Translation of document 007-PS

Brief Report on Activities of the Foreign Affairs Bureau of the Party from 1933-1943

When the Foreign Affairs Bureau [Aussenpolitisches Amt] was established 1 April 1933 the Fuehrer directed that it should not be expanded to a large bureaucratic agency, but should rather develop its effectiveness through initiative and suggestions.

Corresponding to the extra ordinarily hostile attitude adopted by the Soviet Government in Moscow from the beginning the newly-established bureau devoted particular attention to internal conditions in the Soviet Union, as well as to the effects of World Bolshevism primarily in other European countries. It entered into contact with the most variegated groups inclining towards National Socialism and combatting Bolshevism, focussing its main attention on Nations and States bordering on the Soviet Union. On the one end those nations and states constituted an Insulating Ring encircling the Bolshevist neighbor; on the other hand they were the lateral of german living space [Fluegelstellung zum deutschen Lebensraum] and took up a flanking position towards the Western Powers [Flankenstellung Gegenueber Den Westmaechten] especially Great Britain. In order to wield the desired influence by one means or another, the Bureau was compelled to use the most varying methods, taking into consideration the completely different living conditions, the ties of blood, intellect and history of the movements observed by the Bureau in those countries.

In Scandinavia an outspoken pro-Anglo-Saxon attitude, based on economic considerations, had become progressively more dominant after the World War of 191April of 1918. There the Bureau put entire emphasis on influencing general cultural relations with the Nordic peoples. For this purpose it took the Nordic Society [Nordische Gesellschaft] in Luebeck under its protection. The Reich conventions of this society were attended by many outstanding personalities, especially from Finland. While there were no openings for purely political cooperation in Sweden and Denmark, an association based on Greater Germanic ideology was found in Norway. Very close relations were established with its founder, which led to further consequences. (See annex I for more detailed exposition).

South-Eastern Europe was dominated by the French post-war system of alliances. The countries united in the Little Entente were aiming at a more favorable defence of the booty accumulated during the war. In addition each one of these countries sought to gain through this mutual-assistance pact safety against a superior opponent: Czechoslovakia against Germany; Yugoslavia against Italy; Rumania against the Soviet Union. In Czechoslovakia a common hatred against everything German united the still remaining, partly pan- Slavic, Masonic and pro-Jewish tendencies. In Rumania the feeling of insecurity and fear of the superior neighbor, from whom she had taken Bessarabia was growing. In Rumania a primitive anti-Semitic group still existed. Its academically doctrinaire attitude precluded large scale political effectiveness, but nevertheless offered points of mutual interest. The Foreign Affairs Bureau picked these up, developed them, instigated the formation of a new party and thereby forced a decisive change in the whole political situation in Rumania, which is still having its effect today. (See Annex II for more detailed exposition).

Hungary and Bulgaria alone, Allied nations of the World War which had formerly been completely deprived of their rights, were attracted by the newly-formed center of gravity in the north. This attraction was nourished by the hope of obtaining an expansion of their own power through the increasing strength of Germany. However, National Socialism met a certain reserve or antipathy in Bulgaria because of widespread contagion of the Communistic blight. In Hungary it met similar reserve due to the still-fashionable feudal leading circles, who are bolstered by Jewish capital. At any rate it may be mentioned here that the first foreign state visit after the seizure of power took place through the mediation of the Foreign Affairs Bureau. Julius Gombos, who in former years had himself pursued anti-Semitic and racial tendencies, had reached the Hungarian Premier’s chair. The Bureau maintained a personal connection with him. In September 1933 he paid a visit to Germany and was received by the Fuehrer in Erfurt. With this visit the official cordon of isolation surrounding National Socialism was pierced for the first time. This visit had been preceded by the Fuehrer’s reception of the Rumanian poet and former minister Octavian Goga through the Bureau’s mediation. Goga later became the decisive exponent of a political reproachment with Germany.

In Yugoslavia other German Reich agencies had become active in the same direction, so that the Foreign Affairs Bureau remained in the background and shifted its efforts to the purely commercial sphere. It initiated the first contracts with Croatian and Serbian cooperatives.

Motivated by reasons of War Economy, the Bureau advocated the transfer of raw material purchases from overseas to the areas accessible by overland traffic routes, i. E. primarily in the Balkans, naturally insofar as practicable. At first little heed was paid to the Bureau in these endeavors, but it later secured the active support especially of the Food Estate; through its cooperation, e. g., on the subject of fruit and vegetable imports, a very substantial shift in the source of imports was attained, particularly through the currently initiated cooperation with Croatian and Hungarian cooperatives as well as with commercial associations all over the Balkans.

From the beginning, work in Italy was out of the question because ever since the days of our struggle for power ties of a personal nature have existed, which were taken over by official institutions or cultivated by individual personalities. Work in Austria was also excluded, since a special “Provincial Directorate for Austria” existed within the Nazi Party.

The Bureau declined to concern itself with questions of Racial Germans [Volksdeutsche] abroad. For this phase of the problem the “Racial Germans” Central Agency [Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle] was later created.

Towards Western European States the Bureau limited its activities to simple observation of existing conditions, or to the establishment of relations, especially of a commercial nature, primarily in Belgium, Holland and Luxemburg.

In accordance with the attitude on foreign policy laid down by the Fuehrer, the Bureau endeavored to establish far- reaching connections with England through continuous personal contacts with influential personalities of English political life. Eminent Englishmen were invited to the annual Party Rallies.

Pursuant to its self chosen task the Bureau devoted its attention to the Near East. Turkey, newly consolidated by Mustapha Kemal, adopted a hesitating attitude of watchful waiting. This position was probably due to military impotence against Soviet Russia, clearly recognized, on the one hand, and also to hostility to Fascist Italy, already previously manifested, on the other hand. In Iran, however, the Bureau’s initiative in the economic field to stimulate the mutual exchange of goods encountered greatest understanding and the greatest readiness in carrying it through. The Bureau’s initiative in developing with the head of commercial circles, entirely new methods for the economic penetration of Iran found expression, in an extraordinarily favorable way. in reciprocal trade relations. Naturally in Germany, too, this initiative at first encountered a completely negative attitude and resistance on the part of the competent state authorities, an attitude that had first to be overcome. In the course of a few year. the volume of trade with Iran was multiplied five-fold, and in 1939 Iran’s trade turnover with Germany had attained first place. Even Soviet Russia, the competitor who had been biggest and most dreaded previously, had been eliminated from the running. Concurrently with the activation of commercial relation the Bureau had also intensified cultural relations and had, in conjunction with growing commercial influence and in closet collaboration with the Iranian Government, created a series of cultural institutions headed and directed by Germans. In consequence the dominant French cultural influence in Iran has already been broken since the year 1936.

The Bureau simultaneously attempted to also draw Afghanistan into its orbit. Relations established with leading individual personalities led to the willing opening of this country, which had formerly been rather neglected by Germany. All the leading personalities of Afghanistan were guests of the Bureau. The Bureau favored the taking part of German economy in the industrial upbuilding of the country; German experts in all fields we called to Afghanistan in increasing numbers through the Bureau’s mediation. The German Colony became the dominant one in Afghanistan The preparation for expansion of the Afghan army was in German hands; carrying it through was prevented by the outbreak of war. Even though the German Colony had to leave Afghanistan later on, Afghanistan’s neutral position today is largely due to the Bureau’s activity.

The Arab question, too, became part of the work of the Bureau. In spite of England’s tutelage of Iraq the Bureau established a series of connections to a number of leading personalities of the Arab world, smoothing the way for strong bonds to Germany. In this connection, the growing influence of the Reich in Iran and Afghanistan did not fail to have repercussions in Arabia. All these relations took place on a purely economic basis and fostered the systematically directed advancement of German influence and prestige in the domains reserved by the Western Powers for themselves. In this connection it may be mentioned in general that the internal peril to England’s preponderance in those areas would have been considerably more pronounced, if the Bureau’s foresighted initiative, which took Oriental conditions very well into account, had not been forever ignored by official authorities.

The Bureau foresaw the necessity of technical improvement of the Danube water route to facilitate traffic, because of the shift in the increase of the exchange in goods, especially in the Balkans and in the Orient. On its own initiative it attempted to influence competent authorities (especially of the Bavarian Government), together with particularly interested private commercial circles, to enlarge our Danube shipping facilities (primarily the port of Regensburg). Although the Bureau throughout the years asserted this necessity, which was becoming more and more urgent, and although the Bureau relentlessly maintained its initiative its endeavors in this matter were unfortunately not crowned by any success. Presumably all responsible authorities regret it bitterly to-day.

Among other projects due to the Foreign Affairs Bureau’s initiative endeavors to grow the rubber-fibered Kok Sagys plant in Germany deserve to be emphasized. This plant is being cultivated in the Soviet Union. In spite of efforts during many years no success was attained in planting sizeable experimental crops, because of latent disunity among competent authority. The Bureau was compelled to resort to experimental fields in Greece through its own connections in the Balkans.

Somewhat off the beaten path was the Bureau’s undertaking in Brazil, which grew out of personal connections, large quantities of cotton (60,000 tons) were successfully brought to Germany under a clearing agreement at a time when imports of this raw material had become very critically short, already necessitating work outs. A Bureau representative was twice the Brazilian Government’s guest. Brazil and Iran were the only nations from whom Germany could purchase this indispensable raw material for Reichsmark. The Brazilian Minister expressed his thanks for this initial step to the Head of the Bureau in an address delivered at the occasion of an exposition.

About 40 lecture evenings for diplomats and the foreign press should also be listed. They dealt with the construction of the new Germany, and speakers included many leading personalities of the Reich.

The Bureau has carried out the initiating of all politically feasible projects. With the outbreak of war it was entitled to consider its task as terminated. The exploitation of the many personal connections in many lands can be resumed under a different guise.

Signed: ROSENBERG

2 Inclosures

1. Norway
2. Rumania

Annex I to Brief Report on Activities of the Foreign Affairs
         Bureau of the Nazi Party from 1933 to 1943.

   The Political Preparation of the Military Occupation of
                           Norway
               During the War Years 1939/1940.

As previously mentioned, of all political groupings in
Scandinavia only “Nasjonal Samling", led in Norway by the
Former Minister of War and Major of the Reserve Vidkun
Quisling, deserved serious political attention. This was a
fighting political group, possessed by the idea of a Greater
Germanic Community. Naturally all ruling powers were hostile
and attempted to prevent. by any means, its success among
the population. The Bureau maintained constant liaison with
Quisling and attentively observed the attacks he conducted
with tenacious energy on the middle class which had been
taken in tow by the English. From the beginning it appeared
probable that without revolutionary events. which would stir
the population from their former attitude, no successful
progress of Nasjonal Samling was to be expected. During the
winter 193August of 1939, Quisling was privately visited by
a member of the Bureau. When the political situation in
Europe came to a head in 1939, Quisling made an appearance at the
convention of the Nordic Society [Nordische Gesellschaft] in
Luebeck in June. He expounded his conception of the
situation, and his apprehensions concerning Norway. He
emphatically drew attention to the geopolitically decisive
importance of Norway in the Scandinavian area, and to the
advantages that would accrue to the power dominating the
Norwegian coast in case of a conflict between the Greater
German Reich and Great Britain. Assuming that his statements
would be of special interest to the Marshal of the Reich
Goering for aero-strategical reasons, Quisling was referred
to State Secretary [Staatssekretaer] Koerner by the Bureau.
The Staff Director [Stabsleiter] of the Bureau handed the
Chief of the Reich Chancellery a memorandum for transmission
to the Fuehrer. It dealt with the same subject, still taking
into account the then doubtful attitude of Soviet Russia.
After the outbreak of German-Polish hostilities and of the
Soviet-Finnish war, tensions in Scandinavia became more
strained and facilitated the work of Anglo-Saxon propaganda.
It began to appear possible that, under the pretext of
altruistic aid to Finland, Great Britain might intend to
occupy Norway, and perhaps Sweden, to complete the anti-
German blockade in the North Sea for all practical purposes,
and to gain comfortable airplane bases against Germany. The
aim would have been to drag the Northern countries, too,
into a military conflict with Germany. Apprehensive about
this development Quisling again appeared in Berlin in
December 1939 He visited Reichsleiter Rosenberg and Grand
Admiral Raeder. In the course of a report to the Fuehrer,
Reichsleiter Rosenberg turned the conversation once more to
Norway. He especially pointed to Norway’s importance should
England, to tighten her blockade and under the pretext of
aid to Finland, take steps to occupy the country, with the
Norwegians' tacit consent. On the basis of his conversation
with Quisling and at his own request Grand Admiral Raeder,
too, had been asked to see the Fuehrer. In consequence of
these steps, Quisling was granted a personal audience with
the Fuehrer on 16 December, and once more on 18 December In
the course of this audience the Fuehrer emphasized
repeatedly that he personally would prefer a completely
neutral attitude of Norway as well as of the whole of
Scandinavia. He did not intend to enlarge the theaters of
war and to draw still other nations into the conflict.
Should the enemy attempt to spend the war, however, with the
aim of achieving further throttling and intimidation of the
Greater German Reich, he would be compelled to gird himself
against such an undertaking. In order to counterbalance
increasing enemy propaganda activity, he promised Quisling
financial support of his movement, which
is based on Greater Germanic ideology. Military exploitation
of the question now raised was assigned to the Special
Military Staff, which transmitted special missions to
Quisling. Reichsleiter Rosenberg was to take over political
exploitation. Financial expenses were to be defrayed by the
Ministry for Foreign Affairs [Auswaertiges Amt], the
Minister for Foreign Affairs being kept continuously by the
Foreign Affairs Bureau. Chief of Section [ Amtsleiter ]
Scheidt was charged with maintaining liaison with Quisling.
In the course of further developments he was assigned to the
Naval Attache in Oslo, Lt. Commander [Korvettenkapitaen]
Screiber. Orders were given that the whole matter be handled
with strictest secrecy.

Quisling’s reports, transmitted through his representative
in Germany, Hagelin, and dealing with the possibility of
intervention by the Western Powers in Norway with tacit
consent of the Norwegian government, became more urgent by
January already. These increasingly better substantiated
communications were in sharpest contrast to the view of the
German Legation in Oslo. which relied on the desire for
neutrality of the then Norwegian Nygardsvold cabinet and was
convinced of that government’s intention and readiness to
defend Norway’s neutrality. No one in Norway knew that
Quisling’s representative for Germany maintained closest
relations to him; he therefore succeeded in gaining a
foothold within governmental circles of the Nygardsvold
cabinet. and in listening to cabinet members' true views.
Hagelin transmitted what he had heard to the Bureau, which
conveyed the news to the Fuehrer through Reichsleiter
Rosenberg. During the night of 16 to 17 February English
destroyers attacked the German steamer “Altmark” in Jossing
fjord. The Norwegian government’s reaction to this question
permitted the conclusion that certain agreements had been
covertly arrived at between the Norwegian government and the
Allies. Such assumption was confirmed by reports of Section
[Amtsleiter] Scheidt who in turn derived his information
from Hagelin and Quisling. But even after this incident the
German Legation in Oslo championed that opposite view, and
went on record as believing in the good intentions of the
Norwegians.

Thanks to his connections in Norway as agent of the
Norwegian Navy, Hagelin had succeeded, in the meantime, in
being entrusted with the purchase of German AA guns through
the German Navy Ministry. Through these connections he
gained more and
more insight into the real views and intentions of the
Norwegian Nygardsvold cabinet, and into the preparations
already initiated by the Allies in Norway. At the occasion
of his presence in Berlin on 20 March to negotiate about
delivery of German AA guns he mentioned that the Allies were
even now examining Norwegian ports for loading and
transportation facilities. The French Kommandant entrusted
with this mission was said to have revealed Allied
intentions in confidential conversations with the commander
of Narwik, an adherent of Quisling. These intentions were to
land motorized troops at Stavanger, Drontheim and perhaps
Kirkenes, and to occupy Sola airdrome near Stavanger.
Hagelin also re-emphasized his warnings about agreements
secretly concluded between the Allies and the Norwegian
government according to which the Norwegian government would
content itself .solely with paper protests in case of a
possible occupation of port cities by the Allies. He pointed
out that the Norwegian government had never intended to
seriously oppose England, and that it was playing a two-
faced game with Germany solely to gain time for faits
accomplis. He also mentioned that the Norwegian government
had been informed by England that Germany intended to lay a
minefield from Jutland to the Norwegian coast. In view of
all the information that had reached him, Quisling could no
longer stand by his advice to await developments in Norway
for a little while longer; he was compelled to point out
that any delay of the German counter-thrust would entail
extraordinary risks. These reports were immediately
transmitted to the Fuehrer by Reichsleiter Rosenberg On 8
April the Allies struck the first blow in preparation for
their intended occupation of Norway, thus confirming these
reports made by Quisling and his agents, and in contrast to
the views held to the end by the German Legation in Oslo and
by the expert of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs
[Auswaertiges Amt] During the night from 7 to 8 April
minefields were laid alongside the Norwegian coast by the
Allied fleet, and the Allied governments informed the world
of the steps they had taken. In accordance with indications
given by the Bureau, only progressively more tepid protests
were made by Norway. By order of the Fuehrer Greater Germany
counter-attacked, after corresponding preparation in the
morning of 9 April and occupied the most important Norwegian
sea ports and airdromes.

Annex II: Rumania (From the overthrow of Titolescu to
Marshal Antonescu)

In spite of almost complete occupation by the Central Powers
in the last World War, Rumania was indebted to Versailles
for her re-creation, which was effected partially even at
the expense of her one-time Eastern ally. A basically sound
anti-Semitic tendency existed in this post-war country.
which was torn asunder by dynastic squabbles and innumerable
party fights. But in spite of repeated efforts this tendency
had never risen above the limitations of a club, because of
solely scientific doctrinaire leadership. What was lacking w
as the guiding leadership of a political personality. After
manifold grouping trials the Bureau believed to have found
such a personality--the former Minister, and poet. Octavian
Goga. It was not difficult to convince this poet, pervaded
by instinctive inspiration, that a Greater Rumania, though
it had to be created in opposition to Vienna, could be
maintained only together with Berlin. Nor was it difficult
to create in him the desire to link the fate of Rumania with
the future of the National Socialist German Reich in good
time. By bringing continuing influence to bear, the Bureau
succeeded in inducing Octavian Goga as well as Professor
Cuza to amalgamate the parties under their leadership on an
Anti-Semitic basis. Thus they could carry on with united
strength the struggle for Rumania’s renascence internally,
and her affiliation [Anschluss] with Germany externally.
Through the Bureau’s initiative both parties, which had
heretofore been known by distinct names, were merged as the
National Christian Party, under Goga’s leadership and with
Cuza as Honorary President. The attempts concurrently
undertaken by the Bureau to amalgamate this Party with the
much more youthful. but energetic Iron Guard movement were
initially frustrated by the apparently insurmountable
personal incompatibility of Cuza and Codreanu. At any rate
these attempts led to the secret establishment of good
personal relations between Goga and the mystic-fanciful
Codreanu.

In the course of the years after his return, the king had
succeeded in becoming the country’s decisive factor through
craft tactics in dealing with the dominant political
parties. Had the Bureau also succeeded in merging the
National-Christian Party with Codreanu, Rumania would have
obtained sharply anti-Semitic leadership based on strong
mass support. Such leadership could have attained its aims
even against the will of the king. However, surviving
rivalries between the country’s anti-Semitic trends later
enabled the king to use them separately for his plan, in
order to destroy them as far as possible.

The struggle for re-orientation of Rumania’s foreign policy
was taken up by Goga with bold elan. He had earlier
succeeded in upsetting the position of Foreign Minister
Titolescu, the agent of Franco, of the Geneva League of
Nations and of the Little Entente- Titolescu was later
overthrown. Among the numerous not very significant splinter
parties, the “Young Liberals” founded by George Bratianu,
supported Goga’s campaign, without joining the anti-Semitic
trend. The Rumanian front of Vaida Voevod, wobbling to and
fro among all camps, adopted a similar position for some
time.

Through intermediaries, the Bureau maintained constant
contact with both tendencies, just like it constantly
consulted with Goga, through Staff Director [Stabsleiter
Schickedanz] about tactics to be followed. The whole
struggle was accelerated by Soviet Russia’s increasing
pressure in the Bessarabian question and by the process of
political rapprochement with Moscow which was supported by
Paris and Prague. Following a long period of recurring
political trials involving scandal and graft, Rumania's
internal struggle for the future make-up of the country had
been aggravated by the coming to the front of the Christian-
Nationalist Party and of the Iron Guard. This struggle was
being fought with increasing bitterness. The king’s attitude
towards the national movement was procrastinating and
underhanded. The movement was agreeable to him for
eliminating the two parties which, by tradition, took turns
in the government. But he intended to prevent the
unequivocal victory of anti-Semitic and racial [Voelkisch]
principles, influenced by growing Nationalism in the
country. That is why the Nationalists' foreign policy,
secretly projected by Germany, did not fit into his plans.
Because he was in possession of the police and of the army,
he remained the decisive factor in the country. After
repeated postponement of the elections, which were legally
due, the king decided to hold an election. The decision was
based on a very reliable report of his then Prime Minister
Taterescu. Taterescu was convinced that the Liberal Party
would again receive 40% of all votes, through the
machinations customary in Fomia. However, after a bitter
election campaign the Liberal Party suffered painful defeat.
The opposition National Movement had achieved indisputable
victory in spite of all chicanery and machinations by their
opponents. The Iron Guard received about 16% of the total
vote, the National-Christian Party Goga-Cuza
about 11%, the government party about 35%. The rest of the
votes were scattered. After some vacillation and hesitancy,
the king appointed Goga Prime Minister on 27 Decmeber 1937
with a binding promise that Parliament would be dismissed
and new elections held within the legally prescribed time
limit. In spite of warnings by the Bureau Goga believed the
promise given by the king. But the king was only attempting
to gain time.

Thus a second government on racial and anti-Semitic
foundations had appeared in Europe, in a country in which
such an event had been considered completely impossible. The
government immediately made known its intention to proceed
against Jewish predominance in the country and declared
repeatedly that it would have to subject Rumania’s previous
foreign policy to reexamination and reform. In the meantime
the Judaic-Masonic and liberal opposition did not lose time.
Passions were inflamed and became increasingly more
envenomed. It looked like a hot and bloody election
campaign. The prospects of Goga’s Christian-Nationalist
Party pointed to a big victory with sure certainty,
especially since, with the Bureau’s cooperation he had on
the sly made a secret agreement with Codreanu. To be sure,
Goga did not act on the Bureau’s advice to immediately
develop his party cadres, to expand his party machine all
over the country and to permeate the police and gendarmerie.
Goga postponed
the execution of organizational reform, which he also
intended, until after the election. He considered himself to
be under obligation to the king not to undertake anything
until the electoral decisions had been rendered, but to take
steps all the more incisively after legally attaining the
majority.

In innumerable interviews the opposition must have succeeded
in convincing the king that an electoral victory of Goga
would react most acutely against the king himself. In that
case he would no longer be able to get rid of the ghosts he
had called in; if Goga attained a two-thirds majority, he,
the king, would be Goga’s captive. These expostulations, and
the uncontrollable Judaic influences of the Jewish clique at
the Rumanian court, plus the pressure of the French and
British Ministers led to a change in the king’s attitude,
assuming that this change had not already been anticipated
by him at the time of Goga’s appointment. The king decided
to prevent the elections.  Goga resisted. Thereupon the king
offered Goga the formation of an uthoritarian government, a
government created solely by virtue of royal sovereignty.
That meant a coup d'etat. Goga declined. Thereupon the king
informed Goga that he would accept the cabinet’s resigna-
tion, which, however, had not even been offered to him. Goga
realized too late that the strength at his disposal was
entirely inadequate to thwart the king’s plans. He resigned.

But the course once embarked upon forced even the king to
pay heed to the mood that had been created in the country.
Also, a return to the disrupted foreign-policy ties was no
longer possible. Although an authoritarian system had been
built up, Rumania found herself without her former backing.
The French security system had been ruptured and could not
be re-established, if only in view of Yugoslavia’s attitude
in the South-East, where relations established by other
German agencies had simultaneously loosened the cohesiveness
of the Little Entente. That, at any rate, was the Goga
government’s success.

In his last great speech to the Rumania Academy, shortly
before his death, Goga welcomed Austria’s affiliation with
Germany, and affirmed for the last time his belief in
adherence to new Greater German Reich and to Fascist Italy,
a belief he had struggled for.

Now the king’s war of extermination against the Iron Guard
began. Codreanu was arrested with his closest collaborators,
to face a specially convoked court-martial. Sole basis for
the prosecution was an alleged communication from Codreanu
to the Fuehrer, which was proved to be a forgery, and a
telegram addressed to the Fuehrer. On the basis of these
"records” he was sentenced to ten years' hard labor. In vain
did the Bureau attempt to bring about an intervention of the
Ministry for Foreign Affairs in this episode, which
diminished the whole prestige of the German Reich. It did
not prevail against the official agencies, which condemned
the entire project of the Bureau in Rumania, because the
official German delegation expected their sole salvation
from the attitude of the king and his creatures. Logically,
the acceptance without dissent of this challenge was
interpreted in Bucharest as granting carte blanche and
Codreanu was shot with his closest collaborators for
establishment of the first personal contact between the King
and the Fuehrer.

This appeared to doom the Iron Guard, too, Goga’s party,
deprived of his leadership, was submerged into
insignificance. But Goga left behind a personal heir, who is
now Marshal Antonescu. Against the king’s wish, Goga had
appointed this politically insignificant provincial general,
with whom the kind was on bad terms, as his Minister of War.
At first, completely pro French in outlook, Anonescu
gradually adoped a different view under Goga’s influence.
After Goga’s resignation, Antonescu still re-
mained in the king’s cabinet at Goga’s wish. He also
maintained continued relations with the Iron Guard. Thereby
the possibility of eliminating the king was at hand — and
was exploited. Antonescu’s [sic] to-day appears in practice
as executor of the heritage bequeathed to him by Goga, who
had led him from political insignificance into the political
arena. Thereby a change to Germany’s liking had become
possible in Rumania.

                                         [Signed] ROSENBERG