Translation of document C-64

MEETING OF NAVAL STAFF WITH FUEHRER ON 12.12.39
1200 (KEITEL, JODL, PUTTKAMMER)

Norwegian question.

1. C. in C. Navy has received Quisling and Hajelin. Quisling creates the
impression of being reliable and states that:-

As a result of the Russo-Finnish conflict, anti-German feeling in Norway
is even stronger than hitherto. England’s influence is very great —
especially through Storthing — President Hambro (Jew, a friend of
Hore-Belisha), all-powerful in Norway just now. Quisling is convinced
that there is an agreement between England and Norway for the possible
occupation of Norway. In which case Sweden would also stand against
Germany. Danger of Norway’s occupation by England is very great —
possibly very shortly. From 11/1/40 onwards the Norwegian Parliament and
therefore the Norwegian Government is unconstitutional as Parliament in
defiance of the constitution, prolonged its term by a year. This would
give an opportunity for a political reshuffle. Quisling has good
connections with officers of the Norwegian Army and has supporters in
important positions (for example, Railways). In such an event Quisling
is ready to take over the Government and to call upon Germany for help.
He is also ready to discuss preparations of a military character with
the German Armed Forces.

C. in C. Navy points out that with such offers one never knows how far
the people concerned are wishing to further the ends of their own party
or how much they have German interests at heart. Therefore caution is
indicated — Norway must be prevented at all costs from falling into
England’s hands. That might have a decisive effect on the war; for
Sweden would be completely under England’s influence and it would bring
the war into the Baltic, thus preventing completely the activities of
the German Navy in the ocean and the North Sea. The Fuehrer, too, said
that a British occupation of Norway would be unbearable. C. in C. Navy
pointed out that occupation by Germany of positions on the coast of
Norway would naturally produce strong British counter-measures to stop
the export of ore from Narvik, and that this would bring about surface
warfare off the Norwegian coast, to which the German Navy was not equal
for any length of time. This was one weak spot of the occupation.

The Fuehrer thought of speaking to Quisling personally so that he might
form an impression of him. He wanted to see Rosenberg once more
beforehand, as the latter has known Quisling for a long while. C. in C.
Navy suggests that if the Fuehrer forms a
favorable impression, the OKW should obtain permission to make plans
with Quisling for the preparation and carrying out of the occupation —

a. By peaceful means, that is, German forces summoned by Norway, or

b. To agree to do so by force (Fuehrer agrees) [ink note]

2. C. in C. Navy advocates that a very clear policy in the Russo-Finnish
conflict be maintained. No help to Finland by the supply of arms (which
would mean passing through unreliable Sweden).

The C. in C. Armed forces states that the Swedish Foreign Office has
been informed that arms would only be sent to Sweden, on guarantee in
writing by the government that they were only for the use of the Swedish
Armed Forces.

The C. in C. Navy on the other hand is in favor of concessions to
Russia, for example, the supply of oil to U-boats, as Russia would also
offer us practical help [Vorteile], for example, the holding of foreign
steamers in Murmansk until three days after the “Bremen” has sailed.

The Fuehrer has agreed to both points.

                                                                  RAEDER