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19. Artur Seyss-Inquart
Within the Nazi conspiracy Seyss-Inquart became the expert
manipulator and subjugator of countries to be invaded or
already invaded by the Nazi conspirators, first of Austria,
later of Poland and The Netherlands. For the benefit of the
Nazi conspirators he enslaved these countries, making them
vassals of the Nazi regime.
A. POSITIONS HELD BY SEYSS-INQUART.
(1) Positions Held by Artur Seyss-Inquart in the Order
Set Forth in the Indictment.
(a) Member of the NSDAP (Nazi Party), 13 March
1938 to 8 May 1945.
(b) General in the SS, 15 March 1938 to 8 May
1945.
(c) State Councillor of Austria, May 1937 to 12
February 1938.
(d) Minister of Interior and Security of Austria,
16 February 1938 to 11 March 1938.
(e) Chancellor of Austria, 11 March 1938 to 15
March 1938.
(f) Member of the Reichstag, April 1938 to 8 May
1945.
(g) Member of the Reich Cabinet, 1 May 1939 to
1945.
(h) Reich Minister without Portfolio, 1 May 1939
to September 1939.
(i) Chief of the Civil Administration of South
Poland, early September 1939.
(j) Deputy Governor-General of the Polish Occupied
Territory, 12 October 1939 to 18 May 1940.
(k) Reich Commissar for Occupied Netherlands 18
May 1940 to 8 May 1945. (2910-PS)
(2) Positions Held in Addition to Those Set Forth in
the Indictment.
(a) Reich Governor of Austria, 15 March 1938 to 1
May 1939. (2910-PS)
(b) President of the German Academy, Munich, 1943.
(3457-PS)
(3) Previous Occupations of Seyss-Inquart.
(a) Commissioned officer in a Tyrol-Kaiserjaeger
Regiment of the Austrian Army in World War I, 1914-
1918.
(b) Lawyer in Vienna, Austria. (3425-PS)
[Page 957]
B. SEYSS-INQUART USED HIS POSITIONS AND INFLUENCE SO AS TO
PROMOTE THE NAZI SEIZURE AND CONSOLIDATION OF CONTROL OVER
AUSTRIA.
(1) Seyss-Inquart was a member of the Nazi Party and held
the rank of General in the SS. Seyss-Inquart has admitted
that he became a member of the Nazi Party on 13 March 1938;
that he was made a General in the SS on 15 March 1938, and
held both membership and rank until 8 May 1945. (2910-PS)
Seyss-Inquart, in a letter to Goering, on 14 July 1939,
asserted that he had been a member of the Nazi Party since
1931. The following is an excerpt from that letter:
“Until July 1934, I conducted myself as a regular
member of the Party. And if I had quietly in whatever
form paid my membership dues, the first one according
to a receipt, I paid in December 1931.” (2219-PS)
[Page 958]
In a voluntary statement signed by Seyss-Inquart, with the
advice of his counsel, he discussed his affiliation with the
Nazi Party as follows:
“I supported also the National Socialist Party as long
as it was legal, because it declared itself with
particular determination in favor of the Anschluss.
From 1932 onward I made financial contributions to this
Party, but I discontinued financial support when it was
declared illegal in 1934.” (3425-PS)
In contrast with the foregoing assertions of the defendant,
Seyss-Inquart wrote a letter to Heinrich Himmler on 19
August 1939 in which he confirmed the-fact that he became a
member of the Nazi Party in 1931 and also stated that he
continued his membership in the Nazi Party even after it was
declared illegal in Austria. The following is an excerpt
from that letter:
“Concerning my membership in the Nazi Party, I want to
state that I never was asked to enter the Nazi Party
but I asked Dr. Kier in December 1931 to take care of
my relation to the Party. At that time I saw the basis
of the solution of the Austrian question only in the
Party. I wrote this already in the year 1929 to Dr.
Neubacher to adjust his hopes which he had put in the
Austria-German Volksbund. After that, I paid my
membership fees and, as I remember, direct to the Gau
Wien. The payments were made even after the party was
forbidden. Some time later, I got in direct touch with
the Ortsgruppe in Dornbach. The membership fees were
paid by my wife but the Blockwart couldn’t possibly
have any doubt that those payments were for my wife and
myself since the amount of the fees, S 40 [40
Schillings] a month, was a sure indication of this fact
and I was treated in every respect as a Party member.
Besides that, I was, since 1932, a member of the
Steirischen Heimatschutzes Kammerhofer. In this
organization I made every effort to absorb the
Steirische Heimatschutz in the Party and mainly on
account of my efforts, von Habicht declared that the
members of the Steirische Heimatschutz were members of
the Party. That proves that I felt myself, in every
respect, as a member of the Party and I was regarded as
belonging to the Party and as I said before, already in
December 1931.” (3271-PS)
(2) Seyss-Inquart, even before he became a member of the
Nazi Party, belonged to an organization conceived and
founded upon principles which later became those of the Nazi
Party.
[Page 959]
Seyss-Inquart has stated in writing that he had been a
member of a secret organization known as the “German
Brotherhood” (Deutsche Gemeinschaft). This is evidenced by
the following excerpts from his letter to Himmler of 19
August 1939:
“It must be known to you that at the time of the Black-
Red Coalition, there existed an extremely secret
organization under the name of 'German Community.' Here
met all sorts of Nationalists and Catholic elements
who, at least at that time, were anti-Semitic and anti-
Marxists. Dr. Doelter, who was my office chief, was one
of the leaders of this association and through him I
came into this movement. Dolfuss was also active here.
He was of my age and was a very active anti-Semitic. It
is through success of the activities of this
organization that the Black-Red Coalition was broken
and the Marxists never came back in the government.
After the establishment of National Socialism, this
organization was dissolved.” (3271-PS)
The secret organization, “German Brotherhood", (Deutsche
Gemeinschaft), was organized to promote the anti-Semitic and
anti-Free Mason doctrines later adopted by the Nazi Party.
This fact is evidenced by Seyss-Inquart’s copy of the
minutes of a meeting of this organization on 28 December
1918 and by it constitution and by-laws, a portion of which
appear in the following quotation:
“The purpose of this organization is the liberation of
the German people from Jewish influences, and combat
against Jewry with all available means. The
organization is secret. Since a contact of the
organization with the public can’t be avoided it has to
be done under pretense of unsuspicious purposes and
without showing the actual set-up.” (3400-PS)
New members of this organization were required to make a
sworn statement, i.e.:
“As a German man, I assure with my honor, as far as I
know, there is no Jewish blood in my descendency.
Furthermore, I am not connected by marriage with a wife
or other companion of Jewish descendency, and I never
will have relation with one of those. I am not a Free
Mason, I assure to be forever a good member of the
Deutsche Gemeinschaft and I will always represent the
interest of the German people against the Jewish people
and I am willing to fight the Jewish people with all my
power, any place and at any time. I promise to obey all
orders and decrees of the leadership of the
organization and to preserve complete secrecy about
their institution,
[Page 960]
about the persons of the organization, and the events
within it, as long as I live.” (3400-PS)
New members were also asked the question: “In case you will
be accepted, are you willing to employ only Aryan
physicians, attorneys, and businessmen?” (3400-PS)
(3) Seyss-Inquart, after the Austrian Nazi Party was
declared illegal in July 194, posed as a non-member of the
Nazi Party but continued to support it in its activities,
principles, and objectives in a subversive manner.
Seyss-Inquart has stated that:
“Before the Anschluss, I worked for the legal,
political activities of the Austrian Socialists under
the conditions laid down in the Austrian Constitution.
*** From 1932 onwards I made financial contributions to
this party but I discontinued financial support when it
was declared illegal in 1934. From July 1934 until the
year 1936 I supported individual National Socialists as
lawyer and in collaboration with the welfare work
Langoth in Linz. From July 1936 onwards, I endeavored
to help the National Socialists to regain their legal
status and finally to participate in the Austrian
Government. *** I was sympathetic towards the efforts
of the Austrian Nazi Party to gain political power and
corresponding influence because they were in favor of
the Anschluss. *** On 10 March 1938 I suggested to
Chancellor Schuschnigg, as a solution to the
difficulties resulting from his plebiscite plan, that
the National Socialists be appointed to the Cabinet,
after I became in May 1937 State Councillor and then on
16-2-1938 Minister of Interior and Security.” (3425-PS)
Seyss-Inquart was an official in the Austrian Government,
yet he rendered services, and physical and moral support to
the illegal Austrian Nazi Party during those years, knowing
that the radical elements engaged in terroristic acts.
“During this time, particularly after the Party was
forbidden in July 1934, I knew that the radical element
of the Party was engaged in terroristic activities,
such as the attacks on railroads, bridges, telephone
communications, etc. I knew that the governments of
both Chancellors Dolfuss and Schuschnigg, although they
held the same total German viewpoint in principle, were
opposed to the Anschluss then because of the National
Socialist regime in the Reich. I was sympathetic
towards the efforts of the Austrian Nazi Party to gain
political power and corresponding influence, because
they were in favor of the Anschluss. On the day of the
un-
[Page 961]
successful 'putsch,' 25 July 1934, I was at my home in
Stannern near Iglau, Czechoslovakia. I learned later
that the murder of Chancellor Dolfuss on that day was
the outcome of a 'putsch' plan, in which SS circles
were mainly involved, to arrest the Chancellor and put
in an Austrian government with National Socialist
participation. Eight or ten days before this
unsuccessful 'putsch' Chancellor Dolfuss sent for me.
We discussed the disturbances and troubled state of
affairs created in Austria by the radical element of
the Austrian National Socialists. I advised Chancellor
Dolfuss to make an arrangement with Hitler because the
Austrian National Socialists and even this radical
element would obey Hitler’s orders. I conjectured --
later I found confirmation that these terroristic
activities had a certain support from the Reich.
Chancellor Dolfuss told me he would think the matter
over and made a tentative future appointment for a
further discussion. I informed among others, also
acquaintances, of this conversation whom I knew had
influence among the Austrian National Socialists. About
one week later Chancellor Dolfuss informed me that at
the moment he had no time for further discussion.”
(3425-PS)
(4) Seyss-Inquart derived personal benefits and political
power as the result of the subversive manipulations and
terroristic activities of his fellow Nazi collaborators. He
was appointed State Councillor of Austria in May 1937, and
Minister of the Interior and Security of that country as the
direct result of Nazi manipulation. These facts he has
admitted:
“My appointment as State Councillor was the result of
an agreement between Austria and Germany on 11 July
1936. My appointment as Minister of the Interior and
Security was one of the results of the conference
between Chancellor Schuschnigg and Hitler at
Berchtesgaden on 2 December 1938.” (425-PS)
Another result of the Berchtesgaden conference was that
Austrian Nazis were thereafter allowed openly to demonstrate
their conviction, an advantage which they exploited to the
full.
“The Austrian National Socialists must certainly have
taken my appointment as Minister of Interior and
Security as an indication of their right to activity.
Still more, however, the outcome of the agreement of 12
February 1938 allowed them to demonstrate their
convictions. This right they utilized in more and more
widespread demonstrations.” (7425-PS)
(5) Seyss-Inquart used his affiliation with the Nazis to pro-
[Page 962]
mote the absorption of Austria into the Greater German Reich
according to plan as conceived by his fellow Nazi
conspirators. Seyss-Inquart had had a continuous and
constant interest in the union of Austria and Germany for
twenty years, and during all that time worked, planned, and
collaborated with others until the union became an
accomplished fact.
“In 1918 I became interested in the Anschluss of
Austria with Germany. From that year on I worked,
planned, and collaborated with others of a like mind to
bring about a union. *** It was my desire to effect
this union of the two countries — in an evolutionary
manner and by legal means. Among my Austrian
collaborators were Dr. Neubacher, City Councillor
Speiser, the University Professor Hugelmann, and Dr.
Wilhelm Bauer, Professor Wettstein and others. Later,
during the rise of National Socialism, Dr. Friedrich
Rainer, Dr. Jury, Glaise-Horstenau, Major Klausner, Dr.
Muehlmann, Globotschnigg, and others. *** After I
became State Councillor, I discussed several tires with
von Papen, the German Ambassador, the possibilities of
an understanding between the Austrian government and
the Austrian National Socialists, respectively the
Reich. We did not talk of the Anschluss as an actual
program. However, we were both of the opinion that a
successful understanding would bring about in the
course of time the Anschluss by evolutionary means in
some form. The last time I spoke to von Papen was in
January 1938 in Garmisch where I met him by chance.”
(3425-PS)
Seyss-Inquart contributed his efforts to revive the Austrian
Nazi Party after the unsuccessful “putsch” of 25 July 1934,
and to provide relief for the families of arrested and
condemned Nazis. He has described these activities in the
following words:
“The effect of the 'Putsch' was a complete catastrophe
to the National Socialist Camp. Not merely the leaders,
but party members were arrested in so far as they did
not escape; the confiscation of their fortunes was
announced; the revolt which led to military actions in
Steiriermark, Karnten and Oberoesterreich did cost
victims; the political management was seriously
compromised by the Nazis and above all, a most sinister
looking situation was created in regard to foreign
politics. In any case, the idea of a union had suffered
a severe setback. was in agreement about the effect
with Dr. Neubacher, and it was our desire to assist
easing the tension. Following this situation I felt
urged to take up politics beyond the question of the
'Anschluss.' *** The former
[Page 963]
National delegate to the 'Langoth' in Linz was working
with Rheintaller. Dr. Neubacher and myself contacted
this circle and met there some other men whose names I
have forgotten, but who later did not play a particular
role. After some time, the lawyer applicant from Linz,
Dr. Kaltenbrunner, joined this circle. He was said to
be an SS man. The main activities consisted in
organizing an institution to succor the needy families
of those arrested and condemned Nazis. *** As matters
calmed down, the Austrian National Socialists collected
themselves again into an illegal party, the
organization was built up for better or worse according
to the old schedule, those who returned from the Reich
were considered to be more 'in the know' and
authoritative. The institution of succor, 'Langoth,'
remained outside the party organization. But here were
also men in the Nazi circles who considered an absolute
dependence on the Reich as politically wrong and
endeavored for an independent Austrian National
Socialist Party. In effect, Dr. Rainer from Karnten
belonged to those, and by his influence the future
Gauleiter Klausner who is now dead; also Globotschnigg
was in it, though I doubt he was sincerely convinced,
and also others. Dr. Neubacher took a keener interest
in political affairs and entered into relation-ship
with the proper Party circles.” (3254-PS)
The defendant submitted his plans to Hitler, Hess, and
Goering for their approval, and contacted other German
Nazis.
“After my appointment as State Councillor, Wilhelm
Keppler, the German Secretary of State for Austrian
affairs, arranged a visit for me with Hess and Goering.
I explained my intentions and plans to them, namely,
the attainment of the legal activity for the Austrian
National Socialist, independent of the Reich Party.
Hess expressed his interest and said to me among other
things: he regretted that I was not one of the original
'old fighters.' I believe that at that time Goering had
already established direct connections with the
Austrian State Secretary, Guido Schmid. After my
appointment as Minister of Interior and Security of
Austria, I went to Berlin to visit Hitler. I arrived in
Berlin on 17-2-1938 where I was met by Keppler who took
me to Himmler. This visit was not anticipated in my
program. Himmler wanted to talk over police matters, I
informed him, however, that I was not conversant to
speak about them. I did not follow the suggestions
which he made. I greeted Hitler with raised hand --
permissible after the agreement of 2-12 — advised
him, how-
[Page 964]
ever, immediately that as Austrian Minister, my
responsibility lay with Austria. I explained to Hitler
my plans, namely: I was to be the living guaranty for
Dr. Schuschnigg of the evolutionary way. The Austria
National Socialists must only conduct their activities
according to the Austrian Constitution and on those
lines find their way to the Reich; they must not make
any totalitarian claim nor conduct a cultural struggle.
The leadership of the Austrian National Socialists must
be independent of the Reich and remain responsible to
Austria. I would have, as Minister of Security to
oppose any kind of illegal activity. Against this the
Austrian National Socialist would be permitted full
freedom of activity to work for the closest cooperation
of Austria and Germany. Hitler agreed to my plans but
expressed certain doubts whether Dr. Schuschnigg would
be willing to go so far. During my conference with
Hitler, Keppler and Ribbentrop waited in the ante-room
of Hitler’s office.” (3425-PS)
Seyss-Inquart’s fellow Nazi conspirators regarded his
position as Councillor of State in the Austrian Government
as most important to them, because he had a mandate from the
German Nazis in power, which he was attempting to carry out.
Because his negotiations with Chancellor Schuschnigg seemed
to be running aground, Seyss-Inquart sent a report of that
fact to Keppler by courier, stating that he felt compelled
to return his mandate, and expressing a desire to discuss
the matter before acting accordingly. Keppler immediately
sought advice from Goering in a letter dated 6 January 1938.
On that same day Goering’s secretary was instructed to
telephone instructions to Keppler to do anything to avoid
the resignations of Councillor of State Dr. Seyss-Inquart
and State Minister Glaise von Horstenau. Keppler received
this telephone message on 7 January 1938, and on 8 January
1938 wrote a letter to Seyss-Inquart informing him of
Goering’s instructions and relaying Goering’s request not to
give up the mandate under any circumstances without
discussing the matter with Goering. (5473-PS; 3397-PS)
Despite assertions, in statements since his arrest and
indictment, to the effect that he desired a union of Austria
and Germany in an evolutionary manner and by legal means,
Seyss-Inquart has on other occasions made statements to the
contrary. His letter of 14 July 1939 to Goering is
particularly illuminating on this point:
“I told myself in July 1934 that we must fight this
clerical regime on its own ground in order to give the
Fuehrer a chance to use whatever method he desires. I
told myself that
[Page 965]
this Austria was worth a mass. I have stuck to this
attitude with an iron determination because I and my
friends have had to fight against the whole political
church, and Free Masonry, the Jewry, in short, against
everything in Austria. The slightest weakness which we
might have displayed would undoubtedly have led to our
political annihilation; it would have deprived the
Fuehrer of the means and tools to carry out his
ingenious political solution for Austria as became
evident in the days of March 1938. I have been fully
conscious of the fact that I am following a path which
is not comprehensible to the masses and also not to my
party comrades. I have followed it calmly and would
without hesitation follow it again because I am
satisfied that at one point I could serve the Fuehrer
as a tool in his work, even though my former attitude,
even now, gives occasion to very worthy and honorable
Party comrades to doubt my trustworthiness. I have
never paid attention to such things because I am
satisfied with the opinion which the Fuehrer and the
men close to him have of me.” (2219-PS)
Another statement of the defendant, which throws some light
on this point, is found in his letter to Himmler dated 19
August 1939:
“On 8 November 1938, the Fuehrer invited several
political leaders for supper. The Fuehrer asked me to
be next to him. We discussed the situation in Ostmark.
I told him that in accordance with his order, we
started to dissolve the competence of the Austrian
government by giving the powers partly to the Gauen and
partly to the central leaders. But there still would
remain certain affairs which would be common for all
Gauen.” (5271-PS)
Furthermore, Seyss-Inquart has made the following statement:
“I was happy that the Anschluss of Austria with the
German Reich had come at last after so many vain
endeavors since 1918 because I was in favor of the
Anschluss of Austria with the Reich under many
conditions. I was aware at least to a certain extent of
the harshness of the National Socialist regime, but I
was of the opinion that these two German countries
belonged together and that the German people should
solve their own internal affairs and difficulties. I
was convinced that the harshness of the National
Socialist regime chiefly because of its achievement of
the National aim — cancellation of discriminatory
peace treaties and achievement of the right of self-
determinationwould in time be surmounted.” (425-PS)
[Page 966]
The subversive machinations of the Austrian Nazis to bring
about the absorption of Austria by the Greater German Reich
was described in detail by Dr. Friedrich Rainer, a leading
Austrian Nazi and a collaborator of Seyss-Inquart who became
one of Hitler’s Gauleiters, in a report prepared by him and
forwarded to Buerckel. A copy of this report accompanied by
a letter of transmittal was later sent to Seyss-Inquart by
Dr. Rainer. In substance, the report related how the Nazi
party lost a parliamentary battle in 1933, continued its
efforts to force admission of its representatives into the
Austrian government, and finally flowered into the
unsuccessful “Putsch” of July 1934, which, in effect,
destroyed the Nazi organization. Following the unsuccessful
"Putsch", Hitler liquidated the first stage of the battle,
and instructed Franz von Papen to restore normal
relationships between the two countries. Accordingly, a new
method of political penetration was adopted. The result was
that Hinterleitner, an Austrian Nazi got in touch with the
lawyer Seyss-Inquart, who had connections with Dr. Wachter
originating from Seyss-Inquart’s support of the July
uprising. Seyss-Inquart also had a good position in the
legal field and especially well established relations with
Christian Social politicians. Dr. Seyss-Inquart came from
the ranks of the “Styrian Heimatschutz” and had become a
Nazi party member when the entire “Styrian Heimatschutz” was
incorporated in the NSDAP. The reason for utilizing Seyss-
Inquart appears in the following excerpt from the covering
letter which accompanied Dr. Rainer’s report to Reich
Commissar Gauleiter Josef Buerckel, dated 16 July 1939:
“I think the main reason for the fact that the person
of Dr. Seyss-Inquart seemed to Hitler and to public
opinion to have stepped in the limelight in those March
days, was that no position existed in the party which
one might have presented oneself to the public, and
that there was no man who had the guts to let himself
be presented. The actual reason was that the party
leadership had to remain secret during the whole
illegal fight, secret even from the Reich German
public.” 812-PS)
Thus it is clear why Seyss-Inquart was surreptitiously a
member of the Austrian Nazi Party after it was declared
illegal in 1934.
Dr. Rainer goes on to report that full recognition of the
party leadership was given by Seyss-Inquart and also that
the defendant was in permanent contact with Captain Leopold,
who became a member of the staff of Hess. After
Hinterleitner was arrested, Dr. Rainer became his successor
as leader of the Austrian Nazi Party, and, on 16 July 1936,
Dr. Rainer and Globocnik visited
[Page 967]
Hitler at Obersalzburg, where they received a clear
explanation of the situation and the wishes of the Fuehrer.
Subsequently, on 17 July 1936, all illegal Gauleiters met in
Anif near Salzburg, where they received a complete report
from Dr. Rainer on the statement of the Fuehrer and his
political instructions for carrying out the fight. After the
agreement between Germany and Austria on 11 July 1936,
Hitler appointed Wilhelm Keppler as Chief of a mixed
commission to supervise the execution of the agreement. At
the same time Keppler was given full authority for the Nazi
Party in Austria. (812-PS)
(6) The activities of Seyss-Inquart and his fellow Nazi
coconspirators and collaborators forced the then Austrian
government into a critical situation and a struggle for
survival. As the result of the plans, maneuvers, and
disturbances created by the Nazis in Austria, Schuschnigg,
Chancellor of Austria, accompanied by his State Secretary,
Guido Schmid, conferred with Hitler at Berchtesgaden on 12
February 1938. Dr. Muehlmann was also present but not as a
member of the Schuschnigg delegation. At this meeting the
possibilities for military action by Germany against Austria
were demonstrated to the Chancellor. The ultimate result was
that Chancellor Schuschnigg had no choice but to accept the
demands of Hitler that the Austrian Nazi Party be legalized;
that amnesty be granted to Austrian Nazis already convicted
for illegal activities; and that Seyss-Inquart be appointed
Minister of the Interior and Security in the Austrian
cabinet, (2995-PS; 3254-PS; 3425-PS; 2469-PS; 2464-PS)
A few days after the Berchtesgaden meeting of Hitler and
Schuschnigg, and immediately after his appointment as
Minister of the Interior and Security of Austria, Seyss-
Inquart went to Berlin for a conference with Hitler. Upon
arrival in Berlin he was met by Keppler, Hitler’s special
delegate on Austrian affairs, who took him to Himmler. After
a short conference with Himmler, the defendant was conducted
to Hitler, to whom he gave the Nazi salute and with whom he
had a conference lasting two hours and ten minutes. Foreign
Minister von Ribbentrop and Keppler waited in the ante-
chamber during the conference. Seyss-Inquart first offered
Hitler an explanation for greeting him with the Hitler
salute, by saying: “I consider him as the Fuehrer of the
German people who led us out of the discriminations of the
peace treaties.” During the conference, he rendered a report
to Hitler concerning the Austrian situation since June of
1934 and presented his own program for Hitler’s approval.
Hitler expressed his approval of the plan but told Seyss-
Inquart that he doubted
[Page 968]
whether Chancellor Schuschnigg would be willing to go so
far. It seems clear that Hitler’s doubt concerning
Schuschnigg’s approval of the Seyss-Inquart plan referred
solely to Seyss-Inquart’s proposal to allow Austrian Nazis
to “conduct their activities according to the Austrian
Constitution and on those lines find their way to the
Reich,” because all other portions of his plan had
previously been adopted as a result of the Berchtesgaden
Agreement. (3254-PS; 3425-PS; 2484-PS)
Seyss-Inquart has asserted that, upon his return to Vienna
after his conference with Hitler, he reported to Chancellor
Schuschnigg the content of his discussion and urged the
Chancellor to make a decision about the Austrian National
Socialist question. He then attended rallies of the Austrian
National Socialists held in various places in Austria to
inform them of the content of his conference with Hitler.
Two of the principal meetings were held at Graz and Linz
(3425-PS; 3254-PS). Considerable doubt is cast upon the
truth of Seyss-Inquart’s assertions that he reported the
contents of his conference with Hitler to Chancellor
Schuschnigg and in public meetings of the Austrian Nazis, by
a statement contained in a letter written by Seyss-Inquart
to Himmler on 19 August 1939. The statement is as follows:
“I had a conversation of over two hours with the
Fuehrer on 17 February 1938, in which I explained to
him my point of view. I would only be able to make
statements about the content of this conversation if
the Fuehrer would grant me permission. I left this
discussion as a very sincere man and with a feeling of
great happiness to be of help to the Fuehrer.” (3271-
PS)
(7) Finally Chancellor Schuschnigg determined to go before
the people for a decision on the question of Austrian
independence. Chancellor Schuschnigg planned to hold a
plebiscite on that precise question and fixed 13 March 1938
as a date upon which the plebiscite would be held. The
Chancellor took Seyss-Inquart into his confidence and
discussed the matter of the plebiscite with him. The
Chancellor requested Seyss-Inquart to keep the matter a
secret until noon of the next day, and the defendant
promised to do so. Thereafter, Seyss-Inquart prepared a
letter to Schuschnigg objecting to the plebiscite on
constitutional grounds and alleging that the manner in which
the plebiscite was to be held would not allow the Austrians
to express their own desires. Seyss-Inquart admits that a
copy of his letter was delivered to Hitler in Berlin by
Globotschnigg. (254-PS; 425-PS)
On 9 March 1938, a meeting of the Austrian Nazis was held be-
[Page 969]
cause they had learned, through an illegal information
service, that a plebiscite was to be held. Dr. Rainer
describes this meeting in the following
“The 'Landesleitung' received word about the planned
plebiscite through illegal information services on 9
March 1938 at 10 a. m. At the session, which was called
immediately afterwards, Seyss-Inquart explained that he
had known about this information only a few hours, but
that he could not talk about it because he had given
his word to keep silent on this subject. But during the
talks he made us understand that the illegal
information we received was based on truth, and that in
view of the new situation, he had-been cooperating with
the 'Landesleitung' from the very first moment.
Klausner, Jury, Rainer, Globotschnigg, and Seyss-
Inquart were present at the first talks which were held
at 10 a. m. There it was decided that first, the
Fuehrer had to be informed immediately; secondly, the
opportunity for the Fuehrer to intervene must be given
to him by way of an official declaration made by
Minister Seyss-Inquart to Schuschnigg; and thirdly,
Seyss-Inquart must negotiate with the government until
clear instructions and orders were received from the
Fuehrer. Seyss-Inquart and Rainer together composed a
letter to Schuschnigg, and only one copy of it was
brought to the Fuehrer by Globocnik, who flew to him on
the afternoon of 9 March 1938.”
Seyss-Inquart himself admits that he attended this meeting,
which was held at the Regina Hotel, Vienna (3425-PS; 3254-
PS). The defendant was informed at this meeting that he
would receive a letter from Hitler by messenger the next
morning. (3425-PS; 3254-PS).
Early on the morning of 11 March 1938, Seyss-Inquart
received Hitler’s letter. He describes it as having
contained several erroneous statements and containing a
demand that a decision should be arrived at before noon;
that in case of rejection the Reich Government would
denounce the agreement of 12 February 1938 and military
action must be understood. According to Seyss-Inquart,
Hitler also gave expression to his belief that there would
be disturbances in Austria if Chancellor Schuschnigg would
not relent and that the Reich would come to the help of
Austria if Austria demanded go. Glaise-Horstenau arrived by
plane in Vienna early that same morning with the information
that Berlin was greatly excited and that military steps were
in preparation. (3254-PS; 3425-PS)
[Page 970]
(8) Seyss-Inquart then proceeded to carry out Hitler's
orders and to fulfill the plans made by himself and his
fellow Nazi conspirators. Dr. Rainer in his report to Reich
Commissar Gauleiter Josef Buerckel, and in his covering
letter dated 6 July 1939, related his version of the
sequence of events during this period and described the
precise role of Seyss-Inquart, as he viewed it. He
complained about the fact that Hitler and the general public
seemed to give Seyss-Inquart all the credit for the
annexation of Austria by Germany. The following quotation
from this letter and report is significant:
“Soon after taking over in Austria, Klausner,
Globocnik, and I flew to Berlin to report to Hitler's
deputy, Hess, about the events which led to our taking
over the government. We did this because we had the
impression that the general opinion, perhaps also
Hitler’s own, was that the liberation depended more on
Austrian matters of state rather than the Party. To be
more exact, Hitler especially mentioned Dr. Seyss-
Inquart alone; and public opinion gave him alone credit
for the change and thus believed him to have played the
sole leading role.” (812-PS)
Dr. Rainer then proceeded to describe just what happened in
those critical days, and outlined the final instructions
given by him for Friday, 1 March 1938. He explained that
three situations might develop within the following days:
“1st Case: The plebiscite will not be held. In this
case, a great demonstration must be held.
“2nd Case: Schuschnigg will resign. In this case, a
demonstration was ordered in taking over the government
power. “3rd Case: Schuschnigg will take up the fight.
In this case, all party leaders were ordered to act
upon their own initiative, using all means to capture
the position of power.” (812-PS)
Dr. Seyss-Inquart took part in these talks with the
Gauleiters.
“On Friday, 11 March, the Minister Glaise-Horstenau
arrived in Vienna after a visit with the Fuehrer. After
talks with Seyss-Inquart he went to see the chancellor.
At 11:30 a.m. the 'Landesleitung' had a meeting at
which Klausner, Rainer, Globocnik, Jury, Seyss-Inquart,
Glaise-Horstenau, Fishboeck and Muehlmann participated.
Dr. Seyss-Inquart reported on his talks with Dr.
Schuschnigg which had ended in a rejection of the
proposal of the two ministers.
“In regard to Rainer’s proposal, von Klausner ordered
that the government be presented with an ultimatum,
expiring at 1400 hours, signed by legal political,
'Front' men, includ-
[Page 971]
ing both ministers and also State Councillors Fishboeck
and Jury, for the establishment of a voting date in
three weeks and a free and secret ballot in accordance
with the constitution.
“On the basis of written evidence which Glaise-
Horstenau had brought with him, a leaflet, to be
printed in millions of copies, and a telegram to the
Fuehrer calling for help, were prepared.
“Klausner placed the leadership of the final political
actions in the hands of Rainer and Globocnik.
Schuschnigg called a session of all ministers for 2:00
p.m. Rainer agreed with Seyss-Inquart that Rainer would
send the telegram to the Fuehrer and the statement to
the population at 3:00 p.m. and at the same time he
would start all necessary actions to take over power
unless he received news from the session of the
ministers' council before that time. During this time
all measures had been prepared. At 2:30 Seyss-Inquart
'phoned Rainer and informed him that Schuschnigg had
been unable to take the pressure and had recalled the
plebiscite but that he had refused to call a new
plebiscite and had ordered the strongest police
measures for maintaining order. Rainer asked whether
the two ministers had resigned, and Seyss-Inquart
answered: 'No.' Rainer informed the 'Reichskanzlei'
through the German Embassy, and received an answer from
Goering through the same channels that the Fuehrer will
not consent to partial solutions and that Schuschnigg
must resign. Seyss-Inquart was informed of this by
Globocnik and Muehlmann; talks were had between Seyss-
Inquart and Schuschnigg: Schuschnigg resigned. Seyss-
Inquart asked Rainer what measures the party wished
taken. Rainer’s answer: Reestablishment of the
government by Seyss-Inquart, legalization of the party,
and calling up of the SS and SA as auxiliaries to the
police force. Seyss-Inquart promised to have these
measures carried out, but very soon the announcement
followed that everything might be threatened by the
resistance of Miklas. Meanwhile word arrived from the
German Embassy that the Fuehrer expected the
establishment of a government under Seyss-Inquart with
a national majority, the legalization of the party, and
permission for the legion to return, all within the
specified time of 7:30 p.m.; otherwise, German troops
would cross the border at 8:00 p.m. At G:00 p.m. Rainer
and Globocnik, accompanied by Muehlmann, went to the
Chancellor’s office to carry out this errand.
[Page 972]
“Due to the cooperation of the above-mentioned people
with group leader Keppler and other officials of the
Reich and due to the activities of other contact-men in
Austria, it was possible to obtain the appointment of
Seyss-Inquart as 'Staatsrat' [councillor of State] in
July 1937. Due to the same facts, the Chancellor Dr.
Schuschnigg was forced to take a new so-called
'satisfactory action'. Through all this a new and
stronger political position was won in the Austrian
system. The National-Socialist Party became acceptable
again in the political field and became a partner with
whom one had to negotiate, even when it was not
officially incorporated into internal Austrian
political developments. This complicated political
maneuver, accompanied by the steadily increasing
pressure from the Reich, led to talks between the
Fuehrer and Schuschnigg at the Obersalzberg. Here
Gruppenfuehrer Keppler presented the concrete political
demands of the fighting underground movement, which he
estimated according to his personal experiences and the
information he received. The results of these talks
were the right of a free acknowledgment of the National
Socialist movement on the one hand and the recognition
of an independent Austrian state on the other hand, as
well as the appointment of Seyss-Inquart as Minister of
Interior and Public Safety, as a person who will
guarantee to both sides the proper carrying out of the
agreements. In this way Seyss-Inquart occupied the key
position and was in the center of all obvious political
actions. A legal base in the government was won for the
party. This resulted in a paralysis of the 'system
apparatus' [Schuschnigg government] at a time when a
revolution needed to be carried out. Through this, the
basis for a new attack on the Schuschnigg government
was won.
“Situation: Miklas negotiated with Ender for the
creation of a government which included, blacks, reds
and National Socialists, and proposed the post of Vice-
Chancellor to Seyss-Inquart. The latter rejected it and
told Rainer that he was not able to negotiate by
himself because he was personally involved, and
therefore a weak and unpleasant political situation
might result. Rainer negotiated with Zernette. Director
of the cabinet Huber, Guido Schmid, Glaise-Horstenau,
Legation Councillor Stein, Military Attache General
Muffe, and the 'Gruppenfuehrer' Keppler, who had
arrived in the meantime, were also negotiating. At 7:00
Seyss-Inquart entered the negotiations again. Situation
at 7:30 p.m.: Stubborn
[Page 973]
refusal of Miklas to appoint Seyss-Inquart as
Chancellor; appeal to the world in case of a German
invasion.
“Gruppenfuehrer Keppler explained that the Fuehrer did
not yet have an urgent reason for the invasion. This
reason must first be created. The situation in Vienna
and in the country is most dangerous. It is feared that
street fighting will break out any moment because
Rainer ordered the entire party to demonstrate at 3
o'clock. Rainer proposed storming and seizing the
government palace in order to force the reconstruction
of the government. The proposal was rejected by Keppler
but was carried out by Rainer after he discussed it
with Globocnik. After 8:00 p.m. the SA and SS marched
in and occupied the government buildings and all
important positions in the city of Vienna. At 8:30 p.m.
Rainer, with the approval of Klausner, ordered all
Gauleiters of Austria to take over power in all eight
'gaus' of Austria, with the help of the SS and SA and
with instructions that all government representatives
who try to resist should be told that this action was
taken on order of Chancellor Seyss-Inquart.
“With this, the revolution broke out, and this resulted
in the complete occupation of Austria within three
hours and the taking over of all important posts by the
party ***.
“The seizure of power was the work of the party
supported by the Fuehrer’s threat of invasion and the
legal standing of Seyss-Inquart in the government. The
national result in the form of the taking over of the
government by Seyss-Inquart was due to the actual
seizure of power by the party on one hand, and the
political efficiency of Dr. Seyss-Inquart in his
territory on 1;he other; but both factors may be
considered only in the relation to the Fuehrer's
decision on 9 March 1938 to solve the Austrian problem
under any circumstances and the orders consequently
issued by the Fuehrer.” (812-PS)
Seyss-Inquart’s own story of the events on 11 March 1938 is
not fundamentally different, although he does show a marked
tendency to minimize his role in the planning,
precipitating, and accomplishment of the annexation of
Austria by Germany, in a statement signed by him after his
arrest and indictment:
“At 10 o'clock in the morning Glaise-Horstenau and I
went to the Bundes Chancellery and conferred for about
two hours with Dr. Schuschnigg. We told him of all that
we knew, particularly about the possibility of
disturbances and preparations by the Reich. The
Chancellor said that he would
[Page 974]
give his decision by 1400 hours. While I was with
Glaise-Horstenau and Dr. Schuschnigg, I was repeatedly
called to the telephone to speak to Goering. He
informed me, (the demands of the Reich steadily
increasing) that the agreement of 2/12 had been
cancelled, and demanded Dr. Schuschnigg’s resignation
and my appointment as Chancellor. I delivered this
information verbally to Dr. Schuschnigg and withdrew
from the conference.
“In the meantime Keppler arrived from Berlin and had a
conference in the Bundes Chancellery, I believe also
with President Miklas. The latter refused to concede to
the demands and sought to find various other solutions.
When Keppler arrived from Berlin he showed me the
contents of a telegram which I, as leader of the
provisional Austrian Government, was to send to Hitler
and in which I was to request sending of German troops
to Austria to put down disorders. I refused as I did
not want to establish myself as head of a provisional
government, and there were no disorders in Austria.
Keppler repeatedly urged me about the telegram. Around
6 p.m. I told him that he knew my standpoint and should
do what he wished with Berlin. Keppler, as I have been
able to confirm from records available, understood my
answer and did not send off the telegram at that time.
Around 7:30 p.m. a frontier police post announced that
German troops were crossing the frontier. Thereupon Dr.
Schuschnigg gave his well known farewell speech over
the radio. Upon-requests from various sides I followed
with a speech over the radio, stating that I was still
functioning as Minister of Interior and Security,
requesting preservation of peace and order, and gave
directions that no resistance should be offered the
German
“As I am able to gather from the records available, I
was again requested about 10 p.m. to give my sanction
to another somewhat altered telegram, about which I
informed President Miklas and Dr. Schuschnigg. Finally
President Miklas appointed me Chancellor and a little
while later he approved of my proposed ministers.”
(3425-PS)
However, Seyss-Inquart displayed undue modesty in this
statement. His letter to Himmler indicates how active he was
on 11 March 1938, and reveals that he was not satisfied with
making demands upon Chancellor Schuschnigg, but also handed
an ultimatum to President Miklas:
“It is only possible that Buerckels made a statement
that in the critical hours it was hard to find me.
After I had handed
[Page 975]
an ultimatum to Miklas which was respited until 5:45
p.m. I took a recess of about a half hour to catch some
fresh air. I conceded that I was, in a way, exhausted
from the things which happened just a few hours before
that and I tried to find recreation in the fresh air.
Besides that I planned to take a look at the situation
on the streets. Furthermore, I wanted to make a phone
call to Berlin, not from the Chancellery, but from some
other place. Phone calls from the Chancellery were
always tapped whereas they were only sometimes tapped
from other places. I was sure they didn’t need me until
5:30 p.m., because the men of the old system would not
make a decision a second earlier than they had to.”
(3271-PS)
A stenographic transcript of Goering’s telephone
conversation with Seyss-Inquart confirms the fact that Seyss-
Inquart was ordered to demand Chancellor Schuschnigg's
resignation and the appointment of himself as Chancellor.
(2949-PS)
This stenographic record of Goering’s conversations also
reveals that Seyss-Inquart had an agent keep in contact with
Goering during the negotiations with Chancellor Schuschnigg.
Seyss-Inquart was given an order by Goering through this
agent to report by 7:30 p.m., 11 March 1938, that he had
formed a new government. He was informed that the foreign
political aspect would be handled exclusively by Germany and
that Hitler would talk with him about this matter at a
future date.
In addition the stenographic transcript of these telephone
conversations show that the selection of individual members
of the cabinet of the new government to be established by
Seyss-Inquart was to be made by the Nazi conspirators in
Berlin. (2949-PS)
At 1726 hours on the night of 11 March 1938, Seyss-Inquart
reported to Goering by telephone as ordered. He reported
that President Miklas had accepted the resignation of
Chancellor Schuschnigg but wanted to appoint a man like
Ender to the Chancellorship. He further reported his
suggestion to the President that the Chancellorship be
entrusted to him — Seyss-Inquartand also reported that “We
have ordered the SA and the SS to take over police duties.”
Thereupon Goering ordered Seyss-Inquart to go with Lt. Gen.
Muff to President Miklas and inform him that if the demands
were not met immediately German troops, already advancing to
the frontier, would invade Austria that night and Austria
would cease to exist. An audience with the President was to
be demanded. The invasion would be stopped only if President
Miklas entrusted Seyss-Inquart with the Chancellorship.
Seyss-Inquart was also instructed to call out the National
Social-
[Page 976]
ists of Austria all over the country, because Austrian Nazis
should even then be in the streets. Seyss-Inquart was to
report again at 7:30 p.m. (2949-PS)
The telegram, already prepared, asking Hitler to send German
troops into Austria, over the defendant Seyss-Inquart's
signature, was transmitted as ordered and agreed upon. (2463-
PS)
Even before Seyss-Inquart received his appointment as
Chancellor of Austria he dispatched a telegram using that
title. An affidavit of August Eigruber states as follows:
“On the evening of 11 March 1938 at between 8 and 9
o'clock p.m. he received two telegrams; one of which
came from Dr. Seyss-Inquart, as Bundes Chancellor of
Austria, and the other from one Dr. Rainer; that the
telegram from Dr. Seyss-Inquart appointed the affiant
as temporary Landeshauptmann in Upper Austria; and that
the telegram from Dr. Rainer appointed the affiant
temporary leader of the National Socialist Party in
Upper Austria.” (2909-PS)
Schuschnigg presented his resignation, which was accepted by
President Miklas. The appointment of Seyss-Inquart as
Chancellor came late on the evening of 11 March 1938. (2465-
PS)
(9) Having infiltrated into the Austrian Government of
Chancellor Schuschnigg according to plan, Seyss-Inquart
exploited his opportunities to carry out the plan to is
ultimate conclusion, i.e. German annexation of Austria. The
first act of Seyss-Inquart as the new Chancellor of Austria
was to hold a telephone conversation with Hitler early in
the morning of 12 March 1938. He has described the substance
of this telephone conversation as follows:
“During the morning of 12 March I held a telephone
conversation with Hitler in which I suggested that
while German troops were entering Austria, Austrian
troops as a symbol should march into the Reich. Hitler
agreed to this suggestion and we agreed to meet in
Linz, Upper Austria, later on that same day.” (3425-PS)
Thereafter, on 12 March 1938, Seyss-Inquart greeted Hitler
on the balcony of the City Hall of Linz, Upper Austria. In
his ensuing speech, Seyss-Inquart announced that Article 88
of the Treaty of St. Germain, which provided that “the
independence of Austria is inalienable otherwise than with
the consent of the Council of the League of Nations,” was no
longer operative.
“I then flew to Linz with Himmler, who had arrived in
Vienna from Berlin. I greeted Hitler on the balcony of
the City Hall,
[Page 977]
and said that Article 88 of the Treaty of St. Germain
was now inoperative.” (3425-PS; L-231)
In his memorandum entitled “The Austrian Question” Seyss-
Inquart describes his meeting with Hitler as follows:
“In the afternoon, I flew with Himmler to Linz and
drove then to meet Hitler. Hitler entered Linz in the
evening. I never saw such an enthusiasm. The welcome
was spontaneous and of no precedence. In my (welcome)
speech I declared that Article 88 of the St. Germain
Treaty was no longer binding.” (3254-PS; 2485-PS)
Seyss-Inquart then drove back to Vienna on the morning of 13
March 1938. His Secretary of State for Security begged that
he be allowed to resign, a decision he reached as a result
of a conversation with Himmler, which had caused him to fear
for his own personal welfare. Seyss-Inquart then nominated
Kaltenbrunner for State Secretary for Security, and the
nomination was accepted by President Miklas. About noon
State Under Secretary Stuckart of the German Reich Ministry
of the Interior brought a proposal for a reannexation act
uniting Austria to Germany, and announced Hitler’s wish for
prompt execution of it. Seyss-Inquart then called a meeting
of his Council of Ministers, and on his proposal the council
adopted the act. (3254-PS)
Seyss-Inquart, realizing that if the President of Austria
resigned his office, then he, Seyss-Inquart, would be the
successor, went to President Miklas with the information
about the action of the Council of Ministers. Seyss-Inquart
describes this meeting with President Miklas as follows:
“In the case where the Bund President would, for any
reason, either have resigned his functions or be, for
some time, impeded in fulfilling them, his prerogatives
were to go over to the Bund Chancellor, I went to the
Bund President with Dr. Wolff. The President told me
that he did not know whether this development would be
of welfare to the Austrian Nation, but that he did not
wish to interfere and preferred to resign his
functions, so that all rights would come into my hands,
according to the Constitution. The possibility of my
dismissal or resignation were only slightly mentioned
and recognized as inopportune in the prevailing
situation.” (3254-PS)
President Miklas then resigned and Seyss-Inquart succeeded
to his office. (2466-PS)
[Page 978]
Thereafter Seyss-Inquart signed the Act uniting Austria with
Germany and hurried back to Linz to report this news to
Hitler: “Then there were some letters exchanged between the
Bund President and myself, confirming our conversation and
his retirement. Thereafter I drove to Linz, where I arrived
around mid-night and reported to the Fuehrer the
accomplishment of the Anschluss Law. Hitler was very much
impressed by it; for a while he remained quiet, then tears
dropped from his eyes down his cheeks. He said then that he
was especially happy because his Motherland had achieved her
annexation to the Reich without any shedding of blood.”
(3254-PS)
On 14 March 1938 Hitler entered Vienna. On 15 March 1938
there was a public demonstration in Vienna- and Hitler
introduced Seyss-Inquart as “Reich Statthalter for Austria.”
Hitler then put him in charge of the Civil Administration of
Austria, while political matters were assigned to Gauleiter
Josef Buerckel, who shortly thereafter was made Reich
Commissar for the Anschluss. (3425-PS)
(10) Despite Seyss-Inquart’s modesty since arrest and
indictment, his fellow Nazi conspirators recognized the
importance of his part in the Austrian Anschluss.
Goering made a speech in Vienna on 26 March 1938 in which he
said:
“At this moment [announcement of the plebiscite in
Austria it has been established that now the decision
really came. A complete unanimity between the Fuehrer
and the N.S. confidants inside of Austria existed.
According to their opinion also the hour of action had
come, but they thought they could not use any more
democratic methods in negotiations and they took the
law of action in their own strong hand and forced the
others to retreat. If the N.S. rising succeeded so
quickly and thoroughly without bloodshed, it is first
of all due to the intelligent and decisive firmness of
the present Reichsstatthalter Seyss-Inquart and his
confidants. But this too proved the correctness of the
previous continued politics because if our confidants
had not been in the government, this whole course of
events would not have been possible.” (3270-PS)
According to Dr. Rainer, Hitler and the general public gave
Seyss-Inquart credit for playing the leading role in the
annexation of Austria by Germany. This is evidenced by the
covering letter' written by Dr. Rainer, dated 6 July 1939,
to Reich Commissar Gauleiter Josef Buerckel:
[Page 979]
“We had the impression that the general opinion,
perhaps also Hitler’s own, was that the liberation
depended more upon Austrian matters of state rather
than the Party. To be more exact, Hitler especially
mentioned Seyss-Inquart alone; and public opinion gave
him alone credit for the change and thus believed him
to have played the sole leading role.” (812-PS)
In his report to Reich Commissar Buerckel, Dr. Rainer said:
“But as a result of the agreement at Berchtesgaden and
the statement of the Fuehrer made to him during his
state visit to Berlin, Seyss-Inquart was the personal
trustee of the Fuehrer and directly responsible to him
for the illegal NSDAP in Austria within the confines of
his political sphere. *** The seizure of power was the
work of the party supported by the Fuehrer’s threat of
invasion and the legal standing of Seyss-Inquart in the
government.
“The national result in the form of the taking over of
the government by Seyss-Inquart was due to the actual
seizure of power by the Party on one hand and the
political efficiency of Dr. Seyss-Inquart in his
territory on the other.” (812-PS)
Hans Frank recognized the importance of the services
rendered by Seyss-Inquart to the Nazi cause in Austria. When
Seyss-Inquart was about to leave Poland to become Reich
commissar of the Occupied Netherlands Territories, Frank
extolled him as follows:
“But your name without that is shining like a light
through the history of the Third Reich, since you are
the creator of the National Socialist Austria.” (3465-
PS)
(11) The Nazi conspirators within the German Reich evidenced
their intentions of annexing Austria in many ways. Hitler,
on the first page of Chapter 1 of Mein Kampf, said:
“Today it seems to me providential that Fate should
have chosen Braunau on the Inn as my birthplace. For
this little town lies on the boundary between two
German states which we of the younger generation at
least have made it our life work to reunite by every
means at our disposal.
“German-Austria must return to the great German Mother
Country, and not because of any economic
considerations. No, and again no: even if such a union
were unimportant from an economic point of view; yes,
even if it were harmful, it must nevertheless take
place. One blood demands one Reich. Never will the
German Nation possess the moral right to engage in
Colonial politics until, at least, it embraces its own
sons within a single state. Only when the Reich
[Page 980]
borders include the very last German, but can no longer
guarantee his daily bread, will the moral right to
acquire foreign soil arise from the distress of our own
people. Their sword will become our plow, and from the
tears of war the daily bread of future generations will
grow.”
Seyss-Inquart devoted his efforts to legalize the sale and
circulation of Mein Kampf in Austria. His letter to Keppler,
German Secretary of State for Austrian Affairs, contained
the following passage.
“The Teinfaltstrasse is very well informed even if not
in detail about my efforts regarding the re-permission
of the book 'Mein Kampf'.” (3392-PS)
Goering-and Schacht both told an American diplomat that it
was Germany’s determination to annex Austria and Sudetenland
to the Reich. (L-151)
One of the missions of von Papen, as German Ambassador to
Austria, was to effect a change in the personnel of the
Austrian Cabinet headed by Chancellor von Schuschnigg and to
eliminate anti-Nazi opposition, particularly in the Ministry
of Interior and Security. (2246-PS)
The German Reich applied economic pressure upon Austria. One
of the means adopted was the law of 24 March 1933, which
required payment of 1,000 Reichs Marks by every German
crossing the border into Austria (3467-PS). Kurt von
Schuschnigg, former Chancellor of Austria, in his-affidavit
of 19 November 1945, described this economic pressure upon
Austria by Germany in the following words:
“*** During my tenure of office as Federal Chancellor
of Austria, more particularly on 11 July 1936, I
negotiated with the then existing government of the
German Reich, and with Adolf Hitler, an Agreement more
particularly known as the Agreement of 11 July 1936.
“I further depose and say that prior to the
consummation of the aforesaid Agreement, the German
Government had placed certain economic barriers against
trade between Germany and Austria such as — to-wit --
the 1,000 mark barrier which said barrier provided that
any German citizen who crosses the border of Germany
into Austria is obliged to pay to the German Government
the sum of 1,000 German Reichs Marks for the privilege
thereof — Austria had been accustomed before this
edict of the German Government to receive into Austria
some one hundred thousand visitors from Germany
annually.
“I further state that the aforesaid barrier placed
against
[Page 981]
Austria was extremely injurious to Austrian agriculture
and industrial interests.” (2994-PS)
Jodl stated in his diary that in 1938 the aim of German
policy was the elimination of Austria and Czechoslovakia.
The will of resistance in both countries was undermined by
pressure on the government as well as by propaganda and the
fifth column. At the same time German military preparations
for attack were worked out (1780-PS). ("Case Otto” was the
code name for the Austrian campaign, and “Case Green” was
the code name for the battle plans against Czechoslovakia.)
Jodl also stated in his diary that when Chancellor von
Schuschnigg announced the proposed plebiscite for 13 March
1938, Hitler was determined to intervene. Goering, General
Reichenau, and Minister Glaise-Horstenau were called before
Hitler. “Case Otto” was to be prepared, and the mobilization
of army units and air forces was ordered on 10 March 1938.
The march into Austria took place on 11 March 1938. (1780-
PS)
(12) Hitler and the Nazi conspirators completed the
annexation of Austria by decree. On 11 March 1938 Hitler
issued a directive regarding “Case Otto” addressed to the
German armed forces, classified Top Secret, in which he
stated that, if other measures proved, useless, his
intentions were to invade Austria with armed force. The
directive prescribed operational duties and assigned
objectives. It further provided that resistance was to be
broken up ruthlessly with armed force. (C-102)
Later on that same day, at 8:45 p. m., Hitler issued a
second directive, which stated in substance, that the
demands of the German ultimatum to Austria had not been
fulfilled, and for that reason the entry of German armed
forces into Austria would commence at daybreak on 12 March
1938. He directed that all objectives were to be reached by
exerting all forces to the full as quickly as possible. (C-
182)
On 13 March 1938 Germany in violation of Article 80 of the
Treaty of Versailles, formally incorporated Austria into the
Reich by decree and declared- it to be a province of the
German Reich. (2307-PS)
Officials of the Province of Austria were then required by
decree to take an oath of personal obedience to Hitler. Jews
were barred from taking this oath, and thus could not retain
offices and positions previously held. (2311-PS)
Members of the Austrian Army were required to take an oath
of personal allegiance to Hitler as their Supreme Commander.
(2936-PS)
[Page 982]
Compulsory military service was instituted in Austria by
law, which provided the Greater German Reich with additional
man-power for its armed forces. (1660-PS)
(13) Seyss-Inquart participated in the execution of the
plans for aggression against Czechoslovakia. In an official
report to Viscount Halifax, Basil Newton, an official of the
British Government, related some of the “gangster methods
employed by the Reich to obtain its ends in Czecho-
Slovakia.” The part played by Seyss-Inquart was described in
this report in the following words:
“On M. Sidor’s return to Bratislava, after he had been
entrusted with the Government in place of Mgr. Tiso,
Herr Buerckel, Herr Seyss-Inquart and five German
generals came at about 10 pm on the evening of
Saturday, the 11th March, into a Cabinet meeting in
progress at Bratislava, and told the Slovak Government
that they should proclaim the independence of Slovakia.
When M. Sidor showed hesitation, Herr Buerckel took him
on one side and explained that Herr Hitler had decided
to settle the question of Czecho-Slovakia definitely.
Slovakia-ought, therefore, to proclaim her independence
because Herr Hitler would otherwise disinterest himself
in her fate. M. Sidor thanked Herr Buerckel for this
information, but said that he must discuss the
situation with the Government at Prague.” (D-571)
Hitler expressed his intention to crush Czechoslovakia in
the following language:
“At Munich I did not take Bohemia and Moravia into the
German territorial sphere ["Lebensraum"]. I left the
Czechs only another five months, but for the Slovaks I
have some sympathy. I approved the Award of Vienna in
the conviction that the Slovaks would separate
themselves from the Czechs and declare their
independence, which would be under German protection.
That is why I have refused Hungarian demands in respect
of Slovakia. As the Slovaks appear to be agreeing with
the Czechs it looks as though they have not respected
the spirit of the Vienna Award. This I cannot tolerate.
Tomorrow at mid-day I shall begin military action
against the Czechs, which will be carried out by
General Brauchitsch' (who was present and to whom he
pointed). 'Germany,' he said, 'does not intend to take
Slovakia into her “Lebensraum,” and that is why you
must either immediately proclaim the independence of
Slovakia or I will disinterest myself in her fate. To
make your choice
[Page 983]
I give you until to-morrow mid-day, when the Czechs
will be crushed by the German steam-roller.” (D-571)
Ribbentrop and von Neurath also participated in the
execution of the Nazi plot to obliterate Czechoslovakia as a
nation. (D-571 )
The use of pressure, fifth columnists, and propaganda to
undermine resistance in Czechoslovakia, and the preparation
of military plans for the attack upon that country were all
noted by Jodl in his diary. (1780-PS)
Before the annexation of Austria by Germany Seyss-Inquart
was in communication and contact with Konrad Henlein, the
leader of the Sudeten German Nazis in Czechoslovakia. On 29
December 1937 Seyss-Inquart wrote a letter to Henlein in
encouraging terms and extended his warmest sympathy and hope
for the success of the Sudeten Germans (3523-PS). Henlein
thereafter replied in a letter to Seyss-Inquart dated a few
days after the German annexation of Austria had been
accomplished. In this letter Henlein expressed his pride in
the fact that Seyss-Inquart, born a Sudeten German, had
fulfilled the task determined by the Fuehrer in the most
decisive hour of German history. He also thanked Seyss-
Inquart for the elect and influence the developments in
Austria would have in the Sudetenland. (3522-PS)
[Page 983]
C. SEYSS-INQUART PARTICIPATED IN THE POLITICAL PLANNING AND
PREPARATION OF THE NAZI CONSPIRATORS FOR WARS OF AGGRESSION
AND WARS IN VIOLATION OF INTERNATIONAL TREATIES, AGREEMENTS,
AND ASSURANCES SET FORTH IN COUNTS ONE AND TWO OF THE
INDICTMENT.
The German Reichstag came under the control of the Nazi
conspirators with the advent of Hitler into the German
Government and became a willing tool in the hands of Hitler
and the conspirators. (See Sections 2, 3, and 4 of chapter
VII on the acquisition and consolidation of totalitarian
political control, and terrorization of political
opponents.)
The members of the Reich Cabinet were the accomplices,
aiders and abettors of Hitler and his closest Nazi
lieutenants in the political planning and preparation for
Wars of Aggression and Wars in Violation of International
Treaties, Agreements and Assurances. (See section 3 of
chapter XV on the Reich Cabinet.)
Seyss-Inquart was a member of the Reichstag and of the Reich
Cabinet before the invasion of Poland, and occupied those
positions until the unconditional surrender of Germany. Thus
he is
[Page 984]
equally responsible for the acts and decisions of the
members of those governmental bodies concerning the
political planning and preparation of the Nazi Conspirators
for Wars of Aggression and Wars in Violation of
International Treaties, Agreements and Assurances set forth
in Counts One and Two of the Indictment. (2910-PS)
D. SEYSS-INQUART AUTHORIZED, DIRECTED, AND PARTICIPATED IN
THE CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT WAR CRIMES AS SET FORTH IN THE
INDICTMENT.
(a) Position and authority of Seyss-Inquart. Seyss-Inquart
was appointed Reich Governor of Austria by Hitler on 15
March 1938, and was put in charge of the Civil
Administration. Austria had then ceased to exist as an
independent nation and was a province of the German Reich.
(2910-PS; 3425-PS)
Goering, as Delegate for the Four-Year Plan, commissioned
Seyss-Inquart, who was then Reichsstatthalter in Austria,
jointly with the Plenipotentiary of the Reich, to consider
and take any steps necessary for the “Aryanization of
business and economic life, and to execute this process in
accordance with our laws” (Laws of the Reich) (3460-PS)
Seyss-Inquart participated in the drafting of laws for the
sequestration and confiscation of property of the so-called
"enemies of the people and State.” Evidence of this fact is
found in the correspondence between Seyss-Inquart and Dr.
Lammers, Chief of the Reichs Chancellery. On 24 October 1938
Seyss-Inquart wrote a letter to Dr. Lammers stating in
substance that the law providing for the sequestration and
confiscation of the property of enemies of the State was
almost completed and ready for the signature of the Fuehrer,
and expressing hope that the signature would be obtained
soon. Dr. Lammers replied to Seyss-Inquart that the decree
would be issued by the Reichsminister of the Interior, a
copy of which had been submitted to Hitler, who had
expressed no objections. (3448-PS; 3447-PS)
The power and authority of Seyss-Inquart with respect to the
sequestration and confiscation of the property of “enemies
of the State” stemmed from a decree empowering the
Reichsstatthalter in Vienna, or the office designated by
him, to confiscate property of persons or societies which
had promoted efforts inimical to the people of the State.
This decree also attempted to legalize the confiscation of
property ordered by the Secret State Police prior to the
issuance of the decree. (3450-PS) This decree appeared
to be a secret law, because it was not published. Yet it
existence as law is evidenced by a letter written to the
Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief of the German Police, Himmler, in
January 1939, which shows that the decree was in fact issued
on 18 November 1938. (3449-PS)
(b) Murder and ill treatment of civilians. Seyss-Inquart was
aware that so-called enemies of the State were imprisoned in
concentration camps. His knowledge of this matter is
evidenced by his claim of credit for the transfer of his
predecessor — Chancellor of Austria, von Schuschnigg —
from one concentration camp to another in south Germany
which was in the path of the armed forces of the United
States. (254-PS) One of the most notorious concentration
camps was Mauthausen, located in Austria and in existence
while Seyss-Inquart was the Reich Governor of the Province
of Austria. As has already been shown, this camp became
noted as an extermination center. (2176-PS)
(c) Plunder of public and private property. Even before the
issuance of the above decree for the sequestration and
confiscation of the property of the so-called enemies of the
State, Seyss-Inquart wrote a letter to Hitler indicating
that he had come into possession of from 700 to 900 valuable
tapestries. Seyss-Inquart offered to display the most
beautiful pieces so that the Fuehrer might make a selection.
In this same letter Seyss-Inquart expressed his pride and
wonder over the manner in which Hitler had “solved the
Sudeten problem.”
While Seyss-Inquart was Reich Governor of the Province of
Austria a large quantity of valuable property, including
works of art, belonging to the so-called enemies of the
State, was seized, sequestered, and confiscated. A partial
list of such property is found in a memorandum which
referred to a report of the Reich Fuehrer SS and Chief of
the German Police submitted with a letter dated 10 August
1938 and received in Berlin 26 September 1938. This
inventory listed a total of 162 cases of confiscation, of
which 113 cases had a value of some 93,366,358.24 marks. It
is significant that the former owners of this property were
Jews and political opponents of the Nazis. (3446-PS)
(2) Poland.
(a) Position and authority. Seyss-Inquart was appointed
Deputy Governor General of the Polish Occupied Territory by
Hitler’s decree of 12 October 1939, which also appointed
Hans Frank Governor General of the Polish Occupied
Territory. The official title of the government of Poland
under the Nazi con-
[Page 986]
spirators was the “General Government” (3147-PS). Prior to
his appointment as Deputy Governor General of the Polish
Occupied Territory from the early part of September 1939 to
12 October 1939, Seyss-Inquart was Chief of the Civil
Administration of South Poland (2910-PS). Seyss-Inquart as
Deputy Governor General of the Polish Occupied Territory was
second only to the Governor General, Frank. (2283-CC-PS)
The Chief of the Office of the Governor General of the
Polish Occupied Territory and the Higher SS and Police
Leaders were directly subordinate to the Governor General
and his representative. In turn the leaders of the General
and Security Police were subordinated to the Higher SS and
Police Leaders. (3468-PS)
According to Hans Frank, Seyss-Inquart organized the General
Government of Poland. When Seyss-Inquart was about to depart
to assume his new duties as Reich Commissar for the Occupied
Netherlands, Frank eulogized Seyss-Inquart as follows:
“In the construction of the General-Government, your
name will forever take a place of honor as originator
of this organization and State system. I express our
thanks, Mr. Reichsminister, for your collaboration and
for your creative energy in the name of all officers,
employees, and laborers, of all SS organizations and
the whole police force of the General-Government, and
in the name of the District Chiefs, the Gau and city
leaders, in the name of all otherwise on the order of
the Reich and the Fuehrer her active persons. ***”
During November 1939 Seyss-Inquart made a tour of inspection
in Poland. While on this tour he gave lectures to the German
officials of the General Government of Poland concerning
their duties and German administrative policy in that
country. He told these officials that the only principal aim
of that policy was to satisfy the interests of the Reich and
that they should promote everything of use to the Reich and
hamper all that might damage the Reich. He instructed the
officials that the German Government must utilize the
General Government of Poland for German economic purposes.
(2278-PS)
(b) Murder and illtreatment of the civilian population of
occupied territories. While Seyss-Inquart was on the
aforesaid tour of inspection, a Dr. Lasch, who was a
District Governor, reported to Seyss-Inquart that all
criminals found in the penitentiaries were shot. The
executions, however, were conducted in closed-off wooded
areas and not in public. (2278-PS)
In his report concerning his tour of inspection Seyss-
Inquart
[Page 987]
stated that the intellectuals of Poland were to a greater
part locked up. He also passed on the suggestion made by
District Governor Schmidt to use the “moorish” country
around Cychov, Poland, as a reservoir for Jews because this
measure might have a decimating effect upon the Jewish
population of Poland. (2278-PS)
Hans Frank, in his capacity as Governor General of the
Polish Occupied Territory, made an official report to Hitler
in which he stated that, in the course of time, the German
rule had led to a substantial deterioration in the
"attitude” of the entire Polish people due to malnutrition,
mass arrests, mass shootings, and rigorous methods used to
obtain forced labor. In this report it was admitted that
before 1939 the food supply of the Polish people was quite
adequate to sustain them. (437-PS)
(c) Plunder of public and private property. During the
aforesaid tour of inspection Seyss-Inquart ordered the
seizure of all soap stocks, and informed the German
officials that the seizure of soap and tea was to be
regarded as most important. In addition he ordered a
marshalling of goods such as oil, salt, manures, etc., in
monopolies such as cooperative societies. He also directed
that the Polish unemployment fund in a considerable amount
be diverted to the repair of damaged buildings. (2278-PS)
Frank in his report to Hitler stated that there had been a
confiscation of a great part of Polish estates, together
with encroachments upon and confiscation of the assets of
industries, trades, professions, and other private property.
(437-PS)
(d) Conscription of civilian labor. Seyss-Inquart, as Deputy
Governor General of the Polish Occupied Territory, attended
most staff meetings held by Frank, the Governor General.
Among the subjects discussed and decided upon at those
meetings was the conscription and deportation of vast
numbers of Polish nationals to the Reich for forced labor.
Some of these deportees were employed in instruments of war
production in violation of Articles 6, 23h, 46, and 2 of the
Hague Regulations 1907, as well as the Prisoner of War
Convention (Geneva 1929). On 11 January 1940 one
Frauendorfer reported in the presence of Seyss-Inquart that
daily transports, each carrying 1,000 workers, were going to
the Reich. Thus Seyss-Inquart aided and abetted in these
violations.
According to Frank approximately 160,000 agricultural
workers and 50,000 industrial workers were conscripted and
deported from Poland to the Reich up to and including 21
April 1940. Because the total quota had been fixed at
500,000 and because there were not enough “voluntary
enlistments", solution to the prob-
[Page 988]
lem was sought in the use Of coercive measures. Seyss-
Inquart participated actively in the discussions on this
matter, and thus aided materially in the solution of the
problem. (2233-N-PS)
(e) Germanization of occupied territories. The Nazi
government of the Polish Occupied Territory was determined
to make Poland entirely German. (Evidence of this intention
is discussed in Chapter XIII.) In addition, Frank in his
report to Hitler reported that there had been an
expropriation of property and expulsion of Polish nationals
therefrom for German settlements in Poland. (437-PS)
(3) The Netherlands.
(a) Position and authority of Seyss-Inquart. Seyss-Inquart
was appointed Reich Commissar for the occupied Netherlands
territories by decree of Hitler dated 18 May 1940. This
decree made Seyss-Inquart “guardian of the interests of the
Reich” and invested him with “supreme civil authority.”
Seyss-Inquart was made responsible only to Hitler, and
empowered to promulgate laws by decree for the occupied
Netherlands territories. (1376-PS; 2910-PS)
(b) Abrogation and modification of Netherlands legislation
not justified by military necessity. In his capacity as
Reich Commissar of the occupied Netherlands territories
Seyss-Inquart authorized and directed the abrogation or
modification of Netherlands legislation not demanded or
justified by military exigency. This action was in violation
of Article 43 of the Hague Regulations, 1907.
The acts abolished included Provincial and Municipal Laws.
(3340-PS; 3342-PS)
Ordinary criminal laws not in conflict with the permissible
objectives of the occupying power were abrogated, suspended,
or radically changed. Administrative courts martial were
established by decree of Seyss-Inquart as Reich Commissar
which empowered the Leader of the Superior SS and the Police
and Special Agents appointed by the Reich Commissar to
deviate from existing law. This decree also prescribed harsh
penalties for misdemeanors, extending from 10 years to life
imprisonment, and include the death penalty (i) for
participation in “activities likely to disturb or endanger
public order and security” and (ii) for intentional
violation of the orders of the Reich Commissar. (2111-PS)
Existing marriage laws were amended by Seyss-Inquart so as
to require approval of the Reich Commissar instead of the
consent of parent or guardian in the case of Dutch girls.
The statu-
[Page 989]
tory waiting period was also abolished. Thus, intermarriage
of Germans with female persons of Netherlands nationality
were facilitated and promoted. (3339-PS)
Existing legislation concerning Netherlands nationality was
modified by Seyss-Inquart so as to favor Germany. (3341-PS).
Additional decrees not justified or demanded by the military
interests of the occupant were issued by Seyss-Inquart as
Reich Commissar. These decrees amended or superseded and
distorted existing laws concerning press, education, social
services, corporate life, trade unionism, medical care, art,
science, and divers phases of the political, social,
economic, and industrial life of the Netherlands. Some of
these enactments, including the discriminatory decrees
against the Jews, are considered in greater detail
hereafter. (1726-PS)
(C) Germanization of Netherlands Territory. Seyss-Inquart in
his capacity as Reich Commissar for the occupied Dutch
Territory, took affirmative steps to assimilate the
territory under his jurisdiction politically, culturally,
socially, and economically into the German Reich. This
action violated Articles 43, 46, 55, and 56 of the Hague
Regulations, 1907, the laws and customs of war, the general
principles of criminal law, the internal penal laws of | the
countries in which such crimes were committed, and Article 6
(b) of the Charter.
The more of offensive crimes in the above category, such as
economic exploitation and enforced conscription are
considered in detail elsewhere in this section. Other
"Germanization” measures, such as the decrees promoting
marriage between German males and female Netherlanders, and
altering citizenship laws in favor of Germany, have been
previously adverted to.
When he assumed office on 29 May 1940, Seyss-Inquart said in
a speech at The Hague:
“We neither will oppress this land and its people
imperialistically nor will we impose on them our
political convictions. We will bring this about in no
other way — only through our deportment and our
example.” (3430-PS)
The bona fides of the above statement is belied by a public
statement made by Seyss-Inquart two years later. In a speech
at Hengelo on 19 May 1943 he revealed his true purpose:
“Several times it has been held against me that I have
let national socialism come to the fore in all phases
in public life. As far as I am concerned that is no
reproach, it is a historical mission, which I have to
fulfill here.” (3430-PS)
Full disclosure of Seyss-Inquart is intentions and actions
with respect to nazification and exploitation of Holland was
made in
[Page 990]
a Top Secret report prepared by him and sent to Berlin
covering the situation in the Netherlands during the period
29 May 1940 to 19 July 1940. This report was forwarded by
Lammers of the Reich Chancellery to Rosenberg. Seyss-Inquart
prefaces the report by describing his mission as not merely
the guarding of Reich interests and maintaining order, but
also the building of close economic ties between the
Netherlands and the Reich. The report catalogues in
considerable detail the measures initiated by Seyss-Inquart,
discusses the building up of the NSDAP in the Netherlands,
and adverts to the proposed creation of Nazi para-military
and corresponding organizations. It also mentions the
efforts made to bring about an assimilation of interests
between Holland and Germany in the fields of economics and
agriculture, culture, art, and science. The report points
out that the allocation of supplies made, and financial and
currency arrangements prescribed, were favorable to the
Reich; that such transactions were signed by Dutch officials
so that the “appearance of being voluntary” was preserved.
(997-PS)
(d) Spoliation of property. In his capacity as Reich
Commissar for the Occupied Netherlands territory Seyss-
Inquart authorized, directed, and participated in the
exploitation of the material resources of the Occupied
Netherlands territory for purposes unrelated to the needs of
the Army of Occupation. These acts were all in violation of
Article 6 (b) of the Charter and Articles 43, 46-49, 52 of
the Hague Regulations, 1907.
These crimes, for which Seyss-Inquart is responsible not
only by virtue of his position as the dominant civil
representative of the Reich Government in the Occupied
Netherlands territory but also because of his direct
participation in the initiation and execution of such
criminal policies, took the following form:
Control and exploitation of the Netherlands economy in the
interest of the German total war effort.
Levy of excessive occupation charges on the Netherlands.
Exaction of large sums of money and gold as “external
occupation costs,” or “contributions to the war against
Bolshevism.”
Requisitioning of gold and foreign exchange of Dutch
nationals for purposes unrelated to the needs of the
occupation army.
Use of German reichsmarks as currency in the Netherlands for
purposes unrelated to the needs of the occupation army, with
compulsory free exchange of such Reichsmarks for gulden by
the Netherlands Bank.
(Evidence of the foregoing methods of exploitation of the
occupied Netherlands and correlative enrichment of the Reich
is discussed in Chapter XIII.)
[Page 991]
The Nazi conspirators were measurably aided in executing the
foregoing policies in Holland by the cooperation of a local
Nazi, Rost van Tonnigen, who was appointed President of the
Netherlands Bank and Treasurer in the Netherlands Ministry
of Finance by Seyss-Inquart in the spring of 1941. The
cooperative spirit with which van Tonnigen discharged his
responsibilities in these posts was disclosed in the
following excerpt from a report of the German Commissar of
the Netherlands Bank:
“The new President of the Netherlands Bank, Mr. Rost
van Tonnigen, is, in contrast to a large part of the
leadership, penetrated in his movements and his
official acts by the greater German thought, and
convinced of the necessity of the creation of a greater
European economic space. This ideological attitude in
itself gives him the correct position on financial and
monetary policy questions for his country in relation
to the greater German economic space. Furthermore it
makes easier cooperation with my office, a fact which
deserves special mention in consideration of the
frequently observed impossible conduct of the
Netherlands agencies before the entrance into office of
the new President. I consider as a fortunate solution
the fact that the Reichskommissar for the Occupied
Dutch Areas has also entrusted Mr. Rost van Tonnigen
with the Treasury of the Ministry of Finance [Schatzamt
des Finanzministeriums]. Mr. Rost van Tonnigen took
over this office at the end of the month of April. Thus
there is a guarantee that the financial and monetary
policy of the country will be conducted according to
unified points of view.” (ECR-174; see also
Verordnungsblatt, No. 22, 24 August 1940 (Fourth Order
of the Reich Commissar for the Occupied Netherlands
concerning certain Administrative Measures); Lemkin,
“Axis Rule in Occupied Europe,” pp. 455-456.)
In addition to the responsibility which attaches to Seyss-
Inquart as a result of his dominant position in the
Netherlands, his appointment of Nazi-minded individuals to
key positions, and his complete knowledge of and
acquiescence in illegal Nazi policies, there is conclusive
evidence of his initiation of such policies. In April 1942
"at the instigation of the Reich Commissar Seyss-Inquart”
the Netherlands began to pay a “voluntary contribution to
the war against Bolshevism” of 50,000,000 guilders per
month, retroactive to 1 July 1941, of which ten million per
month was paid in gold. (ECR-195)
By 31 March 1944, this contribution amounted to
2,150,000,000 RM. (EC-86)
[Page 992]
The alleged “voluntary” character of the contribution is to
be taken with considerable reserve in view of the admission
contained in Seyss-Inquart’s Top Secret report of 29 May
1940 to 19 July 1940, that the voluntary nature of previous
financial and economic measures was in reality fictional.
(997-PS)
However, the question whether or not the contribution is to
be deemed at the direction of Seyss-Inquart or was in fact
"voluntary” is immaterial. It is manifest that the then
President of the Netherlands Bank and Treasurer in the
Ministry of Finance, van Tonnigen, acted in the German
interest and to the detriment of the Netherlands. His acts
are attributable to the responsible head of the German Civil
Administration in the Netherlands and the individual to whom
he owed his appointment, Seyss-Inquart.
(e) Participation in activities of Einsatzstab Rosenberg.
Seyss-Inquart, in his capacity as Reich Commissar for the
Occupied Netherlands territory, also cooperated with and
acquiesced in the activities of the Einsatzstab Rosenberg in
the territory under his jurisdiction. He is therefore
responsible for his actions in this regard, which
constituted crimes under Article 6 (b) of the Charter and
violations of Articles 46, 47, and 56 of the Hague
Regulations,
(The Einsatzstab Rosenberg, which commenced as a research
library project, developed into a systematic program for the
wholesale looting of art treasures and cultural objects in
the conquered territories. Its activities are discussed in
Chapter XIV.)
Implication of Seyss-Inquart in the criminal activities of
the Einsatzstab Rosenberg is revealed in a detailed progress
report of its chief Netherlands representative, Schimmer.
The first paragraph of this report states as follows:
“The Working Group Netherlands of the Einsatzstab
Reichsleiter Rosenberg began its work in agreement with
the competent representative of the Reichskommissar
during the first days of September 1940. The execution
of the post, conforming with the Fuehrer’s orders,
coordinated itself with the liquidation, that is
confiscation, according to civil law, of the various
subversive institutions — as set forth in the
circulars of the OKW, dated 5 July 1940, and of the
Chief of the OKW to the Commander in Chief of the
Wehrmacht in France, dated 17 September 1940, as well
as to the Commander in Chief of the OKW in the
Netherlands, dated October 1940. The screening of the
material of the various Masonic lodges was taken care
of primarily, and the library and the archives of the
following lodges were sifted and all useful material
was packed.” (176-PS)
[Page 993]
There follows the specification of some 92 Masonic IOOF
Lodges and Rotary Clubs which were screened and yielded 470
cases of valuable objects. Also, a large number of libraries
and scientific and cultural institutions were listed with
the statement that all books and archives contained therein
were being catalogued preparatory to shipment to Germany.
(176-PS)
The report concludes with the following statement indicating
close integration in the Netherlands between Rosenberg's
program of grand larceny and Seyss-Inquart’s anti-Jewish
program, viz:
“The Working Group, in executing the afore-mentioned
tasks, is bound strictly to the pace set by the
Reichskommissar for the handling of the Jewish
questions and that of the international organizations.
This pace again is determined by the political
evolution which is taking shape according to decisions
made on a higher level, and which must not be hampered
by individual acts.” (176-PS)
Other documents captured from Rosenberg’s files remove any
doubt whatever as to Seyss-Inquart’s full knowledge of the
criminal activities of the Einsatzstab Rosenberg in Holland
and his participation therein. On 11 September 1944
Rosenberg informed Seyss-Inquart by letter that orders had
been issued for the seizure and transportation to Germany of
the library of the Social Institute in Amsterdam. (091-PS;
see also 1621-PS, a secret letter from Reichsfuehrer SS
(Himmler) ordering SS Gen. Rauter in the Hague to seize
medical apparatus at the Universities of Leyden and Utrecht
with the aid of Seyss-Inquart.)
(f) Conscription of civilian labor. In his capacity as Reich
Commissar for the occupied Netherlands territories Seyss-
Inquart authorized and directed the deportation of vast
numbers of Netherlands nationals to the Reich for forced
labor in the instruments of German war production. These
acts were all in violation of Articles 6 (b) and (c) of the
Charter; Articles 6, 23h, 46, and 2 of the Hague
Regulations, 1907 (3737-PS); and the Prisoner of War
Convention, Geneva, 1929.
The deportation program in the Netherlands was initiated on
20 June 1940, five weeks after the occupation of that
country. The Germans at first deported only the unemployed,
threatening them with curtailment of their dole for refusal.
Thereafter in 1942 measures were taken to draft employed
workmen. Dutch business concerns were combed in “Sauckel-
actions” for available workers, who were forced to register
at the labor offices. Workmen who refused were prosecuted by
the SD, committed to one of the prisoners' camps in the
Netherlands, and eventually put to work in Germany. By the
end of April 1942 the program
[Page 994]
was in full operation, and not less than 22,000 workers were
deported that month. Many Belgian concerns not considered
essential were closed down to release manpower for
deportation to Germany or for work in Dutch industries
deemed essential to the German war effort. New measures of a
drastic nature were inaugurated in the spring of 1943. All
males between 18 and 35 were forced to register for
"arbeitseinsatz” (war effort), which was synonymous with
deportation. As time elapsed and the German military
situation deteriorated, the measures taken became
increasingly more ruthless. Whole sections of a town were
lined off and people were seized in the streets or in their
homes and transported to Germany. A total of approximately
431,500 Netherlands workers were deported to. Germany and
other foreign countries. (1726-PS)
Illustrative of the participation of Seyss-Inquart in the
slave labor program are four proclamations which he caused
to be issued, calling up Dutch civilians between certain
ages for forced labor and threatening them with shooting in
the case of noncompliance. (1162-PS)
Sauckel, General Plenipotentiary for the Employment of
Labor, on 5 October 1945 disclosed, under oath, the part
played by Seyss-Inquart in the forced recruitment of Dutch
workers for German war production. The following is an
excerpt from an interrogation of Sauckel:
“Q. For a moment I want to turn our attention to
Holland. It is my understanding that the quotas for the
workers for Holland were agreed upon, and then the
numbers given to the Reichskommissar Seyss-Inquart to
fulfill. Isn’t that correct?
“A. Yes, that is correct.
“Q. After the quota was given to Seyss-Inquart, it was
his mission to fulfill it with the aid of your
representatives, was it not?
“A. Yes. This was the only possible thing for me to do
and the same applied to the other countries.” (3722-PS)
Seyss-Inquart has himself acknowledged under oath his active
participation in deporting 250,000 Netherlands workmen
between the ages of 17 and 42 toward the end of 1944,
although he attempted to shift responsibility by stating
that the order was issued by the Wehrmacht and that “I can’t
intervene against the Wehrmacht.” However, he admitted:
“I didn’t oppose it. I helped to carry it out in my
province.” (Transcript of Interrogation of Seyss-
Inquart, afternoon session, 18 September 1945, pp. 19-
20.)
[Page 995]
(g) Murder and treatment of civilian population, including
killing of hostages. Seyss-Inquart, in his capacity as Reich
Commissar for the Occupied Netherlands Territory, authorized
and directed the exaction of collective penalties, murder,
and illtreatment of the civilian population of the
Netherlands, and the killing of hostages. All these actions
constituted war crimes and crimes against humanity within
the meaning of Article 6 (b) and (c) of the Charter, and
violated (i) the Hague Regulations, 1907, Articles 46 and
50, (ii) the laws and customs of war, (iii) the general
principles of criminal law as derived from the criminal laws
of all civilized nations and (iv) the internal penal laws of
Netherlands.
Public utterances of Seyss-Inquart reveal his determination
to resort to ruthless measures for the purpose of
intimidating and repressing the civilian population. In a
speech commemorating the 10th Anniversary of Germany's
coming into power, at Weert on 29 January 1943, before
workers and trades of the NSDAP, he spoke in part as
follows:
“I will give my instructions. They must be executed by
all. In the present situation a refusal to execute such
instructions could be regarded only as sabotage. It is
also clear, now more than ever, that every resistance
which is directed against this fight for existence must
be suppressed. Some time ago the representatives of the
churches had written to the Wehrmacht commander and to
me, and they presented their conception against the
execution of death sentences which the Wehrmacht
commanders announced in the meantime. To this I can
only say the following: The moment in which our men,
fathers and sons with iron determination look towards
their fate in the east and unflinchingly and
steadfastly perform their highest pledge, it is
unbearable to tolerate conspiracies whose goal is to
weaken the rear of this eastern front. Whoever dares
this must be annihilated. We must be severe and become
even more severe against our opponents, this is the
command of a relentless sequence of events, and for us
perhaps humanly hard, but our holy duty. We remain
human because we do not torture our opponents, we must
remain firm by annihilating them.” (3430-PS)
Endorsement of the policy of holding innocent persons
responsible for the misconduct of others beyond their
control is implicit in the following public statement of
Seyss-Inquart made at Weert on
“I have given orders to suppress all appearances with a
se-
[Page 996]
vereness corresponding to the brutality of the crime.
If in connection with these measures Dutch citizens are
affected and have to undergo difficulties and
limitations of special nature, then they have to seek
the cause therefor solely in these eruptions of the
anarchistic mental attitude of a few culprits and he
just-as-criminal-tolerance or apathy within their own
circles.” (3430-PS)
Evidence of Seyss-Inquart’s application of this doctrine of
vicarious responsibility is contained in a poster signed by
him and warning the Dutch population to expect reprisals in
the event of sabotage. The poster reads as follows:
“NOTICE
“I consider all inhabitants responsible for the
destruction or damage to railroad installations,
waterways with their installations, telephone cables
and Post Offices occurring within the boundaries of
their locality.
“The population of such localities may therefore expect
reprisals in the form of seizure of property and
destruction of houses or groups of houses.
“I therefore advise the population to protect the means
of transportation and communications by means of
patrols or other appropriate measures.
“The Hague 24 September 1944
“/s/ Seyss-Inquart
“The Reich Commissar for the Occupied Netherlands
Territories.” (1163-PS)
Another poster issued by the Superior SS and Police Chief
publicized with remarkable candor the fact that 12
Netherlanders were executed “independent of further
investigation” as reprisals for the killing of two Germans.
That poster reads as follows:
“NOTICE
“The Superior SS and Police Chief gives notice that on
20 November 1944 Schutzgruppenmann Janssen and on 13
December 1944 the Senior Officer Candidate Guse were
shot in the back by criminal Netherlands elements. Both
were robbed of their pistols.
“Independent of further investigation of the
perpetrators, two houses. were blasted and 12
Netherlanders were executed at the place of one of the
crimes as reprisals.
“The Hague, 16 December 1944.” (1163-PS)
In an interrogation under oath Seyss-Inquart has
acknowledged that Netherlanders were shot as hostages
without trial. While he sought to shift responsibility to
the SS he admitted that upon one
[Page 997]
occasion the SS called on him to furnish 50 hostages and
that he gave five instead, all of whom were shot.
(Transcript of interrogation of Seyss-Inquart, 18 September
1945, p. 20)
Other crimes against humanity are documented in the
statement of the Dutch Government. The vastness of the scale
of the commission of such crimes and the necessary notoriety
thereof [| clearly implicate Seyss-Inquart as the
responsible civil head of the German Government in the
Netherlands territory. (1726-PS)
E. SEYSS-INQUART PARTICIPATED IN THE CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT
CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY AS SET FORTH IN THE INDICTMENT.
(a) Persecution of the Jews. While Seyss-Inquart was the
Reich Governor of the Province of Austria, laws were issued
against Jews and against those who opposed the Nazi Regime
politically. As has been shown, this usually took the form
of decrees providing for the sequestration and confiscation
of the property of these so-called “enemies of the State.”
In the early days of November 1938, pogroms against the Jews
took place all over the German Reich, including Austria.
These pogroms resulted from the killing of von Rath, a
diplomatic official at the German Embassy in Paris, by a
young Jew named Grynszpan. Jewish synagogues, homes and
shops were smashed and destroyed by fire. Large numbers of
Jews were arrested, jailed, or placed in concentration
camps. A partial report as to what occurred during 9
November 1938 and 10 November 1938 is found in a letter
written by the Reich Commissar for the Reunion of Austria
with the German Reich, Josef Buerckel, to Goering, dated 18
November 1938. This report reveals that the fire department
was not utilized to control the flames consuming Jewish
homes, stores, shops, and synagogues. The school children in
Vienna were given an opportunity to participate in the
demonstration “according to the order.” Buerckel’s report
also discloses that enormous quantities of valuables,
jewelry, and merchandise were stolen from the Jews during
these pogroms. (2237-PS)
A more detailed description of what happened in Vienna
during the 9th and 10th of November 1938 is found in the
stenographic report of a meeting on “The Jewish Question”
under the Chairmanship of Goering (1816-PS). This meeting
was held on 12 November 1938. It appears from this report
that altogether 101 synagogues were destroyed by fire 76
synagogues demolished, and 7,500 stores ruined in the Reich,
including Austria. In this same
[Page 998]
meeting, a member of the official family of Seyss-Inquart
(Reich Governor of the Province of Austria) related the
efficiency with which the Civil Administration in Austria
dealt with the so-called “Jewish Question.” This official
was Fischboeck, and in his verbal report to Goering he said:
“Your Excellency,
“In this matter we have already a very complete plan
for Austria. There are 12,000 Jewish artisans and 5,000
Jewish retail shops in Vienna. Before the National
Revolution, we had already a definite plan for
tradesmen, regarding this total of 17,000 stores. Of
the shops of the 12,000 artisans about 10,000 were to
be closed indefinitely and 2,000 were to be kept open.
4,000 of the 5,000 retail stores should be closed and
1,000 should be kept open, that is, were to be
Aryanized. According to this plan, between 3,000 and
3,500 of the total of 17,000 stores would be kept open,
all others closed. This was decided following
investigations in every single branch and according to
local needs, in agreement with all competent
authorities, and is ready for publication as soon as we
receive the law which we requested in September; this
law shall empower us to withdraw licenses from artisans
quite independently from the Jewish Question.” (1816-
PS)
To this Goering replied:
“I shall have this decree issued today.” (1816-PS)
The stenographic report of this meeting further reveals that
the solution of the so-called “Jewish Problem” adopted in
Austria by Seyss-Inquart and his official family was most
efficient from the viewpoint of Nazi objectives. The plan
adopted in Austria became a model for the entire Reich.
(1816-PS)
A report of the Bureau of Statistics for the Provinces of
Austria on the Jewish population in Vienna and in Austria,
dated 15 December 1939, shows that after the Nazi
conspirators assumed power in Austria, the Jewish population
in that country decreased approximately 100,000.
While the reasons for the decreases in the Jewish population
of Austria would seem to be obvious, yet tangible evidence
of at least one reason is provided by Seyss-Inquart himself
in a letter written by him to Himmler, dated 4 November
1939. In substance Seyss-Inquart, while Deputy Governor
General of the Polish Occupied Territory, stated that an
official in Cracow had informed him that there was a plan to
send Jews from Vienna to Poland, whereupon he gave
instructions that such action should be carried
[Page 999]
out only in cooperation with the SD and by the SD, since he
would not permit wild-cat actions. (3398-PS)
(b) Persecution on political grounds. Seyss-Inquart has
supplied evidence that the SS in Austria was responsible for
the murder of Chancellor Dolfuss on 25 July 1934. (3425-PS)
Seyss-Inquart has also supplied evidence that his
predecessor as Chancellor of Austria, von Schuschnigg, had
been confined in a concentration camp after his forced
resignation from office. (3254-PS)
(2) Poland. The manner is which Polish Jews were treated and
given “special handling” by the Nazi conspirators, although
a matter of common knowledge, was described in detail in the
"Black Book of Poland.” This document tells of the
establishment of special reservations for the Jews as well
as ghettos in various parts of Poland. The report also
relates how the Jews were starved and exterminated in large
numbers. A great portion of these crimes were committed in
Poland by the Nazis while Seyss-Inquart occupied the
position of Deputy Governor General of the Polish Occupied
Territory. (2613-PS)
During the time that Seyss-Inquart held this high office in
the Nazi government of Poland, a special decree was issued
by Frank, dated 26 October 1939, which required compulsory
labor for Jews domiciled in the General Government of
Poland. The decree was to take effect immediately and the
Jews were to be formed in forced labor groups. The execution
of the decree was placed in the hands of the Higher SS and
Police Leaders. (2613-PS)
(3) The Netherlands. Seyss-Inquart, in his capacity as Reich
Commissar of the occupied Dutch territory, bears full
individual responsibility for the execution in the
Netherlands of the Nazi program of persecution of Jews. Acts
against the Jews authorized, directed, or condoned by Seyss-
Inquart, which constitute war crimes and crimes against
humanity as defined in Article 6 (b) and (c) of the Charter,
included: stigmatization; disfranchisement; denial of civil
rights, personal liberty, and economic freedom; religious
and cultural persecution; use of organized “spontaneous
violence” against persons and property of Jews;
ghettoization; starvation; enforced labor; enslavement; mass
deportation, and annihilation.
The intentions of Seyss-Inquart with respect to treatment of
the Jews is a matter of record. In a speech before a
gathering of all workers and trades of the NSDAP at
Amsterdam on 13 March 1941 he left no doubt as to where he
stood on the Jewish question.
[Page 1000]
“The Jews are the enemy of national socialism and the
national socialistic Reich. From the moment of their
emancipation, their methods were directed to the
annihilation of the common and moral worth of the
German people and to replace national and responsible
ideology with international nihilism. The fatal meaning
of Judaism became completely clear to the German people
during the years of the world war. It was really they,
who stuck the knife in the back of the German army
which broke the resistance of the Germans, and in the
year 1918, it was they who wanted to dissolve and
decompose all national tradition and also moral and
religious beliefs of the German people. The Jews for us
are not Dutchmen. They are those enemies with whom we
can neither come to an armistice nor to peace. This
applies here, if you wish, for the duration of the
occupation. Do not expect an order from me which
stipulates this, except regulations concerning police
matters. We will beat the Jews wherever we meet them,
and those who join them must bear the consequences. The
Fuehrer declared that the Jews have played their final
act in Europe, and therefore they played their final
act.” (3430-PS)
Following his assumption of office in the Netherlands on 29
May 1940, Seyss-Inquart, pursuant to the authority vested in
him as Reich Commissar of the Netherlands by the Fuehrer
decree of 18 May 1940, systematically promulgated decrees
designed to implement the Nazi program of persecution and
elimination of Jews. He promulgated a law which prohibited
the Jewish ritual slaughter of animals in the Netherlands
Occupied Territories, thus making it impossible for devout
orthodox Jews to live in accordance with their religious
dietary laws. (2705-PS)
Other anti-Semitic decrees of a like nature, all of which
were signed by Seyss-Inquart and published in the
Verordnungsblatt fuer die besetzen niederlandischen Gebiete
(VOBL), may be summarized as
Publication Date and No. of VOBL.
Summary of Subject Matter
3333-PS, Verordnungsblatt, No. 33, p. 546, 26 October
1940.
Order to register all businesses belonging to
Jews, joint stock corporations including either
one Jewish partner or one Jewish member in their
Board of Directors, or those of which more than
25% of the capital stock belong to Jews or those
in which half of all votes are
[Page 1001]
to be exercised by Jews, or in general, businesses
which in fact are placed under predominatingly
Jewish influence. Section 4 defines the quality of
a Jew. Property situated abroad is to be embodied
in the declaration of registration. Failure
willfully of declaration is punished by
imprisonment not exceeding 5 years and by a fine
not exceeding 100,000 guilders or either of these
penalties, while the same due to negligence
entails an imprisonment not exceeding one year or
a fine not exceeding 10,000 florins; in addition
confiscation of the property concerned may be
ordered.
3334-PS, Verordnungsblatt, No. 42, p. 701, 17 December
1940.
Prohibition to employ German citizens or persons
of cognate blood in Jewish households under a
penalty not exceeding one year imprisonment and a
fine of 10,000 guilders or either of these
penalties.
3323-PS, Verordnungsblatt, No. 6, p. 19,13 January
1941.
Registration of all persons of part or full Jewish
blood.
Sec. 2 defines as a Jew any person one of whose
grandparents was a fullblooded Jew. Any
grandparent who belonged or belongs to the Jewish
religious community is considered as such. Failure
to register entails an imprisonment not exceeding
5 years and the confiscation of property (Sec.
10).
3325-PS, Verordnungsblatt, No. 6, p. 99, 14 February
1941.
Limitation of registration of Jewish students in
Dutch universities and colleges.
2112-PS, Verordnungsblatt, No. 34, p. 655, 16 August
1941.
Obligation to register real estate, mortgages and
real property belonging to Jews, other than
farming estates and lands regulated by a previous
ordinance. Power granted to the Dutch
administration of real property to take over
directly or through persons appointed for the
purpose, the manage-
[Page 1002]
ment of Jewish real property, with the right to
alienate it in part or in whole
3326-PS, Verordnungsblatt, No. 39, p. 785, 20 September
1941.
Freezing of property belonging to Jews who have
emigrated from Holland which is located in
Holland.
3334-PS, Verordnungsblatt, No. 44, p. 846, 23 October
1941.
Prohibitions to employ a non-Jew in households
headed by a Jew or where a Jew is a member of the
family, whether permanently or temporarily but for
an unbroken term of more than four weeks. Any
contract contrary to this provision is
inoperative. Penalties for the employer:
imprisonment up to one year and a fine up to
10,000 florins.
3328-PS, Verordnungsblatt, No. 44, p. 841, 23 October
1941.
No Jew can exercise any profession and trade
without authorization from the administrative
authorities which may refuse it or set up special
conditions for its exercise. Administrative
authorities may order the determination or the
liquidation of any employment contract concerning
a Jew. Any employer may terminate a contract with
a Jew by giving notice on the first day of any
calendar month if the general legal provisions of
the contract provide for a longer term of notice,
or if the contract is to expire normally at a date
after 31 January 1942. An indemnity ranging from
one to six times the monthly salary of the
dismissed Jew may be, under certain circumstances,
allocated as a settlement of all claims against
the employer.
3329-PS, Verordnungsblatt, No. 47, p. 901, 25 November
1941.
Exclusion of Jews from Dutch Chamber of Arts in
which membership is compulsory for all those
active in the field of sculpture, architecture,
artisan arts, music, literature, theater, film
industry and the press. Prohibition for a Jew or a
person related to a Jew to be a member of an
association affiliated
[Page 1003]
with the Chamber of Arts, to found or to take part
in the foundation of such an association or to
establish a foundation or to take part in its
establishment or to benefit directly or indirectly
from its property where such associations or
foundations are affiliated with the Chamber of
Arts. Penalty: not exceeding 5,000 florins.
3325-PS, Verordnungsblatt, No. 11, p.211, 1 May 1942.
Exclusion of Jews from the Dutch Arbeitsfront
(N.A.F.).
3336-PS, Verordnungsblatt, No. 13, p.289, 23 May 1942.
Compulsory written declaration by Jews of claims
of any kind of which they are beneficiaries to be
made at banking firm Lippman, Rosenthal & Co.,
Amsterdam. Titles and other documents proving the
claims are to be delivered to the bank at the time
of the declaration, all rights to such claims
being vested in the above mentioned bank. The
debtor can liberate himself only in the hands of
the bank and by so doing is released. The
declaration embodies also rights on property or
chattels real, participations as in corporations
and partnerships; reversions, expectancies.
Collections of all kinds of art objects, art
articles, articles of gold, platinum, silver, as
well as polished or rough diamonds, semi-precious
stones and pearls, belonging in part or in whole,
legally or “economically” to a Jew, must be
delivered to said bank, with exception of wedding
rings and those of a deceased husband, silver
watches, used table silver, provided that each
person belonging to the family of the owner may
keep only a cover consisting of 4 pieces, a knife,
a fork, a spoon and a dessert spoon; teeth-
fillings of precious metals.
[Page 1004]
A full recapitulation of the crimes perpetrated against the
Jews by the German civil occupation authorities through the
instrumentality of orders, decrees, and laws is contained in
the statement of the Netherlands Government Commissioner for
Repatriation. (1726-PS)
The above statement is also evidence of the fact that in
February 1941 the first mass deportation of Jews from the
Netherlands took place. On that occasion 1000 Jews were
arrested and within a few months sent to Buchenwald and/or
Mauthausen. Subsequently their ashes were returned to their
relatives in Holland, against a payment of 75 florins for
each. Deportation continued until September 1943, when the
last of the Jews composed of the Jewish Council were sent to
Westerbork (Holland). Of 140,000 registered “full” Jewish
Netherlanders, 117,000 were deported to the East. (1726-PS)
[Page 1004]
Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Article 6.
Vol. I, Pg. 5
International Military Tribunal, Indictment Number 1,
Section IV (H); Appendix A. Vol. I, Pg. 29,65
[Note: A single asterisk (*) before a document indicates
that the document was received in evidence at the Nurnberg
trial. A double asterisk (**) before a document number
indicates that the document was referred to during the trial
but was not formally received in evidence, for the reason
given in parentheses following the description of the
document. The USA Description series number, given in
parentheses following the description of the document, is
the official exhibit number assigned by the court.]
[Page 1005]
091-PS; Letter from Rosenberg to Seyss-Inquart, 11
September 1944, concerning seizure of a library in
Amsterdam. Vol. III, Pg. 152.
*176-PS; Report on Einsatzstab Rosenberg, Working Group
Netherlands, signed Schimmer. (USA 707) . Vol. III, Pg. 203
*437-PS; Extract from report, 19 June 1943, by Frank to
Hitler, concerning situation in Poland. (USA 610) . Vol.
III, Pg. 396
*812-PS; Letter from Rainer to Seyss-Inquart, 22 August
1939 and report from Gauleiter Rainer to Reichskommissar
Gauleiter Buerckel, 6 July 1939 on events in the NSDAP of
Austria from 1933 to 11 March 1938. (USA 61) . Vol. III, Pg.
586
997-PS; Top secret report by Seyss-Inquart concerning the
situation in the Netherlands — Exploitation and
Nazification in period 29 May 1940 to 19 July 1940. Vol.
III, Pg. 817
1162-PS; Four Proclamations calling up Dutch civilians for
Temporary Forced Labor. Vol. III, Pg. 817
1163-PS; Posters warning Dutch population of reprisals and
announcing the shootings of hostages. Vol. III, Pg. 819
1376-PS; Decree of the Fuehrer concerning the exercise of
Governmental authority in the Lowlands, 20 May 1940. 1940
Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p.778. Vol. III, Pg. 929
[Page 1006]
1621-PS; Secret letter from Reichsfuehrer SS to General
Rauter, 12 November 1942, concerning procurement of medico-
physiological appliances. Vol. IV, Pg. 136
1660-PS; Decree for registration for active service in
Austria in the year 1938 of 16 June 1938. 1938
Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 631. Vol. IV, Pg. 171
*1726-PS; Statement of Netherlands Government in view of
Prosecution and punishment of the German Nazi War Criminals.
(USA 195) . Vol. IV, Pg. 227
*1780-PS; Excerpts from diary kept by General Jodl, January
1937 to August 1939. (USA 72) . Vol. IV, Pg. 360
*1816-PS; Stenographic report of the meeting on The Jewish
Question, under the Chairmanship of Fieldmarshal Goering, 12
November 1938. (USA 261) . Vol. IV, Pg. 425
1949-PS; Report of Bureau of Statistics for Provinces of
the Ostmark, 15 December 1939, concerning Jews. Vol. IV, Pg.
586
2111-PS; Order of Reich Commissioner for Occupied
Netherlands Territories concerning establishment of
administrative Courts Martial. 1941 Verordnungsblatt, p.
190. Vol. IV, Pg. 735
2112-PS; Order of the Reich Commissioner for Occupied
Netherlands Territories concerning Jewish Real Estate, 11
August 1941. 1941 Verordnungsblatt, p. 655. Vol. IV, Pg. 738
*2176-PS; Report on Mauthausen concentration camp, by
investigating officer, Office of Judge Advocate, Third U.S.
Army, 17 June 1945. (USA 249) . Vol. IV, Pg. 836
[Page 1007]
*2219-PS; Excerpt from letter Inquart to Goering, 14 July
1939. (USA 62) . Vol. IV, Pg. 854
*2233-B-PS; Frank Diary. Tagebuch. 1940. Part I. January-
March. (USA 174). Vol. IV, Pg. 885
*2233-N-PS; Frank Diary. Tagebuch. 1940. Part II. April to
June. (USA 614) . Vol. IV, Pg. 907
2233-CC-PS; Frank Diary. 1939. Entry of 14 December at p.
99. Vol. IV, Pg. 918
2237-PS; Letter from Reich Commissar for Reunion of Austria
with the German Reich to Goering, 18 November 1938,
concerning actions against the Jews in November 1938. Vol.
IV, Pg. 918
*2246-PS; Report of von Papen to Hitler, 1 September 1936,
concerning Danube situation. (USA 67) . Vol. IV, Pg. 930
*2278-PS; Report of Reichsminister Seyss-Inquart to the
General Government of Poland, concerning official tour from
17 November 1939 to 22 November 1939. (USA 706) . Vol. IV,
Pg. 953
*2307-PS; Law concerning reunion of Austria with German
Reich, 13 March 1938. 1938 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p.
237. (GB 133) . Vol. IV, Pg. 997
**2311-PS; Decree of Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor
concerning Administration of the Oath to Officials of
Province of Austria, 15 March 1938. 1938 Reichsgesetzblatt,
Part I, p. 245. (Referred to but not offered in evidence.) .
Vol. IV, Pg. 1005
*2463-PS; Telegram from Seyss-Inquart to Hitler, 11 March
1938, published in Documents of German Politics, 1939, Vol.
VI, Part 1. (USA 708) . Vol. V, Pg. 207
[Page 1008]
**2464-PS; Official Austrian communique of the
reorganization of the Austrian Cabinet and general political
amnesty, 16 February 1938, published in Documents of German
Politics, 1939, Vol. VI, Part 1. (Referred to but not
offered in evidence.) . Vol. V, Pg. 208
**2465-PS; Announcement of appointment of Seyss-Inquart as
Federal Chancellor, 11 March 1938, published in Documents of
German Politics, 1938, Vol. VI, Part 1. (Referred to but not
offered in evidence.) . Vol. V, Pg. 209
**2466-PS; Official communique of resignation of Austrian
President Miklas, 13 March 1938, published in Documents of
German Politics, 1939, Vol. VI, Part 1. (Referred to but not
offered in evidence.) . Vol. V, Pg. 209
**2469-PS; Official German and Austrian communique
concerning equal rights of Austrian National Socialists in
Austria, 18 February 1938, published in Documents of German
Politics, 1939, Vol. VI, Part 1. (Referred to but not
offered in evidence.) . Vol. V, Pg. 210
**2484-PS; Official German communique of visit of Austrian
Minister Seyss-Inquart to Hitler, Berlin, 17 February 1938,
published in Documents of German Politics, 1939, Vol. VI,
Part 1. (Referred to but not offered in evidence.) . Vol. V,
Pg. 234
[Page 1009]
**2485-PS; Address by Federal Chancellor Seyss-Inquart from
Balcony of City Hall at Linz, 12 March 1938, published in
Documents of German Politics, Vol. VI, Part 1, p. 144-146.
(Referred to but not introduced in evidence.) . Vol. V, Pg.
234
2613-PS; Extracts from “The Black Book of Poland". Vol. V,
Pg. 332
2705-PS; Decree of Reich Commissioner for Occupied
Netherlands Territories for avoidance of cruelty to animal
in slaughtering, from Official Gazette for Occupied
Netherlands Territories, 3 August 1940. Vol. V, Pg. 374
2909-PS; Affidavit of August Eigruber, 9 November 1945.
Vol. V, Pg.578
*2910-PS; Certificate of defendant Seyss-Inquart, 10
November 1945. (USA 17) . Vol. V, Pg. 579
**2936-PS; Instruction of the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor
concerning the Austrian Federal Army, 13 March 1938,
published in Documents of German Politics, 1938, Vol. VI,
Part 1, p. 150. (Referred to but not offered in evidence.) .
Vol. V, Pg. 604
*2949-PS; Transcripts of telephone calls from Air Ministry,
11 March 1938-14 March 1938. (USA 76) . Vol. V, Pg. 628
**2994-PS; Affidavit of Kurt von Schuschnigg, former
Chancellor of Austria, concerning Austrian-German Treaty of
11 July 1936. (USA 66) (Objection to admission in evidence
upheld.) . Vol. V, Pg. 703
2995-PS; Affidavit of Kurt von Schuschnigg, former
Chancellor of Austria, concerning his visit to Berchtesgaden
on 12 February 1938. Vol. V, Pg. 709
3147-PS; The Administration of the Occupied Polish
Territory, published in The Archives, No. 67. Vol. V, Pg.
910
[Page 1010]
*3254-PS; The Austrian Question, 1934-1938, by Seyss-
Inquart, 9 September 1945. (USA 704) . Vol. V, Pg. 961
*3270-PS; Goering’s speech on 27 March in Vienna, published
in Documents of German Politics, Vol. VI, Part 1, p. 183.
(USA 703) . Vol. V, Pg. 1047
*3271-PS; Letter from Seyss-Inquart to Himmler, 19 August
1939. (USA 700) . Vol. V, Pg. 1047
3323-PS; Decree concerning obligation to register persons
who are entirely or partly of Jewish race, from Official
Gazette for Occupied Dutch Territories, 1941. Vol. VI, Pg.
39
3325-PS; Decree referring to Jewish students, published in
Official Gazette for Occupied Dutch Territories, 1941. Vol.
VI, Pg. 43
3326-PS; Decree concerning blocking of property belonging
to Jews who emigrated to Netherlands, from Official Gazette
for Occupied Dutch Territories. Vol. VI, Pg. 44
3328-PS; Decree concerning regulation of professional
activities of Jews, from Official Gazette for Occupied Dutch
Territories, year 1941. Vol. VI, Pg. 45
3329-PS; Decree concerning Netherlands Chamber of Culture,
from Official Gazette for Occupied Dutch Territories, year
1941. Vol. VI, Pg. 48
3333-PS; Decree concerning registration of business
enterprises, from Official Gazette for Occupied Dutch
Territories, year 1940. Vol. VI, Pg. 58
3334-PS; Decree concerning employment of Germans in Jewish
households, from Official Gazette for Occupied Dutch
Territories, year 1940. Vol. VI, Pg. 62
[Page 1011]
3336-PS; Order concerning treatment of Jewish property,
from Official Gazette for Occupied Dutch Territories, year
1942. Vol. VI, Pg. 64
3339-PS; Order concerning marriages of male persons of
German Nationality in Occupied Netherlands Territories, from
Official Gazette for Occupied Dutch Territories, year 1941.
Vol. VI, Pg. 71
3340-PS; First Order concerning extraordinary measures of a
Constitutional and Administrative nature, 1 March 1941, from
Official Gazette for Occupied Dutch Territories, year 1941.
Vol. VI, Pg. 72
3341-PS; Third Order concerning certain provision in
connection with Netherlands Nationality, 8 August 1941, from
Official Gazette for Occupied Dutch Territories, year 1941.
Vol. VI, Pg. 73
3342-PS; Eighth Order concerning Special Measures affecting
Administrative Organization, 11 August 1941, from Official
Gazette of Occupied Dutch Territories, year 1941. Vol. VI,
Pg.74
3391-PS; Letter from Seyss-Inquart to Hitler, 30 September
1938. Vol. VI, Pg. 108
3392-PS; Letter from Seyss-Inquart to Keppler, 3 September
1937. Vol. VI, Pg. 109
*3397-PS; Letter from Keppler to Seyss-Inquart, 8 January
1938. (USA 702) . Vol. VI, Pg. 115
*3398-PS; Letter from Seyss-Inquart to Himmler, 4 November
1939. (USA 885) . Vol. VI, Pg. 116
[Page 1012]
3400-PS; Minutes of meeting of German Association, 28
December 1918, and Constitution and By-Laws thereof found in
personal files of Seyss-Inquart for period of 1918 to 1943.
Vol. VI, Pg. 118
*3425-PS; Voluntary statement made by Seyss-Inquart with
advice of counsel, 10 December 1945. (USA 701) . Vol. VI,
Pg. 124
*3430-PS; Extract from Four Years in Holland, 1944. (USA
708) . Vol. VI, Pg. 135
3446-PS; Memorandum relating to report and letter of Reich
Fuehrer SS and Chief of the German Police, 13 October 1938.
Vol. VI, Pg. 153
*3447-PS; Letter from Dr. Lammers to Seyss-Inquart. (USA
887) . Vol. VI, Pg. 156
*3448-PS; Letter from Seyss-Inquart to Dr. Lammers, 23
October 1938. (USA 886) . Vol. VI, Pg. 156
3449-PS; Letter to Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief of German
Police, January 1939. Vol. VI, Pg. 157
*3450-PS; Decree of 18 November 1938 concerning
sequestration and confiscation of property of enemies of the
State of Austria. (USA 888) . Vol. VI, Pg. 157
3457-PS; Extract concerning Seyss-Inquart from The Archive,
1943-44, p. 720. Speech by Goering, from Hermann Goering
Speeches and Papers. (USA 437) . Vol. VI, Pg. 158
*3460-PS; Speech by Hans Frank, from Frank Diary, 1940,
Vol. II, pp. 510-511. (USA 614) . Vol. VI, Pg. 160
3467-PS; Law on Limitation of travel to Republic Austria,
29 May 1933. 1933 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, No. 57, p. 311.
Vol. VI, Pg. 169
[Page 1013]
*3468-PS; Decree concerning establishment of administration
of occupied Polish territories, from Documents of German
Politics, 1939, Part 2, pp. 674-682. (USA 705) . Vol. VI,
Pg. 169
*3473-PS; Letter from Keppler to Goering, 6 January 1938,
giving details of Nazi intrigue in Austria. (USA 581) . Vol.
VI, Pg. 197
3522-PS; Letter from Konrad Henlein to Seyss-Inquart, 17
March 1938. Vol. VI, Pg. 212
3523-PS; Letter from Seyss-Inquart to Henlein, 29 December
1937. Vol. VI, Pg. 213
3588-PS; Order concerning exercise of Governmental
authority in Netherlands, 29 May 1940, from Official Gazette
for Occupied Dutch Territories, 1940. Vol. VI, Pg. 282
*3722-PS; Testimony of Fritz Sauckel, 5 October 1945. (USA
224) . Vol. VI, Pg. 459
3732-PS; Testimony of Seyss-Inquart, 9 October 1945. Vol.
VI, Pg. 539
*C-102; Document signed by Hitler relating to operation
"Otto", 11 March 1938. (USA 74) . Vol. VI, Pg. 911
*C-182; Directive No. 2 from Supreme Commander Armed
Forces, initialled Jodl, 11 March 1938. (USA 77) . Vol. VI,
Pg. 1017
*D-571; Official report of British Minister in Prague to
Viscount Halifax, 21 March 1939. (USA 112) . Vol. VII, Pg.
88
EC-86; Report on financial contributions of the Occupied
Areas. Vol. VII, Pg. 264
ECR-174; Report of the Commissar of the Netherlands Bank
for the month May 1941, dated 12 June 1941. Vol. VII, Pg.
726
ECR-195; Letter from RKK Amsterdam to Central
Administration of RKK Berlin, 21 April 1942, concerning
Dutch East Help. Vol. VII, Pg. 747
L-26; United Nations Information Organization Report No. 8,
14 June 1944 “Conditions in Occupied Territories.” Vol. VII,
Pg. 771
*L-151; Report from Ambassador Bullitt to State Department,
23 November 1937, regarding his visit to Warsaw. (USA 70) .
Vol. VII, Pg. 894
L-231; Telegram from American Legation in Vienna to U.S.
Secretary of State, 13 March 1938. Vol. VII, Pg. 1093
*Chart No. 1; National Socialist German Workers' Party.
(2903-PS; USA 2) . Vol. VIII, Pg. 770