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18. Franz von Papen
A. POSITIONS HELD BY VON PAPEN.
(1) Awarded the Golden Party Badge by Hitler, thereby
becoming member of NSDAP (2902-PS; Das Archiv vol. 48, p.
1614).
(2) Member of Reichstag, 1933-1945 (2902-PS).
(3) Reich Chancellor, 1 June 1942 to 2 December 1942, acting
pro-tem between 17 November and 2 December (2902-PS).
(4) Vice Chancellor, 30 January 1933 to August 1934 ( ?)
Papen admits holding office only to 30 June 1934; he also
admits that decrees published on 1 August 1934 and 2 August
1934 carry his signa-
ture as Vice-Chancellor, but claims this was either mistake
or forgery) (2902-PS).
(5) Special Plenipotentiary for the Saar (13 November 1933
to 30 June 1934) (2902-PS).
(6) Negotiator of Concordat with Vatican (concluded 20 July
1933) (2655-PS).
(7) German Ambassador at Vienna (26 July 1934 to 4 February
1938), continuing thereafter to arrange Berchtesgaden
meeting between Hitler and Schuschnigg and to participate in
meeting itself (2902-PS).
B. AS EX-REICH CHANCELLOR AND PROMINENT POLITICAL LEADER,
VON PAPEN USED HIS PERSONAL INFLUENCE TO PROMOTE THE
ACCESSION OF THE NAZIS TO POWER.
(1) When von Papen began these efforts he was well aware of
the Nazi program and Nazi methods. The official NSDAP
program was open and notorious. For many years it had been
published and republished in the Yearbook of the NSDAP and
elsewhere. The Nazis made no secret of their intention to
make it the fundamental law of the State. The first three
points of this program forecast a foreign policy predicated
upon the absorption of “Germanic” populations outside the
boundaries of the Reich, the abrogation of Versailles treaty
limitations, and the acquisition of “Lebensraum.” Points 4
to 8 foretold the ruthless elimination of the Jews, and the
25th point demanded “unlimited authority” of the central
regime over the entire Reich as a means “for the execution
of all this” (1708-PS).
Hitler and the other leaders of the Party repeatedly
reiterated these views before 1933. Hitler himself
subsequently pointed out that there was no excuse for
misinterpreting Nazi intentions:
“When I came to power in 1933, our path lay
unmistakably before us. Our internal policy had been
exactly defined by our fifteen-year-old struggle. Our
program, repeated a thousand times, obligated us to the
German people. I should be a man without honor, worthy
of being stoned, had I retracted a single step of the
program I then enunciated
“My foreign policy had identical aims. My program was
to abolish the Treaty of Versailles. It is futile
nonsense for the rest of the world to pretend today
that I did not reveal this program until 1933 or 1935
or 1937. Instead of listen-
[Page 917]
ing to the foolish chatter of emigres, these gentlemen
would have been wiser to read what I have written
thousands of times.” (2541-PS)
Hitler and other Nazi leaders repeatedly made clear their
willingness to use force if necessary to achieve their
purposes. They glorified war. Mein Kampf is replete with
early evidence of such intentions, which subsequently were
reaffirmed from time to time in the years preceding 1933 (D-
660; 2771-PS; 2512-PS).
The Nazi leaders prior to 1933 had openly declared their
intentions to subvert democratic processes as a means to
achieve their purposes, and to this end to harass and
embarrass democratic forces at every turn. Thus Hitler
himself had declared that.
“We shall become members of all constitutional bodies,
and in this manner make the Party the decisive factor.
Of course, when we possess all constitutional rights we
shall then mould the State into the form we consider to
be the right one.” (2512-PS)
Frick, writing in the National Socialist Yearbook, declared:
“Our participation in the parliament does not indicate
a support, but rather an undermining of the
parliamentarian system. It does not indicate that we
renounce our anti-parliamentarian attitude, but that we
are fighting the enemy with his own weapons and that we
are fighting for our National Socialist goal from the
parliamentary platform.” (2742-PS)
The practical application of these purposes was thus
subsequently described by a leading Nazi constitutional
authority, Ernst Rudolf Huber:
“It was necessary above all to make formal use of the
possibilities of the party-state system but to refuse
real cooperation and thereby to render the
parliamentary system, which is by nature dependent upon
the responsibility cooperation of the opposition,
incapable of action.” (2633-PS).
This practical application of Nazi purposes and methods was
manifest at the time von Papen was a member of the Reichstag
and Vice Chancellor. By this time the Nazi members of the
Reichstag were engaging in tactics of disturbance which
finally culminated in physical attacks upon members of the
Reichstag and upon visitors, and were using terroristic
measures to assure their election (L-83).
Von Papen not only had the opportunity to observe early
manifestations of Nazi violence and irresponsibility. He
fully under-
[Page 918]
stood the true character of the Nazi menace before 1933 and
publicly condemned
At the time of the German elections in the summer of 1932,
von Papen, President Hindenburg, and certain other German
leaders were hoping that the rising Nazi menace would be
dissipated by providing for National Socialist participation
in a rightist-centrist government. Hitler refused all
overtures inviting such participation, even when suggested
by President Hindenburg himself, insisting upon assuming the
chancellorship without obligation to other parties. Hitler's
refusal at this time to collaborate with Hindenburg and
Papen marked the beginning of a series of public
declarations in which von Papen revealed a clear
understanding of Nazi methods and objections. Thus, on the
occasion of his Munster speech of 28 August 1932 von Papen
declared:
“The licentiousness emanating from the appeal of the
leader of the National Socialist Movement does not
comply very well with his claims to governmental
power.”
*******
“I do not concede him the right to regard the mere
minority following his banner solely as the German
nation, and to treat all our fellow countrymen as 'free
game'.”
*******
“I am advocating the constitutional state, the
community of the people, law and order in government.
In doing so, it is I, and not he, who is carrying on
the struggle against the domination of parties, against
arbitrarianism and injustice, a struggle which millions
of his supporters had been wholeheartedly longing for
years to fight.”
*******
“I am firmly determined to stamp out the smouldering
flame of civil war, to put an end to political unrest
and political violence, which today is still such a
great obstacle to the positive work representing the
sole task of the State.” (3314-PS)
Writing in the September 1932 issue of the periodical “Volk
und Reich,” von Papen declared:
“The present situation clearly shows that party
domination and State leadership are concepts
incompatible with one another. It is conceivable
theoretically that a party might gain the majority in
parliament and claims the government (State leadership)
for itself. The NSDAP has proclaimed this theoretical
possibility as its practical goal and has come very
close to attaining it. It is to be hoped that the
leaders
[Page 919]
of this movement will place the nation above the party
and will thus lend a visible expression to the faith of
millions looking for a way out of the spiritual and-
material distress of the nation provided also by the
leadership of the State.”
*******
“*** The hope in the hearts of millions of national
socialists can be fulfilled only by an authoritarian
government. The problem of forming a cabinet on the
basis of a parliamentary coalition has again been
brought into the field of public political discussion.
If such negotiations, in the face of growing distress,
are conducted with the motif of destroying the
political opponent by the failure of his governmental
activity, this is a dangerous game against which one
cannot warn enough. In the last analysis such plans can
mean nothing else but a tactics which counts on the
possibility that matters get worse for the people and
that the faith of millions will turn into the bitterest
disappointment, if these tactics only result in the
destruction of the political adversary. It is within
the nature of such party-tactical maneuvers that they
are veiled and will be disclaimed in public. That,
however, cannot prevent me from warning publicly
against such plans, about which it may be undecided who
is the betrayer and who the betrayed one; plans,
though, which will certainly cheat the German people
out of their hope for improvement of their situation.
Nothing can prove more urgently the necessity for an
authoritarian government than such a prospect of
maneuvers of a tactical game by the parties.”
(Papen article quoted in “Frankfurter Zeitung", 2 September
1932, p.
In his Munich speech on 13 October 1932 von Papen was
especially clear:
“The essence of conservative ideology is its being
anchored in the divine order of things. That too is its
fundamental difference compared with the doctrine
advocated by the NSDAP. The principle of
'exclusiveness' of a political 'everything or nothing'
which the latter adheres to, its mythical Messiah-
belief in the bombastic Fuehrer who alone is destined
to direct fate, gives it the character of a political
sect. And therein I see the unbridgeable cleavage
between a conservative policy born of faith and a
national-socialist creed as a matter of politics. It
seems to me that today names and individuals are
unimportant when Germany’s final fate is at stake. What
the nation demands is this: it expects of a movement
which has written upon its banner the internal
[Page 920]
and external national freedom that it will act, at all
times and under all circumstances, as if it were the
spiritual, social and political conscience of the
nation. If it does not act that way; if this movement
follows merely tactical points of view, democratic-
parliamentarian points of view, if it engages in the
soliciting of mass support using demagogic agitation an
mean. of proletarian class struggle then it is not a
movement any more, it has become a political party.
“And, indeed, the Reich was almost destroyed by the
political parties. One simply cannot, on one side,
despise mercilessly masses and majorities, as Herr
Hitler is doing, and on the other hand surrender to
parliamentarian democracy; surrender to the extent of
adopting resolutions against one’s own government
together with Bolshevists.”
*******
“In the interest of the entire nation we decline the
claim to power by parties which want to own their
followers body and soul, and which want to put
themselves, as a party or a movement, over and above
the whole nation.” (3817-PS)
In a series of interviews and speeches in the fall of 1932
von Papen castigated the Nazi party for its ambitions to
achieve a total and centralized control of Germany. He
contrasted its objectives and methods to his own
"conservatism” and emphasized its incompatibility with the
preservation of the “federalistic” type of government to
which he was committed. His public pronouncements in this
connection were clearly reflected in the contemporary press:
“Von Papen claimed that it had been his aim from the
very beginning of his tenure in office to build a new
Reich for and with the various states [Laender]. The
Reich government is taking a definite federalist
attitude. Its slogan is not a dreary centralism or
unitarianism.”
*******
“Wherever one did hear von Papen express himself in
public, one did hear a chancellor who took special care
to be regarded as an unconditional federalist.” (3318-
PS)
The Vice Chancellor’s campaign against the Nazis culminated
finally in a radio speech to the German public on 4 November
1932, in which he severely criticized Nazi political
methods. He damned the Nazis' “pure party egoism” which
resulted in methods described by him as “sabotage” and as “a
crime against the nation.” He accused the Nazis of wanting
complete and permanent power in Germany (Deutsche
Reichsgeshichte in Dokumenten IV, p. 523 (Rundfunkrede des
Reichkanzlers von Papen)).
[Page 921]
Nor was von Papen content merely to make speeches against
the Nazis. As late as November 1932, Papen was prepared to
use all the forces at the command of the state in a supreme
effort to suppress the rising Nazi menace. He was deterred
from this purpose only by a failure to secure the support of
his cabinet. The inner struggles of the German cabinet at
this time are recounted by Otto Meissner (in a statement
made at Nurnberg, 28 November 1945), Chief of the Chancery
of Reichspresident Hindenburg.
“Papen’s reappointment as Chancellor by President
Hindenburg would have been probable if he had been
prepared to take up an open fight against the National
Socialists, which would have involved the threat or use
of force. Almost up to the time of his resignation,
Papen and some of the other ministers agreed on the
necessity for pressing the fight against the Nazis by
employing all the resources of the State and relying on
Article 48 of the Constitution, even if this might lead
to armed conflict. Other ministers, however, believed
that such a course would lead to civil war.
“The decision was provided by Schleicher, who in
earlier times had recommended energetic action against
the National Socialists — even if this meant the use
of police and army. Now, in the decisive cabinet
meeting, he abandoned this idea and declared himself
for an understanding with Hitler.
“The gist of Schleicher’s report — which was given
partly by himself, partly by Major Ott, who adduced
detailed statistical material — was that the weakened
Reichswehr, which was dispersed over the whole Reich,
even if supported by civilian volunteer formations,
would not be equal to military operations on a large
scale, and was not suited and trained for civil war.
The police, in particular the Prussian police, had been
undermined by propaganda and could not be considered as
absolutely reliable. If the Nazis began an armed
revolt, one must anticipate a revolt of the Communists
and a general strike at the same time. The forces of
these two adversaries were very strong. If such a 'war
against two fronts' should take place, the forces of
the State would undoubtedly be disrupted. The outcome
of a civil war would be at the least most uncertain.
“In his, Schleicher’s view, it was impossible to take
the risks implied in such a policy. In case of failure,
which he believed likely, the consequences for Germany
would be terrible. All present in the cabinet meeting
were deeply impressed by
[Page 922]
Schleicher’s statement, and even those who had been in
favor of energetic action against the National
Socialists now changed their mind, so that Papen was
isolated and felt himself to be isolated.
“In the interview which Papen had with Hindenburg after
this meeting, on 17 November 1932 Papen did not conceal
his deep disappointment over Schleicher’s altered
position. Although Hindenburg asked him to make a new
attempt to form a government, Papen stood on his
decision to resign and Hindenburg gave in.”
(2) Despite his appreciation of the Nazi menace, von Papen
rigorously proceeded to conduct negotiations which resulted
in placing Hitler and the Nazi regime in power. Following
his resignation as Chancellor on 17 November 1932 von Papen
continued as Chancellor pro-tem until 2 December 1932, when
General Schleicher was appointed to replace him (2902-PS).
Almost as soon as he vacated the Chancery, von Papen began
plotting to unseat his arch-rival Schleicher. On about 10
December 1932 — less than a month after he was willing to
use force to suppress the Nazis — von Papen requested Kurt
von Schroeder, the Cologne banker, to arrange a meeting
between Hitler and von Papen (according to the statement of
Schroeder, made at Nurnberg, 5 December 1945). Schroeder was
one of a group of rightist industrial and financial leaders
who had previously been organized by Hitler’s man, Wilhelm
Keppler, to provide means of bolstering Nazi economic power.
Hitler himself at this time understood von Papen. He knew
that Papen’s ideas were not too different from his own to
preclude agreement. He knew that Papen’s personal rivalry
with Schleicher would make Papen amenable to some agreement
whereby Schleicher might be unhorsed and Papen restored to a
position of public prominence. He accordingly asked Keppler
to arrange for a meeting with Papen (reported in an
affidavit of Wilhelm Keppler, executed at Nurnberg, 26
November 1945).
The result of these maneuvers was the now-famous meeting
between Hitler and Papen at banker Schroeder’s Cologne home
in January 1933. It was at this meeting that Hitler and
Papen reached an understanding, subject only to the ironing
out of minor details. It was at this meeting that Papen
completely committed himself to go along with Nazi policy.
The events of this day have been described by Kurt von
Schroeder (in a statement referred to above):
“On 4 January 1933,Hitler, von Papen, Hess, Himmler and
[Page 923]
Keppler came to my house in Cologne. Hitler, von Papen
and I went to my den where we were closeted in a
discussion lasting about two hours. Hess, Himmler and
Keppler did not participate in this discussion but were
in the next room. Keppler, who had helped arrange this
meeting, came from Berlin; von Papen came alone from
his home in the Saar; and Hitler brought Hess and
Himmler with him, as they were traveling with him to
Lippe in connection with the election campaign. The
discussion was only between Hitler and Papen; I
personally had nothing to say in the discussion. The
meeting started about 11:30 A. M. and the first
question was raised by Hitler as to why it was
necessary to punish the two Nazis who had killed the
Communist in Silesia. Von Papen explained to Hitler
that it had been necessary to punish these two Nazis,
although they had not been put to death, because the
law was on the books and all political offenders under
the law must have some punishment. He further explained
to Hitler that it might be possible to get a pardon
from President Hindenburg to give serious consideration
to making Hitler the Chancellor at the time that
Hindenburg met with Hitler and von Papen and that he
had understood that Hindenburg was perfectly willing to
discuss this matter with Hitler at that time. He said
that it came as a great surprise and shock to him when
Hindenburg was unwilling to do so and he felt that
someone, probably von Schleicher, was responsible for
the change in Hindenburg’s point of view. Next, von
Papen told Hitler that it seemed to him the best thing
to have the conservatives and nationalists who had
supported him join with the Nazis to form a government.
He proposed that this new government should, if
possible, be headed by Hitler and von Papen on the same
level. Then Hitler made a long speech in which he said
if he were made Chancellor, it would be necessary for
him to be head of the government but that supporters of
Papen could go into his (Hitler's) government as
ministers when they were willing to go along with him
in his policy of changing many things. These changes he
outlined at this time included elimination of Social
Democrats, Communists and Jews from leading positions
in Germany and the restoration of order in public life.
Von Papen and Hitler reached an agreement in principle
so that many of the points which had brought them in
conflict could be eliminated and they could find a way
to get together. They agreed that further details would
have to be
[Page 924]
worked out and that this could be done in Berlin or
some other convenient place.
“I understand they met later with von Ribbentrop and
worked out further details.
“The meeting broke up about 1:30 and the three of us
joined Hess, Himmler and Keppler at lunch, during which
there was general conversation which lasted until about
four o'clock when they, all the guests, departed.”
Having reached an understanding with Hitler, von Papen
directed his energy toward convincing President Hindenburg
to allow Hitler to form a new government. In this task he
had to overcome Hindenburg’s fears that this appointment
would lead to domestic oppressions and risk of war
(according to a statement of Otto Meissner, Nurnberg, 28
November 1945).
Von Papen himself subsequently admitted the important role
he played in bringing Hitler to power. At Berchtesgaden on
12 February 1938, immediately after Hitler had forced
Schuschnigg to sign the document which led to the Austrian
Anschluss, Hitler turned to Papen and remarked:
“Herr von Papen, through your assistance I was
appointed Chancellor of Germany and thus the Reich was
saved from the abyss of communism. I will never forget
that.”
Papen replied: “Ja, wohl, Mein Fuehrer.” (2995-PS)
C. AS VICE-CHANCELLOR, VON PAPEN USED HIS POSITION AND
PERSONAL INFLUENCE TO FACILITATE THE CONSOLIDATION OF NAZI
CONTROL OVER GERMANY.
(1) In the first critical year and a half of Nazi
consolidation of control over Germany, von Papen was second
only to Hitler in the Cabinet which established the legal
basis for furtherance of the Nazi program. As Vice-
Chancellor, van Papen was the only member of the government
empowered to act for the Fuehrer in his absence.
(2) Von Papen actively participated in the general abolition
of civil liberties by promoting legislation which paved the
way for the Nazi police state. At the first meeting of
Hitler’s Cabinet, there was intensive discussion concerning
the possibility of securing passage of an Enabling Law which
in practical effect would liquidate the Reichstag and make
the Nazi Cabinet the supreme law-making power of the Reich.
The conspirators, including von Papen, at this meeting
clearly indicated that they did not at the time hold
sufficient power to achieve this measure by normal
constitutional methods (351-PS).
Seizing the Reichstag fire as a pretext, the Cabinet
forthwith arranged for the suspension of those fundamental
civil liberties (including freedom of speech, press,
assembly and association) which would protect citizens who
dared to oppose the plans of the conspirators. The
suspension of civil liberties was accomplished by issuance
of a Presidential decree, which presumably, according to
German usage, was proposed to the Reich President by the
Cabinet and-countersigned by those Ministers whose
departments were involved (1390-PS;
This basic law was only the first of a series which placed
the individual dissenter at the mercy of the Nazi state. As
if to underscore explicitly the basic policy behind this
legislation, von Papen personally signed the decree which
implemented this legislation by creating Special Courts to
enforce its provisions. This decree abolished rights,
including the right of appeal, which had previously
characterized the administration of justice by the German
judicial system. It thus constituted also the first
legislative measure for the Nazification of the German
judiciary (2076-PS).
The subsequent creation of the dreaded Volksgericht and the
wholesale Nazification of the German system of criminal law
was merely the logical development of these earlier steps.
This too was achieved by decree of the Cabinet in which von
Papen was Vice-Chancellor
(3) Von Papen actively participated in substitution of the
Nazi Cabinet for the Reichstag as Germany’s supreme law-
giving authority, notwithstanding his doubts as to the
advisability of giving Hitler such extensive power. Von
Papen actively participated in the Cabinet deliberations
concerning the proposed so-called Enabling Act, and
concerning the means by which it might be made law (351-PS;
2962-PS; 2963-PS).
The enactment of this law deprived the Reichstag of its
legislative functions, so that legislative as well as
executive powers were concentrated in Hitler and his Cabinet
(2001-PS). Enactment of the law was made possible only by
the application of Nazi pressure and terror against the
potential opponents of this legislation, and by taking
advantage of the Presidential decree of 28 February 1933,
suspending constitutional guarantees of freedom. (See
section 2 of Chapter VII on the Acquisition of Totalitarian
Political Control.)
As if to indorse the methods by which this legislation was
enacted, von Papen personally signed the Amnesty Decree of
21
[Page 926]
March 1933, liberating all persons who had committed murder
between 30 January 1933 and 21 March 1933 against anti-Nazi
politicians, writers, and Reichstag Deputies (2059-PS).
Von Papen participated in this program notwithstanding the
fact that he foresaw at that time the implications of
granting to Hitler the complete powers conferred by the
Enabling Act. He has so testified (in an interrogation at
Nurnberg, 3 September 1945):
“Q. After Hitler became Chancellor, when for the first
time did you have any doubts about the wisdom of having
allowed him to become Chancellor?
“A. Well, that’s difficult to say. I mean the first
doubt certainly I had when the Reichstag gave in to his
request for the law, to enable him to rule the country
without parliament.”
(4) Von Papen not only participated in the seizure by the
cabinet of supreme power for the Nazis, but as a member of
the cabinet participated in the systematic elimination of
all potential enemies of the Nazi conspiracy. The Reichstag
fire and the ensuing suppression of civil liberties marked
the beginning of the destruction of all rival political
parties. The immediate elimination of the legally elected
Communist members from the Reichstag was merely the
forerunner of the rapid and complete liquidation of all
political parties other than the National Socialists (2403-
PS; 1396-PS; 2058-PS; 1388-PS). By these measures the
suppression of all democratic opposition became complete,
within one year of the time when von Papen was warning his
countrymen of the dangers of authoritarianism.
Having substituted the autocracy of the Hitler cabinet for
the democratic force of the Reichstag, the cabinet proceeded
immediately to enact a series of laws abolishing the states
and coordinating them with the Reich (2004-PS; 2005-PS; 2006-
PS). The enactment of these laws, which had been clearly
indicated by point 25 of the Party program, removed all
possible retarding influences which the German federal State
might have exerted against the overwhelming centralization
of power in Hitler' Reich Cabinet.
The importance of this step, as well as the role played by
Papen, is reflected in an exchange of letters between Reichs
President Hindenburg, von Papen in his capacity as
Reichskommissar for Prussia, and Reichs Minister Goering.
The exchange occurred in connection with the recall of the
Reichskommissar and the appointment of Goering to the post
of Minister President of Prussia. In tendering his
resignation, on 7 April 1933, von Papen wrote to Hitler:
“With the draft of the law for the coordination of the
states with the Reich, passed today by the Reich
Chancellor, legislative work has begun which will be of
historical significance for the political development
of the German state. The step taken by the Reich
Government, which I headed at the time, is now crowned
by this new inter-locking of the Reich. You, Herr Reich
Chancellor, will now, as once Bismarck, be able to
coordinate in all points the policy of the greatest of
German states with that of the Reich. Now that the new
law enables you to appoint a Prussian Prime Minister I
ask you to inform the Reich President that I return to
his hands my post of Reichs Commissar for Prussia.”
In transmitting this resignation request to President
Hindenburg, Hitler stated:
“Vice-Chancellor von Papen has sent a letter to me
which I enclose for your information. Herr von Papen
already informed me within the last few days that he
agreed with Minister Goering to resign on his own
volition, as soon as the unified conduct of the
governmental affairs in the Reich and in Prussia would
be assured by the new law on coordination of policy in
the Reich and the states [Laender].
“On the eve of the day when the new law on the
institution of Reich governors [Reich-Statthalter] was
adopted, Herr von Papen considered this aim as having
been attained and he requested of me to undertake the
appointment of the Prussian Prime Minister, when at the
same time he would offer his full time services in the
Reich
“Herr von Papen, in accepting the commission for the
Government of Prussia in these difficult times since 30
January, has rendered a very meritorious service to the
realization of the idea of coordinating the policy in
the Reich and the States. His collaboration in the
Reich cabinet, for which he now offers all his
strength, is infinitely valuable; my relationship to
him is such a heartily friendly one, that I sincerely
rejoice at the great help I shall thus receive.
“For profound reverence,
“A.H.” (357-PS)
The enactment of this legislation followed repeated
declarations in which Papen had warned his countrymen of the
dangers of the exaggerated degree of centralized authority
which would result from abolition of the federal system.
These warnings began before Hitler’s accession to power and
continued by implica-
[Page 928]
tion in the reassurances which Papen gave in February 1933
to Bavarian political leaders who expressed their fears of
Nazi centralized authority (Cuno Horkenbach, Das Deutsche
Reich von 1918 bis Heute. (The German Reich from 1918 until
today) (Berlin 1933), p. 44). As late as 3 March 1933, in an
election speech at Stuttgart, von Papen warned that:
“Federalism saves us from centralism, that
organizational form which concentrically draws all the
vital forces of a people to one point, as a mirror will
do with the rays of the sun. No people is less suited
for being governed centralistically than the German
people.”
Less than one month after its seizure of the legislative
power, the cabinet of which von Papen was a member enacted
the first of a series of laws aimed at establishing firm
Nazi control over the entire civil service and judiciary
(2012-PS; 1400-PS; 1398-PS). Having been a public servant
himself, von Papen was aware of the far-reaching effect of
these first legislative and administrative steps in
attaining full totalitarian control over the entire
governmental machinery of Germany.
The cabinet of which von Papen was a member embarked upon a
state policy of persecution of the Jews. The first organized
act in this program was the boycott of Jewish enterprises on
1 April 1933, which was approved by the entire cabinet. This
was followed by a series of laws beginning the systematic
elimination of the- Jews from public and professional life
in Germany. (See Section 7 of Chapter VII on the Program for
Persecution of Jews.)
All these suppressive measures were in line with long-
standing basic objectives of the NSDAP to which von Papen
had agreed in his January conference with Hitler and von
Schroeder.
(5) To complete its suppression of all rival influences, the
Cabinet of which von Papen was a member enacted a series of
decrees which strengthened the Nazi movement by conferring
upon it a para-governmental status. Followers of the Party,
through a decree signed personally by von Papen, were
granted amnesty “for penal acts committed in the material
revolution of the German People, in its preparation of the
fight for the German soil” (2059-PS). The perpetrators of
Nazi terrorism were thereby placed above the law, and a
pattern was established for the subsequent handling of Nazi
excesses.
This cabinet enacted measures which gave legal protection to
the status and symbols of the Party and its formations (1652-
PS;
This cabinet enacted a series of measures to assure the Nazi
[Page 929]
movement’s spiritual control over Germany (2029-PS; 2030-PS;
2415-PS; 2083-PS; 2078-PS; 2088-PS).
Having first outlawed all political parties other than the
NSDAP, the cabinet of which von Papen was-a member formally
decreed that:
“1. After the victory of the National Socialistic
Revolution, the National Socialistic German Labor Party
is the bearer of the concept of the German State and is
inseparably the state.
“2. It will be a part of the public law. Its
organization will be determined by the Fuehrer.” (1395-
PS).
Having granted para-governmental status to the Nazi party,
and having assured legal unity of the Party’s Fuehrer and
the Reich’s Chancellor, the Nazis next step was to combine
in the same person the Presidency of the German Reich. This
was accomplished by merging the offices of President and
Chancellor, by means of a decree signed by von Papen (2003-
PS). An important consequence of this law was to give to
Hitler the supreme command of the German armed forces,
always a perquisite of the Presidency (2050-PS).
(6) Despite disagreements as to detail, von Papen
fundamentally agreed with basic Nazi objectives and publicly
endorsed the regime for which he shared responsibility as
Vice Chancellor. Von Papen’s basic political philosophy was
not so divergent from Nazism as to preclude an easy bridging
of the gap. In 1932, while still Chancellor, von Papen had
been willing to head a government in which Nazism would be
strongly represented. By January 1933 he found it possible -
- as a price for his restoration to a position of public
prominence — to submerge his differences with Hitler and to
direct his energies to the installation of a Nazi regime
(see B above).
In addition to his participation as a cabinet member in the
process of Nazifying Germany, von Papen’s devotion to the
Nazi cause was repeatedly demonstrated throughout this
period by public statements and acts both by himself and by
Hitler. Thus, as noted above in connection with his role in
the elimination of the Laender as a political force, von
Papen wrote Hitler in April 1933, that
“You, Herr Reich Chancellor, will now, as once
Bismarck, be able to coordinate in all points the
policy of the greatest of German states with that of
the Reich,”
And Hitler on that occasion took notice of Papen’s services
by declaring that
[Page 930]
“His collaboration in the Reich cabinet, for which he
now offers all his strength, is infinitely valuable; my
relationship to him is such a heartily friendly one,
that I sincerely rejoice at the great help I shall thus
receive.” (3357-PS).
And again on 2 November 1933, speaking from the same
platform with Hitler and Gauleiter Terboven, in the course
of the campaign for Reichstag election and the referendum on
Germany’s withdrawal from the League of Nations, von Papen
declared:
"Ever since Providence called upon me to become the pioneer
of national resurrection and the rebirth of our homeland, I
have tried to support with all my strength the work of the
national socialist movement and its leader; and just as I at
the time of taking over the chancellorship have advocated to
pave the way to power for the young fighting liberation
movement, just as I on January 30 was selected by a gracious
fate to put the hands of our chancellor and Fuehrer into the
hand of our beloved field marshal, so do I today again feel
the obligation to say to the German people and all those who
have kept confidence in me:
“The kind Lord has blessed Germany by giving it in
times of deep distress a leader who will lead it,
through all distresses and weaknesses, through all
crisis and moment of danger, with the sure instinct of
the statesman into a happy future.”
********
“Let us in this hour say to the Fuehrer of the new
Germany that we believe in him and his work.” (3375-
PS).
By this time as noted above, the cabinet of which Papen was
a member had abolished the civil liberties which were a
condition to any effective protest against Nazism, had
sanctioned political murder committed in aid of Nazism's
seizure of power, had substituted itself for the Reichstag
as Germany’s supreme law-making authority, had destroyed all
rival political parties, had enacted the basic laws for
abolition of the political influence of the Laender, had
provided the legislative basis for purging the civil service
and judiciary of anti-Nazi elements, had embarked upon a
state policy of persecution of the Jews, had legislated Nazi
influence into the cultural life of the German nation, and
had taken its first steps toward conferring a para-
governmental status upon the Nazi party and its principal
formations.
Even after von Papen’s Marburg speech of June 1934, in which
he again showed some understanding of the dangers of Nazism,
he remained a pillar of Nazi policy and influence. Thus
Hitler
[Page 931]
himself, in attempting to justify the Blood Purge of 30 June
1934, tacitly admitted that Papen was still considered a
loyal member of the regime:
“The allegations [of foreign newspapers] that Vice-
Chancellor von Papen, Reichsminister Seldte, or other
gentlemen of the Reich Cabinet had entertained
connections with the rebels is refuted by the fact that
one of the first intentions of the rebels was to
assassinate these men.” (Hitler Reichstag address, 18
July 1934, as quoted in Das Archiv, Vol. IV, pp. 495,
507.)
The Fuehrer thus made-a tacit bid for the continuing loyalty
of von Papen. Von Papen’s subsequent career demonstrated
that this was not a vain expectation. He left the vice-
chancellorship only to assume the new task of special
emissary of the Fuehrer to Austria. But before leaving,
while still Vice Chancellor, von Papen signed the decree
combining the positions of President and Reichs Chancellor
on 1 August 1934, and on 5 August 1934 he delivered the
document — the so-called Hindenburg Testament which
purported to confer the revered president’s dying blessing
upon Hitler and the Nazi regime (Notice concerning delivery
of Hindenburg’s testament by Vice Chancellor von Papen, Das
Archiv, Vol. V, page 648).
D. AS GERMANY’s MOST FAMOUS CATHOLIC LAYMAN AND AS
NEGOTIATOR OF THE VATICAN CONCORDAT, VON PAPEN USED HIS
POSITION AND PERSONAL INFLUENCE TO PARTICIPATE IN THE
CONSOLIDATION OF NAZI CONTROL OVER GERMANY AND IN NAZI
PREPARATION FOR AGGRESSION.
(1) Immediately upon Nazi seizure of power within Germany,
von Papen endeavored to weld German Catholicism into a
powerful body of support for the Nazi state. When Naziism
seized control of Germany in January 1933, its relations
with the church were at a low ebb. The period of the
Reichstag elections of July and November 1932 was marred by
certain widely circulated anti-Nazi pronouncements of the
German bishops, especially in such Catholic papers as
Germania, Koelnische Volkszeitung, and the Rhein-Mainische
Volkszeitung. These bishops discerned the fundamental
incompatibility between the Church and the Nazis' own
declarations of State policy. They accordingly publicly
stigmatized the Nazi movement as anti-Christian, forbade the
Catholic clergy to participate in any ceremonies (such as
funerals) in which the Nazi Party was officially
represented, refused the sacraments to
[Page 932]
Party officials, and in several pastorals expressly warned -
the faithful against the danger to German Catholicism
created by the Party
Immediately upon seizure of power, the main concern of the
new regime was to liquidate political opposition.
Achievement of this objective was predicated upon the
strategy of “divide and rule". A first step in this strategy
was to convince conservatives that the efforts of the
government were being directed primarily against the
Communists and other forces of the extreme Left, and that
their own interests would remain safe in Nazi hands as long
as they would consent to refrain from political activity.
The result was a brief but active period of rapprochement
between Church and Party. Von Papen was a leader in this
strategy. The minutes of the Reich cabinet meeting of 15
March 1933 contain the following notation in connection with
discussions on the Enabling Act:
“The Vice Chancellor and Reich Commissar for the State
of Prussia said it-is of decisive importance to
integrate into the new State the masses standing behind
the Parties. He said that the question of coordination
of political Catholicism into the new State is of
special importance.” (2962-PS)
Eight days later, speaking at the second meeting of the
Reichstag of 1933, on 23 March 1933, Hitler asked for
adoption of the Enabling Act. In this speech he declared:
“While the government is determined to carry through
the political and moral purging of our public life, it
is creating and insuring prerequisites for a truly
religious life. The government sees in both Christian
confessions the factors most important for the
maintenance of our Folkdom. It will respect agreements
concluded between them and the states. However, it
expects that its work will meet with a similar
appreciation. The government will treat all other
denominations with equal objective justice. However, it
can never condone that belonging to a certain
denomination or to' a certain race might be regarded as
a license to commit or tolerate crimes. The Government
will devote its care to the sincere living together of
Church and State.” (3387-PS).
The immediate effect of this assurance was action by the
conference of German bishop, meeting in Fulda on 28 March
1933. This conference lifted restrictions imposed on members
of the church adhering to the Nazi movement. In a cautious
statement which placed full faith and credit in the Papen-
inspired Hitler assurances, the bishops declared:
“The high shepherds of the dioceses of Germany in their
du-
[Page 933]
tiful anxiety to keep the Catholic faith pure and
protect the untouchable aims and rights of the Catholic
Church have adopted, for profound reasons, during the
last years, an oppositional attitude toward the
National Socialist movement, through prohibitions and
warnings, which was to be in effect as long and as far
as those reasons remained valid.
“It must now be recognized that there are official and
solemn declarations issued by the highest
representative of the Reich Government — who at the
same time is the authoritarian leader of that movement
— which acknowledge the inviolability of the teachings
of Catholic faith and the unchangeable tasks and rights
of the church, and which expressly assure the full
value of the legal pacts concluded between the various
German States and the Church.
“Without lifting the condemnation of certain religious
and ethical errors implied in our previous measures,
the Episcopate now believes it can entertain the
confidence that those prescribed general prohibitions
and warnings may not be regarded as necessary any
more.” (3389-PS)
This action opened the door for mass Party adherence by
practicing Catholics. All those German Catholics who were
inclined to adopt Nazi political views and had hesitated
only because of the anti-Nazi attitude of the hierarchy
hastened now to join the victorious party of the “National
Revolution". This tendency was marked by a tremendous and
sudden burst of activity by the so-called “bridge-builders,”
who rushed to close the gap between the Church and the Nazi
State. Von Papen, who only a short time before had been
willing to use armed force to suppress the Nazis, was
foremost among these “bridge-builders", who not only claimed
an ideological affinity between the Nazi system and the
alleged anti-liberal character of Catholic politics, but
affirmatively apologized for excesses of the State which
even then had begun to shock the world.
Existing agencies were used for this purpose. Thus, the
Union of Catholic Germans (Arbeitsgemeinschaft Katholischer
Deutscher), of which von Papen was president, insisted in
its program that the church, like the Nazi movement itself,
was guided by the leadership principle (Cuno Horkenbach, Das
Deutsche Reich von 1918 bis Heute (The German Reich from
1918 Until Today) (Berlin 1935), pp. 436, 504). The same
organization, in the course of the election campaign which
preceded adoption of the Enabling Act, had bitterly
criticized the Catholic political opposition to Marxism and
urged that Catholics “by all means vote unani-
[Page 934]
mously the National Socialist ticket", because “We Catholics
do not wish to be denied to march in the lead in this
election campaign” (Election Appeal, Voelkischer Beobachter,
23 February 1933, p. 2). Later, on the eve of the Nazis'
first anti-Jewish boycott, this same organization played its
part in the extensive campaign replying to foreign newspaper
reports concerning atrocities committed against German Jews.
On 1 April 1933 it published through the Prussian News
Service, an “Appeal to all Christians", viewing “with great
indignation” this “irresponsible campaign against Germany”
which “continues in spite of official German declarations
and corrections". This “Appeal” characterized the foreign
reports as “intentional lies and falsifications” and “a
reckless, crafty campaign of destruction conducted by the
Jewish world alliance and moneyed powers against the right
of self-determination of all peoples and against the entire
Christian civilization". It called upon “the Christians of
all countries, irrespective of denominations, to form a
world-wide front of defense against that Jewish conspiracy
disturbing the true peace” ("Appeal to All Christians",
Voelkischer Beobachter (People’s Observer), 30 March 1933,
p. 2).
Notwithstanding the force of these activities, this
Nazification by existing agencies was not deemed adequate to
the task of organizing Catholic lay support. The result was
the creation, in early April 1933, under the sponsorship of
von Papen, of a new “Bund” of Catholic Germans called “Cross
and Eagle” ("Kreuz und Adler") which made it its task “to
contribute enthusiastic devotion to the upbuilding of the
future Reich” (Gerd Ruehle, Das Dritte Reich (The Third
Reich), p. 250).
This whole program of rapprochement between Church and Party
manifests the Papen “touch” — the same quality of handiwork
which had manifested itself in Hitler’s accession to power
and which later was to reappear in Austria: First, gentle
hints by Papen a to strategy, followed within eight days by
reassurances in Hitler’s Reichstag speech. Next, again
following merely by days, the formal lifting of the
restrictions on Nazi membership by the leaders of the Church
of which von Papen was the most famous lay member. Finally,
again within a few days, the open campaign by which Papen-
sponsored organizations endeavored to align Church and
Party. The close timing of these events was not a
coincidence.
(2) Having achieved initial successes in consolidating
Catholic support within Germany, von Papen undertook
international consolidation of Nazi-Church relationships by
negotiation of a Con-
[Page 935]
cordat with the Vatican. The program of rapprochement and
the public declarations bridging the gap between the Church
and the Nazi movement were merely advertising media by which
Nazi-minded Catholics were herded into the movement, and
slogans by which the conspirators might placate the Catholic
hierarchy. Throughout this period there continued an
undercurrent of anti-Catholic activity. A thorough job was
done in purging Reich, state, and municipal administrations
of officials appointed for their adherence to the Centre or
Bavarian People’s parties. Former leaders of those parties,
including priests, joined Communists and Social Democrats in
the concentration camps, and the campaign of hatred against
the “black” was resumed. By April 1933 the bishops were
making appeals for clemency toward former civil servants,
who, they pointed out, were not able to join the celebration
of national awakening because they had been dismissed from
positions in which they had given their best to the
community of the German people. And on 31 May 1933, a
meeting of the Bavarian bishops adopted a solemn statement
directed against the tendency of attributing to the State
alone the right of educating, organizing, and leading
ideologically the German youth (Dismissal of Catholics,
Excerpts from Voelkischer Beobachter, February-March 1933;
Excerpt, Voelkischer Beobachter, 19 April 1933 (Munich ed.),
p. 2).
By this maintenance of a certain amount of pressure against
Catholic interests, the hierarchy was reminded of the
dangers of not coming to a definite agreement with the Nazi
State. The stage was thus set for von Papen’s negotiation of
a Concordat with the Vatican.
At the time of these activities, the government of which von
Papen was Vice Chancellor had already launched its program
to mold the state machinery into the Nazi image. The
Enabling Act had become law, and the general outlines of the
Nazi State were already manifest. Notwithstanding the doubts
created in his mind by Hitler’s insistence upon the Enabling
Act, von Papen undertook negotiations with the Vatican. In
fact, he since has claimed that these fears gave rise to the
negotiation of the Concordat (Interrogation at Nurnberg,
“I became alarmed, you remember, somewhere in June when
I went to Rome to negotiate a concordat because I
certainly feared that the particular powers of the
Hitler Party would create difficulties on the religious
side. So that with the consent of Hitler I went to Rome
to make that concordat.”
It is clear, however, that these alleged fears of the
Enabling Act were not fears at all. They were merely an
understanding
[Page 936]
of the threat they carried to all persons and
instrumentalities antagonistic to the Nazi system. Von Papen
understood the significance of these developments. What he
actually feared was that the rest of the world would also
understand Nazi methods and would erect barriers to the
consummation of the plans of the conspirators. The situation
plainly called for a neutralizing of these potential
barriers to Nazi plans. One method of achieving this result
at that time was the negotiation of solemn agreements
whereby other powers would commit themselves to a policy of
non-intervention by either armed or moral force.
When von Papen concluded the Concordat with the Vatican, the
political objectives of furthering the purposes of the Nazi
conspiracy were thus foremost in his mind. Even at that
time, in the first half of 1933, von Papen had in mind, in
concluding this Concordat, not only the consolidation of
Catholicism behind the Nazi regime within Germany, but also
the psychological build-up of the Austrians in preparation
for Anschluss. Von Papen’s own words eloquently characterize
these manoeuvres (monograph entitled “Austria” written at
Nurnberg,
“Although the 'Heimwehr' movement [in Austria] had
brought these patriotic elements together before this,
and had fought with them to free the country from
strong Socialistic pressure, yet they were armed only
from the standpoint of domestic politics and remained
aloof from all ambitions for a greater Germany. The
cause lay mostly in the Catholic nature of the country,
and in the strong influence of the clergy in political
leadership. The Reich was considered a bulwark of
Protestantism, despite its twenty million Catholics.
The anti-clerical wave, which was dominant in the Reich
under the leadership of Prussia, itself led by
Socialists, appeared to have verified the fears of the
Austrian clergy. For in spite of Catholics at the head
of the Reich — Wirth, Marx, Bruening — the Centre
Party had always put through its cultural demands by
logrolling with the Socialists. There were at least two
Socialist officials, university professors or teachers
for every Catholic appointee. In contrast to the
obviously badly functioning Weimar Constitution, there
was an effort in Austria, under clerical leadership and
with the strong support of the Vatican, to develop into
a corporate state.
“Those were serious obstacles on both sides. When,
after the seizure of power of the NSDAP in 1933, as the
first remedy against a new 'Kulturkampf', I safely
concluded the
[Page 937]
Concordat of the New Reich with the Holy See, my
thoughts at the time were not focused only of the
Reich. For a peaceful evolution of the German-Austrian
question it was of the greatest importance that the
doubts of the clergy on the Austrian side be completely
eliminated.”
*******
“It was my first purpose in the diplomatic field to
deprive the Austrian problem of its European character,
and to develop it gradually into an exclusively
internal problem between the Reich and Austria.
“It therefore had to be my primary aim to convince the
Vatican that a union could not endanger the Vatican's
interests. A Concordat of the Reich with the Vatican
had been my first attempt to prevent religious
difficulties arising from Nazism’s revolutionary
doctrine; the attempt had obviously failed. Under the
growing influence of his Party, Hitler sabotaged the
Concordat. Rome was deeply disappointed and in the
greatest excitement.”
On 20 July 1933 the Reich Concordat with the Vatican was
signed by von Papen as representative of the Nazi Government
of Germany. This instrument was an international treaty
which purported to give the church an official guarantee of
all the church rights it had sought. In addition it
purported to confer freedom for Catholic organizations,
maintenance of parochial schools, and preservation of the
general influence of the church on the education of the
German Catholic youth. Among the 33 articles of the
Concordat, 21 treated exclusively the rights and
prerogatives accorded to the church. Reciprocation consisted
only in a pledge of loyalty by the clergy to the Reich
Government and a promise that Catholic religious instruction
would emphasize the patriotic duties of the Christian
citizen and insist on a loyal attitude toward the
Fatherland. Since it had always been the practice of the
Catholic church to abide by established governments and to
promote patriotic convictions among the faithful, these
stipulations of the Concordat were no more than
legalizations of an existing custom. They were no more than
a guarantee of goodwill betokening harmonious Church-State
relations (2655-PS).
(3) The signing of the Concordat was only an interlude in
the church policy of the Nazi Conspirators, which was a
policy of reassurances and repression. The signing of the
Concordat merely marked the beginning of evasions and
violations of both its spirit and letter. The ink was hardly
dry before it became
[Page 938]
necessary for the Vatican to complain about a false
interpretation of the text, made by the Nazi government in
it own favour. (See Section 6 of Chapter VII on Suppression
of the Christian Churches.)
By action taken only ten days after the signing of the
Concordat, and despite its provision for the continuance of
the Catholic Youth Association, simultaneous membership in
the Hitler Jugend and the Catholic Youth Association was
forbidden, and the campaign to smash the latter organization
thereby commenced (2456-PS).
These first steps were merely a foretaste of a long series
of violations which were to commence almost immediately and
eventually to result in papal denunciation and serious
excesses committed against the clergy (3280-PS).
The continuing character of the conspirators' church policy
-- and of von Papen’s participation in it — is further
revealed by von Papen’s action of 19 September 1934, when,
as president of the Union of Catholic Germans
(Arbeitsgemeinschaft Katholischer Deutscher), he ordered
dissolution of this organization. By this time the Nazis
were dropping all pretext that rival organizations might be
permitted to exist, and were well along in their plans for
the integration of all German institutions into the Nazi
system. The official published announcement of dissolution
is a revealing document:
“Since the Reich Party Leadership through its
department for spiritual peace increasingly and
immediately administers all cultural problems and those
concerning the relationship of State and Churches, the
tasks at first delegated to the Union of Catholic
Germans are now included in those of the Reich Party
Leadership in the interest of a stronger coordination.
“Vice-Chancellor von Papen, up to now the Leader of the
Union of Catholic Germans, declared about the
Dissolution of this organization that it was done upon
his suggestion, since the attitude of the national
socialist State toward the Christian and Catholic
Church had been explained often and inequivocally
through the leader and chancellor himself.” (3376-PS).
[Page 939]
E. AS ENVOY AT VIENNA, VON PAPEN USED HIS POSITION AND
INFLUENCE DELIBERATELY TO WEAKEN THE AUSTRIAN GOVERNMENT,
AND PARTICIPATED IN THE POLITICAL PLANNING AND PREPARATION
FOR MILITARY AGGRESSION, AGAINST AUSTRIA.
(1) Von Papen accepted appointment a envoy at Vienna knowing
he would “front” for a Nazi fifth column in Austria. In July
1934, the Austrian policy of the Nazi government of Germany
was in bad odor throughout the civilized world. The
historical record of this period was written in the
newspaper headlines of the day. A period of Nazi pressure
and terror culminated on 25 July 1934 in an attempted
revolutionary putsch, the murder of the Austrian Chancellor
Dollfuss, in which the German Minister, Reith, was
implicated. (See Section 3 of Chapter IX on Aggression
Against Austria.) The situation was such as to call for
removal of the German Minister, Reith, and for the prompt
substitution of a man who was an enthusiast for Anschluss
with Germany, who could be tolerant of Nazi objectives and
methods, but who could lend an aura of respectability to
official German representation in Vienna. Hitler’s reaction
was immediate. He chose von Papen as quickly as he heard the
news of the Dollfuss murder. Writing of this event in 1945
after his arrest by Allied authorities, von Papen
dramatically describes the Fuehrer’s response to the
situation (monograph on “Austria” referred to above):
“Suddenly, at three o'clock in the morning, there was a
loud ringing of my doorbell. SS men demanded admission.
My son and I were of the opinion that I-was going to be
imprisoned. We went to the front door armed with
pistols. Our suspicions were unfounded. The SS men
declared that they had come from the Chancellery with
the order to put through a telephone connection between
Hitler and myself. “Hitler was in Bayreuth and had been
trying for hours without success to get in touch with
me. The connection was made.
“Hitler started, 'You know of course what has happened
in Vienna. You must go there immediately and try to set
things in order.'
“I replied, 'I have no idea what has happened in
Vienna. I have just returned from the country and I
don’t understand what you want with me in Vienna. I am
in the act of packing my trunk to leave Berlin once and
for all.'
“Hitler, highly excited, gave thereupon a short
description
[Page 940]
of the dramatic events in Vienna which led to the
murder of Dollfuss, and continued, 'You are the only
person who can save the situation. I implore you to
carry out my request.'”
As a result of this telephone call, von Papen flew
immediately to join Hitler at Bayreuth. There it was clear
that the Nazi leadership feared international repercussions
from their Austrian policy and felt themselves in dire need
of a respectable “front” man. Von Papen has described this
meeting:
“There I found Hitler and his entire entourage, excited
as an ant-hill. It was difficult to get anything
approaching an exact picture of the Vienna 'Putsch' and
the role of Hitler’s promoters. Even if one had come
into this gathering in complete ignorance of the
different circumstances involved, one could have
gathered with one look that they had a very bad
conscience and now were fearing the consequences. From
the very first moment I was certain that the immoderate
policy of the Austrian NSDAP under the leadership of
Hitler’s condottiere, Habig, had led to this coup
d'etat.
“This was, then, a few days after the 30 June, the
second bloody excess of the Party which had promised to
bring Germany by peaceful means to social tranquility,
welfare, and respect. It was obvious that both events
had made a deep impression on the entire world, and
that the governmental methods of the Party must damage
most seriously the political credit of the Reich".
At this meeting it was Papen himself who drafted the letter
of appointment. This letter was a masterpiece of deceit,
calculated to conceal completely Hitler and Papen’s goal of
annexation. It stated:
“As a result of the events in Vienna I am compelled to
suggest to the Reichs-President the removal of the
German Minister to Vienna, Dr. Reith, from his post,
because he, at the suggestion of Austrian Federal
Ministers and the Austrian rebels respectively
consented to an agreement made by both these parties
concerning the safe conduct and retreat of the rebels
to Germany without making inquiry of the German Reich
Government. Thus the Minister has dragged the German
Reich into an internal Austrian affair without any
reason.
“The assassination of the Austrian Federal Chancellor
which was strictly condemned and regretted by the
German Government has made the situation in Europe,
already fluid, more acute, without any fault of ours.
Therefore, it is my desire to bring about if possible
an easing of the general
[Page 941]
situation, and especially to direct the relations with
the German Austrian State, which have been so strained
for a long time, again into normal and friendly
channels.
“For this reason, I request you, dear Mr. von Papen, to
take over this important task, just because you have
possessed and continue to possess my most complete and
unlimited confidence ever since we have worked together
in the Cabinet.
“Therefore, I have suggested to the Reichs-President
that you, upon leaving the Reich-Cabinet and upon
release from the office of Commissioner for the Saar,
be called on special mission to the post of the German
Minister in Vienna for a limited period of time. In
this position you will be directly subordinated to me.
“Thanking once more for all that you have at a time
done for the coordination of the Government of the
National Revolution and since then together with us for
Germany, I remain.” (2799-PS).
The actual mission of von Papen was stated more frankly,
shortly after his arrival in Vienna, in the course of a
private conversation with the American Minister, George S.
Messersmith. Mr. Messersmith has described this meeting:
“When I did call on von Papen in the German Legation,
he greeted me with 'Now you are in my Legation and I
can control the conversation'. In the baldest and most
cynical manner he then proceeded to tell me that all of
Southeastern Europe, to the borders of Turkey, was
Germany’s natural hinterland, and that he had been
charged with the mission of facilitating German
economic and political control over all this region for
Germany. He blandly and directly said that getting
control of Austria was to be the first step. He
definitely stated that he was in Austria to undermine
and weaken the Austrian Government and from Vienna to
work towards the weakening of the Governments in the
other states to the South and South East. He said that
he intended to use his reputation as a good Catholic to
gain influence with certain Austrians, such as Cardinal
Innitzer, towards that end. He said that he was telling
me this because the German Government was bound on this
objective of getting this control of Southeastern
Europe and there was nothing which could stop it and
that our own policy and that of France and England was
not realistic.
“The circumstances were such, as I was calling on him
in the German Legation, that I had to listen to what he
had to
[Page 942]
say and of course I was prepared to hear what he had to
say although I already knew what his instructions were.
I was nevertheless shocked to have him speak so baldly
to me and when he finished I got up and told him how
shocked I was to hear the accredited representative of
a supposedly friendly state to Austria admit that he
was proposing to engage in activities to undermine and
destroy that Government to which he was accredited. He
merely smiled and said, of course this conversation was
between us and that he would, of course, not be talking
to others so clearly about his objectives. I have gone
into this detail with regard to this conversation as it
is characteristic of the absolute frankness and
directness with which high Nazi officials spoke of
their objectives.” (1760-PS)
(2) Von Papen proceeded forthwith to accomplish his mission
-- the maintenance of an outward appearance of non-
intervention while keeping appropriate contacts useful in
the eventual overthrow of the Austrian Government.
Throughout the earlier period of his mission to Austria, von
Papen’s activity was characterized by the assiduous
avoidance of any appearance of intervention. His true
mission was reaffirmed with clarity, several months after
its commencement, when he was instructed by Berlin that
"during the next two years nothing can be undertaken which
will give Germany external political difficulties". Every
"appearance” of German interference in Austrian affairs
"must be avoided” (1760-PS). As von Papen himself stated to
Berger-Waldenegg, the Austrian Foreign Minister:
“Yes, you have your French and English friends now and
you can have your independence a little longer.” (1760-
PS).
Throughout this period, the Nazi movement was gaining
strength in Austria without openly-admitted German
intervention, and Germany needed more time to consolidate
its diplomatic position. These reasons for German policy
were frankly expressed by the German Foreign Minister von
Neurath in conversation with the American Ambassador to
France
Von Papen accordingly restricted his public activity to the
normal ambassadorial function of cultivating all respectable
elements in Austria and ingratiating himself in these circle
particularly if they were well-disposed (but not too
obviously) to notions of Pan-Germanism. In these efforts he
was particularly careful to exploit his background as a
former professional officer and a Catholic (1760-PS).
Meanwhile, however, the Austrian Nazis continued illegal
organization in anticipation of he possibility of securing
their
[Page 943]
objectives by force if necessary. In these efforts they were
aided by Germany, which permitted the outlawed Austrian
Nazis to meet and perfect their plots within Germany and
with German Nazi assistance; which harbored the Austrian
Legion; which made funds-available to National Socialists in
Austria; and which established appropriate contact with them
through the Reich Propaganda Ministry and through
"respectable” Austrian “front” personalities (1760-PS; 812-
PS). (See also Section 3 of Chapter IX on Aggression Against
Austria.)
Von Papen was fully aware of the existence and activities of
these groups, and of their potentialities in effecting an
Anschluss. Thus, in a report to Hitler dated 27 July 1935,
entitled “Reflections on the Anniversary of Dollfuss'
Death", he reviewed the activities of these illegal groups
and concluded that National Socialism could “certainly
become the rallying point of all racially German units
beyond the borders". In this report he declared:
“The Third Reich will be with Austria, or it will not
be at all. National Socialism must win it or it will
perish, if it is unable to solve this task.” (2248-PS).
These sentiments concerning the role of National Socialism
were something more than idle speculation. Von Papen knew
that the presence of the Austrian Legion in Germany in
itself produced incidents, and that the Austrian Nazi
movement was dependent on German support. He has so
testified (at an interrogation in Nurnberg, 13 October
1945). In fact, despite his facade of strict non-
intervention, he remained in contact with subversive and
potentially subversive elements within Austria. Thus, in a
report to Hitler dated 17 May 1935 he advised concerning the
Austrian Nazi strategy as proposed by Captain Leopold,
leader of the illegal Austrian Nazis (2247-PS). In
subsequent statements he has revealed his modus operandi in
the use of his embassy staff. This method provided him with
an opportunity to disclaim responsibility if these
activities should be questioned. Thus, his military attache,
Mutz, “maintained good relations with the Army circles which
were inclined towards National Socialism". Von Papen’s all-
around contact man with the Austrian Nazis was a member of
his staff, Baron von Kettler, who “had always maintained
intimate contact with a group of young Austrian National
Socialists who, as we both agreed, had a conservative
coating and fought for a healthy development within the
Party". The practical effect of these contacts has been
clarified in questioning of von Papen (at Nurnberg, 8
October 1945):
“*** A. As I told you, I charged one of my younger
[Page 944]
people of the Embassy, von Kettler — he was made the
go-between with these Nazi people, to smooth them down
and talk with them. Personally I had not very much to
do with them.
“Q. Well, I know that. That is what you always said.
But the result of your time in Austria was that their
interests were furthered through your office. Whether
you did it personally or somebody working for you did
it, I don’t think it is too important for what we have
in mind here tonight; do you?
“Q. Now, isn’t it a fact that their interests were
furthered through your office, if not through you as an
individual during those years that you were there?
“A. Yes, I wanted to know about their doings, you see.
I must have been informed what was going on.”
[Page 944]
(3) Conclusion of the Agreement of 11 July 1936 merely
constituted another step towards Anschluss. Prior to 1936,
sponsorship of political subversion was not the only
pressure applied by Germany in its efforts to gain control
of Austria. The German Government in addition had placed
certain economic barriers against trade between German and
Austrian subjects, the most serious of which was the 1000
mark law, which crippled the Austrian tourist traffic by
levying a 1000 RM tax on any German citizen crossing the
border into Austria. The effect of these pressures was to
induce the Austrian Chancellor, Kurt von Schuschnigg, to
seek from Hitler an agreement to “lift the 1000 Mark barrier
he had levied against Austria and reassure Austria that he
had no political designs concerning our state, Austria”
The result was the agreement of 11 July 1936 between Germany
and Austria, which was negotiated by von Papen as Hitler's
representative. The published form of this agreement
provided:
“Being convinced that they are making a valuable
contribution towards the whole European development in
the direction of maintaining peace, and in the belief
that they are thereby best serving the manifold mutual
interests of both German States, the Governments of the
Federal State of Austria and of Germany have resolved
to return to relations of a normal and friendly
character. In this connection it is
“(1) The German Government recognizes the full sover-
[Page 945]
eignty of the Federal State of Austria in the spirit of
the pronouncements of the German Fuehrer and Chancellor
of 21 May 1935.
“(2) Each of the two Governments regards the inner
political order (including the question of Austrian
National Socialism) obtaining in the other country as
an internal concern of that country, upon which it will
exercise neither direct nor indirect influence.
“(3) The Austrian Federal Government will constantly
follow in its policy in general, and in particular
towards Germany, a line in conformity with leading
principles corresponding to the fact that Austria
regards herself as a German State.
“By such a decision neither the Rome Protocols of 1934
and their additions of 1936, nor the relationships of
Austria to Italy and Hungary as partners in these
protocols, are affected. Considering that the detente
desired by both sides cannot become a reality unless
certain preliminary conditions are fulfilled by the
Governments of both countries, the Austrian Federal
Government and the German Government will pass a number
of special measures to bring about the requisite
preliminary state of affairs.” (TC-22).
More interesting was the secret part of this agreement, the
most important provisions of which have been summarized by
Mr.
“Austria would (1) appoint a number of individuals
enjoying the Chancellor’s confidence but friendly to
Germany to positions in the Cabinet; (2) would devise
means to give the 'National opposition' a role in the
political life of Austria and within the framework of
the Patriotic Front, and (3) would amnesty all Nazis
save those convicted of the most serious offenses.”
(1760-PS)
Especially interesting was the manner in which this
agreement contained German economic concessions and further
solemn assurances regarding Austrian independence and
integrity, on the one hand, alongside far-reaching political
concessions to the Nazi movement (2994-PS). The effect was
to place Austria completely at the mercy of German good
faith. Von Papen has correctly described it (in an
interrogation at Nurnberg, 8 October 1945) as “the first
step” toward preparation for Anschluss, notwithstanding his
clear understanding at the time that the Austrian government
desired and intended to retain its independence.
The Germans lost no time in making the most of their new
opportunities, solemn assurances notwithstanding, The agree-
[Page 946]
ment merely heralded a new era in “legitimizing” the German
fifth column in Austria. Thus, the immediate amnesty to
political prisoners in itself presented serious police
problems. The freedom granted to political demonstrations
and organization by German Nazis made it difficult to police
the propagandizing of Austrians. And the agreement
specifically gave the German Nazis an opening wedge to
representation in the Austrian government. The terroristic
activities and pressure of the illegal Nazis continued
without interruption under German sponsorship, until their
hand was strengthened to the point of openly asking for
official recognition (812-PS; 1760-PS; 2994-PS).
The importance of this agreement to the Germans was
underscored by the promotion of its negotiator from
Gesandter to Botschafter, at the time of its signing
(Announcement, Das Archiv, XXVIII, p. 571).
Von Papen himself participated in this pressure game by
maintaining contact with the illegal Nazis, by trying to
influence appointments to strategic cabinet positions, and
by attempting to secure official recognition of Nazi “front”
organizations. Reporting to Hitler shortly after conclusion
of the 11 July 1936 agreement, he succinctly summarized his
program for “normalizing” Austro-German relations under the
regime of the new agreement:
“The progress of normalizing relations with Germany at
the present time is obstructed by the continued
persistence of the Ministry of Security, occupied by
the old anti-National Socialistic officials. Changes in
personnel are therefore of utmost importance. But they
are definitely not to be expected prior to the
conference on the abolishing of the Control of Finances
[Finanzkontrolle] at Geneva. The Chancellor of the
League has informed Minister de Glaise-Horstenau, of
his intention, to offer him the portfolio of the
Ministry of the Interior. As a guiding principle
[Marschroute] I recommend on the tactical side,
continued, patient psychological manipulations, with
slowly intensified pressure directed at changing the
regime. The proposed conference on economic relations,
taking place at the end of October will be a very
useful tool for the realization of some of our project.
Discussion with government officials as well as with
leaders of the illegal party (Leopold and Schattenfreh)
who conform completely with the concordat of July 11, I
am trying to direct the next developments in such a
manner to aim at corporative representation of the
movement in the
[Page 947]
fatherland front [Vaterlaendischen Front] but
nevertheless refraining from putting National-
Socialists in important positions for the time being.
However such positions are to be occupied only by
personalities, having the support and the confidence of
the movement. I have a willing collaborator in this
respect in Minister Glaise-Horstenau.”
This activity continued through 1937. In fact, by 14 January
1937 the negotiations with the Austrian Minister of Security
and the development of “front” organizations had proceeded
so far that “a very intensive crisis has arisen for the
illegal party” with respect to its future program. In urging
a patient attitude toward these problems, von Papen appeared
less concerned with the legitimacy of their position under
the 11 July 1936 agreement than with his fear that
“a too strong and far-reaching connection (with a
proposed conservative 'German Action' front
organization) would be understood neither in our own
ranks nor could it be of use to the action itself.”
(2831-PS)
On the other hand when an Austrian cabinet minister failed
to show sufficient energy to suit von Papen’s purpose, he
showed no hesitancy, under the terms of his 11 July 1936
agreement, to urge replacement by a more cooperative
individual. Thus, von Papen has summarized his efforts to
remove the Austrian Minister of the Interior (monograph
“I had tried to persuade Schuschnigg to appoint another
minister to his cabinet beside Herr von Glaise, who was
not very active. The new minister was to act as trusted
liaison man between the two governments, able to work
on innumerable problems directly without diplomatic
intervention. This simplification would also bring the
men on both sides of the fence closer together.”
By the beginning of 1938, the Nazi hand had been so
strengthened in Austria, and the differences and
misunderstandings regarding the agreement of 11 July had
become so serious and frequent, that Chancellor Schuschnigg
found it expedient to accept von Papen’s invitation to meet
Hitler at Berchtesgaden, notwithstanding serious misgivings
on the part of Schuschnigg (2995-PS). Von Papen showed no
hesitancy in extending this invitation despite the fact that
he knew Hitler’s “idea to swallow Austria", despite his
knowledge of Schuschnigg’s distrust of Hitler, and despite
his own doubts concerning the value of Hitler’s word.
Notwithstanding the situation, he found it possible even to
urge Schuschnigg that Hitler was a man upon whom Schuschnigg
could rely. And in making these representa-
[Page 948]
tions, he was fully aware of the extent of German rearmament
and of its possible use as a diplomatic pressure device
(according to interrogations, Nurnberg, 19 September 1945
and 8 October 1945).
On 11 February 1938, Schuschnigg left for Berchtesgaden to
meet Hitler. At this meeting the severest pressure was
exerted to extort far-reaching concessions from Austria,
including reorganization of the cabinet, appointment of
Seyss-Inquart as Minister of Security and the Interior, and
a general amnesty to Nazis convicted of crimes (2995-PS;
2461-PS; 1544-PS; 1780-PS).
It was at this meeting that Papen urged upon Hitler the
appointment of Seyss-Inquart as Minister of Security and the
Interior (according to monograph “Austria").
Thoroughly entrenched in the government, the Nazis were now
able to seize upon Schuschnigg’s plebiscite as an excuse to
seize power, and to call for military intervention by
Germany (812-PS; 2996-PS). (See also Section 3 of Chapter IX
on Aggression Against Austria.)
Thereafter it was only a matter of hours before Austria
became a province of the Reich — by a law signed by von
Papen’s man, Seyss-Inquart (2307-PS).
LEGAL REFERENCES AND LIST OF DOCUMENTS
RELATING TO FRANZ VON PAPEN
[Page 948]
Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Article 6.
Vol. I, Pg. 5
International Military Tribunal, Indictment Number 1,
Section IV (H); Appendix A. Vol. I, Pg. 29, 63
[Note: A single asterisk (*) before a document indicates
that the document was received in evidence at the Nurnberg
trial. A double asterisk (**) before a document number
indicates that the document was referred to during the trial
but was not formally received in evidence, for the reason
given in parentheses following the description of the
document. The USA series number, given in parentheses
following the description of the document, is the official
exhibit number assigned by the court.]
[Page 949]
*351-PS; Minutes of First Meeting of Cabinet of Hitler, 30
January 1933. (USA 389) . Vol. III, Pg. 270
*812-PS; Letter from Rainer to Seyss-Inquart, 22 August
1939 and report from Gauleiter Rainer to Reichskommissar
Gauleiter Buerckel, 6 July 1939 on events in the NSDAP of
Austria from 1933 to 11 March 1938. (USA 61) . Vol. III, Pg.
586
1388-PS; Law concerning confiscation of Property subversive
to People and State, 14 July 1933. 1933 Reichsgesetzblatt,
Part I, p. 479. Vol. III, Pg. 962
1390-PS; Decree of the Reich President for the Protection
of the People and State, 28 February 1933. 1933
Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 83. Vol. III, Pg. 968
*1395-PS; Law to insure the unity of Party and State, 1
December 1933. 1933 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 1016. (GB
252) . Vol. III, Pg. 978
1396-PS; Law concerning the confiscation of Communist
property, 26 May 1933. 1933 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p.
293. Vol. III, Pg. 979
[Page 950]
1398-PS; Law to supplement the Law for the restoration of
the Professional Civil Service, 20 July 1933. 1933
Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 618. Vol. III, Pg. 986
1400-PS; Law changing the regulations in regard to public
officer, 30 June 1933. 1933 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p.
433. Vol. III, Pg. 987
*1544-PS; Von Papen’s notes, 26 February 1938, on his
parting visit with Chancellor Schuschnigg. (USA 71) . Vol.
IV, Pg. 103
1652-PS; Decree of the Reich President for protection
against treacherous attacks on the government of the
Nationalist movement, 21 March 1933. 1933 Reichsgesetzblatt,
Part I, p. 135. Vol. IV, Pg. 160
*1708-PS; The Program of the NSDAP. National Socialistic
Yearbook, 1941, p. 153. (USA 255, USA 324) . Vol. IV, Pg.
208
*1760-PS; Affidavit of George S. Messersmith, 28 August
1945. (USA 57) . Vol. IV, Pg. 305
*1780-PS; Excerpts from diary kept by General Jodl, January
1937 to August 1939. (USA 72) . Vol. IV, Pg. 360
2001-PS; Law to Remove the Distress of People and State, 24
March 1933. 1933 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 141. Vol.
IV, Pg. 638
2003-PS; Law concerning the Sovereign Head of the German
Reich, 1 August 1934. 1934 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p.
747. Vol. IV, Pg. 639
2004-PS; Preliminary law for the coordination of Federal
States under the Reich, 31 March 1933. 1933
Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 153. Vol. IV, Pg. 640
[Page 951]
2005-PS; Second law integrating the “Laender” with the
Reich, 7 April 1933. 1933 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 173.
Vol. IV, Pg. 641
2006-PS; Law for the reconstruction of the Reich, 30
January 1934. 1934 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 75. Vol.
IV, Pg. 642
2012-PS; First regulation for administration of the law for
the restoration of professional Civil Service, 11 April
1933. 1933 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 195. Vol. IV, Pg.
647
2014-PS; Law amending regulations of criminal law and
criminal procedure, 24 April 1934. 1934 Reichsgesetzblatt,
Part I, p. 341. Vol. IV, Pg. 648
2029-PS; Decree establishing the Reich Ministry of Public
Enlightenment and Propaganda, 13 March 1933. 1933
Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 104. Vol. IV, Pg. 652
2030-PS; Decree concerning the Duties of the Reich Ministry
for Public Enlightenment and Propaganda, 30 June 1933. 1933
Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 449. Vol. IV, Pg. 653
2050-PS; The Constitution of the German Reich, 11 August
1919. 1919 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 1383. Vol. IV, Pg.
662
2058-PS; Decree for the securing of the State Leadership, 7
July 1933. 1933 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 462. Vol. IV,
Pg. 699
2059-PS; Decree of the Reich President relating to the
granting of Amnesty, 21 March 1933. 1933 Reichsgesetzblatt,
Part I, p. 134. Vol. IV, Pg. 701
2076-PS; Decree of the Government concerning formation of
Special Courts, 21 March 1933. 1933 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part
I, pp. 136-137. Vol. IV, Pg. 705
[Page 952]
2078-PS; Decree concerning establishment of Ministry for
Science, Education and Popular Culture, 1 May 1934. 1934
Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 365. Vol. IV, Pg. 706
2083-PS; Editorial control law, 4 October 1933. 1933
Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p.713. Vol. IV, Pg. 709
2088-PS; Decree relating to tasks of Reichs Ministry for
Education, 11 May 1934. 1934 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p.
375. Vol. IV, Pg. 718
*2246-PS; Report of von Papen to Hitler, 1 September 1936,
concerning Danube situation. (USA 67) . Vol. IV, Pg. 930
*2247-PS; Letter from von Papen to Hitler, 17 May 1935,
concerning intention of Austrian government to arm. (USA 64)
. Vol. IV, Pg. 930
*2248-PS; Report of von Papen to Hitler, 27 July 1935,
concerning National Socialism in Austria. (USA 63) . Vol.
IV, Pg. 932
*2307-PS; Law concerning reunion of Austria with German
Reich, 13 March 1938. 1938 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p.
237. (GB 133) . Vol. IV, Pg. 997
2403-PS; The End of the Party State, from Documents of
German Politics, Vol. I, pp. 55-56. Vol. V, Pg. 71
2415-PS; First decree for the implementation of law
relating to The Reich Chamber of Culture, 1 November 1933.
1933 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I. Vol. V, Pg. 89
2456-PS; Youth and the Church, from Complete Handbook of
Youth Laws. Vol. V, Pg. 198
[Page 953]
*2461-PS; Official German communique of meeting of Hitler
and Schuschnigg, 12 February 1938, published in Documents of
German Politics, 1939, Vol. VI, Part I. (GB 132) . Vol. V,
Pg. 206
2512-PS; Hitler’s Testimony Before the Court for High
Treason, published in Frankfurter Zeitung, 26 September
1931. Vol. V, Pg. 246
2541-PS; Extracts from German Publications. Vol. V, Pg. 285
2633-PS; Extracts from Constitutional Law of the Greater
German Reich, 1939. Vol. V, Pg. 344
2655-PS; Concordat between the Holy See and the German
Reich, Article 31. 1933 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part II, pp. 679,
687-8. Vol. V, Pg. 364
2742-PS; Passage written by Frick in National Socialist
Yearbooks 1927, p. 124. Vol. V, Pg. 383
2759-PS; Law for the protection of Nationalist Symbols, 19
May 1933. 1933 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 285. Vol. V,
Pg. 394
2771-PS; U.S. State Department, National Socialism,
published by U.S. GPO, 1943. Vol. V, Pg. 417
**2799-PS; Letter from Hitler to von Papen, 26 July 1934,
published in Documents of German Politics, Vol. II, p. 83,
No. 38. (Referred to but not offered in evidence.) . Vol. V,
Pg. 441
*2830-PS; Letter from von Papen to Hitler 12 May 1936,
concerning May Rally of Freedom Union. (GB 243) . Vol. V,
Pg. 496
2831-PS; Letter from Office of Extraordinary and
Plenipotentiary Ambassador of German Government to Reich
Chancellery, inclosing report on Political situation in
Austria, 14 January 1937. Vol. V, Pg. 498
[Page 954]
*2902-PS; Statement of von Papen, 13 November 1945,
prepared by his defense lawyer. (GB 233) . Vol. V, Pg. 569
*2962-PS; Minutes of meeting of Reich Cabinet, 15 March
1933. (USA 578) . Vol. V, Pg. 669
*2963-PS; Minutes of meeting of Reich Cabinet, 20 March
1933. (USA 656) . Vol. V, Pg. 670
**2994-PS; Affidavit of Kurt von Schuschnigg, former
Chancellor of Austria, concerning Austrian-German Treaty of
11 July 1936. (USA 66) (Objection to admission in evidence
upheld.) . Vol. V, Pg. 703
2995-PS; Affidavit of- Kurt von Schuschnigg, former
Chancellor of Austria, concerning his visit to Berchtesgaden
on 12 February 1938. Vol. V, Pg. 709
2996-PS; Affidavit of Kurt von Schuschnigg, former
Chancellor of Austria, concerning events of 11 March 1938.
Vol. V, Pg. 713
*3280-PS; Extract from Papal Encyclical “Mit Brennender
Sorge", set forth in Appendix II, p. 524, of “The
Persecution of the Catholic Church in the Third Reich". (USA
567) . Vol. V, Pg. 1079
*3313-PS; Von Papen, Appeal to the German Conscience,
Stuttgart speech of 3 March 1933. (GB 240) . Vol. VI, Pg. 1
*3314-PS; Von Papen’s address as Chancellor, 28 August
1932, published in Frankfurter Zeitung, 29 August 1932. (GB
234) . Vol. VI, Pg. 2
*3317-PS; Von Papen’s address as Chancellor, 12 October
1932, published in Frankfurter Zeitung, 13 October 1932. (GB
235) . Vol. V, Pg. 3
[Page 955]
*3318-PS; Visit of von Papen as Chancellor in Munich, 11
October 1932, published in Frankfurter Zeitung, 12 October
1932. (GB 241) . Vol. VI, Pg. 4
*3357-PS; Exchange of letters, Papen-Hitler-Hindenburg,
from Documents of German Politics, Vol. I, p. 158. (GB 239)
. Vol. VI, Pg. 85
*3375-PS; Von Papen’s speech at Essen, 2 November 1933,
published in Voelkischer Beobachter, Southern German
Edition, 4 November 1933. (GB 245) . Vol. VI, Pg. 101
*3376-PS; Dissolution of Union of Catholic Germans,
published in The Archives, September 1934, Vol. VI; pp. 767-
768. (GB 244) . Vol. VI, Pg. 103
*3387-PS; Hitler Reichstag speech, 23 March 1933, asking
for adoption of Enabling Act, from Voelkischer Beobachter,
24 March 1933, p. 1. (USA 566) . Vol. VI, Pg. 104
*3389-PS; Fulda Declaration of 28 March 1933, from
Voelkischer Beobachter, 29 March 1933, p. 2. (USA 566) .
Vol. VI, Pg. 105
3463-PS; Extracts from Dates from the History of the NSDAP
by Dr. Hans Volz. Vol. VI, Pg. 165
*D-472; Ribbentrop’s actions as Foreign Minister, from
International Biographical Archives, 22 April 1943. (GB 130)
. Vol. VII, Pg. 59
*D-631; Decree of Reichs president against political
excesses, 14 June 1932. 1932 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, pp.
297-300. (GB 236) . Vol. VII, Pg. 101
*D-632; Biography of Papen, from International -
Biographical Archives, 26 October 1944. (GB 237) . Vol. VII,
Pg. 102
*D-633; Letter from von Papen to Hitler, 13 November 1932.
(GB 23) . Vol. VII, Pg. 106
*D-634; Letter from Hitler to von Papen, 16 November 1932.
(GB 238) . Vol. VII, Pg. 107
*D-635; Radiogram from von Papen-to Board of Trade for
German-American Commerce, 27 March 1933. (Translation
published in New York Times.) (GB 242) . Vol. VII, Pg. 111
*D-660; Extracts from Hutchinson’s Illustrated edition of
Mein Kampf. (GB 128) . Vol. VII, Pg. 164
*L-83; Affidavit of Gerhart H. Seger, 21 July 1945. (USA
234) . Vol. VII, Pg. 859
*L-150; Memorandum of conversation between Ambassador
Bullitt and von Neurath, German Minister for Foreign
Affairs, 18 May 1936. (USA 65) . Vol. VII, Pg. 890
*TC-22; Agreement between Austria and German Government and
Government of Federal State of Austria, 11 July 1936. (GB
20). Vol. VIII, Pg. 369