations Palace at Geneva.

I have attempted during this period gradually to bring about better and lasting relations with other nations as well. We have given guarantees for the States in the West. We have assured all our immediate neighbours of the integrity of their territory as far as Germany is concerned. That is no mere phrase. It is our sacred will. We have no interest whatever in a breach of the peace. We want nothing from these peoples. These offers of ours met with growing understanding. One by one the peoples are freeing themselves from the crass blindness of Geneva, which I would call a policy, not of the collective obligation for peace, but of the collective obligation for war. They are freeing themselves and beginning to see problems soberly; they are ready for understanding and desirous of peace.

“Document TC-30: German Assurance To Denmark, Norway, Belgium And The Netherlands, 4/28/1989 [translation]”, pp. 379-380.

[Documents of German Politics (Dokumente der deutschen Politik) Part VII, I Pages 139, 172-175.]

“I have given binding declarations to a large number of States. None of these States can complain that even a trace of a demand contrary thereto has ever been made to them byGermany. None of the Scandinavian statesmen, for example, can contend that a request has ever been put to them by the German Government or by German public opinion which was incompatible with the sovereignty and integrity of their State.

“I was pleased that a number of European States availed themselves of these declarations by the German Government to express and emphasize their desire too for absolute neutrality. This applies to Holland, Belgium, Switzerland, Denmark, etc. I have already mentioned France. I need not mention Italy, with whom we are united in the deepest and closest friendship, Hungary and Yugoslavia, with whom we as neighbours have the fortune to be on very friendly terms. On the other hand I have left no doubt from the first moment of my political activity that there existed other circumstances which represent such a mean and gross outrage of the right of self-determination of our people that we can never accept or endorse them. I have never written a single line or made a single speech displaying a different attitude towards the above-mentioned States. On the other hand with reference to the other cases I have never written a single line or made a single speech in which I have expressed any attitude contrary to my actions.”

“Document TC-31 [translation]”, p. 380.

Copy

GERMAN LEGATION

AIDE MEMOIRE

The German Reich Government is determined, in view of the friendly relations which exist between Norway and Germany, under no circumstances to prejudice the inviolability and integrity of Norway and to respect the territory of the Norwegian State. In making this declaration the Reich Government naturally expects, on its side, that Norway will observe an unimpeachable neutrality towards the Reich and will not tolerate any breaches of Norwegian neutrality by any third party which might occur. Should the attitude of the Royal Norwegian Government differ from this so that any such breach of neutrality by a third party recurs, the Reich Government would then obviously be compelled to safeguard the interests of the Reich in such a way as the resulting situation might dictate.

OSLO, 9/2/1939.

This is to certify that the above is a true copy of the Aide-Memoire which was handed to the Norwegian Foreign Minister by the German Minister in Oslo on 9/2/1939. OSLO,10/3/1945.

(signed) TRYGVE LIE Foreign Minister.

“Document TC-32: German Assurance To Norway Of 10/6/1939 [partial translation]”, p. 381.

[Documents of German Politics (Dokumente der deutschen Politik), Vol. VII, I, page 350.]

Germany has never had any conflicts of interest or even points of controversy with the northern States, neither has she any today. Sweden and Norway have both been offered nonaggression pacts by Germany and have both refused them solely because they do not feel themselves threatened in any way.

“Document TC-34: German Declaration Of 10/13/1937 [translation]”, pp. 381-382.

Monsieur le Ministre,

I have the honour on behalf of the German Government, to make the following communication to your Excellency:

The German Government has taken cognizance, with particular interest, of the public declarations in which the Belgian Government defines the international position of Belgium. For its part, it has repeatedly given expression, especially through the declaration of the Chancellor of the German Reich in his speech of 1/30/1937 to its own point of view.

The German Government has also taken cognizance of the declaration made by the British and French Governments on 4/24/1937.

Since the conclusion of a treaty to replace the Treaty of Locarno may still take some time, and being desirous of strengthening the peaceful aspirations of the two countries,the German Government regards it as appropriate to define now its own attitude towards Belgium.

To this end it makes the following declaration:

(1) The German Government has taken note of the views which the Belgian Government has thought fit to express; that is to say:

(a) Of the policy of independence which it intends to exercise in full sovereignty;

(b) Of its determination to defend the frontiers of Belgium with all its forces against any aggression or invasion, and to prevent Belgium territory from being used, for purposes of aggression against another State, as a passage or as a base of operations by land, by sea, or in the air; and to organize the defence of Belgium in an efficient manner for this purpose.

(2) The German Government considers that the inviolability and integrity of Belgium are common interests of the Western Powers. It confirms its determination that in no circumstances will it impair this inviolability and integrity, and that it will at all times respect Belgian territory, except, of course, in the event of Belgium’s taking part in a military action directed against Germany in an armed conflict in which Germany is involved.

(3) The German Government, like the British and French Governments, is prepared to assist Belgium should she be subjected to an attack or to invasion.

I have the honour, etc.

ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF RECEIPT

The Belgian Government has taken note with great satisfaction of the declaration communicated to it this day by the German Government. It thanks the German Government warmly for this communication.

“Document TC-36: Declaration Made By The Ambassador Of Germany On 8/26/1939 [translation]”, pp. 382-323.

In view of the gravity of the international situation, I am expressly instructed by the Head of the German Reich to transmit to Your Majesty the following communication.

Though the German Government is at present doing everything in its power to arrive at a peaceful solution of the questions at issue between the Reich and Poland, it nevertheless desires to define clearly, here and now, the attitude which it proposes to adopt towards Belgium should a’ conflict in Europe become inevitable.

The German Government is firmly determined to abide by the terms of the Declaration contained in the German Note of 10/13/1937. This provides, in effect, that Germany will in no circumstances impair the inviolability and integrity of Belgium and will at all times respect Belgian territory. The German Government renews this undertaking, however, in the expectation that the Belgian Government, for its part, will observe an attitude of strict neutrality and that Belgium will tolerate no violation on the part of a third Power, but that on the contrary she will oppose it with all the forces at her disposal. It goes without saying that if the Belgian Government were to adopt a different attitude, the German Government would naturally be compelled to defend its interest in conformity with the new situation thus created.

“Document TC-40: Declaration By The German Minister, Count Von Zech, Communicated To Her Majesty The Queen In The Presence Of The Minister For Foreign Affairs On 8/26/1939 [translation]”, pp. 383-384.

We are resolved, in accordance with the traditional friendly relations existing between the two countries, and in appreciation of the known Netherlands policy of Independence, to maintain an attitude towards the Netherlands which under no circumstances prejudices the inviolability and integrity of the Netherlands and at all times respects Netherlands territory. But we also naturally expect on our side the Netherlands to observe an unimpeachable neutrality towards us in the event of any conflict. It is of first importance in this connection that Holland shall not tolerate any breaches of her neutrality which may be committed by a third party, but shall oppose them with all the means at her disposal. Should the attitude of the Netherlands in the case of such a breach of neutrality by a third party differ from this, we should obviously be compelled to defend our interests in such a way as the resulting situation might dictate.

Voor eensluidend afschrift:

De Minister van Buitenlandsche Zaken, Voor den Minister, De Secretaris-General

(Signed) Certified at the Netherlands Embassy for legislation of the foregoing signature of Jhr. A. M. Snouck Hurgronje, Secretary General of the Netherlands Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

LONDON, 10/5/1945

(Signed) Netherlands Ambassador

“Document TC-42-A: German Assurance To Luxembourg, 4/28/1939 [translation]”, p. 385.

Documents of German Politics (Dokumente der deutschen Politik), Part VII, 1, Pages 139; 172-175.]

Finally Mr. Roosevelt demands the readiness to give him an assurance that the German fighting forces will not attack the territory or possessions of the following independent nations, and, above all, that they will not march into them. And he goes on to name the following as the countries in question: Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, Esthonia, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Holland, Belgium, Great Britain, Ireland, France, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Poland, Hungary, Rumania, Yugoslavia, Russia, Bulgaria, Turkey, Iraq, Arabia, Syria, Palestine, Egypt and Iran.

Answer: I started off by taking the trouble to find out in the case of the countries listed, firstly, whether they feel themselves threatened and, secondly and particularly, whether this question Mr. Roosevelt has asked us was put as a result of a demarche by them or at least with their consent.

The answer was a general negative, which in some cases took the form of a blunt rejection. Actually this counter-question of mine could not be conveyed to some of the states and nations listed, since they are not at present in possession of their liberty (as for instance Syria), but are occupied by the military forces of democratic states, and therefore, deprived of all their rights.

Thirdly, apart from that, all the states bordering on Germany have received much more binding assurances and, above all, much. more binding proposals than Mr. Roosevelt asked of me in his peculiar telegram.

“Document TC-49: Text of the Agreement between the Führer and Reichs Chancellor Adolf Hitler and the President of the Czecho-Slovak State, Dr. Hacha [translation]”, p. 402.

[Documents of German Politics, (Dokumente der deutschen Politik), Part VII, 2, Pages 498-499.]

The Führer and Reichs Chancellor to-day received in Berlin, at their own request, the President of the Czecho-Slovak State, Dr. Hacha, and the Czecho-Slovak Foreign Minister, Dr. Chwalkowsky, in the presence of Herr von Ribbentrop, the Foreign Minister of the Reich. At this meeting the serious situation which had arisen within the previous territory of Czechoslovakia, owing to the events of recent weeks, was subjected to a completely open examination. The conviction was unanimously expressed on both sides that the object of all their efforts must be to assure quiet, order and peace in this part of Central Europe. The President of the Czecho-Slovak State declared that, in order to serve this end and to reach a final pacification, he confidently placed the fate of the Czech people and of their country in the hands of the Führer of the German Reich. The Führer accepted this declaration and expressed his decision to assure to the Czech people, under the protection of the German Reich, the autonomous development of their national life in accordance with their special characteristics. In witness whereof this document is signed in duplicate.

ADOLF HITLER Von RIBBENTROP

Dr. HACHA Dr. CHWALKOWSKY

Berlin, March 15,1939

“Document TC-50: Proclamation Of The Führer To The German People On 3/15/1939 [translation]”, pp.

[Documents of German Politics (Dokumente der deutschen Politik) Part VII, 2, Pages 499-501.]

To the German People

Only a few months ago Germany was compelled to protect her fellow-countrymen living in well-defined settlements against the unbearable Czechoslovakian terror regime; and during the last weeks the same thing has happened on an ever increasing scale. This is bound to create an intolerable state of affairs within an area inhabited by citizens of so many nationalities.

These national groups, to counteract the renewed attacks against their freedom and life, have now broken away from the Prague Government. Czechoslovakia has ceased to exist.

Since Sunday at many places wild excesses have broken out, amongst the victims of which are again many Germans. Hourly the number of oppressed and persecuted people crying for help is increasing. From areas thickly populated by German-speaking inhabitants, which last autumn Czechoslovakia was allowed by German generosity to retain, refugees robbed of their personal belongings are streaming into the Reich.

Continuation of such a state of affairs would lead to the destruction of every vestige of order in an area in which Germany is vitally interested, particularly as for over 1000 years it formed a part of the German Reich.

In order definitely to remove this menace to peace and! to create the conditions for a necessary new order in this living space. I have to-day resolved to allow Germans troops to march into Bohemia and Moravia. They will disarm the terror gangs and the Czechoslovakian forces supporting them, and protect the lives of all who are menaced. Thus they will lay the foundations for introducing a fundamental re-ordering of affairs which will be in accordance with the 1000 year-old history and will satisfy the practical needs of the German and Czech peoples.

BERLIN, 3/15/1939

(signed) ADOLF HITLER

ORDER OF THE FÜHRER TO THE GERMAN ARMED FORCES, 3/15/

Czechoslovakia is in dissolution. In Bohemia and Moravia terror against German fellow-countrymen reigns. From 3/15/1939 onwards formations of the German Army and Air Force will enter Czech territory in order to safeguard lives and property of all inhabitants of the country.

I expect every German soldier to consider himself not as an enemy of the inhabitants of the territory to be occupied, but only as an instrument for carrying out the German Reich Government’s decision to restore a satisfactory order in that territory. But should resistance be offered anywhere, it will immediately be crushed with all means.

For the rest, remember that you set foot on Czech soil as representatives of Greater Germany.

The Führer and Supreme C-in-C of the Armed Forces

(signed) ADOLF HITLER.

“Document TC-53-A: Marginal Note To The Law Concerning The Reunion Of The Memel Territory With The German Reich Of 3/23/1939 [translation]”, p. 408.

[Documents of German Politics (Dokumente der deutschen Politik), Part VII, 2, Page 552, Note 2.]

The transfer commissioner [Ueberleitungskommissar] for the Memel Territory, Gauleiter and Oberpresident Erich Koch, effected on 4/3/1939 during a conference at Memel the final incorporation of the late Memel Territory into the national-socialist party Gau of East Prussia and into the state administration of the East-Prussian Regierungsbezirk of Grunbinnen.

“Document TC-54: Proclamation Of The Führer To The German Armed Forces, 9/1/1939 [translation]”, pp. 408-409.

To the Armed Forces

The Polish Government unwilling to establish good neighbourly relations as aimed at by me wants to force the issue by way of arms.

The Germans in Poland are being persecuted with bloody terror and driven from their homes. Several acts of frontier violation which cannot be tolerated by a great power show that Poland is no longer prepared to respect the Reich’s frontiers. To put an end to these mad acts I can see no other way but from now onwards to meet force with force.

The German Armed Forces will with firm determination take up the struggle for the honour and the vital rights of the German people.

I expect every soldier to be conscious of the high tradition of the eternal German soldierly qualities and to do his duty to the last.

Remember always and in any circumstances that you are the representatives of National Socialist Greater Germany.

Long live our people and Reich!

Berlin, 9/1/1939.

(signed) ADOLF HITLER.

“Document TC-55: German Ultimatum (Memorandum) To The Norwegian And Danish Governments Dated 4/9/1940 [translation]”, pp. 410-413.

[Documents of German Politics (Dokumente der deutschen Politik), Part VIII, I, Pages 21-31.]

Contrary to the sincere desire of the German people and their Government to live in peace and amity with the English and French peoples, and in spite of the absence of any reasonable grounds for mutual strife, those in power in London and Paris have declared war on the German nation.

With the unleashing of this war of aggression against the existence of the German Reich for which they had long been preparing, England and France have also started a maritime war against the neutral world.

Whilst, with complete disregard of the elementary rules of international law, they sought to direct a starvation blockade against German women, children, and old people, at the same time they subjected neutral States to their ruthless blockade measures. The immediate consequences of these methods of warfare initiated by England and France, which are contrary to international law and which had to be met by Germany with counter measures, were the most severe damage to neutral shipping and to neutral trade. This English procedure, however, dealt the very conception of neutrality a shattering blow.

Germany, for her part, has made equally serious efforts to preserve the rights of neutral countries by her endeavours to limit maritime warfare to maritime zones lying between Germany and her opponents. In contrast to this, England, with the object of diverting danger from her islands and at the same time of preventing German trade with neutral countries has expended greater and greater efforts on carrying maritime warfare into neutral waters. In pursuance of this truly British method of waging war, England has taken belligerent action in the territorial waters and regions of Denmark and Norway to an ever increasing degree and in flagrant breach of international law.

From the outbreak of the war Germany had foreseen this development. Through her economic policy at home and abroad she has known how to frustrate the attempt made by the British starvation blockade against the German nation and to prevent the strangulation of German trade.

This has caused the complete collapse of the British blockade policy to becomeincreasingly evident in recent months.

These developments, together with the hopelessness of any direct attack on German western defenses and the growing anxiety in England and France in the face of the successful German counterattacks at sea and in the air, have recently caused both nations to make increasingly serious efforts to carry the theatre of war by every means in their power into the neutral mainland both within and outside Europe. It goes without saying that, following the British tradition, England and France, in making these attempts, have the small European states in view in the first place. During recent months English and French statesmen have quite openly proclaimed the extension of the war to these territories to be the fundamental strategical concept of their conduct of the war.

The Russo-Finnish conflict offered the first occasion for this. The English and French Governments had expressed quite openly their intention to intervene with military force in the conflict between Soviet Russia and Finland, and to use the territory of the northern States as a base of operations for this purpose.

Only the early conclusion of peace in the North, which occurred contrary to their wishes, hindered them from putting this resolution into effect at that time. If English and French statesmen subsequently declared that they would have made the carrying out of this intention dependent upon the concurrence of the Scandinavian States, that is a gross untruth. The Reich Government has documentary proof in its possession, showing that England and France had together decided if necessary to carry out the action through the territories of the Northern States even against their will.

The decisive factor is, however, the following:

From the attitude of the French and the English Governments before and after the conclusion of the Soviet-Finnish Peace, and from the documentary evidence actually in the hands of the Reich Government, there is indisputable proof that the decision to assist Finland against Russia should over and above that serve to aid further plans.

The further aim of England and France in Scandinavia was and primarily is:

1. By the occupation of Narvik to cut off Germany from her one supply route in the North.

2. In the landing of English and French fighting forces in Scandinavian countries to establish a new front in order to attack Germany’s flank from the North.

In this way the northern countries would serve as a theatre of war of the English and French forces, whilst the northern people in accordance with an age-long English tradition, would be allotted the role of auxiliary and mercenary troops.

As by reason of the conclusion of the Finnish Russian peace, this plan was frustrated. It then became even clearer to the Reich Government that England and France were making decisive endeavours immediately to realize and develop their plans in a different way.

With the urgent necessity of preparing an intervention in the North, in recent weeks the English and French Governments openly proclaimed the thesis that there could be no neutrality in this war, and it was the duty of small countries actively to take part in the war against Germany. This thesis was prepared for by propaganda from the Western Powers, supported by ever-increasing political pressure on the neutral countries. Concrete reports regarding forthcoming endeavours of the Western Powers to land in Scandinavia accumulated recently more and more. If there ever was the slightest doubt regarding the definite decision of the Western Powers to intervene in the North, it has finally been removed during the last few days.

The Reich Government has in its possession conclusive evidence that England and France intended to effect a surprise occupation of certain territories in the northern countries within the next few days.

The northern countries have on their side not only not offered any resistance to these encroachments by England and France but have even tolerated without taking any counter measures the greatest encroachments on their sovereign rights.

The Reich Government must, consequently, assume that the Royal Norwegian Government will adopt the same attitude towards the preparations and fulfillment of plans of action now intended by England and France. But even if the Royal Norwegian Government had intended to take countermeasures, the Reich Government was quite certain that the Norwegian military forces would not be sufficient to be able to oppose the English-French actions successfully.

In this decisive phase of the fight for existence forced on the German people by England and France, the Reich Government can in no circumstances tolerate that Scandinavia should be made the theatre of war against Germany by the Western Powers, and the Norwegian people, whether directly or indirectly, misused in a war against Germany.

Germany does not intend to await idly or to put up with such a realization of the opponents’ plans. The Reich Government therefore has today begun certain military operations, which will lead to the occupation of strategically important points on Norwegian territory. The Reich Government therewith undertakes the protection of the Kingdom of Norway for the duration of the war. It has resolved, from now on, to protect peace in the North with all its power against any English-French attack, and finally to assure it.

The Reich Government did not wish for this development. England and France alone bear the responsibility. Both States proclaim quite hypocritically the protection of small countries. In reality, however, they offer violence to these (smaller countries) in the hope thereby to be able to realize their will to destroy, directed against Germany and daily more openly announced.

The German troops therefore do not set foot on Norwegian soil as enemies. The German High Command does not intend to make use of the points occupied by German troops as bases for operations against England, as long as it is not forced to do so by measures taken by England and France. German military operations aim much more exclusively at protecting the North against the proposed occupation of Norwegian strongpoints by English-French forces.

The Reich Government is convinced that by this action it is at the same time serving Norway’s interests. For this protection the German Wehrmacht offers the Scandinavian peoples the only guarantee that during this war their countries will not become a field of battle or a theatre of perhaps most terrible engagements.

The Reich Government thus expects that the Royal Norwegian Government and the Norwegian people will respond with understanding to the German measures and ofer no resistance to it. Any resistance would have to be and would be broken by all possible means by the German Forces employed and would therefore lead only to absolutely useless bloodshed. The Royal Norwegian Government is therefore requested to take all measures with the greatest speed to ensure that the advance of the German troops can take place without friction and difficulties.

In the spirit of the good German-Norwegian relations that have always existed, the Reich Government declares to the Royal Norwegian Government that Germany has no intention of infringing by her measures the territorial integrity and political independence of the Kingdom of Norway now or in the future.

“Document TC-58-A: Secret Instruction To The Commander Of The 2nd Luftflotte Found In A German Aeroplane On 1/10/1940 [translation]”, pp. 423-425.

[The following documents were in possession of a Staff Major of the 7th Air Division (parachutist and transport of troops by airHeadquarters at Berlin) who made a forced landing in Belgium on 1/10/1940. The Major had been attached to Unit, 220 of Troop Transport by Air (F1.F.220) and, when captured, was flying to Cologne to discuss the scheme at the 22nd Infantry Division headquarters. Our British Intelligence had ascertained the 22nd Division as specially trained for landing from the air in enemy territory.]

[DOCUMENT I]

Air Force Command Instructions, 2 … File of 11/17/1939 to be destroyed(?) pp. the Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force The Chief of Staff by order

(Signature undecipherable) Lieutenant-Colonel, General Staff. IV Aviation Corps Copy No. 1, VIII Aviation Corps Copy No. 2, 7 Aviation Division Copy No. 3, Commander of Air Carrier No. 220 and to 22nd Infantry Division Copy No. 4, II Anti-Aircraft Defense Corps Copy No. 5, Headquarters of VI Air Region Copy No. 6, Headquarters of XI Air Region Copy No. 7, Reconnaissance Group No. 122 Copy No. 8

For the information of

GHQ of Air Force Copy No. 9, B Group of Armies Copy No. 10, Also to the Air Command Copy No. 11, Liaison Officers at B Group of Armies Copy No. 12, Army Headquarters, No. 6 Copy No. 13, Air Force Command Copy No. 14, Staff: Staff-Commander Copy No. 15, Chief of Staff Copy No. 16, Deputy Chief of Staff Copy No. 17, Intelligence Section Copy No. 18, Operations Section No. 2 Copy No. 19, A.Q. Copy No.20, Officer in Charge of Signals Copy No. 21, Operations Section No. 1 Copy No. 22, Reserve Copies No. 23 and 24

British Army here [?] between Douai and Calais. Behind the whole of this zone important operative reserves are held deep in Northern France.

The Belgian Army covers the Liege-Antwerp line with its main force, lighter forces are in position in front on the Meuse-Scheldt Canal and on the frontier.

Only light forces of the Dutch Army are in position south of the Waal.

For weather conditions and information about the enemy: see I c 1 No. 7212/39 Chief of General Staff of 11/3/1939.

3. The German Western Army directs its attack between the North Sea and the Moselle, with the strongest possible air-force support, through the Belgo-Luxemburg region, with the object of … the largest possible groups of the French Army and of its …

The fortress of Liege and … surround (?) …

Further, it is intended with the help of part of the force (10th Army Corps reinforced by 1 Cavalry Division), to seize Dutch territory, with the exception of Festung, Holland.

5. Composition of Army Group B: see Appendix 2.

6. Cooperating Forces:

(a) The 3rd Luftflotte attacks, with all the weight of its aircraft, the French Air Force on the ground, and prevents it from taking part in land operations.

Later, it prevents the advance of the French Armies moving Northeast from theirconcentration areas.

The 3rd Luftflotte cooperates also with its Northern Wing (1st Aviation Corps) with Army Group B.

(b) The X Aviation Corps, directly under order from Air Force Headquarters, operates in close co-operation with the naval forces and the F.d Luft against the enemy naval forces and in particular, against the British naval forces.

Its reserves and … .

With regard to home defenses against air attack, the chief object is to protect the ground and war industries organization.

8. Forces. Disposition of the troops and points to be attacked see Appendix 1.

9. Reconnaissance.

(a) Air General Headquarters: reconnaissance to the west of the line Le Havre-Orleans-Bourges-Lyon-Geneva.

(b) 2nd Luftflotte: reconnaissance by Reconnaissance Group 122 to the northwest and west of the line Western Frisian Isles-Amsterdam-Antwerp-Brussels-Nivelles (islands and towns included). (a) Find out the disposition of the enemy Air Force in Northern France and Belgium.

(b) Watch the areas where the British Army is concentrated, detect as quickly as possible any movements from that area towards Belgium in the direction of Brussels-Ghent.

Left Boundry … .

Liege-Charleroi-Valenciennes-Amiens-Dieppe. (These towns included)

(f) Crossing of the frontier by reconnaissance planes first on the day A at H plus 5 minutes.

10. TASK OF THE VIII AVIATION CORPS:

On the first day of the attack, the VIII Aviation Corps supports with part of its forces a landing operation on the VII Aviation Division (see special order).

Closely cooperating with the 6th Army (main action to the West of Maastricht), it supports the advance of the land forces attacking the fortified line and the streams of the basin of the Meuse and destroys the Belgian Army to the West of that region. Attack against towns and villages during the course of these operations are only permitted if it is absolutely certain that they are occupied by troops.

Its fighter squadrons have to obtain command of the air over the area of attack of the 6th Army.

[DOCUMENT 2] APPRECIATION OF THE SITUATION On either side of the Meuse a high plateau with heights rising to … m. Very uneven, in places great differences in height, ravines.

Clayey ground, medium heavy to heavy. Only sparsely [?] populated. The operational area of the Division is on the whole thickly wooded.

The Meuse itself constitutes a marked cleft, deeply cut out. Width of river 100m. Banks rising steeply and mainly wooded. Observation very difficult.

Parachute troops can be dropped everywhere in … the bridges.

Airborne troops can only be landed at points 15 km. west of the Meuse on the line Vitrival, M …, Posee.

The country is similar in many respects to that of Freuden … and troop movements … not very mobile will be hindered. On the other hand, it lends itself to defense by groups … widely separated.

2. LANDING GROUNDS.

Five landing grounds have been reconnoitered. Of these, three are suitable in mild weather (I, III, V), two are suitable only under certain conditions (II, IV). In frosty weather all are suitable. On the whole some … 30% bad landing conditions as for “Enterprise” [?].

The whole of the landing troops of the division can be engaged. Time required: Parachuting and landing of the 1st [?] Division … a slight frost gives most favorable conditions … reducing as much as possible the jump … troops.

3. At the cutting of the Meuse, the Division should … (objective) … and keep open … .

Road Bridge of Annevoie.

Road bridge Yvoir (here point of main action).

Bridge Dinant-Namur (northwest … ).

If the country between the Meuse and the French frontier up to … should not be occupied by enemy troops, the landing would at first be unopposed. The landing grounds to the North can, it is true, be shelled by the heavy guns at Namur (15 km) if they should be discovered.

However, enemy attacks from the fortress of Namur must be expected very soon, and also perhaps from Charleroi, Philippeville and Givet.

The chief threat to the division is the arrival of mobile French troops from the line Maubeuge-Hinson-Fumay (40 km), whose advance units can be on the spot in a very short time.

5. This is why it is essential that, from the beginning of the landing operation, large forces of our bomber aircraft should be engaged against enemy concentration on the line Maubeuge. … Fumay against troops and transport moving from that line:

(a) on the road Mons-Charleroi (especially important); (b) on the road Maubeuge-Beaumont-Philippeville (specially important); (c) road Philippeville-Givet; (d) road Foumies-Chimay-Couvin-Givet; (e) road Rocroi-Mariembourg-Philippeville-Florennes; (f) road Rocroi-Fumay-Givet-towards … Dinant (specially important); (g) railway Mons-Charleroi … (important); (h) railway Maubeuge …; () railway Charleroi … (specially important); (k) railway PQ …; (I) railway … Hastiere …; (m) Then, for the protection of the Division … road Marche-Leignon-Ach …; (n) road Ciney-Evrehailles.

The area where bombing by our own aircraft is forbidden is bounded by: road Riviere-Floretteto a line 4 km South of the Sambre railway [?] Chatelet through Gerpinnes, Florennes, up to road Philippeville-Dinant (this railway is outside the forbidden zone straight [?] line from the level crossing up to Hermeton (this village outside the zone)the Meuse up to the Anseremme bridge (bridge included in the zone)line 4 km east of the Meuse up to Riviere.

6. Up and down movement of troops can best take place south of Liege at right angles to the frontier toward the Meuse through Malmedy-Ciney, i.e. by the shortest route in enemy territory.

In the given weather conditions, any detour would only cause inconvenience.

Antiaircraft defence is insignificant here. On the other hand very strong opposition from enemy fighters must be expected (chiefly French fighters).

The landing and fighting zone of the Division lies also … of many French aerodromes. French and British aviation groups also stationed more to the west fly, on their way to the front near … .

The intervention of the Division with more than 600 tons of transport planes and at this spot where the effect will be most felt by the enemy decides the chief point of concentration of enemy aircraft.

The Division is threatened more from the air than from the ground. This is why heavy fighter and fighter aircraft formations are necessary:

(a) for the transport, the parachuting and finally the landing (… very strong protection);

(b) supplies;

(c) against enemy air attacks (continuously … and not only according to special orders).

In this case this protection should be incessant … movement and landing. Greater needs in heavy fighters and … G … .

To satisfy this need … fighting area should only be 110 km from the frontier [?] … and should only imply 200 km flight over enemy territory … .

[DOCUMENT 3]

… Namur and the immediate vicinity … (21 Art.) and light forces Ard. … between Ourthe (here point of main attack) (… point) and the Meuse … 2 Cavalry Divisions.

At Charleroi 3rd Regiment of Gendarmerie.

French forces … are concentrated on the frontier … ready to march (to the west of the Meuse). … Army and parts of the 2nd Army with mechanized cavalry and infantry Divisions. Forward elements in the Givet wedge. To the east of the Meuse positions are in the course of construction along the railway line Namur-Assesse-Ciney-Jemelle.

2. The Meuse itself is only defended by light forces stationed at the bridges. On the Meuse between Namur and the frontier no permanent fortifications. Special preparations for demolition and blocking are not known here but are likely.

The region between the Meuse and the French frontier to the west and to the southwest is entirely free from enemy troops.

3. It must be expected that the hostile Walloon populations will wage guerrilla warfare (sharp-shooting from the houses and hedges).

4. The possibility of requisitioning (in order to enable the troops to move rapidly and to keep supplied) should only be considered with reservations owing to the sparsely populated nature of the region.

5. Defense against enemy aircraft in the area of operations of the 7th Air Division (Fl.Div.7).

In the operational area Namur-Dinant and in the neighboring region no fighters nor antiaircraft defense have been detected so far.

Antiaircraft guns … assumed at Charleroi. Fighters.

At St. Hubert1 Squadron of single-seaters, only at intervals. Liege 1 group of single-seaters. Nivelles- 1 group of single-seaters.

Besides important concentrations of French fighters in Ra … Verdun.

Grandmenil (33 km West St. Vith) at intervals. North of Huy, light anti-aircraft guns. At St. Hubert heavy anti-aircraft guns at intervals. (s) Student.

This copy certified correct.

PUTTNER [?] Major, General Staff.

“Document TC-60: Memorandum From The German Government To The Luxembourg Government, Dated 5/9/1940 [translation]”, pp. 431-432.

[Documents of German Politics, (Dokumente der deutschen Politik), Part VIII, I, Pages 150-151]

The Reich Government has been reliably informed that England and France, in thecourse of their policy of spreading the war, have decided to attack Germany in the near future through Belgian and Dutch territory. Belgium and the Netherlands who, long since secretly violating their neutrality, have taken the side of the enemies of Germany, not only do not intend to prevent this attack but to favour it. The facts which go to prove this have been stated in detail in a memorandum which is being handed to the Royal Belgian Government and the Royal Government of the Netherlands a copy of which is enclosed herewith.

In defense against the imminent attack, the German troops have now received the order to safeguard the neutrality of these two countries with all the power at the disposal of the Reich.

The offensive, decided upon by England and France with the consent of Belgium and the Netherlands will also involve the territory of Luxembourg. To repulse the attack the Reich Government has therefore been forced to extend its military operations to Luxembourg territory also.

It has been known to the Grand Ducal Government of Luxembourg that the Reich was prepared to respect the neutrality and integrity of Luxembourg, provided that the other powers which are neighbours of the Grand Duchy would also take the same attitude. Negotiations for agreements to that effect between the powers concerned, which seemed to be almost completed in the summer of 1939, were then broken off by France. This breaking off of the negotiations by France finds its explanation in the military decisions now taken by her together with the other enemies of Germany, an explanation which does not need any further illustration.

The Reich Government expects the Grand-Ducal Government of Luxembourg to take account of the position created solely by the guilt of Germany’s enemies, and to take all the necessary measures to prevent the Luxembourg population causing difficulties to the German military operations. The Reich Government, on its part, gives the assurance to the Grand-Ducal Government of Luxembourg that Germany has no intention, now or in the future, to interfere with the territorial integrity or political independence of the Grand Duchy.

“Document TC-70: Hitler’s Speech Of 1/30/1934 Concerning Agreement With Poland [partial translation]”, pp. 433-434.

[Voelkischer Beobachter, 1/31/1934.]

For this reason and with these intentions the German Government has endeavoured in its first year to secure a new and better relationship with the Polish State.

When I took over the government on 30 January, the relations between the two countries seemed to me more than unsatisfactory. There was a danger that the existing differences, which were due to the territorial clauses of the Treaty of Versailles and the mutual tension resulting therefrom, would gradually crystallize into a state of hostility which if persisted in might only too easily acquire the character of a dangerous traditional enmity.

Apart from its latent dangers such a development would constitute a permanent obstacle to the profitable cooperation of the two peoples. Germans and Poles will have to learn to accept the fact of each other’s existence. Hence it is more sensible to regulate this state of affairs which the last thousand years has not been able to remove and the next thousand will not be able to remove either, in such a way that the highest possible profit will accrue from it for both nations.

It seemed to me further necessary to show from a concrete example that admittedly existing differences cannot be allowed to interfere with a form of mutual intercourse which shall promote the peace and prosperity of both nations, in contrast to the political and economic paralysis which must inevitably result from a permanent state of mutual distrust.

Further, it seemed to me right in such a case to attempt to deal with the problems affecting both countries by means of a frank and open exchange of views between the two parties rather than to go on entrusting third and fourth parties with this task. Moreover, whatever the differences between the two countries in the future may be, the catastrophic effects of the attempt to remove them through warlike actions would far outweigh any possible advantage gained.

Thus the German Government was fortunate in finding the same generous attitude in the leader of the present Polish State, Marshal Pilsudski, and in being able to incorporate this mutual recognition of the situation in a treaty which will not only be of equal advantage to the Polish and German peoples, but which also represents an important contribution to the maintenance of world peace.

In the spirit of this treaty the German Government is willing and prepared to cultivate economic relations with Poland in such a way that here too the state of unprofitable suspicion can be succeeded by a period of useful cooperation.

It is a matter of particular satisfaction to us that in this same year the National Socialist Government of Danzig has been enabled to effect a similar clarification of its relations with its Polish neighbour.

“Document TC-72 [partial translation]”, pp. 438-441.

No. 13

HITLER’S SPEECH TO THE REICHSTAG ON 4/28/1939

[British Blue Book on German-Polish Relations]

There is little to be said as regards German-Polish relations. Here, too, the Peace Treaty of Versaillesof course intentionallyinflicted a most severe wound on Germany. The strange way in which the Corridor giving Poland access to the sea was marked out was meant, above all, to prevent for all time the establishment of an understanding between Poland and Germany. This problem isas I have already stressedperhaps the most painful of all problems for Germany. Nevertheless, I have never ceased to uphold the view that the necessity of a free access to the sea for the Polish State cannot be ignored, and that as a general principle, valid for this case, too, nations which Providence has destined or, if you like, condemned to live side by side would be well advised not to make life still harder for each other artificially and unnecessarily. The late Marshal Pilsudski, who was of the same opinion, was therefore prepared to go into the question of clarifying the atmosphere of German-Polish relations, and, finally, to conclude an agreement whereby Germany and Poland expressed their intention of renouncing war altogether as a means of settling the questions which concerned them both. This agreement contained one single exception which was in practice conceded to Poland. It was laid down that the pacts of mutual assistance already entered into by Polandthis applied to the pact with Franceshould not be affected by the agreement. But it was obvious that this could apply only to the pact of mutual assistance already concluded beforehand, and not to whatever new pacts might be concluded in the future. It is a fact that the German-Polish Agreement resulted in a remarkable lessening of the European tension. Nevertheless, there remained one open question between Germany and Poland, which sooner or later quite naturally had to be solvedthe question of the German city of Danzig. Danzig is a German city and wishes to belong to Germany. On the other hand, this city has contracts with Poland, which were admittedly forced upon it by the dictators of the Peace of Versailles. But since, moreover, the League of Nations, formerly the greatest stirrer-up of trouble, is now represented by a High Commissionerincidentally a man of extraordinary tactthe problem of Danzig must in any case come up for discussion, at the latest with the gradual extinction of this calamitous institution. I regarded the peaceful settlement of this problem as a further contribution to a final loosening of the European tension. For this loosening of the tension is assuredly not to be achieved through the agitations of insane warmongers, but through the removal of the real elements of danger. After the problem of Danzig had already been discussed several times some months ago, I made a concrete offer to the Polish Government. I now make this offer known to you, Gentlemen, and you yourselves will judge whether this offer did not represent the greatest imaginable concession in the interests of European peace. As I have already pointed out, I have always seen the necessity of an access to the sea for this country, and have consequently taken this necessity into consideration. I am no democratic statesman, but a National Socialist and a realist.

I considered it, however, necessary to make it clear to the Government in Warsaw that just as they desire access to the sea, so Germany needs access to her province in the east. Now these are all difficult problems. It is not Germany who is responsible for them, however, but rather the jugglers of Versailles, who either in their maliciousness or their thoughtlessness placed 100 powder barrels round about in Europe, all equipped with hardly extinguishable lighted fuses. These problems cannot be solved according to old-fashioned ideas; I think, rather, that we should adopt new methods. Poland’s access to the sea by way of the Corridor, and, on the other hand, a German route through the Corridor have, for example, no kind of military importance whatsoever. Their importance is exclusively psychological and economic. To accord military importance to a traffic route of this kind, would be to show oneself completely ignorant of military affairs. Consequently, I have had the following proposal submitted to the Polish Government:

(1) Danzig returns as a Free State into the framework of the German Reich.

(2) Germany receives a route through the Corridor and a railway line at her own disposal possessing the same extra-territorial status for Germany as the Corridor itself has for Poland.

In return, Germany is prepared:

(1) To recognize all Polish economic rights in Danzig.

(2) To ensure for Poland a free harbour in Danzig of any size desired which would have completely free access to the sea.

(3) To accept at the same time the present boundaries between Germany and Poland and to regard them as ultimate.

(4) To conclude a twenty-five year nonaggression treaty with Poland, a treaty therefore which would extend far beyond the duration of my own life.

(5) To guarantee the independence of the Slovak State by Germany, Poland and Hungary jointlywhich means in practice the renunciation of any unilateral German hegemony in this territory.

The Polish Government have rejected my offer and have only declared that they are prepared (1) to negotiate concerning the question of a substitute for the Commissioner of the League of Nations and (2) to consider facilities for the transit traffic through the Corridor.

I have regretted greatly this incomprehensible attitude of the Polish Government, but that alone is not the decisive fact; the worst is that now Poland, like Czecho-Slovakia a year ago, believes, under the pressure of a lying international campaign, that it must call up troops, although Germany on her part has not called up a single man and had not thought of proceeding in any way against Poland. As I have said, this is in itself very regrettable and posterity will one day decide whether it was really right to refuse this suggestion made this once by me. Thisas I have saidwas an endeavor on my part tosolve a question which intimately affects the German people by a truly unique compromise and to solve it to the advantage of both countries. According to my conviction Poland was not a giving party in this solution at all but only a receiving party, because it should be beyond all doubt that Danzig will never become Polish. The intention to attack on the part of Germany, which was merely invented by the international press, led as you know to the so-called guarantee offer and to an obligation on the part of the Polish Government for mutual assistance, which would al_so, under certain circumstances, compel Poland to take military action against Germany in the event of a conflict between Germany and any other Power and in which England, in her turn, would be involved. This obligation is contradictory to the agreement which I made with Marshal Pilsudski some time ago, seeing that this agreement reference is made exclusively to existing obligations that is at that time, namely, to the obligations of Poland towards France of which we were aware. To extend these obligations subsequently is contrary to the terms of the German-Polish nonaggression pact. Under these circumstances I should not have entered into this pact at that time, because what sense can nonaggression pacts have if one partner in practice leaves open an enormous number of exceptions.

There is either collective security, tat is collective insecurity and continuous danger of war, or clear agreements which, however, exclude fundamentally any use of arms between the contracting parties. I therefore look upon the agreement which Marshal Pilsudski and I at one time concluded a having been unilaterally infringed by Poland and thereby no longer in existence!

I have sent a communication to this effect to the Polish Government. However, I can only repeat at this point that my decision does not constitute a modification of my attitude in principle with regard to the problems mentioned above. Should the Polish Government wish to come to fresh contractual arrangements governing its relations with Germany, I can but welcome such an idea, provided, of course, that these arrangements are based on an absolutely clear obligation binding both parties in equal measure. Germany is perfectly willing at any time to undertake such obligations and also to fulfill them.

No. 14

GERMAN GOVERNMENT MEMORANDUM HANDED TO THE POLISH GOVERNMENT ON 4/28/1939 [British Blue Book on German-Polish Relations]

The German Government have taken note of the Polish-British declaration regardingthe progress and aims of the negotiations recently conducted between Poland and Great Britain. According to this declaration there has been concluded between the Polish Government and the British Government a temporary understanding, to be replaced shortly by a permanent agreement which will provide for the giving of mutual assistance by Poland and Great Britain in the event of the independence of one of the two States being directly or indirectly threatened.

2. The German Government consider themselves obliged to communicate the following to the Polish Government:

3. When in 1933 the National Socialist Government set about the reshaping of German policy, after Germany’s departure from the League of Nations, their first object was to stabilize German-Polish relations on a new plane. The Chancellor of the German Reich and the late Marshal Pilsudski concurred in the decision to break with the political methods of the past and to enter, as regards the settlement of all questions affecting both States, on the path of direct understanding between them.

4. By means of the unconditional renunciation of the use of force, guarantees of peace were instituted in order to assist the two States in the difficult task of solving all political, economic and cultural problems by means of the just and equitable adjustment of mutual interests. These principles, contained in a binding form in the German-Polish Peace Declaration of 1/26/1934, had this aim in view [sic] and by their practical success were intended to introduce an entirely new phase of German-Polish relations. The political history of the last five years shows that they proved efficacious in practice for both nations. As recently as the 26th January of this year, on the fifth anniversary of the signature of the declaration, both sides publicly confirmed this fact, while emphasizing their united will to maintain in the future their adhesion to the principles established in 1934.

5. The agreement which has now been concluded by the Polish Government with the British Government is in such obvious contradiction to these solemn declarations of a few months ago that the German Government can take note only with surprise and astonishment of such a violent reversal of Polish policy. Irrespective of the manner in which its final formulation may be determined by both parties, the new Polish-British Agreement is intended as a regular pact of alliance, which by reason of its general sense and of the present state of political relations is directed exclusively against Germany. From the obligation now accepted by the Polish Government it appears that Poland intends in certain circumstances to take an active part in any possible German-British conflict in the event of aggression against Germany, even should this conflict not affect Poland and her interests. This is a direct and open blow against the renunciation of all use of force contained in the 1934 declaration.

6. The contradiction between the German-Polish Declaration and the Polish-British Agreement is, however, even more far-reaching in its importance than that. The 1934 declaration was to constitute a basis for the regulation of all differences arising between the two countries, independently of international complications and combinations, by means of direct discussion between Berlin and Warsaw, to the exclusion of external influences. Naturally, such a basis must rest on the mutual confidence of both parties and on the political loyalty of the intentions of one party with regard to the other.

7. The Polish Government, however, by their recent decision to accede to an alliance directed against Germany, have given it to be understood that they prefer a promise of help by a third Power to the direct guarantee of peace by the German Government. In view of this the German Government are obliged to conclude that the Polish Government do not at present attach any importance to seeking a solution of German-Polish problems by means of direct friendly discussions with the German Government. The Polish Government have thus abandoned the path traced out in 1934 for the shaping of German-Polish relations.

8. The Polish Government cannot in this connection appeal to the fact that the 1934 declaration was not to affect the obligations previously accepted by Poland and Germany in relation to third parties, and that the Treaty of Alliance between Poland and France maintained its value side by side with that declaration. The Polish-French Alliance already existed in 1934 when Poland and Germany proceeded to reorganize their relations. The German Government were abe to accept this fact, since they were entitled to expect that the possible dangers of the Polish-French Alliance, dating from the period of the most acute German-Polish differences, would automatically lose more and more of their significance through the establishment of friendly relations between Germany and Poland. However, the entry of Poland into relations of alliance with Great Britain, which was effected five years after the publication of the declaration of 1934, can for this reason in no way be compared politically with the still valid Polish-French Alliance. By this new alliance the Polish Government have subordinated themselves to a policy inaugurated from another quarter aiming at the encirclement of Germany.

9. The German Government for their part have not given the least cause for such a change in Polish policy. Whenever opportunity offered, they have furnished the Polish Government, both publicly- and in confidential conversations, with the most binding assurances that the friendly development of German-Polish relations is a fundamental aim of their foreign policy, and that, in their political decisions, they will always respect Poland’s proper interests. Thus the action taken by Germany in March of this year with a view to the pacification of Central Europe did not, in the opinion of the Government of the Reich, disturb Polish interests in any way. This action led to the creation of a common Polish-Hungarian frontier, which had constantlY been described on Poland’s side as an important political objective. Moreover, the German Government gave unequivocal expression to their readiness to discuss with the Polish Government in a friendly manner all problems which, in the Polish Government’s opinion, might arise out of the changed conditions in Central Europe.

10. In an equally friendly spirit the German Government tried to regulate yet another question outstanding between Germany and Poland, namely, that of Danzig. The fact that this question required settlement had long been emphasized on the German side, and was not denied on the Polish side. For a long time past the German Government have endeavoured to convince the Polish Government that a solution was certainly possible which would be equitable to the interests of both parties and that the removal of this last obstacle would open a path for a political collaboration of Germany and Poland with the most favourable prospects. In this connection the German Government did not confine themselves to allusions of a general nature, but in March of this year proposed to the Polish Government in a friendly form a settlement of this question on the following basis:

11. The return of Danzig to the Reich. An extra-territorial railway line and autostrada between East Prussia and the Reich. In exchange, the recognition by the Reich of the whole Polish Corridor and the whole of Poland’s Western frontier; the conclusion of a nonaggression pact for twenty-five years; the maintenance of Poland’s economic interests in Danzig and the settlement of the remaining economic and communications problems arising for Poland out of the union of Danzig with the Reich. At the same time, the German Government expressed their readiness to respect Polish interests in ensuring the independence of Slovakia.

12. Nobody knowing conditions in Danzig and the Corridor and the problems connected therewith can deny, in judging the matter objectively, that this proposal constitutes the very minimum which must be demanded from the point of view of German interests, which cannot be renounced. The Polish Government, however, gave a reply which, although couched in the form of counter-proposals, showed in its essence an entire lack of comprehension for the German point of view and was equivalent merely to a rejection of the German proposals. The Polish Government proved that they did not consider their reply suitable for the initiation of friendly discussions by proceeding at the same time, in a manner as unexpected as it was drastic, to effect a partial mobilization of the Polish army on a large scale. By these entirely unjustified measures the Polish Government demonstrated the meaning and object of the negotiations which they immediately afterwards entered upon with the British Government. The German Government do not consider it necessary to reply to the partial Polish mobilization by counter-measures of a military character. They cannot, however, disregard without a word the decisions recently taken by the Polish Government, and are forced, to their own regret, to declare as follows:

(1) The Polish Government did not avail themselves of the opportunity offered to them by the German Government for a just settlement of the Danzig question, for the final safeguarding of Poland’s frontiers with the Reich, and thereby for a permanent strengthening of the friendly neighbourly relations between the two countries. The Polish Government even rejected German proposals made with this object.

(2) At the same time the Polish Government accepted, with regard to another State, political obligations which are not compatible either with the spirit, the meaning or the text of the German-Polish Declaration of 1/26/1934. Thereby the Polish Government arbitrarily and unilaterally rendered this declaration null and void.

13. In spite of this necessary statement of fact, the Government of the Reich do not intend to alter their fundamental attitude towards the question of the future of German-Polish relations. Should the Polish Government attach importance to a new settlement of these relations by means of a treaty, the German Government are ready to do this, but on one condition, namely, that such a settlement would have to consist of a clear obligation binding on both parties.

No. 16

MEMORANDUM COMMUNICATED TO THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT BY THE POLISH GOVERNMENT ON 5/5/1939, IN REPLY TO THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT MEMORANDUM OF 4/28/1939. [British Blue Book on German-Polish Relations]

As appears from the text of the Polish-German Declaration of 1/26/1934, and from the course of the negotiations which preceded its conclusion, this declaration had as its object to lay the foundations for a new framing of mutual relations based on the following two principles:

(a) The renunciation of the use of force as between Poland and Germany, and

(b) The friendly settlement by means of free negotiations of any contentious questions which might arise in the relations between the two countries.

The Polish Government have always understood in this manner their obligations under the declaration, and it is in this spirit that they have always been prepared to conduct neighbourly relations with the German Reich.

2. The Polish Government had foreseen for several years that the difficulties encountered by the League of Nations in carrying out its functions at Danzig would create a confused situation which it was in Poland’s and Germany’s interest to unravel. For several years the Polish Government had given the German Government to understand that frank conversations should be held on this subject. The German Government, however, avoided these and confined themselves to stating that Polish-German relations should not be exposed to difficulties by questions relating to Danzig. Moreover, the German Government more than once gave assurances to the Polish Government regarding the Free City of Danzig. It is sufficient here to quote the declaration made by the Chancellor of the Reich on 2/20/1938.

The Chancellor made publicly in the Reichstag the following declaration regarding Danzig:

The Polish State respects the National conditions in this State, and the Free City and Germany respect Polish rights. It has thus been possible to clear the way for an understanding which, while arising out of the question of Danzig, has to-day in spite of the efforts of certain disturbers of the peace succeeded in effectively clarifying relations between Germany and Poland and has transformed them into sincere and friendly collaboration.

It was only after the events of 9/1938, that the German Government suggested the opening of Polish-German conversations regarding the alteration in the situation in Danzig and regarding the transit routes between the Reich and East Prussia. In thisconnection the German memorandum of 4/28/1939, refers to the suggestion put forward by the Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs in his conversation of 3/21/1939, with the Polish Ambassador in Berlin. In this conversation emphasis was laid on the German side on the necessity for a rapid settlement of those questions which was a condition of the Reich maintaining its proposals in force in their entirety. The Polish Government, animated by the desire to maintain good relations with the Reich, although surprised at the pressing form in which these proposals were put forward, and by the circumstances in which they were advanced, did not refuse conversations although they considered the German demands thus couched to be unacceptable.

In order to facilitate endeavours to reach an amicable solution of the question, the Polish Government on 3/26/1939, formulated their point of view in writing to the German Government, stating that they attached full importance to the maintenance of good neighbourly relations with the German Reich. The Polish point of view was summarized in the following points:

(a) The Polish Government propose a joint guarantee by Poland and Germany of the separate character of the Free City of Danzig,-the existence of which was to be based on complete freedom of the local population in internal affairs and on the assurance of respect for Polish rights and interests.

(b) The Polish Government were prepared to examine together with the German Government any further simplifications for persons in transit as well as the technical facilitating of railway and motor transit between the German Reich and East Prussia. The Polish Government were inspired by the idea of giving every possible facility which would permit the citizens of the Reich to travel in transit across the Polish territory, if possible without any hindrances. The Polish Government emphasized that their intention was to secure the most liberal treatment possible of the German desiderata in this respect with the sole reservation that Poland could not give up her sovereignty over the belt of territory through which the transit routes would run. Finally, the Polish Government indicated that their attitude in the question of facilitating communications across Pomerania depended on the attitude of the Reich regarding the Free City of Danzig.

In formulating the above proposals the Polish Government acted in the spirit of the Polish-German Declaration of 1934 which, by providing the direct exchanges of views on questions of interest to both countries authorized each State to formulate its point of view in the court of negotiations.

The Polish Government received no formal reply to their counter-proposals for a month, and it was only on 4/28/1939, that they learnt from the Chancellor’s speech and from the German Government’s memorandum that the mere fact of the formulation of counter-proposals instead of the acceptance of the verbal German suggestions without alteration or reservation had been regarded by the Reich as a refusal of discussions.

It is clear that negotiations in which one State formulates demands and the other is to be obliged to accept those demands unaltered are not negotiations in the spirit of the declaration of 1934 and are incompatible with the vital interests and dignity of Poland.

In this connection it should be pointed out that the Polish Government were unable at that time to express an opinion regarding the Polish-German-Hungarian guarantee of the independence of Slovakia which was alluded to in a general way in the German memorandum and more precisely stated in the Chancellor’s speech of 4/28/1939, since a proposal of this description and in this form had never been made to them before. It is, moreover, difficult to imagine how such guarantee could be reconciled with the political and military protectorate of the Reich over Slovakia which had been announced a few days previously before the German Reich formulated its proposals towards Poland.

3. The Polish Government cannot accept such an interpretation of the declaration of 1934 as would be equivalent to a renunciation of the right to conclude political agreements with third States and consequently, almost a renunciation of independence in foreign policy. The Policy of the German Reich in recent years has clearly indicated that the German Government have not drawn conclusions of this sort from the declaration as far as they themselves were concerned. The obligations publicly accepted by the Reich towards Italy and the German-Slovak Agreement of 3/1939, are clear indications of such an interpretation by. the German Government of the declaration of 1934. The Polish Government must here recall that in their relations with other States they give and require full reciprocity as being the only possible foundation of normal relations between States.

The Polish Government reject as completely without foundation all accusations regarding the alleged incompatibility of the Anglo-Polish Mutual Guarantee of 4/1939, with the Polish-German Declaration of 1934. This guarantee has a purely defensive character and in no way threatens the German Reich, in the same way as the Polish-French Alliance, whose compatibility with the Declaration of 1934 has been recognized by the German Reich. The declaration of 1934 in its introductory paragraphs clearly stated that both Governments have “decided to base their mutual relations on the principles laid down in the Pact of Paris of 8/27/1928.” Now the Pact of Paris, which constituted a general renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy, just as the declaration of 1934 constituted such renunciation in bilateral Polish-German relations, contained the explicit reservation that “any signatory Power which shall hereafter seek to promote its national interests by resort to war should be denied the benefits furnished by this treaty”. Germany accepted this principle in signing the-Pact of Paris and re-affirmed it in the declaration of 1934, together with other principles of the Pact of Paris. It appears from this that the declaration of 1934 would cease to be binding on Poland should Germany have recourse to war in violation of the Pact of Paris. Poland’s obligations arising out of the Polish-British understanding would come into operation in the event of German action threatening the independence of Great Britain, and, consequently, in the very circumstances in which the declaration of 1934 and the Pact of Paris had ceased to be binding on Poland as regards Germany.

The German Government in making a complaint against the Polish Government for undertaking obligations to guarantee the independence of Great Britain and in regarding this as a violation by Poland of the declaration of 1934, ignore their own obligations toward Italy of which the Chancellor spoke on 1/30/1939, and in particular their obligations towards Slovakia contained in the agreement of 3/18/1939, and 3/23/1939. The German guarantees of Slovakia did not exclude Poland (sic), and, indeed, as appears from the provisions of the above agreement regarding the distribution of garrisons and military fortifications in Western Slovakia, were directed primarily against Poland.

4. It appears from the above that the Government of the German Reich had no justification for their unilateral decision to regard the declaration of 1934 as not binding. The Pact was, indeed, concluded for ten years without any possibility of denunciation during that time. It should be pointed out that the decision to regard the 1934 Declaration as not binding took place after the previous refusal of the German State to accept explanations as to the compatibility of the Anglo-Polish guarantee with the 1934 Declaration, which it was the intention of the Polish Government to furnish to the representative of the Reich in Warsaw.

5. Although the Polish Government do not share the view of the German Government that the treaty of 1934 has been violated by Poland nevertheless, should the German Government attach importance to the fresh regulation, by means of a treaty, of Polish-German relations on a good neighbourly basis, the Polish Government would be prepared to entertain suggestions of this kind with the reservation of their fundamental observations contained above in the present memorandum.

No. 17

STATEMENT BY THE PRIME MINISTER IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS ON 3/31/1939 [British Blue Book on German-Polish Relations]

The Prime Minister (Mr. Chamberlain): The right hon. gentleman the leader of the Opposition asked me this morning whether I could make a statement as to the European situation. As I said this morning, His Majesty’s Government have no official confirmation of the rumours of any projected attack on Poland and they must not,therefore, be taken as accepting them as true.

I am glad to take this opportunity of stating again the general policy of His Majesty’s Government. They have constantly advocated the adjustment, by way of free negoiation between the parties concerned, of any differences that may arise between them. They consider that this is the natural and proper course where differences exist. In their opinion there should be no question incapable of solution by peaceful means, and they would see no justification for the substitution of force or threats of force for the method of negotiation.

As the House is aware, certain consultations are now proceeding with other Governments. In order to make perfectly clear the position of His Majesty’s Government in the meantime before those consultations are concluded, I now have to inform the House that during that period, in the event of any action which clearly threatened Polish independence, and which the Polish Government accordingly considered it vital to resist with their national forces, His Majesty’s Government would feel themselves bound at once to lend the Polish Government all support in their power. They have given the Polish Government an assurance to this effect.

I may add that the French Government have authorized me to make it plain that they stand in the same position in this matter as do His Majesty’s Government.

No. 18

ANGLO-POLISH COMMUNIQUE ISSUED ON 4/6/1939 [British Blue Book on German-Polish Relations]

The conversations with M. Beck have covered a wide field and shown that the two Governments are in complete agreement upon certain general principles. It was agreed that the two countries were prepared to enter into an agreement of a permanent and reciprocal character to replace the present temporary and unilateral assurance given by His Majesty’s Government to the Polish Government. Pending the completion of the permanent agreement, M. Beck gave His Majesty’s Government an assurance that the Polish Government would consider themselves under an obligation to render assistance to His Majesty’s Government under the same conditions as those contained in the temporary assurance already given by His Majesty’s Government to Poland.

Like the temporary assurance, the permanent agreement would not be directed against any other country but would be designed to assure Great Britain and Poland of mutualassistance in the event of any threat, direct or indirect, to the independence of either. It was recognized that certain matters, including a more precise definition of the various ways in which the necessity for such assistance might arise, would require further examination before the permanent agreement could be completed.

It was understood that the arrangements above mentioned should not preclude either Government from making agreements with other countries in the general interest of the consolidation of Peace.

No. 53

REPORT OF BRITISH AMBASSADOR, WARSAW [British Blue Book on German-Polish Relations]

Sir H. Kennard to Viscount Halifax. (Telegraphic) Warsaw, 8/26/1939.

Series of incidents again occurred yesterday on German frontier.

2. Polish patrol met party Germans 1 kilometer from East Prussian frontier near Pelta. Germans opened fire. Polish patrol replied, killing leader, whose body is being returned.

3. German bands also crossed Silesian frontier near Szczyglo, twice near Rybnik and twice elsewhere, firing shots and attacking blockhouses and customs posts with machine guns and hand grenades. Poles have protested vigorously to Berlin.

4. Gazeta Polska, an inspired leader to-day, says these are more than incidents. They are clearly prepared acts of aggression of para-military disciplined detachments supplied with regular army’s arms, and in one case it was a regular army detachment. Attacks more or less continuous.

5. These incidents did not cause Poland to forsake calm and strong attitude of defense. Facts spoke for themselves and acts of aggression came from German side. This was best answer to ravings of German press.

6. Minister for Foreign Affairs state uniformed German detachment has since shot Pole across frontier and wounded another.

No. 54

REPORT OF BRITISH AMBASSADOR, WARSAW [British Blue Book on German-Polish Relations]

Sir H. Kennard to Viscount Halifax. (Telegraphic) Warsaw, 8/29/1939.

Ministry for Foreign Affairs categorically deny story recounted by Herr Hitler to French Ambassador that twenty-four Germans were recently killed at Lodz and eight at Bielsko. Story is without any foundation whatever.

No. 55

REPORT OF BRITISH AMBASSADOR, WARSAW [British Blue Book on German-Polish Relations]

Sir H. Kennard to Viscount Halifax. (Telegraphic) Warsaw, 8/271939.

So far as I can judge, German allegations of mass ill-treatment of German minority by Polish authorities are gross exaggeration, if not complete falsification.

2. There is no sign of any loss of control of situation by Polish civil authorities. Warsaw (and so far as I can ascertain the rest of Poland) is still completely calm.

3. Such allegations are reminiscent of Nazi propaganda methods regarding Czecho-Slovakia last year.

4. In any case it is purely and simply deliberate German provocation in accordance with fixed policy that has since March exacerbated feeling between the two nationalities. I suppose this has been done with object (a) creating war spirit in Germany, (b)impressing public opinion abroad, (c) provoking either defeatism or apparent aggression in Poland.

5. It has signally failed to achieve either of the two latter objects.

6. It is noteworthy that Danzig was hardly mentioned by Herr Hitler.

7. German treatment of Czech Jews and Polish minority is apparently negligible factor compared with alleged sufferings of Germans in Poland, where, be it noted, they do not amount to more than 10% of population in any commune.

8. In face of these facts, it can hardly be doubted that, il Herr Hitler decided on war, it is for the sole purpose of destroying Polish independence.

9. I shall lose no opportunity of impressing on Minister for Foreign Affairs necessity of doing everything possible to prove that Herr Hitler’s allegations regarding German minority are false.

No. 56

LETTER OF 8/22/1939, FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO THE GERMAN CHANCELLOR [British Blue Book on German-Polish Relations]

10 Downing Street, 8/22/1939.

Your Excellency,

Your Excellency will have already heard of certain measures taken by His Majesty’s Government, and announced in the press and on the wireless this evening.

These steps have, in the opinion of His Majesty’s Government, been rendered necessary by the military movements which have been reported from Germany, and by the fact that apparently the announcement of a German-Soviet Agreement is taken in some quarters in Berlin to indicate that intervention by Great Britain on behalf of Poland is no longer a contingency that need be reckoned with. No greater mistake could be made. Whatever may prove to be the nature of the German-Soviet Agreement, it cannot alter Great Britain’s obligation to Poland which His Majesty’s Government have stated in public repeatedly and plainly, and which they are determined to fulfil.

It has been alleged that, if His Majesty’s Government had made their position more clear in 1914, the great catastrophe would have been avoided. Whether or not there is any force in that allegation, His Majesty’s Government are resolved that on this occasion there shall be no such tragic misunderstanding.

If the case should arise, they are resolved, and prepared, to employ without delay all the forces at their command, and it is impossible to foresee the end of hostilities once engaged. It would be a dangerous illusion to think that, if war once starts, it will come to an early end even if a success on any one of the several fronts on which it will be engaged should have been secured.

Having thus made our position perfectly clear, I wish to repeat to you my conviction that war between our two peoples would be the greatest calamity that could occur. I am certain that it is desired neither by our people, nor by yours, and I cannot see that there is anything in the questions arising between Germany and Poland which could not and should not be resolved without the use of force, if only a situation of confidence could be restored to enable discussions to be carried on in an atmosphere different from that which prevails to-day.

We have been, and at all times will be, ready to assist in creating conditions in which such negotiations could take place, and in which it might be possible concurrently to discuss the wider problems affecting the future of international relations, including matters of interest to us and to you.

The difficulties in the way of any peaceful discussion in the present state of tension are, however, obvious, and the longer that tension is maintained, the harder will it be for reason to prevail.

These difficulties, however, might be mitigated, if not removed, provided that there could for an initial period be a truce on both sidesto press polemics and to [end] all incitement.

If such a truce could be arranged, then, at the end of that period, during which steps could be taken to examine and deal with complaints made by either side as to the treatment of minorities, it is reasonable to hope that suitable conditions might have been established for direct negotiations between Germany and Poland upon the issues between them (with the aid of a neutral intermediary, if both sides should think that that would be helpful).

But I am bound to say that there would be slender hope of bringing such negotiations to successful issue unless it were understood beforehand that any settlement reached would, when concluded, be guaranteed by other Powers. His Majesty’s Government would be ready, if desired, to make such contribution as they could to the effective operation of such guarantees.

At this moment I confess I can see no other way to avoid a catastrophe that will involve Europe in war.

In view of the grave consequences to humanity, which may follow from the action oftheir rulers, I trust that Your Excellency will weigh with the utmost deliberation the considerations which I have put before you.

Yours sincerely,

NEVILLE CHAMBERLAIN.

No. 60

COMMUNICATION FROM THE GERMAN CHANCELLOR TO THE PRIME MINISTER, HANDED TO HIS MAJESTY’S AMBASSADOR ON 8/23/1939 [British Blue Book on German-Polish Relations]

Your Excellency,

The British Ambassador has just handed to me a communication in which your Excellency draws attention in the name of the British Government to a number of points which in your estimation are of the greatest importance.

I may be permitted to answer your letter as follows:

1. Germany has never sought conflict with England and has never interfered in English interests. On the contrary, she has for years endeavouredalthough unfortunately in vainto win England’s friendship. On this account she voluntarily assumed in a wide area of Europe the limitations on her own interests which from a national-political point of view it would have otherwise been very difficult to tolerate.

2. The German Reich, however, like every other State possesses certain definite interests which it is impossible to renounce. These do not extend beyond the limits of the necessities laid down by former German history and deriving from vital economic prerequisites. Some of these questions held and still hold a significance both of a national-political and a psychological character which no German Government is able to ignore.

To these questions belong the German City of Danzig, and the connected problem of the Corridor. Numerous statesmen, historians and men of letters even in England have been conscious of this at any rate up to a few years ago. I would add that all of these territories lying in the aforesaid German sphere of interest and in particular those lands which returned to the Reich eighteen months ago received their cultural development atthe hands not of the English but exclusively of the Germans and this, moreover, already from a time dating back over a thousand years.

3. Germany was prepared to settle the question of Danzig and of the Corridor by the method of negotiation on the basis of a proposal of truly unparalleled magnanimity. The allegations disseminated by England regarding a German mobilization against Poland, the assertion of aggressive designs towards Roumania, Hungary, etc., as well as the so-called guarantee declarations which were subsequently given had, however, dispelled Polish inclination to negotiate on a basis of this kind which would have been tolerable for Germany also.

4. The unconditional assurance given by England to Poland that she would render assistance to that country in all circumstances regardless of the causes from which a conflict might spring, could only be interpreted in that country as an encouragement thence-forward to unloosen, under cover of such a charter, a wave of appalling terrorism against the 1.5 million German inhabitants living in Poland. The atrocities which since then have been taking place in that country are terrible for the victims, but intolerable for a Great Power such as the German Reich which is expected to remain a passive onlooker during these happenings. Poland has been guilty of numerous breaches of her legal obligations towards the Free City of Danzig, has made demands in the character of ultimata, and has initiated a process of economic strangulation.

5. The Government of the German Reich therefore recently caused the Polish Government to be informed that it-was not prepared passively to accept this development of affairs, that it will not tolerate further addressing of notes in the character of ultimata to Danzig, that it will not tolerate a continuance of the persecution of the German minority, that it will equally not tolerate the extermination of the Free City of Danzig by economic measures, in other words, the destruction of the vital bases of the population of Danzig by a kind of Customs blockade, and that it will not tolerate the occurrence of further acts of provocation directed against the Reich. Apart from this, the questions of the Corridor and of Danzig must and shall be solved.

6. Your Excellency inform me in the name of the British Government that you will be obliged to render assistance to Poland in any such case of,intervention on the part of Germany. I take note of this statement of yours and assure you that it can make no change in the determination of the Reich Government to safeguard the interests of the Reich as stated in paragraph 5 above. Your assurance to the effect that in such an event you anticipate a long war is shared by myself. Germany, if attacked by England, will be found prepared and determined. I have already more than once declared before the German people and the world that there can be no doubt concerning the determination of the new German Reich rather to accept, for however long it might be, every sort of misery and tribulation than to sacrifice its national interests, let alone its honour.

7. The German Reich Government has received information to the effect that the British Government has the intention to carry out measures of mobilization which, according to the statements contained in your own letter, are clearly directed against Germany alone. This is said to be true of France as well. Since Germany has never had the intention of taking military measures other than those of a defensive character against England or France, and, as has already been emphasized, has never intended, and doesnot in the future intend, to attack England or France, it follows that this announcement as confirmed by you, Mr. Prime Minister, in your own letter, can only refer to a contemplated act of menace directed against the Reich. I therefore inform your Excellency that, in the event of these military announcements being carried into effect, I shall order immediate mobilization of the German forces.

8. The question of the treatment of European problems on a peaceful basis is not a decision which rests on Germany but primarily on those who since the crime committed by the Versailles dictate have stubbornly and consistently opposed any peaceful revision. Only after a change of spirit on the part of the responsible Powers can there be any real change in the relationship between England and Germany. I have all my life fought for Anglo-German friendship; the attitude adopted by British diplomacyat any rate up to the presenthas, however, convinced me of the futility of such an attempt. Should there be any change in this respect in the future nobody could be happier than I.

ADOLF HITLER.

No. 62

BRITISH OFFICIAL REPORT, DANZIG 8/26/1939 [British Blue Book on German-Polish Relations

Mr. F. M. Shepherd to Viscount Halifax. (Telegraphic) Danzig, 8/26/1939.

Following is translation of decree of Senate dated 23rd August:

Decree: Article 1. Gauleiter of Danzig is Head of State [‘Staatsoberhaupt’] of the Free City of Danzig.

Article 2. This decree comes into force on 8/23/1939. Following are translations of letters dated 24th August (a) from President of Senate to Herr Forster, and (b) of latter’s reply:

(a) At its meeting yesterday the Senate passed a resolution according to which you have been declared Staatsoberhaupt of the Free City of Danzig as from yesterday. A copy of the certified resolution is enclosed. In addition, a legal decree has been prepared today and signed making the above-mentioned resolution of the Senate operative. By means of these two acts of the Government the Danzig Constitution has been altered in the above-mentioned sense. The Senate has authorized me to request you, Herr Gauleiter,to accept this office forthwith in order in these difficult but wonderful last decisive days outwardly to give expression to the unity between party and State, which has so often been stressed and which inwardly has always existed.

(b) I have taken cognizance of the contents of your letter of the 24th instant and of the enclosed certified copy of the decree regarding the Staatsoberhaupt of the Free City of Danzig of 8/23/1939, and of the copy of the Senate’s resolution of 8/23/1939, which was also enclosed. It, of course, goes without saying that in my capacity as Leader of the N.S.D.A.P. of the Danzig district I am prepared in days which are so fateful for Danzig also to conduct the affairs of the State. With this decree promulgated on 8/23/1939, a state of affairs is officially sanctioned which, since the accession to power by the National Socialists in 1933, has in practice been in force.

No. 68

SUPPLEMENTARY COMMUNICATION FROM THE GERMAN CHANCELLOR HANDED TO HIS MAJESTY’S AMBASSADOR ON 8/25/1939. [British Blue Book on German-Polish Relations]

The following is a translation of the text of a verbal communication made to Sir Neville Henderson by Herr Hitler at his interview on the 25th. August:

By way of introduction the Führer declared that the British Ambassador had given expression at the close of the last conversation to the hope that, after all, an understanding between Germany and England might yet be possible. He (the Führer) had therefore turned things over in his mind once more and desired to make a move as regards England which should be as decisive as the move as regards Russia which had led to the recent agreement. Yesterday’s sitting in the house of Commons and the speeches of Mr. Chamberlain and Lord Halifax had also moved the Führer to talk once more to the British Ambassador. The assertion that Germany affected to conquer the world was ridiculous. The British Empire embraced 40 million square kilometres, Russia 19 million square kilometres, America 9.5 million square kilometres, whereas Germany embraced less than 600000 square kilometres. It is quite clear who it is who desires to conquer the world.

The Führer makes the following communication to the British Ambassador:

1. Poland’s actual provocations have become intolerable. It makes no difference who is responsible. If the Polish Government denies responsibility, that only goes to show thatit no longer itself possesses any influence over its subordinate military authorities. In the preceding night there had been a further twenty-one new frontier incidents; on the German side the greatest discipline had been maintained. All incidents had been provoked from the Polish side. Furthermore, commercial aircraft had been shot at. If the Polish Government stated that it was not responsible, it showed that it was no longer capable of controlling its own people.

2. Germany was in all circumstances determined to abolish these Macedonian conditions on their Eastern frontier and, what is more, to do so in the interests of quiet and order, but also in the interests of European peace.

3. The problem of Danzig and the Corridor must be solved. The British Prime Minister had made a speech which was not in the least calculated to induce any change in the German attitude. At the most, the result of this speech could be a bloody and incalculable war between Germany and England. Such a war would be bloodier than that of 1914-1918. In contrast to the last war, Germany would no longer have to fight on two fronts. Agreement with Russia was unconditional and signified a change in foreign policy of the Reich which would last a very long time.

Russia and Germany would never again take up arms against each other. Apart from this, the agreements reached with Russia would also render Germany secure economically for the longest possible period of war.

The Führer had always wanted an Anglo-German understanding. War between England and Germany could at the best bring some profit to Germany but none at all to England.

The Führer declared that the German-Polish problem must be solved and will be solved. He is, however, prepared and determined after the solution of this problem to approach England once more with a large comprehensive offer. He is a man of great decisions, and in this case also he will be capable of being great in his action. He accepts the British Empire and is ready to pledge himself personally for its continued existence and to place the power of the German Reich at its disposal if

(1) His colonial demands which are limited and can be negotiated by peaceful methods are fulfilled and in this case he is prepared to fix the longest time limits.

(2) His obligations towards Italy are not touched; in other words, he does not demand that England gives up her obligations towards France and similarly for his own part he cannot withdraw from his obligations towards Italy.

(3) He also desires to stress the irrevocable determination of Germany never again to enter into conflict with Russia. The Führer is ready to conclude agreements with England which, as has already been emphasized, would not only guarantee the existence of the British Empire in all circumstances as far as Germany is concerned, but also if necessary an assurance to the British Empire of German assistance regardless of where such assistance should be necessary. The Führer would then also be ready to accept a reasonable limitation of armaments which corresponds to the new political situation and which is economically tolerable. Finally, the Führer renewed hisassurances that he is not interested in Western problems and that a frontier modification in the West does not enter into consideration. Western fortifications which have been constructed at a cost of milliards were final Reich frontier on the West.

If the British Government would consider these ideas a blessing for Germany and also for the British Empire might result. If it rejects these ideas there will be war. In no case would Great Britain emerge stronger; the last war proved this.

The Führer repeats that he is a man of ad infinitum decisions by which he himself is bound and that this is his last offer. Immediately after solution of the German-Polish question he would approach the British Government with an offer.

No. 74

REPLY OF HIS MAJESTY’S GOVERNMENT DATED 8/28/1939, TO THE GERMAN CHANCELLOR’S COMMUNICATIONS OF 8/23-25/1939. [British Blue Book on German-Polish Relations]

His Majesty’s Government have received the message conveyed to them from the German Chancellor by His Majesty’s Ambassador in Berlin, and have considered it with the care which it demands.

They note the Chancellor’s expression of his desire to make friendship the basis of the relations between Germany and the British Empire and they fully share this desire. They believe with him that if a complete and lasting understanding between the two countries could be established it would bring untold blessings to both peoples.

2. The Chancellor’s message deals with two groups of questions: those which are the matters now in dispute between Germany and Poland and those affecting the ultimate relations of Germany and Great Britain. In connection with these last, His Majesty’s Government observe that the German Chancellor has indicated certain proposals which, subject to one condition, he would be prepared to make to the British Government for a general understanding. These proposals, are of course, stated in very general form and would require closer definition, but His Majesty’s Government are fully prepared to take them, with some additions, as subjects for discussion and they would be ready, if the differences between Germany and Poland are peacefully composed, to proceed so soon as practicable to such discussion with a sincere desire to reach agreement.

3. The Condition which the German Chancellor lays down is that there must first be a settlement of the differences between Germany and Poland. As to that, His Majesty’s Government entirely agree. Everything, however, turns upon the nature of the settlement and the method by which it is to be reached. On these points, the importance of which cannot be absent from the Chancellor’s mind, his message is silent, and His Majesty’s Government feel compelled to point out that an understanding upon both of these is essential to achieving further progress.

The German Government will be aware that His Majesty’s Government have obligations to Poland by which they are bound and which they intend to honour. They could not, for any advantage offered to Great Britain, acquiesce in a settlement which put in jeopardy the independence of a State to whom they have given their guarantee.

4. In the opinion of His MaJesty’s Government a reasonable solution of the differences between Germany and Poland could and should be effected by agreement between the two countries on lines which would include the safeguarding of Poland’s essential interests, and they recall that in his speech of the 28th April last the German Chancellor recognized the importance of these interests to Poland.

But, as was stated by the Prime Minister in his letter to the German Chancellor of the 22nd August, His Majesty’s Government consider it essential for the success of the discussions which would precede the agreement that it should be understood beforehand that any settlement arrived at would be guaranteed by other Powers. His Majesty’s Government would be ready if desired to make their contribution to the effective operation of such a guarantee.

In view of His Majesty’s Government it follows that the next step should be the initiation of direct discussions between the German and Polish Governments on a basis which would include the principles stated above, namely, the safeguarding of Poland’s essential interests and the securing of the settlement by an international guarantee.

They have already received a definite assurance from the Polish Government that they are prepared to enter into discussions on this basis, and His Majesty’s Government hope the German Government would for their part also be willing to agree to this course.

If, as His Majesty’s Government hope, such discussion led to agreement the way would be open to the negotiation of that wider and more complete understanding between Great Britain and Germany which both countries desire.

5. His Majesty’s Government agree with the German Chancellor that one of the principal dangers in the German Polish situation arises from the reports concerning the treatment of minorities. The present state of tension, with its concomitant frontier incidents, reports of maltreatment and inflammatory propaganda, is a constant danger to peace. It is manifestly a matter of the utmost urgency that all incidents of the kind should be promptly and rigidly suppressed and that verified reports should not be allowed to circulate, in order that time may be afforded, without provocation on either side, for a full examination of the possibilities of settlement. His Majesty’s Government are confident that both the Governments concerned are fully alive to these considerations.

6. His Majesty’s Government have said enough to make their own attitude plain in the particular matters at issue between Germany and Poland.

They trust that the German Chancellor will not think that, because His Majesty’s Government are scrupulous concerning their obligations to Poland, they are not anxious to use all their influence to assist the achievements of a solution which may commend itself both to Germany and to Poland.

That such a settlement should be achieved seems to His Majesty’s Government essential, not only for reasons directly arising in regard to the settlement itself, but also because of the wider considerations of which the German Chancellor has spoken with such conviction.

7. It is unnecessary in the present reply to stress the advantage of a peaceful settlement over a decision to settle the questions at issue by force of arms. The results of a decision to use force have been clearly set out in the Prime Minister’s letter to the Chancellor of the 22nd August, and His Majesty’s Government do not doubt that they are as fully recognized by the Chancellor as by themselves.

On the other hand, His Majesty’s Government, noting with interest the German Chancellor’s reference in the message now under consideration to a limitation of armaments, believe that, if a peaceful settlement can be obtained, the assistance of the world could confidently be anticipated for practical measures to enable the transition from preparation for war to the normal activities of peaceful trade to be safely and smoothly effected.

8. A just settlement of these questions between Germany and Poland may open the way to world peace. Failure to reach it would ruin the hopes of better understanding between Germany and Great Britain, would bring the two countries into conflict, and might well plunge the whole world into war. Such an outcome would be a calamity without parallel in history.

No. 75

SIR N. HENDERSON TO VISCOUNT HALIFAX [British Blue Book on German-Polish Relations]

Berlin, 8/28/1939. (Telegraphicreceived 2.35 a.m. August 29).

I saw the Chancellor at 10.30 this evening. He asked me to come at 10 p.m., but I sent word that I could not have the translation ready before the later hour. Herr von Ribbentrop was present, also Dr. Schmidt. Interview lasted one and a quarter hours.

2. Herr Hitler began by reading the German translation. When he had finished, I said that I wished to make certain observations from notes which I had made in the conversations with the Prime Minister and His Majesty’s Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. In the first place I wished to say that we in England regarded it as absurd that Britain should be supposed by the German Government to consider the crushing of Germany as a settled policy. We held it to be no less astonishing that anyone in Germany should doubt for a moment that we would not fight for Poland if her independence or vital interests were menaced.

3. Our word was our word, and we had never and would never break it. In the old days Germany’s word had the same value, and I quoted a passage from a German book (which Herr Hitler had read) about Marshal Bluecher’s exhortation to his troops when hurrying to the support of Wellington at Waterloo: “Forward, my children, I have given my word to my brother Welling ton, and you cannot wish me to break it.”

4. Herr Hitler at once intervened to observe that things were different 125 years ago. I said not so far as England was concerned. He wanted, I said, Britain’s friendship. What value would he place on our friendship if we began it by disloyalty to a friend? Whatever some people might say, the British people sincerely desired an understanding with Germany, and no one more so than the Prime Minister (Herr von Ribbentrop remarked that Mr. Chamberlain had once said to him that it was his dearest wish). To-day the whole British public was behind the Prime Minister. The recent vote in the House of Commons was an unmistakable proof of that fact. The Prime Minister could carry through his policy of an understanding if, but only if, Herr Hitler were prepared to co-operate. There was absolutely no truth in the idea sometimes held in Germany that the British Cabinet was disunited or that the country was not unanimous. It was now or never, and it rested with Herr Hitler. If he was prepared to sacrifice that understanding in order to make war or immoderate demands on Poland, the responsibility was his. We offered friendship but only on the basis of a peaceful and freely negotiated solution of the Polish question.

5. Herr Hitler replied that he would be willing to negotiate, if there was a Polish Government which was prepared to be reasonable and which really controlled the country. He expiated on misdoings of the Poles, referred to his generous offer of March last, said that it could not be repeated and asserted that nothing else than the return of Danzig and the whole of the Corridor would satisfy him, together with a rectification in Silesia, where 90% of the population had voted for Germany at the post-war plebiscite but where as a result of Haller-Korfanti coup, what the Plebiscite Commission had allotted had nevertheless been grabbed by Poland.

6. I told Herr Hitler that he must choose between England and Poland. If he put forward immoderate demands there was no hope of a peaceful solution. Corridor was inhabited almost entirely by Poles. Herr Hitler interrupted me here by observing that this was only true because a million Germans had been driven out of that district since the war. I again said the choice lay with him. He had offered a Corridor over theCorridor in March, and I must honestly tell him that anything more than that, if that, would have no hope of acceptance. I begged him very earnestly to reflect before raising his price.- He said his original offer had been contemptuously refused and he would not make it again. I observed that it had been made in the form of a dictate and therein lay the whole difference.

7. Herr Hitler continued to argue that Poland could never be reasonable: she had England and France behind her, and imagined that even if she were beaten she would later recover, thanks to their help, more than she might lose. He spoke of annihilating Poland. I said that reminded me of similar talk last year of annihilation of the Czechs. He retorted that we were incapable of inducing Poland to be reasonable. I said that it was just because we remembered the experience of Czechoslovakia last year that we hesitated to press Poland too far to-day. Nevertheless, we reserved to ourselves the right to form our own judgment as to what was or what was not reasonable so far as Poland or Germany was concerned. We kept our hands free in that respect.

8. Generally speaking, Herr Hitler kept harping on Poland, and I kept on just as consistently telling Herr Hitler that he had to choose between friendship with England which we offered him and excessive demands on Poland which would put an end to all hopes of British friendship. If we were to come to an understanding it would entail sacrifices on our part. If he was not prepared to make sacrifices on his part there was nothing here to be done. Herr Hitler said that he had to satisfy the demands of his people, his army was ready and eager for battle, his people were united behind him, and he could not tolerate further ill-treatment of Germans in Poland etc.

9. It is unnecessary to recall the details of a long and earnest conversation in the course of which the only occasion in which Herr Hitler became at all excited was when I observed that it was not a question of Danzig and the Corridor, but one of our determination to resist force by force. This evoked a tirade about the Rhineland, Austria and Sudeten and their peaceful reacquisition by Germany. He also resented my reference to 15th March.

10. In the end I asked him two straight questions. Was he willing to negotiate direct with the Poles and was he ready to discuss the question of an exchange of populations ? He replied in the affirmative as regards the latter (though I have no doubt that he was thinking at the same time of a rectification of frontiers). As regards the first, he said he could not give me an answer until after he had given reply of His Majesty’s Government the careful consideration which such a document deserved. In this connection he turned to Herr von Ribbentrop and said: “We must summon Field-Marshal Göring to discuss it with him.”

11. I finally repeated to him very solemnly the main note of the whole conversation so far as I was concerned, namely, that it lay with him as to whether he preferred a unilateral solution which would mean war as regards Poland, or British friendship. If he were prepared to pay the price of the latter by a generous gesture as regards Poland, he could at a stroke change in his favour the whole of public opinion not only in England but in the world. I left no doubt in his mind as to what the alternative would be, nor did he dispute the point.

12. At the end Herr von Ribbentrop asked me whether I could guarantee that the Prime Minister could carry the country with him in a policy of friendship with Germany. I said there was no possible doubt whatever that he could and would, provided Germany co-operated with him. Herr Hitler asked whether England would be willing to accept an alliance with Germany. I said, speaking personally, I did not exclude such a possibility provided the developments of events justified it.

13. Conversation was conducted in quite a friendly atmosphere, in spite of absolute firmness on both sides. Herr Hitler’s general attitude was that he could give me no real reply until he had carefully studied the answer of His Majesty’s Government. He said that he would give me a written reply tomorrow, Tuesday. I told him that I would await it, but was quite prepared to wait. Herr Hitler’s answer was that there was no time to wait.

14. I did not refer to the question of a truce. I shall raise that point tomorrow if his answer affords any real ground for hope that he is prepared to abandon war for the sake of British friendship.

No. 78

REPLY OF THE GERMAN CHANCELLOR TO THE COMMUNICATION OF 8/28/1939, FROM HIS MAJESTY’S GOVERNMENT. (THIS REPLY WAS HANDED TO SIR N. HENDERSON BY HERR HITLER DURING THE EVENING OF 8/29/1939.) British Blue Book on German-Polish Relations]

The British Ambassador in Berlin has submitted to the British Government suggestions which I felt bound to make in order

(1) to give expression once more to the will of the Reich Government for sincere Anglo-German understanding, co-operation and friendship;

(2) to leave no room for doubt as to fact that such an understanding could not be bought at the price of renunciation of vital German interests, let alone the abandonment of demands which are based as much upon common human justice as upon the national dignity and honour of our people.

The German Government have noted with satisfaction from the reply of the British Government and from the oral explanations given by the British Ambassador that the British Government for their part are also prepared to improve relationship betweenGermany and England and to develop and extend it in the sense of the German suggestion.

In this connection, the British Government are similarly convinced that the removal of the German-Polish tension, which has become unbearable, is the pre-requisite for the realization of this hope.

Since the autumn of the past year, and on the last occasion in 3/1939, there were submitted to the British Government proposals, both oral and written, which, having regard to the friendship then existing between Germany and Poland, offered the possibility of a solution of the questions in dispute acceptable to both parties. The British Government are aware that the Polish Government saw fit, in March last, finally to reject these proposals. At the same time, they used this rejection as a pretext or an occasion for taking military measures which have since been continuously intensified. Already in the middle of last month Poland was in effect in a state of mobilization. This was accompanied by numerous encroachments in the Free City of Danzig due to the instigation of the Polish authorities; threatening demands in the nature of ultimata, varying only in degree, were addressed to the City. A closing of the frontiers, at first in the form of a measure of customs policy but extended later in a military sense affecting also traffic and communications, was imposed with the object of bringing about the political exhaustion and economic destruction of this German community.

To this were added barbaric actions of maltreatment which cry to Heaven, and other kinds of persecution of the large German national group in Poland which extended even to the killing of many resident Germans or to their forcible removal under the most cruel conditions. This state of affairs is unbearable for a Great Power. It has now forced Germany, after remaining a passive onlooker for many months, in her turn to take the necessary steps for the safeguarding of justified German interests. And indeed the German Government can but assure the British Government in the most solemn manner that a condition of affairs has now been reached which can no longer be accepted or observed with indifference.

The demands of the German Government are in conformity with the revision of the Versailles Treaty in regard to this territory which has always been recognized as being necessary: viz., return of Danzig and the Corridor to Germany, the safeguarding of the existence of the German national group in the territories remaining to Poland.

The German Government note with satisfaction that the British Government also are in principle convinced that some solution must be found for the new situation which has arisen.

They further feel justified in assuming that the British Government too can have no doubt that it is a question now of conditions, for the elimination of which there no longer remains days, still less weeks, but perhaps only hours. For in the disorganized state of affairs obtaining in Poland, the possibility of incidents intervening which it might be impossible for Germany to tolerate, must at any moment be reckoned with.

While the British Government may still believe that these grave differences can be resolved by way of direct negotiations, the German Government unfortunately can nolonger share this view as a matter of course. For they have made the attempt to embark on such peaceful negotiations, but instead of receiving any support from the Polish Government, they were rebuffed by the sudden introduction of measures of a military character in favour of the development alluded to above.

The British Government attach importance to two considerations: (1) that the existing danger of an imminent explosion should be eliminated as quickly as possible by direct negotiation, and (2) that the existence of the Polish State, in the form in which it would then continue to exist, should be adequately safeguarded in the economic and political sphere by means of international guarantees.

On this subject the German Government makes the following declaration:

Though sceptical as to the prospects of a successful outcome, they are nevertheless prepared to accept the English proposal and to enter into direct discussions. They do so, as has already been emphasized, solely as the result of the impression made upon them by the written statement received from the British Government that they too desire a pact of friendship in accordance with the general lines indicated to the British Ambassador.

The German Government desire in this way to give the British Government and the British nation a proof of the sincerity of Germany’s intentions to enter into a lasting friendship with Great Britain.

The Government of the Reich felt, however, bound to point out to the British Government that in the event of a territorial rearrangement in Poland they would no longer be able to bind themselves to give guarantees or to participate in guarantees without the U.S. S. R. being associated therewith.

For the rest, in making these proposals the German Government have never had any intention of touching Poland’s vital interests or questioning the existence of an independent Polish State. The German Government, accordingly, in these circumstances agree to accept the British Government’s offer of their good offices in securing the despatch to Berlin of a Polish Emissary with full powers. They count on the arrival of this Emissary on Wednesday, 8/30/1939.

The German Government will immediately draw up proposals for a solution acceptable to themselves and will, if possible, place these at the disposal of the British Government before the arrival of the Polish negotiator.

No. 79

SIR N. HENDERSON TO VISCOUNT HALIFAX [British Blue Book on German-Polish Relations]

(Telegraphicreceived 9.15 p.m.).

Berlin, 8/29/1939.

Herr Hitler handed me German reply at 7.15 this evening Translation of full text will follow as soon as possible.

2. In reply to two British proposals, namely, for direct German-Polish negotiations and international guarantee of any settlement, German Government declares:

(1) That, in spite of its scepticism as to the prospect of their success, it accepts direct negotiation solely out of desire to ensure lasting friendship with Britain, and

(2) In the case of any modifications of territory German Government cannot undertake or participate in any guarantees without consulting the USSR,

3. Note observes that German proposals have never had for their object any diminution of Polish vital interests, and declares that German Government accepts mediation of Great Britain with a view to visit to Berlin of some Polish plenipotentiary. German Government, note adds, counts on arrival of such plenipotentiary to-morrow, Wednesday, 30th August.

4. I remarked that this phrase sounded like an ultimatum, but after some heated remarks both Herr Hitler and Herr von Ribbentrop assured me that it was only intended to stress urgency of the moment when the two fully mobilized armies were standing face to face.

5. I said that I would transmit this suggestion immediately to His Majesty’s Government, and asked whether, if such Polish plenipotentiary did come, we could assume that he would be well received and that discussions would be conducted on footing of complete equality. Herr Hitler’s reply was “of course”.

6. German demands are declared to be revision of Versailles Treaty; namely, return of Danzig and the Corridor to Germany, security for lives of German national minorities in the rest of Poland; note concludes with statement that the German Government will immediately elaborate proposals for an acceptable solution, and inform British Government, if possible, before arrival of Polish plenipotentiary.

No. 89

REPLY OF HIS MAJESTY’S GOVERNMENT TO THE GERMAN CHANCELLOR’S COMMUNICATION OF 8/29/1939. (This reply was handed by Sir N. Henderson to Herr von Ribbentrop at Midnight on 8/30/1939.) [British Blue Book on German-Polish Relations]

His Majesty’s Government appreciate the friendly reference in the Declaration contained in the reply of the German Government to the latter’s desire for an Anglo-German understanding and to their statement of the influence which this consideration has exercised upon their policy.

2. His Majesty’s Government repeat that they reciprocate the German Government’s desire for improved relations, but it will be recognized that they could not sacrifice the interests of other friends in order to obtain that improvement. They fully understand that the German Government cannot sacrifice Germany’s vital interests, but the Polish Government are in the same position and His Majesty’s Government believe that the vital interests of the two countries are not incompatible.

3. His Majesty’s Government note that the German Government accept the British proposal and are prepared to enter into direct discussions with the Polish Government.

4. His Majesty’s Government understand that the German Government accept in principle the condition that any settlement should be made the subject of an international guarantee. The question of who shall participate in this guarantee will have to be discussed further, and His Majesty’s Government hope that to avoid loss of time the German Government will take immediate steps to obtain the assent of the USSR, whose participation in the guarantee His Majesty’s Government have always assumed.

5. His Majesty’s Government also note that the German Government accept the position of the British Government as to Poland’s vital interests and independence.

6. His Majesty’s Government must make an express reservation in regard to the statement of the particular demands put forward by the German Government in an earlier passage in their reply. They understand that the German Government are drawing up proposals for a solution. No doubt these proposals will be fully examined during the discussions. It can then be determined how far they are compatible with the essential conditions which His Majesty’s Government have stated and which in principle the German Government have expressed their willingness to accept.

7. His Majesty’s Government are at once informing the Polish Government of the German Government’s reply. The method of contact and arrangements for discussions must obviously be agreed with all urgency between the German and Polish Governments, but in His Majesty’s Government’s view it would be impracticable toestablish contact so early as today.

8. His Majesty’s Government fully recognize the need for speed in the initiation of discussion, and they share the apprehensions of the Chancellor arising from the proximity of two mobilized armies standing face to face. They would accordingly most strongly urge that both parties should undertake that, during the negotiations, no aggressive military movements will take place. His Majesty’s Government feel confident that they could obtain such an undertaking from the Polish Government if the German Government would give similar assurances.

9. Further, His Majesty’s Government would suggest that a temporary modus vivendi might be arranged for Danzig, which might prevent the occurrence of incidents tending to render German-Polish relations more difficult.

No. 92

SIR N. HENDERSON TO VISCOUNT HALIFAX. [British Blue Book on German-Polish Relations]

(Telegraphicreceived 9.30 a.m. August 31.)

Berlin, 8/30/1939

I told Herr von Ribbentrop this evening that His Majesty’s Government found it difficult to advise Polish Government to accept procedure adumbrated in German reply, and suggested that he should adopt normal contact, i.e., that when German proposals were ready to invite Polish Ambassador to call and to hand him proposals for transmission to his Government with a view to immediate opening of negotiations. I added that if basis afforded prospect of settlement His Majesty’s Government could be counted upon to do their best in Warsaw to temporize negotiations.

2. Herr von Ribbentrop’s reply was to produce a lengthy document which he read out in German aloud at top speed. Imagining that he.would eventually hand it to me I did not attempt to follow too closely the sixteen or more articles which it contained. Though I cannot therefore guarantee accuracy the main points were: restoration of Danzig to Germany; southern boundary of Corridor to be line Marienwerder, Graudenz, Bromberg, Schoenlanke; plebiscite to be held in the Corridor on basis of population on 1/1/1919, a solute majority to decide international commission of British, French, Italian and Russian members to police the Corridor and guarantee reciprocalcommunications with Danzig and Gdynia pending result of the plebiscite; Gdynia to be reserved to Poland; Danzig to be purely commercial city and demilitarized.

3. When I asked Herr von Ribbentrop for text of these proposals in accordance with undertaking in the German reply of yesterday, he asserted that it was now too-late as Polish representative had not arrived in Berlin by midnight.

4. I observed that to treat matter in this way meant that request for Polish representative to arrive in Berlin on 3th August constituted in fact, an ultimatum in spite of what he and Herr Hitler had assured me yesterday. This he denied, saying that idea of an ultimatum was figment of my imagination. Why then I asked could he not adopt normal procedure and give me copy of proposals and ask Polish Ambassador to call on him, just as Herr Hitler had summoned me a few days ago, and hand them to him for communication to Polish Government? In the most violent terms Herr von Ribbentrop said that he would never ask the Ambassador to visit him. He hinted that if Polish Ambassador asked him for interview it might be different. I said that I would naturally inform my Government so at once. Whereupon he said while those were his personal views he would bring all that I had said to Herr Hitler’s notice. It was for Chancellor to decide. We parted on that note, but I must tell you that Herr von Ribbentrop’s whole demeanor during an unpleasant interview was aping Herr Hitler at his worst. He inveighed incidentally against Polish mobilization, but I retorted that it was hardly surprising since Germany had also mobilized as Herr Hitler himself had admitted to be yesterday.

No. 110

VISCOUNT HALIFAX TO SIR N. HENDERSON (BERLIN) [British Blue Book on German-Polish Relations]

(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, 9/1/1939. 5:45 P.M.

Following is text referred to in my immediately preceding telegram:

On the instructions of His Majesty’s Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, I have the honour to make the following communication:-

Early this morning the German Chancellor issued a proclamation to the German army which indicated clearly that he was about to attack Poland.

Information which has reached His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom and the French Government indicates that German troops have crossed the Polish frontier and that attacks upon Polish towns are proceeding.

In these circumstances, it appears to the Governments of the United Kingdom and France that by their action the German Government have created conditions (viz., an aggressive act of force against Poland threatening the independence of Poland) which call for the implementation by the Governments of the United Kingdom and France of the undertaking to Poland to come to her assistance.

I am accordingly to inform your Excellency that unless the German Government are prepared to give His Majesty’s Government satisfactory assurances that the German Government have suspended all aggressive action against Poland and are prepared promptly to withdraw their forces from Polish territory, His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom will without hesitation fulfill their obligations to Poland.

No. 113

VISCOUNT HALIFAX TO SIR H. KENNARD (WARSAW) British Blue Book on German-Polish Relations]

Foreign Office, 9/1/1939. The Polish Ambassador called to see me at his request at 10.30 this morning. Count Raczynski said that he had been officially informed from Paris that German forces had crossed the frontier at four points. He added that the towns of Vilno, Grodno, Brest-Litovsk, Lodz, Katowice and Cracow were being bombed and that at 9 a.m. an air attack had been made on Warsaw, as a result of which there were many civilian victims, including women and children. As regards the German attack, he understood, although he had no official information, that the points at the frontier which had been crossed were near Danzig, in East Prussia and Upper Silesia. His Excellency said that he had few words to add, except that it was a plain case as provided for by the treaty. I said that I had no doubt on the facts as he had reported them that we should take the same view.

No. 118

VISCOUNT HALIFAX TO SIR N. HENDERSON (BERLIN). [British Blue Book on German-Polish Relations]

(Telegraphic) Foreign Office, 9/8/1939, 5 A.M.

Please seek interview with Minister for Foreign Affairs at 9 A.M. to-day, Sunday or, if he cannot see you then, arrange to convey at that time to representative of German Government the following communication:

In the communication which I had the honour to make to you on 1st September I informed you, on the instructions of His Majesty’s Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, that, unless the German Government were prepared to give His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom satisfactory assurances that the German Government had suspended all aggressive action against Poland and were prepared promptly to withdraw their forces from Polish territory, His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom would, without hesitation, fulfill their obligations to Poland.

Although this communication was made more than twenty-four hours ago, no reply has been received but German attacks upon Poland have been continued and intensified. I have accordingly the honour to inform you that, unless not later than 11 A.M., British Summer Time, to-day 3rd September, satisfactory assurances to the above effect have been given by the German Government, and have reached His Majesty’s Government in London, a state of war will exist between the two countries as from that hour.

If the assurances referred to in the above communication are received, you should inform me by any means at your disposal before 11 A.M. to-day, 3rd September. If no such assurance is received here at 11 A.M., we shall inform the German representative that a state of war exists as from that hour.

No. 124

MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT TO HERR HITLER OF 8/24/1939. [British Blue Book on German-Polish Relations]

In the message which I sent you on the 14th April, I stated that it appeared to be that the leaders of great nations had it in their power to liberate their peoples from the disaster that impended, but that, unless the effort were immediately made, with good will on all sides, to find a peaceful and constructive solution to existing controversies, the crisis which the world was confronting must end in catastrophe. Today that catastrophe appears to be very nearat hand, indeed.

To the message which I sent you last April I have received no reply, but because my confident belief that the cause of world peace which is the cause of humanity itselfrises above all other considerations I am again addressing myself to you, with the hope that the war which impends and the consequent disaster to all peoples may yet be averted.

I therefore urge with all earnestnessand I am likewise urging the President of the Republic of Polandthat the Governments of Germany and Poland agree by common accord to refrain from any positive act of hostility for a reasonable stipulated period, and that they agree, likewise by common accord, to solve the controversies which have arisen between them by one of the three following methods:

First, by direct negotiation;

Second, by the submission of these controversies to an impartial arbitration in which they can both have confidence; or

Third, that they agree to the solution of these controversies through the procedure of conciliation, selecting as a conciliator or moderator a national of one of the American Republics, which are all of them free from any connection with, or participation, in, European political affairs.

Both Poland and Germany being sovereign Governments, it is understood, of course, that, upon resort to any one of the alternatives I suggest, each nation will agree to accord complete respect to the independence and territorial integrity of the other.

The people of the United States are as one in their opposition to policies of military conquest and domination. They are as one in rejecting the thesis that any ruler or any people possess the right to achieve their ends or objectives through the taking of action which will plunge countless of millions into war, and which will bring distress and suffering to every nation of the world, belligerent and neutral, when such ends and objectives, so far as they are just and reasonable, can be satisfied through the processes of- peaceful negotiation or by resort to judicial arbitration.

I appeal to you in the name of the people of the United States, and I believe in the name of peace-loving men and women everywhere, to agree to a solution of the controversies existing between your Government and that of Poland through the adoption one of the alternative methods I have proposed.

I need hardly reiterate that should the Governments of Germany and Poland be willing to solve their differences in the peaceful manner suggested, the Government of the United States still stands prepared to contribute its share to the solution of the problems which are endangering world peace in the form set forth in my message of the 14thApril.

No. 126

REPLY OF 8/25/1939, TO PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT FROM PRESIDENT MOSCICKI [British Blue Book on German-Polish Relations]

I appreciate the noble message which your Excellency has been kind enough to send me. I should like to emphasize that the Polish Government have ever considered direct talks between Governments to be the most suitable method of resolving difficulties which may arise between States. We consider that this method is all the more suitable where neighbouring States are concerned. On the basis of these principles Poland concluded non-aggression pacts with Germany and Russia. We consider also that the method of conciliation through the intermediary of a disinterested and impartial third party is a just method of resolving differences which have been created between nations.

Although I clearly wish to avoid even the appearance of desiring to profit by this occasion to raise points of litigation, I deem it my duty, nevertheless, to make clear that in the present crisis it is not Poland which is formulating demands and demanding concessions of any other State. It is therefore, perfectly natural that Poland should hold aloof from any action of this kind, direct or indirect. I would like to close by expressing my ardent wish that your message of peace may contribute to a general appeasement which is so necessary to enable the nations once more to regain the blessed path of progress and civilization.

No. 127

PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT’S SECOND APPEAL TO HERR HITLER, DATED 8/25/1939

[British Blue Book on German-Polish Relations]

I have this hour received from the President of Poland a reply to the message which I addressed to your Excellency and to him last night.

(The text of President Moscicki’s reply is then given. President Roosevelt continues as follows):

Your Excellency has repeatedly publicly stated that the aims and objects sought by the German Reich were just and reasonable.

In his reply to my message the President of Poland has made it plain that the Polish Government is willing, upon the basis set forth in my message, to agree to solve the controversy which has arisen between the Republic of Poland and the German Reich by direct negotiation or the process of conciliation.

Countless human lives can yet be saved and hope may still be restored that the nations of the modern world may even now construct the foundation for a peaceful and happier relationship, if you and the Government of the German Reich will agree to the pacific means of settlement accepted by the Government of Poland. All the world prays that Germany, too, will accept.

No. 139

BROADCAST APPEAL FOR PEACE BY HIS HOLINESS THE POPE, 8/24/1939 [British Blue Book on German-Polish Relations]

Once again a critical hour strikes for the great human family) an hour of tremendous deliberations, towards which our heart cannot be indifferent and from which our spiritual authority, which comes to us from God to lead souls in the ways of justice and peace must not hold itself aloof.

Behold us then with all of you, who in this moment are carrying the burden of so great a responsibility, in order that through our voice you may hear the voice of that Christ from Whom the world received the most exalted example of living, and in whom millions and millions of souls repose their trust in a crisis in which His word alone is capable of mastering all the tumultuous disturbances of the earth.

Behold us with you, leaders of peoples, men of State and men of arms, writers, oratorsof the radio and of the public rostrum and all those others who have the power to influence the thought and action of their fellow-men for whose destiny they are responsible.

We, armed only with the word of Truth and standing above all public disputes and passions speak to you in the name of God from “Whom all paternity in heaven and earth is named”in the name of Jesus Christ, Our Lord, who desired that all men be brothersin the name of the Holy Ghost, Gift of God most High, inexhaustible source of love in the hearts of men.

To-day, notwithstanding our repeated exhortations and our very particular interest, the fear of bloody international conflict becomes more excruciating; to-day, when the tension of minds seems to have arrived at such a pass as to make the outbreak of the awful scourge of war appear imminent we direct with paternal feeling a new and more heartfelt appeal to those in power and to their peoples: to the former that, laying aside accusations, threats, causes of mutual distrust, they may attempt to resolve their present differences with the sole means suitable thereto, namely by reciprocal and trusting agreement; to the latter that in calm tranquility, without disordered agitation they may encourage the peaceful efforts of those who govern them.

It is by force of reason and not by force of arms that Justice makes progress; and empires which are not founded on Justice are not blessed by God. Statesmanship emancipated from morality betrays those very ones who would have it so.

The danger is imminent but there is yet time.

Nothing is lost with peace; all may be with war. Let men return to mutual understanding. Let them begin negotiations anew. Conferring with goodwill and with respect for reciprocal rights they will find that to sincere and conscientious negotiators, an honourable solution is never precluded.

They will feel a sense of greatnessin the true sense of the wordif by silencing the voices of passion, be it collective or private, and by leaving to reason its rightful rule, they will have spared the blood of their fellow men and saved their country from ruin.

May the Almighty grant that the voice of this Father of the Christian family of this Servant of servants, who bears amongst men, unworthily indeed, but nevertheless really, the person, the voice and the authority of Jesus Christ, find in the minds and in the hearts of men a ready and willing reception.

May the strong hear us that they may not become weak through injustice, may the powerful hear us if they desire that their power be not a destruction, rather a protection for their peoples and a safeguard to tranquility in public order and in labour.

We beseech them by the blood of Christ, whose conquering force in the world was His mildness in life and in death. And beseeching them we know and feel that we have with us all those who are upright of heart; all those who hunger and thirst after justiceall those who already suffer every sorrow through the evils of life. We have with us the heart-of mothers which beats as one with ours; the fathers who would be obliged toabandon their families; lowly who labour and do not understand; the innocent upon whom weighs heavily the awful threat; the young men, generous knights of the purest and noblest ideals. And with us also is the soul of this ancient Europe which was the product of the faith and of Christian genius. With us all humanity seeks just bread, freedom; not steel which kills and destroys. With us that Christ, Who has made His one, solemn commandmentLove of One’s Brotherthe very substance of His religion and the promise of salvation for individuals and for nations.

Recalling finally that human efforts are of no avail without Divine assistance, we invite all to raise their eyes to Heaven and to beseech the Lord with fervent prayer that His divine grace descend in abundance upon this world in its upheaval, placate dissensions, reconcile hearts and evoke the resplendent dawn of a more serene future.

To this end and with this hope we impart to all, from the heart, our paternal Benediction.

No. 141

MR. OSBORNE TO VISCOUNT HALIFAX [British Blue Book on German-Polish Relations]

(Telegraphicreceived 3.45 a.m.)

Holy See, 8/31/1939.

The Pope is unwilling to abandon hope that pending negotiations may lead to a just pacific solution such as the whole world continues to pray for.

His Holiness therefore, in the name of God, beseeches the German and Polish Governments to do all that is in their power to avoid any incident and to abstain from taking any step that might aggravate the present tension.

His Holiness begs the British, French and Italian Governments to support his appeal.

“Document TC-75 [partial translation]”, pp. 513-515.

BERLIN, 1/2/1938.

VERY CONFIDENTIAL PERSONAL ONLY Memo for the Führer

Deductions on the report “German Embassy London A5522” regarding the future form of Anglo-German relations.

With the realization that Germany will not tie herself to a status quo in Central Europe and that sooner or later a military conflict in Europe is possible, the hope of an agreement will slowly disappear amongst Germanophile British politicians, in so far as they are not merely playing a part that has been given to them. Thus the fateful question arisesWill Germany and England eventually be forced to drift into separate camps and will they march against each other one day. To answer this question one must realize the following:

A change of the status quo in he East in the German sense can only be carried out by force. As long as France knows that England, which so to speak has taken on a guarantee to aid France against Germany, is on her side, France’s fighting for her Eastern allies is probable, in any case always possible and thus with it, war between Germany and England. This applies then even if England does not want war. England, believing she must defend her borders on the Rhine would be dragged in automatically by France, in other words, peace or war between England and Germany rests solely in the hands of France, who could bring about such a war between Germany and England by way of a conflict between Germany and France. It follows therefore that war between Germany and England on account of France can be prevented only if France knows from the start that England’s forces would not be sufficient to guarantee their common victory. Such a situation might force England and thereby France to accept a lot of things that a strong Anglo-French Coalition would never tolerate. This position would arise, for instance, if England, through insufficient armament or as a result of threats to her Empire by a superior coalition of powers, (e.g. Germany-Italy-Japan) thereby tying down her military forces in other places, would not be able to assure France of sufficient support in Europe. Regarding the question of the coalition of powers, this depends on further developments, on our policy of alliances and on the future position of British-American relations. It would be unfavourable to England, if she, not yet sufficiently armed, should stand opposed to the above mentioned coalition by herself. However, this. coalition would have to be firmly welded and there must be no doubt in England and France about the fact that Italy and Japan are firmly on our side, and that if necessary the combined forces of the coalition would be employed at one stroke. Italy’s and Japan’s interest in a strong Germany is as great as ours in a strong Italy and Japan.

The existence of the new Germany has been of great advantage to both of them in their efforts to expand during the last few years. With reference to this and to common aims in the future it should be possible to get these two powers to announce their solidarity with us at the right time. Given such a situation it may be possible that England wouldprevent France from interfering in the event of a war by Germany against one of France’s allies in the East, so as to localize the conflict and that England should not be forced through France’s interfering to have to fight for her Empire under unfavourable conditions, possibly in three places, in the Far East, in the Mediterranean and in Europe. Even if it should mean a considerable strengthening of Germany, England, in my opinion would not risk fighting for her Empire under unfavourable conditions for the sake of a local Central European conflict. In such a case France, without England, would hardly have the nerve to run against the German fortifications in the West by herself. The deciding factor which appears to me in this connection is the speed with which such a Central European war could be victoriously decided. In the event of a lightning success I am convinced that the West would not interfere. A lengthy campaign, however, might give our enemies the idea that they had over-rated Germany’s strength and with this the moment of intervention by the Western-powers would have come decidedly near.

In conclusion I should like to summarize my ideas with the following headings:

1. England is behind with her armaments and therefore is playing for time.

2. England believes that in a competition with German time is on English sideutilization of her greater economic possibilities for her armaments time for the extension of her treaties (e.g. U.S. A.)

3. The Halifax visit is therefore to be regarded as a reconnaissance and screening movement, also Germanophiles in England are for the most part only playing,the parts they have been given.

4. In my opinion England and her Prime Minister do not see in Halifax’s visit the possibility of the basis of an agreement with Germanythey have as much faith in National Socialist Germany as we have in Englandtherefore they fear one day they may be forced by a strong Germany to a solution which is not agreeable to themto counter this England is preparing herself in any case militarily and politically for war with Germany.

5. Therefore conclusions to be drawn by us:

i. Outwardly further understanding with England in regard to the protection of the interests of our friends.

ii. Formation under great secrecy but with wholehearted tenacity of a coalition against Englandi.e. a tightening of our friendship with Italy and Japan also the winning over of all nations whose interests conform with ours directly or indirectly-close and confidential co-operation of the diplomats of the three great powers towards this purpose. Only in this way can we confront England be it in a settlement or in war. England is going to be a hard and astute opponent in this game of diplomacy.

6. The particular question whether in the event of a war by Germany in Central Europe, France and thereby England would interfere depends on the circumstances and the time at which such a war commences and ceases and on military considerations whichcannot be gone into here. I should like to give the Führer some of these points of view verbally.

“Document TC-78: Letter From The French Prime Minister Daladier To The Führer, Dated 8/26/1939 [translation]”, pp. 529-530.

Paris, 8/26/1939

Dear Reichchancellor,

The French Ambassador in Berlin has informed me of your personal communication.

In the hours, in which you speak of the greatest responsibility which two heads of Governments can possibly take upon themselves, namely that of shedding the blood of two great nations, who long only for peace and work, I feel I owe it to you personally and to both our peoples to say that the fate of peace still rests in your hands.

You can doubt neither my own feelings towards Germany, nor France’s peaceful feelings towards your nation. No Frenchman has done more than myself to strengthen between our two nations not only peace, but also sincere cooperation in their own interests as well as in those of Europe and of the whole world. Unless you credit the French People with lower sense of honour, than I credit the German Nation with, you cannot doubt that France loyally fulfills her obligations towards other powers, such as Poland, which, as I am fully convinced, wants to live in peace with Germany.

These two convictions are fully compatible.

Till now there has been nothing to prevent a peaceful solution of the international crisis, with all honour and dignity for all nations, if the same will for peace exists on all sides.

Together with-the good will of France I proclaim that of all her allies. I take it upon myself to guarantee Poland’s readiness, which she has always shown, to submit to the mutual application of a method of open settlement, as it can be imagined between the governments of two sovereign nations. With the clearest conscience I can assure you that among the differences which have arisen between Germany and Poland over the question of Danzig, there is not one which could not be submitted to such a method the purpose of reaching a peaceful and just solution.

Moreover, I can declare on my honour that there is nothing in France’s clear and loyal solidarity with Poland and her allies, which could in any way prejudice the peaceful attitude of my country. This solidarity has never prevented us, and does not prevent ustoday, from keeping Poland in the same friendly state of mind.

In so serious an hour, I sincerely believe that no high minded human being could understand it, if a war of destruction was started without a last attempt being made to reach a peaceful settlement between Germany and Poland. Your desire for peace could in all certainty work for this aim, without any prejudice to German honour. I, who desire good harmony between the French and the German people, and who am on the other hand bound to Poland by bonds of friendship and by a promise, am prepared, as head of the French Government, to do everything an upright man can do, to bring this attempt to a successful conclusion.

You and I were in the trenches in the last war. You know, as I do, what horror and condemnation the devastations of that war have left in the conscience of the peoples, without any regard to its outcome. The picture I can see in my mind’s eye of your outstanding role as the leader of the German people on the road of peace, towards the fulfillment of its task in the common work of civilization, leads me to ask for a reply to this suggestion.

If French and German blood should be shed again, as it was shed 25 years ago, in a still longer and more murderous war, then each of the two nations will fight believing in its own victory. But the most certain victors will bedestruction and barbarity.

(Signed) Daladier.

“Document TC-79: Letter From The Führer To The French Prime Minister Daladier, Dated 8/27/1939 [translation]”, pp. 531-534.

Berlin, 8/27/1939

Dear Prime Minister,

I understand the qualms you express. I too have never overlooked the high responsibility which rests on those who are in a position to decide the fate of nations. As an old front line soldier, I hate the horrors of war as you do. It is from this conviction and knowledge that I have made honest efforts to eliminate all the grounds of conflict between our two nations. I have assured the French people quite openly that the return of the Saar would be the prerequisite for it. After its return I immediately and solemnly confirm my renunciation of any further claims which might affect France. The German people approved my attitude. You were able to realize yourself during your last stay here that, proud of its own attitude, it neither felt nor feels any resentment or hatred towards the valiant foe of the past. On the contrary. The satisfactory solution of ourWestern frontier problem led to an increase in understanding, at least on the part of the German people. This understanding on many occasions reached the point of demonstrativeness. The building of our strong Western fortifications which cost us and are still costing us many millions of Marks proves that Germany is accepting and confirming the final frontier of the Reich. The German people have thereby given up two provinces which used to belong to the old German Reich, were later on conquered with much blood and still later defended with still more blood. Your Excellency will have to agree that the waiving of our claims is no tactical measure to impress the outer world, but a decision which has been logically confirmed by all our measures. You will be unable, my dear Prime Minister, to quote me an instance where in a single line or speech there has been any opposition to this final delineation of the Western boundary of the Reich. I believed that through this waiving of our claims and by this attitude I had eliminated any possible source of controversy between our two peoples which would lead to a repetition of the tragedy of 1914-1918. However, this voluntary limitation of Germany’s vital demands in the West cannot be taken as implying total acceptance of the Versailles treaty. I have really tried year after year to obtain by agreement a revision of at least those clauses of the treaty which were most irrational and unbearable. It has been impossible. Many far-sighted people of all nations saw and knew that a revision had to come. Whatever anyone may say against my methods, whatever criticism anyone may feel himself compelled to level against them, one must not overlook or deny that they not only made it possible in many cases to find solutions satisfactory to Germany, without first shedding of blood, but also owing to the very nature of these methods, spared foreign statesmen the necessity of justifying such revisions to their own people, a necessity which they would often have been unable to face; for your Excellency will have to agree with me on one point: The revision had to come. The Versailles treaty was intolerable. No Frenchman possessing a sense of honour, not even you, Monsieur Daladier, would have acted differently from me in a similar position. I have now also tried in this sense to abolish the most unreasonable of all the Versailles treaty. I made an offer to the Polish Government, which shocked the German people. No one but 1 could have dared to announce such an offer in public. That is why I could only make that offer once. I am now firmly convinced that Europe would have been able to enjoy a state of peace today and for the next 25 years, if at that time the Poles had been persuaded, particularly by Great Britain to see reason; instead a wild press campaign against Germany was started and rumours were spread of a German mobilization. Thus Polish public opinion was first of all roused by lies about German aggression; it was made more difficult for the Polish Government to come to their own necessary clear-cut decisions and.the subsequently given guarantee in particular impaired their ability to see the limits of what was possible. The Polish Government turned the other down. Polish public opinion, firmly convinced that Britain and France would go to war on their behalf, started to make demands which could have been regarded as ridiculous lunacies, had they not been so terribly dangerous. At that time an unbearable terrorizationa physical and economic oppression of the Germans in the territories ceded by the Reich, who still amounted to over 1 1/2 millions, began. I do not wish to discuss here the atrocities committed. Even Danzig was increasingly reminded, by the continuous encroachments of Polish authorities, that it had been surrendered, apparently without hope of salvation, to the arbitrary will of a power alien to the national character of town and population.

May I take the liberty of asking you, Daladier, how you, a Frenchman, would act ifthrough the unlucky and of a courageous fight one of your provinces were cut off by a corridor occupied by a foreign power; if a large town, let us say Marseilles, was prevented from acknowledging her ties with France and if the Frenchman living in that territory were persecuted, beaten, maltreated, even bestially murdered? You are a Frenchman, M. Daladier, and therefore know how you would act. Do not, M. Daladier, doubt my sense of honour and my sense of duty which tells me to act exactly as you would do! If you had suffered the misfortune which we have suffered, would you be able to understand it M. Daladier, if Germany should without provocation insist on the corridor through France being maintained, on the stolen territory not being allowed to revert, on the return of Marseilles to France being forbidden? I at least, M. Daladier, cannot imagine that Germany should fight against you for such a reason, since I and the hole world have waived the claim to Alsace-Lorraine to prevent further shedding of blood. All the less would we shed blood to uphold an injustice, which would be as intolerable to you, as it would be unimportant for us. I feel exactly as you do, M. Daladier, about the matters mentioned in your letter. Being both old front-line soldiers, perhaps we can understand each other more easily on many points; however, I must ask you to understand this too: That it is impossible for a nation with a sense of honour to waive their claim to almost two million people, and to see them maltreated on their own frontier. I have therefore formulated a clear-cut demand. Danzig and the corridor must revert to Germany. The “Macedonian” conditions on one Eastern frontier must disappear. I can see no way of inducing Poland, which now believes itself unassailable under the protection of the guarantees, to take steps towards a peaceful solution. I should however despair of the honourable future of my people, if, under such circumstances, we were not determined to solve the question in one way or another. Should fate thereby once more force our two peoples to fight, there would yet be a difference in our motives. I and my people, M. Daladier, would fight to rightand the others to maintaina wrong which has been inflicted on us. This would be all the more tragic as many most outstanding men, including some of your own people, have recognized the folly of the 1919 solution as well as the impossibility of permanently upholding it. I am quite aware of the dire consequences which would result from such a conflict. But I believe that Poland would suffer most, for, whichever way the war about this question went, the present Polish state would be lost anyhow.

Not only for you, M. Daladier, but for me too it is most painful that our two peoples are now to embark on a new bloody war of extermination on these grounds. But as I said before, I cannot see a way for us to induce Poland by rational means to correct a situation which is intolerable for the German people and the German Reich.

(Signed) Adolf Hitler.

“Document TC-92: The Führer’s Address On The Occasion Of The Dinner In Honour Of The Prince Regent Of Yugoslavia On 6/1/1939 [partial translation]”, pp. 536-537.

[Documents Concerning the Conflict with Yugoslavia and Greece (Dokumente zum Konflict mit Jugoslawien und Griechenland) Berlin, 1941, Page 74.]

The German friendship for the Yugoslav nation is not only a spontaneous one. It gained depth and durability in the midst of the tragic confusion of the world war. The German soldier then learned to appreciate and respect his extremely brave opponent. I believe that this feeling was reciprocated. This mutual respect finds confirmation in common political, cultural and economic interests. We therefore look upon your Royal Highness’s present visit as a living proof of the accuracy of our view, and at the same time on that account we derive from it they hope that German-Yugoslav friendship may continue further to develop in the future and to grow ever closer.

In the presence of your Royal Highness, however, we also perceive a happy opportunity for a frank and friendly exchange of views which, and of this I am convinced, in this sense can only be fruitful to our two peoples and States. I believe this all the more because a firmly established reliable relationship of Germany to Yugoslavia, now that, owing to historical events, we have become neighbours with common boundaries fixed for all time, will not only guarantee lasting peace between our two peoples and countries, but can also represent an element of calm to our nerve-wracked continent. This peace is the goal of all who are disposed to perform really constructive work.

“Document TC-93: Proclamation Of The Führer To The German People, 4/6/1941 [partial translation]”, p. 537.

[Documents Concerning the Conflict with Yugoslavia and Greece (Dokumente zum Konflict mit Jugoslawien und Griechenland) Berlin, 1941, Page 2.]

From the beginning of the struggle it has been England’s steadfast endeavour to make the Balkans a theatre of war. British diplomacy did, in fact, using the model of the World War, succeed in first ensnaring Greece by a guarantee offered to her, and then finally in misusing her for Britain’s purposes.

The documents published today afford a glimpse of a practice which, in accordance with very old British recipes, is a constant attempt to induce others to fight and bleed for British interests.

In the face of this I have always emphasized that

(1) The German people have no antagonism to the Greek people, but that

(2) We shall never, as in the World War, tolerate a Power establishing itself on Greek territory with the object, at a given time, of being able to advance thence from the south-east into German living space. We have swept the northern flank free of the English: we are resolved not to tolerate such a threat in the south!

In the interests of a genuine consolidation of Europe, it has been my endeavour, since the day of my assumption of power, above all to establish a friendly relationship with Yugoslavia. I have consciously put out of mind everything that once took place between Germany and Serbia. I have not only offered the Serbian people the hand of the German people, but, in addition, have made efforts as an honest broker to assist in bridging all difficulties which existed between the Yugoslavia State and various nations allied to Germany.

“Document UK-20: Treatment Of Supporters Of De Gaulle Who Fight For The Russians [translation]”, p. 538.

SECRET copy

High Command of the Armed Forces. Nr.002106/43 g.K./WFSt/Qu.(Verw)

Führer’s H.Q. 5/26/1943. 20 copies, Copy No. 8.

French airmen serving in the Soviet forces have been shot down on the Eastern front for the first time. The Führer has ordered that employment of French troops in the Soviet forces is to be counteracted by the strongest means.

It is therefore ordered:

1. Supporters of de Gaulle who are taken prisoner on the Eastern front will be handed over to the French government for proceedings in accordance with OKW order/WR/I/3 Nr. 4697/40 of 12/6/1940.

2. All instances of this type will be collected and be used for exerting political pressure on the French government, which is responsible, in accordance with the terms of the armistice, for preventing members of the French forces from leaving France.

Steps to be taken against the French government are being prepared by OKW/A.Ausl./Abw.Ag.Ausl. in conjunction with the foreign office.

3. Detailed investigations are to be made in appropriate cases against relatives of Frenchmen who fight for the Russians, if these relatives are resident in the occupied area of France. If the investigation reveals that relatives have given assistance to facilitate escape from France then severe measures are to be taken.

OKW/WR is making the necessary preparations with the Military Commander on the spot, and with the SS and Police chief.

Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces

(signed) KEITEL

Certified correct Lt.Col.G.S.

Certified correct copy. [signature illegible] Capt.

Distribution etc.

“Document UK-57: Counteraction To Kharkov Show Trial [translation]”, pp. 539-540.

NOT VIA REGISTRY Amt Ausland/Abwehr Ag Ausland Nr. 17/44 gKdos I B2

SECRET COMMAND MATTER

Note: Chief High Mil. Command We want documents on basis of which we can institute similar proceedings. They are reprisals which have no connection with battle actions. Legal indications are superfluous 8 Jan. To be submitted to the Chief High Mil. Command. via Chef Foreign Direct/Security.

2 copies of which this copy is certified correct. (signed) REICHEL In compliance with orders received the following steps have so far been taken.

1. “The army dept. for investigations of infringement” at WR has, since 1940 been carefully collecting all documentary evidence through which breaches of international law by the enemy up to the present have been placed on record. This evidence has been thoroughly checked by means of interrogation under oath of the participating soldiers. A systematic survey of this material has already been presented to WFSt by the foreign dept. in 1942.

On going through the material for the present purpose (counteraction KHARKOV) it has been found, however, that in none of the cases detailed information about the participants is available.

It therefore only remains:

a. To ascertain, in conjunction with the general staff of the army, which troop formations were present on the enemy’s side at the time of the ascertained breaches of international law.

b. To ask the chief PW organization to ascertain whether any PW from troop formations used at the time are in German hands. This information has been handed over to the Chief PW organization and investigation is in progress. The events in Crete, at Dieppe and in N. Africa have been brought into the scope of the investigations. The collecting of further evidence is costing a great deal of time owing to the large distances between the service depts. concerned.

2. The documents referred to “Commandos” have been collected by the Reich security HQ and thoroughly investigated. In five cases members of the British armed forces have been arrested as participants. In accordance with the order of the Führer they were thereupon shot. The possibility would exist that breaches of international law could not be attributed to them and they could be posthumously sentenced to death by the way of the courts. Up to the present no breaches of international law can be proved against the commando participants. The documentary material to hand is therefore, correspondingly poor: further material has been asked for. When this has been received and examined it will be passed on to the Armed Forces Legal Dept. and a further report submitted. NOT VIA REGISTRY

Foreign Dept. of Defense. Foreign Directorate / Security Foreign Dept. No. 17/44 VERY SECRET DOCUMENT Foreign I B2 (a Aug).

OU 1/6/1944 5 copies, 1st copy

SECRET COMMAND MATTER High Army Command, Army Operational Staff, Communications Station 1/12/1944

2. REPORT MEMORANDUM To Chief, High Command via Chief for: Direct./Sec.

Re: Counteraction to KHARKOV SHOW TRIAL

In pursuance of the orders received the following “Commando” cases have been established up to the present:

1. Guerilla activities in North Africa.

a. 1st Lieut Michael Alexander, born 11/20/1920

b. Cpl Gurney, born 2/8/1919, in London (Volume 6) were landed on 8/15/1942 in North Africa together with sabotage commando. After blowing up several ammunition dumps and splinter proof walls they surprised Cpl Seemann and 3 soldiers in their tent on the morning of 8/16/1942, bound them, rendered an MG useless and took 2 German army pistols and two German army forage caps with them. For this attack A and G were only dressed in khaki coloured shirts and trousers and wore no headgear. Cpl G was wearing an English web belt with a canvas pistol pouch whilst 1st Lieut A was wearing a German pistol punch made of black leather. During his flight after the raid A put on the German tropical cap which he had taken with him. The attacked Cpl Seemann found him a few hours later hidden in a sand pit under a straw mat and took him prisoner.

Proceedings for guerilla activities have been brought before the Reich court martial by order of the Führer (sheet 29) and the charge sheet (sheet 6) has been brought before the Reich minister of foreign affairs (sheet 37). Proceedings have been temporarily suspended by order of the Chief OKW (sheet 43/46).

The accused are at present in the Eichstadt Bavaria camp as ordinary PWs (sheet 22).

Distribution: Chief Sect. Gen. Armed Forces Matters, Personally Chief, PW Inspection Chief, Armed Forces Legal Section

2. Attempted attacks on the battleship Tirpit.

At the end of October 42 a British commando that had come Norway in a cutter had orders to carry out an attack on the battleship Tirpitz in Drontheim Fjord by means of a two-man torpedo. The action failed since both torpedoes which were attached to the cutter were lost in the stormy sea. From amongst the crew consisting of 6 Englishmen and 4 Norwegians a party of 3 Englishmen and 2 Norwegians were challenged on the Swedish border. However, only the British seaman Robert Paul Evans born 14 Jan 22 at London, could be arrested, the others escaped into Sweden.

Evans had a pistol pouch in his possession such as are used to carry weapons under the arm-pit and also a knuckle-duster. Violence, representing a breach of international law could not be proved. He has made extensive statements about the operatIon. In accordance with the Führer’s order (sheet 15 and 53) he was shot on 1/19/1942.

3. Blowing up of the Glomfjord Power Station.

On 9/16/1942 10 Englishmen and 2 Norwegians landed on the Norwegian coastdressed in the uniform of the British Mountain Rie Regt., heavily armed and equipped with explosives of every description. After negotiating difficult mountain country they blew up important installations in the power station Glomfjord on 9/21/1942. The German sentry was shot dead on that occasion. Norwegian workmen were threatened that they would be chloroformed should they resist. For this purpose the Englishmen were equipped with morphine syringes. Several of the participants have been arrested whilst the others escaped into Sweden (sheet 178).

Those arrested are:

Capt. Graeme Black, born 5/9/1911 in Dresden. Capt. Joseph Houghton, born 6/13/1911 at Bromborough. Top Sgt Miller Smith, born 11/2/1915 at Middlesborough. Cpl William Chudley, born 5/10/1922 at Exeter. Rfn Reginald Makeham, born 1/28/1914 at Ipswich. Rfn Cyril Abram, born 8/20/1922 in London. Rfn Eric Curtis, born 10/24/1921 in London.

They were shot on 10/30/1942 (sheet 124).

A number of reports about this sabotage operation have been circulated by the English and neutral press and radio in which the capture of 7 Englishmen (sheet 114-115, 127, 162-163) and their shackling was mentioned.

4. The sabotage attack against German ships off Bordeaux.

On 12/12/1942 a number of valuable German ships off Bordeaux were seriously damaged by explosives below water-level. The adhesive mines had been fixed by 5 English sabotage gangs working from canoes. From amongst the 10 participants the following were arrested after a few days:

Kinnon, Mac Naval lieut born 7/15/1921 N. Argyleshire, British. Laver, Albert Friedrich, P/O, born 9/29/1920. Birkenhead, British. Mills, William Henry, Marine, born 15 Dec 21. Kettering, British. Wallace, Samuel, Sgt, born 9/24/13, Dublin/Eire, Irish. Conway, James, Marine, born 8/28/1922, Stockport, British. Ewart, Robert, Marine, born 12/4/1921, Glasgow, British.

A seventh soldier named Moffet was found drowned, the remainder apparently escaped into Spain.

Participants proceeded in pairs from a submarine in canoes upstream into the mouth of the River Gironde. They were wearing olive green special uniforms. After effecting the explosions they sank the boats and attempted to escape into Spain in civilian clothe and with the assistance of the French civil population.

No special criminal actions during the flight have been discovered. All the arrested, in accordance with order were shot on 3/23/1943. The investigations into three further “Commando” cases have not yet been completed.

Signed: REICHEL

COPY

VO Foreign/Ic Führer’s Hq. FHQ 1/9/1944

The Chief OKW has handed the Deputy Chief WSSt the enclosed letter with the following remarks:

It is of no importance to prove breaches of international law in documentary fashion, what is important, however, is the collection of material which can be used for presentation of a show trial from a propaganda point of view. A show trial, as such, is therefore, not meant to take place but merely a propaganda presentation of cases of breaches of international law by enemy soldiers who will be mentioned by name and who have either already been punished with death for their crimes or are awaiting the death penalty.

Chief OKW asks the chief of the Foreign Dept. to bring with him corresponding documents for his next visit to the Führer’s HQ.

Signed: KRUMMACHER.

SECRET COMMAND MATTER

Air. SecurityAbr. Abw. III, No. 2778/44/54 gKdos (C2) O. U. 4/21/1944

4 Copies, 1 Copy.

Reference: Countermeasures to Soviet Russia’s Show Trials. References:

1. WFSt/Qu 2 No. 003265/44 g Kdos v. 3/27/1944. Armed Forces Op. Staff/Quarters. Very Secret document.

2. First Report Memo. under same No. 4.4.44.

3. Second Report Memo. under same No. of 11.4.44.

3. Report Memorandum for Chief, High Mil. Command

1. The final figures of the cases concerned (persons) is 97, of which 52 are officers.Amongst these there is one English Brigadier-General, one American Colonel and eight British Majors. Distribution of the 97 cases can be seen from the following two summaries: British: 47 American: 5 Taken After middle of 1943: 39 Before middle of 1943: 13 Still living? Yes: 44 No: 7 Not yet ascertained: 1

SOLDIERS below the rank of Corporal

British: 32 American: 13 Taken After middle of 1943: 25 Before middle of 1943: 20 Yes: 19 No: 24 Not yet ascertained: 2

The British operation for the organization of Albanian Units officers and 3 EMs), which wa originally omitted from the second report, is included herein.

From the material to hand, regarding Anglo-American soldiers (EM), only those cases have been considered which have taken part in a joint operation with officers, whilst EM alone have only been considered in 2 particularly suitable cases.

Over and above the 97 cases there are reports of cases regarding further 8 English officers who, according to the records in hand, cannot be regarded as absolutely suitable, but which, should the occasion arise, could be used after suitable treatment, furthermore, 3 cases of English officers of Danish nationality.

It has not been possible to consider the case of an English murder plot against leading persons of the Dutch national socialist movement, dealt with in the first report memorandum. According to information from the Reich security department it has been established that an American citizen who has been arrested, has been proved to be a participant, but it has not been clarified up to the present whether or not he is a soldier. A separate report will be submitted.

2. A list of the 97 cases, with names, is contained in the attached folder. The 8 cases which are not necessarily regarded as suitable, and the 3 cases of English officers of Danish nationality, are listed in Appendix I.

3. The cases of ill treatment, shackling or killing of German PWs or wounded German soldiers (El Alamein, Dieppe and Crete) and where direct guilt cannot be proven, are compiled in appendix II. They are not contained in the number of 97 cases.

4. The foreign office, for the reason that they must be included in the preparation of theproposed counter measures, has asked for the total material for their examination. We should like to have your decision as to whether this request is to be complied with.

p.p. Martin.

End I Folder. [The following notes in pencil appear upon this document:

(a) In mauve pencilinitialled by G. KEITEL. “For examination by Wm. Fuehrungs St. abroad.” “To be kept by W. F. St. (Liaison offr abroad).”

(b) In blue pencil at bottom of page initialled by JODL.

L. O. Abroad to take action.

I must point out the danger of leaving these prisoners in Paris or Brussels. They must be brought to Germany. J.]

“Document UK-65: Report By The C. In C. Of The Navy To The Führer On The 10/16/1939 [translation]”, pp. 545-547.

(present: Gen. JODL.)

1. Report on the operation of the “U7” in the Scapa Flow. Promotion of the B.d.U. to AdmiralCommanding Officer to come to Berlin to make a report and to be decorated with the Knight’s Cross.

2. Report on the intensification of the naval war in connection with the memorandum which is handed to the Führer. The Führer permits:

a. The torpedoing without warning of all merchant ships clearly identified as belonging to the enemy (British or French).

b. Passenger ships in convoy may be torpedoed some time after it has been made known that this is intended. The C. in C. of the Navy points out that passenger ships are already being torpedoed if they are sailing blacked out.

c. The Italian, Russian, Spanish and Japanese Governments are to be requested to make a declaration that they will not carry any contraband, otherwise they will be treated in the same way as other neutral nations. (This is being done.)

3. The C. in C. of the Navy reports that the Russians have put a well-situated base, tothe west of Murmansk, at our disposal, where a depot ship is to be stationed.

[signed] RAEDER.

Berlin, 11/3/1939.

Directorate of Naval Strategy No. 1/SRC. A. I. 656/39 G Kdos The enclosed memorandum contains the considerations of the Naval High Command regarding the possibilities of an intensification of the naval war against England.

per pro (signed) FRICKE

Distribution:

Führer and Supreme Commander No. 1, O.K.W. WA/L No. 2, Ob. d. M. No. 3, 1. Dept. Skl. No. 4, 1. Dept. Skl. No. 5, Foreign Office No. 6, O.K.W. Dept. Foreign Countries No. 7, O.K.W. Special Staff of Admiral Schuster No. 8, The Führer’s Adjutant No. 9, Group West, at the same time for the B.d.U. No. 10

Berlin, 10/15/1939.

Memorandum regarding the intensified naval war against England.

A. Designation the aim of the war:

The Führer’s proposal for the restoration of a just, honourable peace and the new adjustment of political order in Central Europe has been turned down. The enemy powers want the war, with the aim of destroying Germany. In this fight, in which Germany is now forced to defend her existence and her rights, she must use her weapons with the utmost ruthlessness, at the same time fully respecting the laws of military ethics.

Germany’s principal enemy in this war is Britain. Her most vulnerable spot is her maritime trade. The naval war at sea against Britain must therefore be conducted as an economic war, with the aim of destroying Britain’s fighting spirit within the shortest possible time and of forcing her to accept peace.

The mediums for this economic war are all weapons that are suitable for it: Naval surface forces, U-boats, ‘planes, political organs, economy and propaganda. But a lasting and probably decisive effect against Britain can only be expected from the Navy (and in particular from the U-boat arm) and the Air Force. The first condition for this is the carrying out of an extensive U-boat building program, which will mean the largest possible concentration of the active war industry on building U-boats, as well as an increased building up of that part of the Air Force which is suitable for the conduct of the War against Britain.

The principal target of the Directorate of Naval strategy is the merchant ship, not only the enemy’s, but in general every merchant ship which sails the seas in order to supply the enemy’s war industry, both by way of imports and exports. Besides this, the enemywarship also remains a military target, because in it the enemy possesses a weapon with which he can counter a direct attack on the merchant ship.

Because of its direct effect on the life of the neutrals also, the prosecution of the economic war means a closer relationship between politics and the conduct of the war than in any other measure of war.

It is the duty of the military leadership of the war at sea to use the military means at its disposal with the severity necessary for attaining success, and to achieve the complete strangulation of the enemy.

It is the task of economic-warfare clearly to recognize what results the military measures will have on our own economy to find ways and means of making up for the losses from other sources, and, where this is unavoidably necessary for maintaining the life of the German people, to voice any doubts as to the conduct of the naval war.

The political leadership and supreme command will then bring the demands of the naval warfare and those of our own war industry into accord with the political aim and the aims of the conduct of the war in general, and will make the necessary decision accordingly.

B. Estimate of the enemy’s position:

The way in which the war has been waged to date has shown that Britain is unwilling to make large military sacrifices in this war, or to make full use of her military means. She therefore confines herself to a long term propaganda and economic war. Her measures aim at cutting Germany off completely from all her trade. Her control of trade, which is built up on a large scale and carried out ruthlessly, together with the strongest possible political and economic pressure, interferes with the neutrals’ trade and forces them to support Britain’s economic war against Germany. At the same time Britain’s own economic position is difficult because of the extent of her dependence on supplies from overseas. This position would improve considerably if the United States of America with its large resources were to place itself economically and militarily fully on the side of the enemy powers.

Britain wishes to avoid economic sacrifices just as much as military sacrifices as much as possible. Economically too, the war is not to be “bad business” for Britain. Therefore she attaches the greatest importance to retaining her overseas trade to the largestpossible extent. This is only possible through keeping up a great part of her export trade. By hindering British exports as well we will therefore hit Britain in a particularly sensitive spot.

The extent to which Britain depends on overseas countries, the particular bottlenecks of its economic system and the available alternatives are shown in appendix 1.

To combat German economic warfare, the following steps have been taken by Great Britain up till now:

Extensive formation of convoys protected by cruisers, destroyers, submarines and planes.

Deviations from the normal peacetime Atlantic trading routes for convoys and single ships.

Arming of the great majority of merchantmen-and instructions to merchant shipping to make use of their armament against U-boats.

Admiralty orders to the British mercantile Marine to ram German U-boats.

Aerial reconnaissance on a big scale over all territorial waters and employment of planes against U-boats, partly in collaboration with destroyers and fishing smacks.

Employment of strong formations of submarine chasers against U-boats in the English channel, off the Norwegian coast in the North Sea, along the French and Western Spanish coastline and in own territorial waters.

Employment of cruiser formations against German commerce raiders (Panzerschiffe) in the Atlantic.

If the present form of economic warfare is continued, one can count in principle on the present defense methods being maintained, though with a considerable intensification of safety measures, a more intensive anti U-boat campaign, a perfection of countermeasures against U-boats and a slow increase in the use of mines against our U-boats and surface vessels.

C. Possibilities of future naval warfare.

I. Military requirements for the decisive struggle against Great Britain.

Our naval strategy will have to employ all the military means at our disposal as expeditiously as possible. Military success can be most confidently expected if we attack British sea-communications wherever they are accessible to us with the greatest ruthlessness; the final aim of such attacks is to cut off all exports into and exports from Britain. We should try to consider the interest of Neutrals insofar as this is possible without detriment to in military requirements. It is desirable to base all military measures taken on existing international law; however-measures which are considered necessary from a military point of view, provided a decisive success can be expectedfrom them, will have to be carried out, even if they are not covered by existing international law. In principle therefore any means of warfare which is effective in breaking enemy resistance should be used on some legal conception, even if that entails the creation of a new code of naval warfare.

The supreme War Council, after considering the political, military and economic consequences within the framework o the general conduct of the war, will have to decide what measures of military and legal nature are to be taken. Once it has been decided to conduct economic warfare in its most ruthless form, in fulfilment of military requirements this decision is to be adhered to under all circumstances and under no circumstances may such a decision for the most ruthless form of economic warfare, once it has been made, be dropped or released under political pressure from neutral powers; that is what happened in the World War to our own detriment. Every protest by neutral, powers mst be turned down. Even threats of further countries, including the U.S. coming into the war which can be expected with certainty should the war last a long time, must not lead to a relaxation in the form of economic warfare once embarked upon. The more ruthlessly economic warfare is waged, the earlier will it show results and the sooner will the war come to an end. The economic effect of such military measures on our own war economy must be fully recognized and compensated through immediate re-orientation of German war economy and the redrafting of the respective agreements with neutral state; for this, strong political and economic pressure must be employed if necessary.

II. How far are military requirements being fulfilled by the present form of economic warfare?

The deciding factor in the present conduct of economic warfare is that the existing laws of naval warfare particularly the laws concerning prizes are recognized in principle. Economic warfare is therefore governed at present by the following basic rules:

(a) Individual unarmed enemy merchantmen: stopping, searching, seizing as prize or, where that-is impossible, sinking.

(b) Individual neutral merchantmen carrying contraband for the enemy; stopping, searching, seizing as prize or, where that is impossible, sinking.

(c) Enemy merchantmen in convoy and neutral merchantmen in enemy convoy: sinking without warning.

(d) Troop transports: sinking without warning.

(e) All merchantmen resisting seizure or threatening our own ships: sinking without warning.

In view of the requirements of naval warfare and of the fact that a large percentage of enemy merchantmen have been armed and that such merchantmen have been clearly instructed by the Admiralty to make use of their armaments against U-boats, our U-boats are already entitled to sink without warning the following categories:

(a) All enemy merchantmen which are clearly armed.

(b) All enemy or neutral vessels in enemy coastal waters which are blacked ut or behave in a suspicious manner.

(c) All ships making use of their wireless on the surfacing of U-boats or during seizure.

At present therefore stopping and searching is still necessary in the case of all individual unarmed enemy merchantmen, all neutral merchantmen proceeding either individually or in neutral convoys.

The following are at present exempted from seizure and sinking:

1. Merchantmen of the friendly neutrals- Italy, Spain, Japan and Russia.

2. Passenger steamers and steamers capable of transporting a considerable number of passengers, even when travelling in enemy convoys.

3. Individual neutral ships not carrying contraband which behave in a completely correct manner.

Furthermore, the whole of English export trade, the throttling of which would have serious consequences for the maintenance of English foreign trade, is, according to the present international law, exempt from being taken as a prize when carried on neutral ships.

A further limitation of the effectiveness of the economic war has, at the moment, been imposed as the result of an economic agreement with Denmark, resulting in the raising of the ban on Danish exports of foodstuffs to England, in order to secure thereby the import of cattle food into Denmark via England, which will guarantee Germany important Danish foodstuff deliveries in the future.

England’s main imports are being brought in under the convoy system which is now starting up. Our second wave of U-boats, which is now being marshalled, will therefore be used primarily against enemy convoys. The two U-boats which have up to now attacked convoys were in both cases successful in their attacks.

The results of the economic war to date, achieved by U-boat and surface vessels, are satisfactory from a military point of view, but the present form of economic warfare iscompletely inadequate for having a decisive effect on the course of the war. The stream of imports to England which has, as yet evaded confiscation and sinkings must, for the moment, be considered as quite sufficient for England’s economic war needs.

The reasons for this are:

1. The fact that the number of U-boats and Atlantic commerce raiders is still small at the moment.

2. The non-exploitation of all the possibilities presented by the special characteristics of the U-boat by virtue of its ability to dive, for instance the possibility of cancelling the enemy’s superiority at sea to a very great extent.

3. The, as yet, incomplete exploitation of the air force for economic warfare as well as for the destruction of the British import harbours.

4. The possibility the enemy has of guaranteeing a large part of his imports by way of employing the system of the “continued journey” on neutral ships via neutral receivers.

The observance by U-boats of the rules for determining the nature of ships as laid down in the laws governing prizes, (surfacing, stopping, examination) cannot be justified any more from a military point of view according to practical experience to date, especially in enemy coastal waters. The clear orders by the British Admiralty to British Merchant shipping to ram every German U-boat and to use their weapons, as well as the strong air cover and anti U-boat defences which U-boats have already encountered, show clearly the dangers to which U-boats are exposed in the vicinity of the enemy coast, when stopping and examining merchantmen. Only in rare cases is it possible to determine through the periscope whether a merchantman has the armament which justifies sinking. One must further consider the possibility of the mis-use of neutral flags and identification marks by British Q-boats (U-boat traps) and merchantmen during the further course of the-war. The prospect of success of our economic warfare will be considerably increased by strengthening our U-boat arm and our commerce raiders operating in the Atlantic and by simultaneously perfecting measures for hindering the “continued journey” of contraband via neutral states. Even then we still cannot attain a decisive form of economic warfare.

To sum up, it must be realized that the military demands for ruthless throttling of allongoing and outgoing maritime commerce cannot be achieved now or in the future, by the present form of ‘economic’ warfare against England.

III. Possibilities of intensifying economic warfare at sea.

a. Intensification of the present form of economic warfare.

The fact that enemy merchant ships have been armed on a big scale, as official British and French reports have stated, and that the British Admiralty has called upon all British merchant ships to ram all German U-boats, forces us as a first step towards intensification, to declare the raising of the ban on sinking enemy merchant ships of all kinds and in all places without warning. The U-boat’s chances of success will be considerably increased by the measure, since it lessens the dangers from enemy aircraft and submarine chasers to which the U-boat is exposed each time it surfaces. The reason for the order can be found, without any need for further arguments, in the publication of the British Admiralty directive, as well as in the reference to the fact that the arming of all enemy merchant ships had been concluded, which fact gives these ships a military character.

Neutral States are to be advised to forbid their nationals travelling on belligerent merchant ships in view of the fact that ships ill also be expected to be armed and intend to resist. Over and above this, efforts are to be made to get these neutral States which have- a coastline to forbid the entry of belligerent merchant ships into their ports. If these measures are carried out, the possibility of conflicts with neutrals resulting from the submarine war is considerably lessened and British shipping placed in a very difficult position.

Submarine warfare in this form would not give rise to objections by neutrals, and it could at the same time be expected to achieve a great part of the effects of unrestricted submarine warfare without the disadvantages of the latter. This measure has the particularly valuable advantage of: requiring no general declaration of blockade zones, which only cause a sensation, give rise to unrest and irritation among the neutrals and invite enemy counter-propaganda.

For the further intensification of the present form of economic warfare, the following additional orders are to be given:

1. Raising of the ban on the capture or sinking of Italian, Spanish, Russian and Japanese merchant ships. The measure is to be given a diplomatic justification and the governments in question re to be informed that in the interest of the German war effort we expect them to put a strict ban on the delivery of contraband to the enemy powers.

2. The systematic laying of non-contact ground mines in British harbours and rendezvous points on the east and west coats by submarines and surface.mine-layers. The extension of the use of mines to places overseas, by the use of auxiliary cruisers, this affecting the ports from which imports into Britain and France set out.

3. Concentrated attacks by the operational air force on the enemy’s main ports for the handling of imports, with the aim of destroying the port and quay installations and theunloading appliances as military targets.

4. Accelerated large scale measures for keeping a-watch on the neutral trade of the northern and neighboring states and also of Holland and Belgium in their export and import ports, for the purpose of stopping the re-dispatch of;contraband goods.

5. The strongest political and commercial pressure on the countries in question to induce them to stop trading in contraband with England.

Despite the increase in the likelihood of success which can safely be expected, the economic war will still not satisfy the basic military needs even after the above-mentioned measures have been carried out. The system of stopping and searching merchant ships in the way laid down in the laws governing prizes, which is so dangerous for submarine, till remains in effect. It is not possible to sink without warning:

(1) in the case of all neutral merchant ships, including those carrying contraband when travelling alone or in neutral convoys;

(2) in the case of all merchant ships which are not clearly -recognized as enemy ones, though it must be taken into account that the enemy may soon begin disguising his merchant ships as neutral vessels.

It is impossible to estimate the extent of this trade carried on by single ships still subject to being stopped. It is however possible that it still forms a considerable part of the total trade which would mean that it would be doubtful whether this economic warfare would lead to a decisive success. Experience must show how far it is possible to cripple British trade by the intensified measures for economic warfare as laid down.

b. Declaration of a state of blockade.

The sense of a blockade was laid down in international law in the London declaration of 2/26/1909. Its basic legal prerequisites are (a that it should be limited to enemy ports and coasts, (b) that its real effectiveness should be assured and (c) that it would be publicly declared. The meaning of “effectiveness” is to be construed in the light of the conditions of modern naval warfare, which demand that naval forces be spread out over a wide area, while largely ensuring the effectiveness of a blockade, even when the number of submarines and surface vessels available is small, by the use of the air force. A blockade of the British and French coasts is capable, if sufficient blockading forces are used of cutting off trade between Britain and France completely: Difficulties arise in the execution of the blockade from the fact that Britain is not effectively cut off from the neutral states of Holland, Belgium and Ireland; and affect both the effectiveness of the isolation of England from all trade, and the necessity for leaving trade routes open for the neutral states to destination overseas.

A blockade has the following advantages over the type of economic warfare applied to date:

1. Military:

The military demands are to a large extent fulfilled, and the safety of submarines increased. After the ban on sinking all enemy merchant ships without warning has been raised, which can be done independently of a blockade, the actual declaration of a blockade would, in practice, only have a new meaning in comparison with the previous position:

a. in the case of neutral shipping not travelling in convoy, and

b. in the case of merchant steamers not clearly recognized as enemy ones.

Actually, even under a state of blockade, it is not possible simply to sink these ships without warning, but the task of the submarines is nevertheless considerably simplified, since they no longer need conform to the routine of stopping and searching, as laid down in the laws governing prizes, since any ship breaking the blockade can be sunk, after the crew has taken to the boats, without it being necessary to investigate the nature of its cargo. The crew can be warned from a distance, thus considerably diminishing the danger of the submarine being shelled or rammed by the merchant ship.

The air force, being freed from the limitations of the prize laws, is also in a position to take an effective part in the conduct of the economic war, and to sink merchant ships breaking through the blockade, by the use of bombs, after having warned them by firing in front of them or into their bows with machine guns.

2. Commercial.

The blockade will cut off the enemy coasts from trade almost completely if a sufficient number of submarines, bombers and surface vessels is used. It has the very substantial advantage that not only neutral merchant ships bringing in imports, but also all neutral ships leaving.with exports can be intercepted by the blockading force.

3. From the point of view of international law.

A blockade is a legal state recognized by international law. When it is really effective, objections from neutrals are not likely and can in any case be rejected, attention being drawn at the same time to the legal state of blockade.

4. Political.

The harm done to the neutrals by the complete throttling of their trade with England, by the difficulties put in the way of their domestic economy and trade with the other neutral countries, and by losses in men and material is considerable.

However one need not expect that the declaration of a state of blockade based on international law will as a matter of course lead to an extension of the conflict by the entry of neutral states into the war against Germany. One must however reckon on America entering upon a policy of armed neutrality for the purpose of bringing convoys to England.

To sum up on the question of a declaration of a state of blockade, it is to be noted that:

A ruthless policy of attacking all merchant ships without warning, though required militarily, is not possible. Even when a blockade has been declared, submarines must surface to warn neutral merchant ships and those which are not clearly recognized as enemy ones.

To blockade the British and French coasts in a manner which fulfills the requirements of international law as to effectiveness, we need a greater number of submarines and aircraft than we at present have at our disposal. Until the submarine arm has been reinforced and a large scale air force built up, the complete isolation of the enemy coasts will remain an illusion, and the blockade will have no chance of asserting itself legally. The declaration of a state of blockade would therefore give the neutrals politically undesirable opportunities to protest, and would give a handle to enemy propaganda. After neutral merchant shipping has been frightened off for a short time, neutral trade with England and France will be resumed, as soon as the risk is seen to be small. The danger of a loss of prestige by the Reich is to be expected.

b. The “Siege of England”.

A “siege from the sea” is a new concept, unknown to existing international law. It can be considered an intensification of a blockade, and therefore represents the most intensified form of economic warfare. It brings into the picture (a) the air arm, whose position with regard to the laws of naval warfare has not yet been clarified and (b) the conditions of modern naval warfare the great effectiveness of anti-submarine measures and air patrols. The aim of this “siege” is to bring the available naval forcessurface vessels, submarines and aircraftinto action with the most ruthless intensity.

The “siege from the sea” is based on the realization that submarines and aircraft can no longer operate really effectively under the conditions of economic warfare laid down in the laws governing prizes, in the coastal waters patrolled by the enemy from the air especially when one takes into account the policy of arming merchant ships, and the British Admiralty directive to merchant shipping to ram all German submarines. It allows submarines-and aircraft to ink without warning every enemy or neutral ship approaching or leaving the coast of England. However efforts should be made, in conformity with the ethical codes of war, to warn the crews of neutral ships before sinking them and to allow them to take to the boats.

1. The consequence of a siege in the fields of politics and international law:

The-idea of a-siege presupposes a geographical relationship between the besieged territory and the besieging forces. It however helps the prosecution of the war to tie oneself down as little as possible to a delimitation of particular zones at sea. If the German government publicly declares a “state of siege” of the British Isles within a definite, geographically limited area, it will thereby not only reintroduce the prohibited zone of the Great War, but will reintroduce it in an even more intensified form, since not only submarines and surface vessels, but also aircraft, would have to use only armed force within that zone; The results of such a declaration, clearly defining the limits of the prohibited siege zone, would be to irritate the neutrals greatly and cause them to protest vigorously. Such a declaration, particularly as it is not essential, should therefore be avoided as-long as the besieging forces are not strong enough and as long as the neutrals continue not to take up a definite position, and especially as long as the United States continues not to come in unreservedly on the side of the Western powers.

On the other hand it seems necessary to point out to the neutral governments that the German government is making efforts to ensure the continuance of peaceful trade between the neutral states and to inform them of the ways and means of continuing their peaceful trade with other neutrals, unmolested.

Since the term “siege” has not yet received legal sanction, the neutral states will try, by pointing out the absolute impossibility of ensuring an effective siege (in the sense of investing a fortress, to make the public declaration of a state of siege appear a breach of international law. As against this, it can be pointed out that Chamberlain used the expression “a besieged fortress”, with reference to Germany itself, in his speech before the House of Commons at the end of 9/1939, and that the French press also spoke (at that time) of a besieging war against Germany. On 10/12/1939, the British Prime Minister further announced that. England’s full strength would be put into-the war, i.e. that it would prosecute the war with all the legal and illegal means at its disposal. On the public announcement of a siege, with the declaration of a-prohibited zone involving the sinking without warning of all merchant ships, one has to reckon with far-reaching political repercussions among the neutrals, in spite of the extremely favourable conditions for justifying it propagandistically. It is possible that America or other neutral states may rapidly enter the war on the side of the Western powers. There is no doubt that in 4/1917, it was the preceding introduction of total submarine warfare that was the direct cause of the entry into the war of the United States, but that this reason would not, by itself have led to war, if other important reasons, commercial and financial interests and an anti-German feeling among the public, to mention only a few, had not driven them towards war anyhow. It is probable that America is to-day again basically determined to support the Western powers if they are threatened by defeat, but that the time of America’s entry into the war will be decisively influenced by incisive measures of economic-warfare, such as the “siege of England”.

The public announcement of “state of siege” accompanied by the declaration of a prohibited zone, can therefore result in serious disadvantages in the fields of politics and of international law at the present moment, so that it seems right to exploit the term “siege” as propaganda, in the same loose way as the Western powers use it, but to avoid the formal legal announcement of a state of siege and of a prohibited zone.

Actually a strain on the Reich’s political position is unavoidable, even without thepublic announcement of a “state of siege”, since the practical effects of the intensified prosecution of the economic war, in the form of siege, the abandoning by the U-boats of economic warfare in accordance with the laws governing prizes, and the resulting breach of the Submarine Act of 1936 will in any case have a strong effect on neutrals.

However, by giving up the idea of announcing the concept “siege” publicly, we shall eliminate the possibility of the neutrals making protests based on international law and shall make it easier for the German Reich to reject all objections unambiguously.

2. Military consequences:

The aims of the “siege from the sea” fully fulfil the military demands for a completely ruthless prosecution of the economic war against England. It is however a military necessity that the public announcement of the intensest form of economic warfare i. e. that of a siege, should in no way cramp the decision of the directors of naval strategy, but should on the contrary leave them full freedom to take any military action demanded by the development of the situation.

The size of the forces at our disposal at the moment, especially the small number of submarines capable of Atlantic trips and of aircraft suitable for use against England, makes it completely impossible at present to invest the whole length of British and French coasts. Until about 150 submarines and a large number of aircraft suitable for the conduct of the war against England are ready in Spring 1941, the siege will be incomplete and will cover only a part of the total trade, which it will however be possible to attack with a good chance of success, owing to the removal of the regulations limiting measures to those laid down by the prize laws. It does not however, seem right from a military point of view, to make a public declaration of a state of siege, as long as the means available for carrying on the siege are still insufficient, so that the incompleteness of the declared siege inevitably becomes quickly apparent.

The directors of naval warfare must, whilst employing all available forces ruthlessly, try to adjust the strategic method to the potentialities of the forces on hand in each particular case. These forcessurface vessels, submarines, aircraft and mines are, as a fundamental principle, to be used in such a way that the economic war cuts off enemy imports and exports as effectively as is possible, and is prosecuted independently of all legal concepts of economic warfare, on the basis of the military operation.

The declaration of a prohibited zone for the sinking without warning of all merchant ships does not seem desirable, if the neutrals are clearly informed that Germany intends using every means at her disposal to prevent all trade with England and France and that in the zone of operations around England and France every merchant ship coming in or going out exposes itself fully to the risks of war.

After the ban on sinking all enemy merchant ships without warning has been raised, which can be done at any time, independently of the declaration of a state of siege, the prosecution of the economic war in an intensified form during a siege raises the ban on the final possibility which is that of sinking without warning all neutral merchant ships travelling alone, and all merchant ships which are not clearly recognized as enemy ones. Where exactly sinking without warning is to be applied in the siege-area and in what form it is to be carried out is a matter for the supreme strategic command, and is governed by the possibilities of employing their forces as seen by the directors of naval strategy.

No definite assurance can be given that as a matter of principle neutral merchant ships will be warned before sinking, so that the crews can be saved. If this is possible under the particular circumstances without endangering the submarine or aeroplane, one must continue to aim at it, especially in the early stages of the intensified form of economic warfare, in accordance with the demands of the blockade. One must however expect that submarines especially will not be able to give a preliminary warning to merchant ships, owing to the grave danger to themselves resulting therefrom.

Aircraft can give the warning by firing in front of or into the bows of the ship.

After a delay which is long enough to allow the crew to escape, the steamer becomes subject to sinking.

The prosecution of the intensified economic war is to be supported as effectively as is possible by air raids on the enemy’s main import and export ports, aimed at destroying the dock installations which are important for the war effort, and by ruthlessly laying mines right up to the enemy ports and coasts.

England’s and France’s measures of defense against the enforcement of a German military siege will probably include the following measures:

a. increased air patrols

b. perfection of anti-submarine devices

c. an increased use of mines to endanger the routes by which German commerce raiders set out

d. concentration of commerce into heavily guarded convoys

e. political and commercial pressure on all neutral states to support the commercial blockading of Germany

f. A ruthless propaganda activity.

One must also reckon on the American government hastening to build up the system of neutral convoys, thus entering upon a state of armed neutrality which will in practice primarily affect us.

3. Commercial consequences.

The enforcement of a siege aims at throttling the whole of England’s and France’s trade. The directors of naval strategy will therefore employ all the forces at its disposal to prevent all trade by the neutral states with England and France, without taking into consideration the type of cargo and without differentiating between export and import trade. We must expect England to use our declaration of a state of siege to throttle, in her turn, German exports in neutral ships as a reprisal just as she did in the Great War as a result of our declaration of a prohibited zone. The neutrals will accept this step by England with all the less objections if England points out to them that the Germans started the thing with their concept of a siege, which was a breach of international law.

Should a change in the American neutrality law take place in the next few weeks, in the direction of a reintroduction of the cash and carry clause for all goods shipped from America to the belligerent powers, the premises for the announcement by us of an intensified form of economic warfare would be all the better, since American interests would no longer be affected by the throttling of British imports.

IV. Political and economic measures in support of naval warfare.

For the prosecution of any intensified economic warfare all the relevant possibilities should be exploited and political an economic measures used in support. England’s refusal to accept the Führer’s constructive peace suggestions may possibly lead to a temporary anti-British and anti-French attitude amongst many neutrals; this must be utilized by Germany to attempt to mobilize neutral countries against Britain as far as possible by insisting on Great Britain’s sole responsibility for the continuation of the war and for the heavy economic pressure to which the neutrals are exposed. The aim of German economic policy must be to set up a continental European blockade directed against Britain. The economic system of neutral states must e adapted quickly, and-with far-reaching German help in organizing the change, to new trade connections with Germany and other neutrals and to a complete stoppage of trade with Great Britain.

A question to be examined is, whether favourable premises for the German conduct of a ruthless economic war in the form of a siege can be created in America by referring to forthcoming American legislation and to the results of the Panama conference.

The draft of the new neutrality law submitted to Congress intends to confer powers on the President to declare certain territories to be war zones, entry into which is forbidden for American ships and American nations. If and when this clause becomes effective it will be possible to refer to it and to suggest that it should apply to British ad French coastal waters.

Such a suggestion can be suggested with a reminder that in the Pan-Americanconference the American state claimed extensive sea-areas as their spheres of interest, wherein no warlike operations were allowed to take place. They should therefore recognize similar areas surrounding the belligerent countries as being the spheres of interest of the belligerents and they are not justified in protesting if those belligerents make the utmost se of the means at their disposal in those areas.

Should the political leaders consider the recognition of the neutral maritime zone demanded by the American states, such recognition can be made dependent on the American states undertaking on their part to forbid-their merchant ships entering the operational zone around Britain and France.

Should the political leaders decide on a gradual intensification of economic warfare, it will be possible to create favourable psychological premises for Germany’s action by agreeing in principle in Germany’s reply to the decision of the Panama conference not to treat food products as contraband, providing reciprocity is ensured. The British refusal to give similar assurances which can be expected with confidence, could be the basis for a more ruthless economic campaign against England, particularly in the form of a siege.

D. Conclusions.

1. The present form of economic warfare according to the law governing prizes does not correspond to the military demand for utmost ruthlessness.

A large part of the enemy’s mercantile trade, including all exports in neutral ships, is not covered.

The requirements of naval law that neutral merchantmen be stopped and searched can no longer be fulfilled, in view of the strength of aerial reconnaissance and U-boat countermeasures in the enemy’s westal waters. Economic warfare according to the law governing prizes has therefore to be limited and in the North sea and the Baltic must be left to surface craft only. In the Atlantic, U-boats in enemy westal waters will limit their activities to attacks without warning on convoys, troop transports, armed merchantmen and (once it has been approved) all enemy merchantmen, and will conduct economic warfare according to the laws governing prizes only in exceptional cases. The use of the operational air-force for economic warfare is not possible. Economic warfare is conducted within the framework of international law and the possibility of a controversy with neutral states is ruled out.

If the supreme command for political reasons should not be able at the moment to decide to prosecute the economic war in the most vigorous form possible by having recourse to a siege, it will be possible to increase the effectiveness of the policy o throttling enemy trade by a ruthless increase in the use of mines and by air attacks on enemy port installations. One cannot, however, expect a decisive result from the economic war in its present form.

2. For the future conduct of economic warfare the basic military requirements demand the utmost ruthlessness. The employment of the “siege by sea” as most intensified form of economic war meets this demand. Even without the public announcement of a state of siege after it has been clearly defined as a concepta declaration which would have drawbacks militarily and from the point of view of international lawand even without the declaration of a prohibited zone, it seems perfectly possible at the moment, as has been explained in this memorandum to take military measures to introduce the intensest form of economic warfare and to achieve what is at present the greatest possible effectiveness in the interruption of enemy trade, without the directors of naval strategy being bound down in all cases to special forms and areas.

The suggestions for the announcement of the intensification of economic warfare in the form of a siege, indicated in general terms, and the note to the neutrals are given in Appendix 3 and 4.

The decision as to what form the intensification of the war against merchant shipping is to take, and the timing of the transition to the most ruthless and therefore for this war final form of naval warfare, is of the most far reaching political importance. This decision can only be made by the Supreme Command, which will weigh up the military, political and economic requirements against one another. Economic situationGreat Britain

I. Import requirements in peace-time.

Percentage of total requirements imported: 75% Imported quantities 1937: 23.9 million tons Details of Imports: Many bulkfodder products and highly concentrated food products

Percentage of total requirements imported: 73% (of total value) Imported quantities: 35.2 million 1937 Details of Imports: Many bulk raw materials, few manufactured goods

Percentage of total requirements imported: 96% Imported quantities 1937: 11.2 million tons: Details of Imports: Mainly refined mineral oil.

Details of dependence on imports from abroad:

Food products: Fats, tea, coffee, cocoa, semi-tropical fruit: 90-100% Cereals: 80-90% Sugar: 70-80% Cheese, fruit: 60-70% Meat: 50-60%

Raw materials: Rubber, cotton, silk, jute, lime, bauxite, nickel, antimony. mercury: 100% Copper, manganese, chrome: 99-100% Pyrites, wolfram: 98-99% Flax, zinc: 96-97% Wood, mineral oil: 96% Tin, lead: 92-93% 71% Wool, skins and hides 71% Iron ore(ferro-contents)

Only requirements of coal and nitrogen are completely covered by Home production.

II. Import requirements in war-time.

The necessity of importing any goods can be very much reduced and can sink far below the peace-time requirements by the scaling down of civilian requirements and the changing over, from the import of bulk to that of concentrated products, reduction of reserve stocks, increasing home production and administrative measures. On the other hand importing of mineral oils must be stepped up. Estimates carried out by the Trade Investigation Institute [Institut fuer Konjunkturforschung] by order of the German Admiralty (O.K.M.) yield the following picture:

British import requirements in wartime (in million tons)

Agricultural produce: 1937: 23.9 1st year of war: 19.0 2nd year of war: 16.2 Industrial imports: 1937: 35.2 1st year of war: 24.8 2nd year of war: 18.9 Mineral oils: 1937: 11.2 1st year of war: 21.8 2nd year of war: 24.2 [total]: 1937: 70.3 1st year of war: 65.6 2nd year of war: 59.3

If reports are to be scaled down and exports limited, an emergency measure which Britain may take, as she did in the World War, imports can be further reduced to an extent dependent on the throttling of exports.

Total import requirements (in million tons)

Maintenance of industrial imports at half level: 1st year of war: 60.0 2nd year of war: 53.7 If exports are stopped altogether: 1st year of war: 56.5 2nd year of war: 50.2

One must therefore expect Britain to be able to scale down imports in case of need, probably up to 30% of her peace-time standards.

III. Tonnage requirements.

1. Dry goods.

The British mercantile fleet, excluding oil-tankers, amounted to 12.8 million grossregistered tons in the middle of 1939; which was adequate for peace-time import requirements.

In war-time a number of efficiency-impairing factors will have to be taken into account, namely

a. Immobilization of tonnage through congestion in harbours.

b. Longer sea routes.

c. Longer duration of voyages.

d. Increased marine accident rate through convoy procedure, etc.

These are balanced by a number of efficiency-increasing factor such as

a. Centralized control.

b. Concentration of tonnage on the shortest sea-routes.

c. Full utilization of the carrying capacity of ships.

d. Elimination of incidents, etc.

Taking all factors into account, the following tonnage will be required for the war-time imports as laid down in Part II above:

Required tonnage in million gross registered tons

If exports are maintained up to: 100%: 1st year of war: 7.5 2nd year of war: 5.9; 50%: 1st year of war: 6.6 2nd year of war 5.1; 0: 1st year of war: 6.0 2nd year of war: 4.5

A reserve of British tonnage, which fluctuates between 5.3 and 8.3 million gross registered tons according to estimated war-time import requirements, is therefore available for other needs, i.e.

a. requisition for military purposes,

b. total losses through marine risk (excluding war losses)

c. assistance of the allies (France)

2. Mineral oils.

The cargo capacity of the British tanker fleet amounted to 2.9 million gross registered tons in the middle of 1939 almost exceeded peace-time requirements by twice. The greatly increased requirements of mineral-oil for war purposes will demand

approximately 2.6 million gross registered tons during the first year of war,approximately 2.9 million gross registered tons during the first year of war

There will therefore not be a reserve of British oil-tanker tonnage worth mentioning (but see under IV,1)

IV. Tonnage reserves.

1. Existing reserves:

The principal reserves for Great Britain from amongst the merchant navies of neutral countries is formed by the oil-tanker fleet of the USA. amounting to 2.8 million gross registered tons and the merchant navies of the Nordic States and Greece with a total of 12.3 million gross registered tons, of which 2.1 million gross registered tons are Norwegian oil-tankers. It is difficult at present to forecast which proportion of that reserve Britain will be able to use in case of need.

Tonnage from the Dominions and Colonies (3.1 million gross registered tons) will presumably only be available to the U.K. to a small degree, since it can not be spared from local and inter-Empire traffic.

2. Output reserves.

The shipbuilding capacity of Britain and the U.S. is expected to reach 6 million gross registered tons per annum. However, this output will only be reached in the third year of war. Shipbuilding in Britain alone may amount to 1.5 million gross registered tons in the first year of war and to 2 million gross registered tons in the second year of war, though this output may be reduced through aerial warfare.

V. Dependance on Nordic and Baltic States.

Great Britain imported the following percentages of her total imports from the Nordic and Baltic States in 1937:

Agricultural produce: Bacon: 70% Butter: 42% Eggs: 70%

Wood, including imports from Russia: Timber: 65% Wood pulp: 90% Paper, cardboard: 55%

Iron ores: 22%

The transfer of such imports for other supplier countries is for Britain simply a problem of shipping space and price. The elimination of Nordic and Baltic supplier countries will not at present create a bottleneck in British war economy.

VI. North American Continent as a purveyor.

North America is able to cover more than 90% of Britain’s wartime import requirements, provided the USA. put their resources fully at Great Britain’s disposal, if necessary in some cases by limiting their own consumption.

1. Agricultural products:

Provided there are no bad harvests, requirements can be fulfilled by North America, where the market at present shows a strong tendency towards overproduction and reserves of fodder make a quick increase of cattle stocks possible. Requirements can be supplied by Canada.

3. Iron and steel.

Since the American iron and steel industries were only utilized up to 60% in 8/1939, the U.S. would be able to cover Britain’s total iron and steel requirements, provided full use was made of their industrial capacity and that supplies to other countries were held up where necessary.

4. Non-ferrous metals:

Requirements of copper, nickel, zinc, lead and titanic iron can be met in full.

5. Textiles:

Excluding the manufacture of high-class fabrics and yarns requiring Egyptian cotton, British cotton requirements could be supplied by the US, all the more since a 6 months’ reserve of world supplies, i.e. 12 million bales, are held there.

6. Oil.

In view of the gigantic oil reserves and the possibilities of a quick increase in production, British requirements can be met by the USwithout imposing a reduction of their own consumption.

North America cannot supply the following goods:

Wood, flax, hemp, jute: approx. 0.8 million tons Manganese: approx. 0.3 million tons Rubber: approx. 0.2 million tons Lime: approx. 0.2 million tons Tin: approx. 0.1 million tons Bauxite: approx. 0.3 million tons Total: approx. 1.9 million tons

Mercury, chromium ore, antimony- and wolfram are either not available in North America or in sufficient quantities. These metals in view of the small quantities which are required, have little bearing on the tonnage position, similar to certain raw materials of a mineral or earth nature, furs and hides and chemical products which can only be partly supplied by the US.

Such far reaching deliveries to England by North America would considerably ease the protection of her trade by the concentration of sea communications in the Atlantic. At the same time, requirements of English tonnage would be greatly reduced. The military value and the position of international law in regard to warning areas and prohibited zones.

a. Warning areas come into consideration only where mines are being used against military object. It makes no difference whether the use of mine is a defensive one in our own coastal waters, or whether they are being used in the battle against military objects in any other parts of the high seas. The use of mines in this manner is permissible under international law.

Mines that are laid endanger very naturally both enemy and neutral merchant shipping. From this the question arises as to whether merchant shipping must be warned. The warning that mines have been laid is not an unconditional duty in international law; it is called for, where it is to be used as a means of determining merchant shipping; it is out of the question where it would lessen the moment of surprise against military object.

The declaration of warning areas is therefore a question of military consideration. The declaration of a warning area does not allow the right to make use of any further mediums of naval warfare, and therefore not of U-boats either.

b. Prohibited zones only come into consideration where, for military reasons, the navigation of particular maritime areas by warships and by all merchant ships must be hindered by the unlimited use of weapons.

Prohibited zones for defensive purpose in ones own coastal waters are acknowledged in international law. As prohibited zones for the purpose of attack in the enemy’s coastal waters has not yet been found general, though already considerable acknowledgment in international law, it is judicious to confine them for the time being to maritime areas where their military purpose can be clearly recognized and can not be denied (naval ports, ports of military importance, straits, narrow seas). The damage to merchantshipping resulting from this is an unavoidable secondary effect, which does not offer any considerable opportunity to the enemy’s propaganda. Prohibited zones for the actual purpose of combatting merchant shipping is not permissible under inter’ national law; its declaration gives the enemy a first class weapon for their propaganda.

Contrary to the warning areas, there is the duty under international law to make a declaration in the case of prohibited zone.

According to the development of the’ military situation it may be possible to carry out extension of the prohibited zones gradually for military reasons, so that merchant shipping can be progressively crowded into narrow and narrower shipping lanes that are easy to control. The success of such measures can only be expected, if the effectiveness of the prohibited zones can be guaranteed, and if merchant shipping is, as a result, deterred from navigating the prohibited zone.

Prohibited zones for the actual purpose of combatting merchant shipping, no matter what they are called or how it is going to be attempted to justify them under international law, can only then be considered, when political considerations for neutrals can be dropped. Draft for a proclamation by the-Führer

I have received an answer of refusal to my proposals for a just and secure peace, desired by all nations.

The enemy’s wish forces us to continue a war, the absurdity of which must be clear to any sensible politician who is aware of this responsibilities and who is concerned for the welfare of his people. The sanguinary guilt for this crime rests before the world and in history with the warmongers who are in power in Britain and in France at the present time.

Britain is our mortal enemy. Her aim is the destruction of the German Reich and the German people. Her method is not one of honest-war, but the one of dastardly and brutal starvation, nay, the annihilation of the weak and defenceless not only in Germany but throughout the whole of Europe. History proves it.

The head of the British Government remained true to this historical attitude, when, on 9/26/1939, he declared to the House of Commons that the blockade at sea against Germany that had now been declared by Britain was in no way different from a siege on land, and that never yet had it been customary to allow the besieged free rations.

We Germans will neither allow ourselves to be starved, nor shall we capitulate. But by paying back in equal currency we shall let Britain herself feel from now on, what it feels like to be besieged, 90 as to finally rid the world of the intolerable and undeserved British despotism and bondage.

Just as the head of the British government announced in his speech of the 12.10.1939 that he will employ Britain’s active strength in this war, i.e. to fight with all legal and, as is already happening, with illegal methods also, so shall we also employ our weapons during the war which has been forced on us in the defence of our existence and our rights, with the utmost ruthlessness though under respect for military ethics.

The German government will take all measures to cut Britain and France off entirely from all supplies, such as is the case in every siege according to the words of the British Prime Minister.

From now on enemy ships met with in the operational zone around Britain and France without consideration for its flag exposes itself fully to the dangers of the war. The German government will keep up these military measures until such a time, as the certain guarantee exists, that Britain is prepared for free and orderly relations with all the peoples of Europe.

APPENDIX 4

Draft for a note to the neutrals

In their desire to conduct the war which has been forced upon the German people by the British declaration of war in such a manner as to limit it to the use of military forces on both sides, and so as to spare neutral commerce as much as possible, the German government returned fully to the principles of the London treaty on naval warfare of 1909 in the new German law governing prizes, which was announced on 9/3/1939, but revoking the additional measures that had become necessary during the Great War as a reprisal against the British measures at that time. In accordance with this, in the regulations concerning contraband only those articles and goods destined for enemy territory or for the enemy forces, which actually serve the arming of the army, navy or air force, were announced to be absolute contraband. For the time being the German government had refrained from compiling a list of conditional contraband altogether, and had instructed its naval forces not to take goods of this nature as a prize. However, after the British government had published a list of unconditional contraband on 9/4/1939, which went far beyond the regulations of the new German law governing prizes, and after the British government had, at the same time, published a list of conditional contraband and had included in this list foodstuffs and other vital goods, the German government felt obliged to adapt the German regulations regarding unconditional and conditional contraband to the British procedure.

In the Führer’s peace offer, proposals for further efforts to make war more human were made on the 12.1., however, the British Government, through the medium of the British Prime Minister, not only turned down all efforts for peace,but it declared to the world that it intended, together with her ally France, to carry the fight to destroy Germany through to the utmost limits of British strength. In this present war Britain once againregards this starvation blockade as its strength. Thus the British Prime Minister expressly stated in the House of Commons on 9/27/1939, that Britain intended to carry out the blockade from a distance against Germany and felt herself entitled in doing so, contrary to the laws concerning blockades, and in no way different from a siege on land. Referring to this, a British prize court during the Great War expressly stated that it was not only directed against children, women and old men, but also against the neutrals situated in the besieged area.

In his answer to Britain on the … the Führer told the world, that after his constructive proposals for peace and his proposals for making war more human had been turned down,.he was now also determined for his part to carry out the total cutting off of Britain and France from all overseas trade, with all the means at the disposal of the German armed forces, as a reprisal against British blockade methods.

In its note of the …, the German government has already requested the neutral governments to point out to the merchant ships sailing under their flags, that in their own interest, and so as to avoid being mistaken for an enemy warship or an enemy naval auxiliary, they are not to behave in any suspicious manner, such as altering course or sending wireless messages on sighting German naval forces, zigzagging, steaming blacked out, not following instructions, accepting an enemy escort, etc. As a result of the situation crested by-Britain’s behaviour, the German government is now obliged to address the urgent request to all neutral states, that they should ask the merchant ships under their flags to desist from sailing in waters around Britain and France in every case, and to follow the example set by the USA and warn all their subjects not to use ships of the nations at war. The German government finds itself forced to take-these measures, because of the arming of enemy merchant ships-and the instructions issued by the British Admiralty to all enemy vessels to attack all German U-boats by ramming, of the commencement of escorting merchant ships by warships, of the supervision of traffic by warplanes as well as the setting up U-boat traps, these waters have perforce become an operational area where naval actions must be reckoned with at all times, and where, as a result, neutral shipping also is faced by the utmost danger.

The German government is not in a position to accept any responsibility whatsoever for accidents that neutral ships or persons might meet with in this operational area.

The German government is endeavouring as much as possible to guarantee the maintenance of peaceful commerce amongst the neutral countries. She is therefore willing to inform neutral governments, whose countries are situated in the proximity of these waters that have now become an operational area, as to how and in what manner the continuation of their peaceful commerce can be safeguarded.

Document UK-66

“Document UK-66: Report Of British War Crimes Section Of Allied Force Headquarters On; German Reprisals For Partisan Activities In Italy [translation]”, pp. 572-575.

COPY.

The British War Crimes Section of the Allied Force Headquarters has investigated fully a number of cases of German reprisals for partisan activity in Italy, committed between 4-11/1944. In addition it has been established that information received from many sources on a further large number of atrocities committed between 3/1944-4/1945, is substantially correct.

A study of all these cases reveals that-there is a striking similarity in the facts. The incident invariably opens the killing or wounding of a German soldier or soldiers by partisans; reprisal activity is then initiated either by the troops immediately on the spot or in more serious cases, by the arrival of definite units and formations specially detailed for the purpose. There is no taking of hostages in the normal sense of the word, but a number of people are selected haphazardly from the local population and are killed by shooting or hanging, whilst whole villages or certain farms or houses are destroyed by fire. In a number 1 of cases an announcement is then made to the population that the action taken was a reprisal for the death of a German soldier and will be repeated should further attacks on Germans take place.

A typical example is the Civitella atrocity, one of those cases which has been completely investigated. Partisan Bands had been operating in the area, attacking lone German lorries and motor cycles. On 6/18/1944, two German soldiers were killed and a third wounded in a fight with Partisans in the village of Civitella. Fearing reprisals, the inhabitants evacuated the village but when the Germans discovered this, punitive action was postponed. On 6/29/1944, when the local inhabitants were returning and were feeling secure once more, the Germans carried out a well organized reprisal, combing the neighbourhood. Innocent inhabitant were often shot on sight. During that day 212 men, women and children in the immediate district were killed. Some of the dead women were found completely naked. In the course of investigation, a nominal roll of the dead has been compiled, and is complete with the exception of a few names where bodies could not be identified. Ages of the dead ranged from 1-84 years. Approximately 100 houses were destroyed by fire; some of the victims were burned alive in their homes.

On 12/16/1942, Keitel issued an order relating to the combatting of Partisans. This order was captured in Crete. (A copy, with English translation, is annexed hereto and marked A).

On 6/17-7/1/1944, Kesselring issued orders on this subject. (Copies, with English translations, are annexed hereto and marked ‘B’ and ‘C’). Document ‘B’ was found at Kesselring’s H.Q., after the surrender of the German Forces, whilst Document ‘C’ was fund amongst the records of the Ortskommandatur, Castiglione dei Popli, Nr. Bologna. Other evidence of the issue of this second order to German formations has been found.

A comparison of Documents ‘A’, ‘B’, and ‘C’ makes it clear that Kesselring’s orders werein accordance with a policy laid down by the Supreme Command. Documents are held proving that this general policy was dictated to lower commands in the German Army in Italy.

Evidence has been found to show that a large number of the atrocities in Italy was committed by the Hermann Göring Parachute Panzer Division. Notable offenders also were 1 Parachute Division, 16 SS Panzer Grenadier Division and 114 Light Division.

The orders of the German Command were made known to the local population in a series of notices which were exhibited in towns and villages throughout German-occupied Italy and were published in newspapers. (A specimen copy of a typical Notice to the inhabitants of Covolo is annexed hereto and marked ‘D’.)

In the cases on which reliable information is held, it is considered that a conservative estimate of the number of persons who met their deaths at the hands of the German soldiery, is more than 7,500 men, women and children ranging in years from infancy to extreme old age. In the Ardeatine Caves case in Rome, alone, 335 men were shot. Many other reports have not yet been substantiated, but it is certain that the total of innocent Italian civilians who were killed in such reprisals is very much greater than the number given above. Sources of information on which this report is based

1. 127 German official documents collected by A.F.H.Q.

2. Official A.F.H.Q. reports resulting from the investigation of the following atrocity cases:

Place: Ardeatine Caves, Rome Date: 3/24/1944. Guardistallo: 6/29/1944. Fucecchio Marshes: 7/6-8/23/1944. Rifreda Castello: 8/5/1944. Commune of Cavriglia: 7/4/1944, 7/8/1944 and 7/11/1944. Bucine: 7/7-9/1944. Civitella: 6/29/1944. Badicroce: 6/30-7/18/1944. Palazzo Del Pero: 6/24/1944. San Pola: 7/14/1944. Castiglion Fibocchi: 7/11/1944 S. Giustino Valdarno: 7/6/1944. Quota: 9th to 7/11/1944. Partina Moscaio: 4/13/1944. Montemignaio: 20th to 6/29/1944. Stia-Vallucciole Valley: 4/13-18/1944. Sarsina: 9/28/1944. Verruchio: 9/28/1944. Villa Del Albero, Ravenna: 11/27/1944. Padulivo: 7/10-11/1944. Gobbio: 6/20-23/1944.

‘A’

COPY TRANSLATION

Enclosure to 3rd Copy. Br. B. Nr. 71/42 g. Kdos. (Top Secret) v. (of) 1/31/1943. Chief Judge and Legal Adviser of High Command SOUTH (b. O.B.S.) H.Q. 12/16/1942.

Copy of Copy.

The Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces Nr. 004870/42 Top Secret, Armed Forces Operations Staff/Chief Operation Office (g. Kdos. WFSt./Op (N))

Subject: Combattings of Partisans. Top Secret

Reports have been submitted to the Führer, that individual members of the armed forces participating in the fighting against partisans, have subsequently had to account for their actions in combat.

The Führer has therefore ordered:

1. The enemy employs in partisan warfare communist-trained fanatics who do not hesitate to commit any atrocity. It is more than ever a question of life and death. This fight has nothing to do with soldierly gallantry or principles of the Geneva Convention.

If the fight against the partisans in the East as well as in the Balkans, is not waged with the most brutal means, we will shortly reach the point when the available forces are insufficient to control this area.

It is therefore not only justified, but is the duty of the troops to use all means without restrictioneven against women and childrenas long as it ensures success.

Any consideration for partisans is a crime against the German people and the soldier at the front who will have to bear the consequences of partisan plots, and who can see no reason whatever for showing the partisans and their followers any leniency.

The principles must also govern the application of the “Directives for combatting partisans in the East”

2. No German employed against partisans will be held accountable for his act in the fighting against them or their followers, either by disciplinary action or by Court Martial.

All Commanders of troops employed in fighting partisans are responsible that: The contents of this order are strongly impressed on all officers of subordinate units. Their legal advisers are informed of this order immediately No judgments are confirmed, which oppose this order.

Signed: KEITEL.

For the correctness of the copy of a copy

Certified Copy Signed Captain.

Oberkriegsgerichtsrat d. Lw.

COPY.

6/17/1944. 8 Originals. 8th Original.

MOST SECRET.

1. GHQ Staff, 10th Army, 2. GHQ Staff, 14th Army, 3. Army Group, V ZANGEN, 4. General Plenipotentiary German Armed Forces in ITALY. 5. HQ LUFTFLOTTE 2., 6. German Naval High Command, ITALY 7. Supreme Head of SS and Police, ITALY 8. General i/cTPT ITALY, 9. Plenipotentiary of the Greater German Reich with the Italian Government, Ambassador RAHN. 10. Staff R. u. K.

Carbon Copies to:

GOC in C SOUTH-WEST/Chief Q Branch GOC in C SOUTH-WEST/H.Q. Staff. GOC in C SOUTH-WEST/H.Q. 111 GOC in C SOUTH-WEST Chief Liaison Off (O.T. (2 copies)). GOC in C SOUTH-WEST OC Tech Tps. GOC in C SOUTH-WEST Gen i/c Maint of Rlys in ITALY.

Ref: TPM GOC in C SOUTH-WEST Ia No.4968/44 MOST SECRET dated 5/10/1944.

Concerning: New Measures in connection with operations against Partisans.

1. The partisan situation in the Italian theatre, particularly in Central Italy, has recently deteriorated to such an extent, that, it constitutes a serious danger to the fighting troops and their supply lines as well as to the war industry and economic potential.

The fight against the partisans must be carried on with all means at our disposal and with the utmost severity. I will protect any commander who exceeds our usual restraint in the choice of severity of the methods he adopts against partisans. In his connection the old principle holds good, that a mistake in the choice of methods in executing one’s orders, is better than failure or neglect to act. Only the most prompt and severe handling is good enough as punitive and deterrent measures to nip in the bud otheroutrages on a greater scale. All civilians implicated in anti-partisan operations who are apprehended in the course of reprisals, are to be brought up to the Assembly Camps which are being erected for this purpose by the Quartermaster General C in C South-West for ultimate despatch to the Reich as workers.

2. The combat against Partisans consists of passive and active operations with centre of gravity on the latter. The passive combat consists of protection of important buildings of historic or artistic value, railways, and roads, as well as essential installations such as power stations, factories, etc. Even these passive operations must be conducted within the local boundaries for example, Recce Troops will constantly guard the foreground of an installation to be protected.

Active operations will be conducted especially in Partisan overrun districts where it is-vital to maintain the life-line of the Armed Forces. These Partisans will have to be attacked and wiped out. Propaganda amongst Partisans (as well as use of agents) is of utmost importance.

3. The responsibility for the entire operations against Partisans in the Italian theatre and the fundamental instructions for same continue to be valid with the following amendments:

GHQ 10 and 14 Armies are responsible for all operations against Partisans within their Army Sectors and Army Group V Zangen within the coastal belt to a depth of 30 kms. The tasks entrusted to the GOC in C Operational Zone Adriatic Coast in connection with coastal defense (in accordance with Führer Instruction No. 40) are not affected by this ruling. In the remainder of the Italian Theatre the Supreme Head of the SS and Police conducts the operations against Partisans on his responsibility, in accordance with my instructions. Details in connection with delineation of the 30 km wide strip along the coastal zones are to be settled direct between the Supreme Head of the SS and Police and Army Group V Zangen. The boundary between 14th Army, 10th Army and Army Group V Zangen Quercianella (North of Rosignano)Certaldo-Figline-Sansepolora from there along road 73 to Fano (Road incl. to 10th Army)

4. Armed Forces for Operations against Partisans:

Here one has to differentiate between:

(a) Military units (Police forces, Govt. Troops Bohemia and Moravia etc.) who are exclusively employed for active and passive operations against Partisans. These are subordinated to the Supreme Head of the SS and Police Italy.

(b) Task Forces and guard detachments: For this purpose Task forces are to be formed, armed and trained by withdrawn formations, staffs and units and these should be placed upon demand without any reservations, at the disposal of the local staff HQ, local Headquarters, combat commander, SS unit. Outside the Army sectors and the 30 km. wide coastal strip upon the request of the Supreme Head of the SS and Police, they are to be utilized to the fullest extent for operations against Partisans in so far as the position and their other tasks permit.

The local command of operations, within the jurisdiction of the Supreme Head of the SS and Police, where units of the Wehrmacht are utilized as well, depends upon the proportionate strength of the Wehrmacht and Police forces employed. The responsibility for the general conduct itself rests with the Supreme Head of the SS and Police Italy.

(c) Each local Commandant is responsible for the safeguarding of his locality and immediate surroundings and this applies as well to operations against Partisans. The military local HQ areas are to be subdivided into security sectors, to be placed under the order of the leader of the Armed Forces, SS or Police, whichever is the most suitable for the task. He is fully responsible for the security within his sector. All shock troops, task forces etc. are at his disposal upon request from the local Heads. Rapid action guarantees surprise and success. Such security Commandants are especially to be appointed along the main reinforcement routes within the Army Sectors and the 30 km. wide coastal strip by the Armies or Army Group V Zangen with definite tasks allotted to them. Within the rest of the area, the security commanders are to be allocated by the Supreme Head of the SS and Police in collaboration with Army Group V Zangen and the Plenipotentiary General. They will take their orders in this district from the Supreme Head of the SS and Police, notwithstanding their belonging to part of the Armed Forces.

(d) Operations against Paratroopers will be undertaken in addition to operations against Partisans.

5. The protection of the following lines of communication is of primary importance:

(a) Railway Sections (South of the PO) (1) Alessandria-Genoa-La Spezia-Leghorn-Cecina (2) Cremona-Fornova-Borga Val Di Taro-La Spezia (3) Casalmaggiore-Parma-Fornova (4) Ostiglia-Bologna-Pistoia (5) Ferrara-Bologna-Prato-Florence (6) Florence-Empoli-Siena-Chiusi (7) Florence-Arezzo-Terontola-Chiusi (8) Torontola-Perugia-Foligno (9) Fano-Fermignano-Fabriano (10) Ancona-Fabriano-Foligno (11) Aquata Scrivia-Tortona-Piacenza-Parma-Modena-Bologna (12) Viareggio-Lucca-Pistoia-Prato-Florence Rimini-Ancona-Civitanova (13) Pisa-Empoli-Florence

(b) Roads (1) Tortona-Genoa (35) (2) Piacenza-Genoa (45) (3) Parma-Sarzana (62) (4) Reggio-Sarzana (63) (5) Fivizzano-Castelnuovo-Bagni Di Lucca (6) Modena-Lucca (12)(7) Bologna-Pistoia-Florence (64, 66). (8) Bologna-Florence (65) (9) Forli-Florence (67) (10) Forli-Meldola-Bagno-Sanseroloro-Umbertide-Perugia (11) Cesena-Bibbiena-Arezzo (71) (12) Fano-Urbino-Arezzo (73) (13) Fano-Foligno (3) (14) Ancona-Fabriano-Fossato (76) (15) Ancona-Loreto-Macerato-Foligno (16, 77) ( 16 ) Ponnedera-Volterra-Saline-Massa-Maritimia-Follonica (17)-Empoli-Poggibonsi-Siena-Padicofani (2) (18) Florence-Poggibonsi-Cecina (2, 68). (19 ) Florence-Impruneta-Radda-Castelnuovo-Sinalunga (20) Florence-Arezzo-Perugia (69, 75) (21) Arezzo-Siena-Monte Piscaldi (73) (22) Florence-Bibiena (70) (23) Forli-Meldola-Bagno-Sansepoloro-Umbertide-Perugia (24) Rimini-Pesaro-Ancona-Civitanova.

Roads of No. 2 Priority Importance. (1) Castelnuovo-Pievo Polago (2) Poretta-Sambuca-Pistoia (3) Sassabol-Castiglione-Prato (4) Imola-irenzuola-S. Piero. (5) Faenza-Borgo S. Lorenzo-Florence. (6) Santarcangello-Sansepoloro. (7) Persaro-Urbino.

The relative needs of the various installations and buildings of artistic and cultural value to be guarded along the railway lines is to be agreed upon on the one hand by the Armies, Army Group V Zangen, the Supreme Head of the SS and Police and on the other hand by the General i/c Transportation, in direct consultations. The safeguarding of the buildings of artistic and cultural value along the roads within the Army Sectors and the coastal strip are the responsibility of the Armies or Army Group V Zangen, outside these limits the Supreme Head of the SS and Police Italy assumes responsibility. In this connection he is to be in close contact with the G.O.C. in C. South West/General i/c Pioneers.

6. So far as security of essential installations is concerned (Power Stations, Pumping Stations, Industrial undertakings etc.) G.O.C. Tech. Troops and the Staffs R.u.K. is to have liaison directly with the Supreme Head of the SS and Police Italy or the Armies or Army Group V Zangen.

7. To further security of the Appenines the Armies are to post, commencing forthwith,-reinforced units, Field units, road blocks, etc. in accordance with operational instructions “Alarich”. These are to be located along the main passes and principal lines of reinforcement.

8. The Supreme Head of the SS and Police Italy is requested to submit by 25th June to G.O.C. in C South-West, a map (scale 1:500000) with markings showing location of his security sectors, security troops, local security sectors, Local Commandants (Operations against Partisans) etc.

Signed: Kesselring G.O.C. in C. SOUTH-WEST Ia T. No. 0402/44 MOST SECRET

(Signed) [?] Oberstleutnant.

‘C’ COPY KR WAAJ/C 00104/06 1/7 1210

To Leitkommandantur, Bologna.

SUBJECT: Combatting of Partisans.

SOURCE: Telepring Ia Nr. 12099/44 SECRET (After receipt to be treated as Top Secret) from 6/20/1944.

In my appeal to the Italians I announced that severe measures are to be taken against the Partisans. This announcement must not represent an empty threat. It is the duty of all troops and police in my command to adopt the severest measures. Every act of violence committed by partisans must be punished immediately. Reports submitted-must also give details of counter measures taken. Wherever there is evidence of considerable numbers of partisans groups, a proportion of the male population of the area will be arrested and in the event of an act of violence being committed, these men will be shot. The population must be informed of this. Should troops etc. be fired at from any village, the village will be burnt down. Perpetrators or the ring leaders will be hanged in public. Nearby villages to be held responsible for any sabotage to cables and damage inflicted to tyres. The most effective counter measure is to recruit local patrols. Members of the Fascist party will not be included in any of the reprisals. Suspects will be handed over to the prefects and a report sent to me. Every soldier will protect himself outside villages by carrying a fire-arm. District Commanders will decide in which towns it will also be necessary to carry fire arms. Every type of plunder is forbidden and will be punished severely. All counter measures must be hard but just. The dignity of the German soldier demands it.

KESSELRING Bologna, 7/14/1944.

Platzkommandantur 11/1012 Abt. Ia Prov. 8/44 g. Kdos. to all Ortskommandanturen.

Above mentioned copy is sent for acknowledgement. Platzkommandant, Tschurtschenthaler.

“D” TRANSLATION.

AREA HEADQUARTERS COVOLO.

The Commander of the district of Covolo announces the following:

For every member of the German Armed Forces, whether military or civilian, who is wounded, Fifty men, taken from the place where the deed was committed, will be shot.

For every soldier or civilian killed, One Hundred men also taken from the locality of the crime, will be shot.

In the event of more than one soldier or civilian being killed or wounded, All the Men of the District Will Be Shot, the Houses Set On Fire, the Women Interned and the Cattle Confiscated, Immediately.

THE COMMANDER Cap DENDA.

Covolo. 7/11/1944.