Partial translation of document 3562-PS

                         TOP SECRET

        Berlin, W. 8, Behrenstrasse 63, 1 June 1939.

THE CHIEF PLENIPOTENTIARY
      FOR THE ECONOMY.

GBW 8/2669/39 g.Rs.

Replies to be addressed to Leadership Staff GBW
attention of Ministerial Director Sarnow or his
deputy in the office.

TO:

a. Under-Secretary Reinhardt, Reich Finance Ministry,

b. Under-Secretary Dr. Landfried, Reich Ministry of Economics,

c. Chief of Military Economic Staff, Major General Thomas,

d. Under-Secretary Dr. Neumann, Prussian Ministry of State,

e. Reichsbank Director Puhl, Directorate of the Reichsbank,

f. General Plenipotentiary for the Reich Administration in
   the Reich Ministry of the Interior, attention of Under-
   Secretary Dr. Stuckart, or his deputy in the office.

g. Ministerialdirigent Dr. Michel, Reich Ministry of Economics, Berlin,

h. Councillor in the Ministry, Mr. Sussdorf, here.

Attached please find minutes of a conference of 30
May 1939 concerning war financing. As soon as the
new proposals of the Reich Ministry of Finance
have been handed to me I shall take the
opportunity of again referring to the matter.

                                    Represented by
                              signed    Dr. Posse.
[Seal of Reich
Certified:
Ministry of Economics]
[signature illegible]

                                  Justizsekretaer.

To be shown to the Minister
for his information.
[initial] 5/6


* * *  Then a report was made of the contents of
the “Notes on the Question of Internal Financing
of War", of 9 May of this year (appendix to GBW
8/2179/39 top secret), in which the figures given
to me by the Reichs Minister of Finance are also
discussed. It was pointed out that the General
Plenipotentiary for the Economy is primarily
interested to introduce into the legislation for
war finance, the idea of financing war
expenditures by anticipating future revenues, to
be expected after the war.
* * *

Undersecretary Newman, first, submitted for
discussion the question whether the production
would be able to meet, to the assumed extent, the
demands of the army, especially if the demands of
the army, as stated in the above report, would
increase to approximately 14 billions in the first
three months of war. He stated that, if the
production potential of the present Reich
territory is taken as a basis, he doubts the
possibility of such a production increase.  * * *

The demands of the army would probably be higher
in the first three months of war than during the
further course of the war.

                                        [Page 250]

                         TOP SECRET

Enclosure to GBW 8/2669/ g. Rs.

     List of Persons Present at the meeting of 30th May
                            1939
                  concerning war financing

Dr. Landfried, Under-Secretary, Reich Ministry of
Economics.

Dr. Holtz, Councillor in the Ministry, GBW.

Reinhardt, Under-Secretary, Reich Finance
Ministry.

Dr. Neumann, Under-Secretary, Four Year Plan.

Dr. Kadgien, Regierungsrat, Four Year Plan.

Krezschmann, Reichsbank Director, Reichsbank.

Tischbein, Ministerial Director, Supreme Command
of
Armed Forces.

Dr. Danckwerts, Ministerialdirigent, Reich
Ministry of
the Interior.

Jacobi, Oberregierungsrat, Reich Ministry of the
Interior.

Sussdorf, Councillor in the Ministry, GBW.

Dr. Michel, Ministerialdirigent, Reich Ministry of
Eco-
nomics.

Thomas, Major General, Supreme Command of Armed
Forces.

                           *******

First, as concerns the scope of the total
production, it is clear that the economic power of
the protectorate and of other territories,
possibly to be acquired, must of course be
completely exhausted for the purposes of the
conduct of the war. It is, however, just as clear
that these territories cannot obtain any
compensation from the economy of Greater Germany
for the products which they will have to give us
during the war, because their power must be used
fully for the war and for supplying the civilian
home population. It is therefore superfluous to
add any amount for such compensation to the debt
of the domestic German war financing. The question
as to what labor forces, new products and other
commodities in the Protectorate and in the
territories to be acquired, can be utilized for
us, and the question how these commodities can be
obtained and, in a proper case, are to be paid by
us, thus can be excluded from this investigation.
Insofar as it should happen that, for political
reasons, deliveries without any expectancy of
compensation cannot be demanded of the “occupied”
territories, to that extent one will be able to
pay with debt certificates of the Reich and an
answer to the question of settling those
certificates must be found after the termination
of the war …It goes without saying that the
question of cov-

                                        [Page 251]

ering the minimum requirements of the civilian
population during the war in the countries coming
into our scope of Government, will remain a
domestic task of such countries.

                           *******

During the war the army can reckon, out of the
economy of Greater Germany, substantially only
with deliveries to the extent of that portion of
production which in peacetime is attributed to the
public expenditures--minus the minimum
requirements of the civilian government agencies.
In order to cover additional requirements of the
Army the economic power of the Protectorate and of
the territories to be acquired during the
campaign, must be used.