15. Erich Raeder

A. POSITIONS HELD BY RAEDER.

Erich Raeder was born in 1876 and joined the German Navy in
1896. By 1915 he had become commander of the Cruiser Koeln.
In 1928 he became an admiral, Chief of Naval Command, and
head of the German Navy. In 1935 he became Commander-in-
Chief of the Navy. In 1936 he became General Admiral, a
creation of Hitler's, on his forty-seventh birthday. In 1937
he received the golden badge of honor of the Nazi Party. In
1938 he became a member of the Secret Cabinet Council. In
1939 he was made Grand Admiral, a rank created by Hitler,
who presented Raeder with a marshal’s baton. In 1943 he
became Admiral Inspector of the German Navy, which was a
kind of retirement into oblivion, since after January 1943
Doenitz was the effective commander of the German Navy.
(2888-PS)

B. RAEDER’s PART IN THE CONSPIRACY TO PLAN AND WAGE WARS OF
AGGRESSION

During the years of Raeder’s command of the German Navy,
from 1928 to 1943, he played a vital role in building up the
Navy as an instrument of war, to implement the Nazis'
general plan of aggression.

(1) Concealed rearmament in violation of the Treaty of
Versailles. In successive and secret steps, the small Navy
permitted to Germany under the Treaty of Versailles was
enormously expanded under the guidance of Raeder.

The story of Germany’s secret rearmament in violation of the
Treaty of Versailles is told in a history of the fight of
the German Navy against Versailles, 1919 to 1935, which was
published secretly by the German Admiralty in 1937 (C-156).
This history shows that before the Nazis came to power the
German Admiralty was deceiving not only the governments of
other countries, but its own legislature and at one stage
its own government, regarding the secret measures of
rearmament ranging from experimental U-Boat an E-Boat
building to the creation of secret intelligence and finance
organizations. Raeder’s role in these developments are
described as follows:

     “The Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, Admiral Raeder,
     had received hereby a far-reaching independence in the
     building and development of the Navy. This was only
     hampered insofar as the previous concealment of
     rearmament had to
     be continued in consideration of the Versailles
     Treaty.” (C-156)

An illustration of Raeder’s concealment of rearmament is
contained in his statement that:

     “In view of Germany’s treaty obligations and the
     disarmament conference, steps must be taken to prevent
     the first E-boat Half-Flotilla from appearing openly as
     a formation of torpedo-carrying boats, as it was not
     intended to count these E-boats against the number of
     torpedo-carrying boats allowed them.” (C-141)

It appears that even in 1930 the intention ultimately to
attack Poland was already current in German military
circles. An extract from the History of War Organization and
of the Scheme for Mobilization (C-135) which is headed “All
850/38", suggesting that the document was written in 1938,
reads:

     “Since under the Treaty of Versailles all preparations
     for mobilization were forbidden, these were at first
     confined to a very small body of collaborators and were
     at first only of a theoretical nature. Nevertheless,
     there existed at that time an 'Establishment Order' and
     'Instructions for Establishment,' the forerunners of
     the present-day scheme for Mobilization.

     “An 'establishment organization' and 'adaptable
     instructions for establishment' were drawn up for each
     A-year, the cover name for a mobilization year.

     “As stated, the 'Establishment Organizations' of that
     time were to be judged purely theoretically, for they
     had no positive basis in the form of men and materials.
     They provided, nevertheless, a valuable foundation for
     the establishment of a War Organization as our ultimate
     aim.”

                           *******

     “The crises between Germany and Poland, which were
     becoming increasingly acute, compelled us, instead of
     making theoretical preparations for war, to prepare in
     a practical manner for a purely German-Polish conflict.

     “The strategic idea of a rapid forcing of the Polish
     base of Gdynia was made a basis, and the fleet on
     active service was to be reinforced by the auxiliary
     forces which would be indispensable to attain this
     strategic end, and the essential coastal and flak
     batteries, especially those in Pillau and Swinemuende
     were to be taken over. Thus in 1930 the Reinforcement
     Plan was evolved.” (C-135)

The extract further shows that Hitler had made a clear
political request to build up for him in five years, that
is, by April 1938,
armed forces which he could place in the balance as an
instrument of political power. (C-135)

The Nazi seizure of power in 1933 was a signal to Raeder to
go full speed ahead on rearmament. In June 1934 Raeder told
Hitler that the German fleet must be developed to oppose
England, and that therefore from 1936 on, the big ships must
be armed with big guns to match the British “King George”
class of battleship. Raeder also went along with Hitler's
demand that the construction of U-Boats should be kept
completely secret, especially in view of the Saar plebiscite
(C-189). In November 1934 Raeder had a further talk with
Hitler on the financing naval rearmament, and on that
occasion Hitler told him that in case of need he would get
Doctor Ley to put 120,000,000 to 160,000,000 RM. from the
Labor Front at the disposal of the Navy. (C-190)

Another example of the deceit used by Raeder in building up
the German Navy is the fact that the true displacement of
certain German battleships exceeded by twenty percent the
displacement which the Nazis had reported to the British (C-
23). In similar vein, it was ordered that auxiliary
cruisers, which were being secretly constructed, should be
referred to as “transport ships O.” (C-166)

The support given by the German Navy to the German Armament
Industry illustrates Raeder’s concern with the broader
aspects of Nazi policy and of the close link between Nazi
politicians, German Service Chiefs, and German armament
manufacturers. (C-29)

A commentary on post-1939 naval rearmament is contained in a
letter from Raeder to the German Navy, dated 11 June 1940.
This letter was given extensive distribution; in fact there
is provision in the distribution list for 467 copies. This
letter of Raeder which is marked with both self-
justification and apology, reads:

     “The most outstanding of the numerous subjects of
     discussion in the Officer Corps are the Torpedo
     position and the problem whether the naval building
     program, up to Autumn 1939, envisaged the possibility
     of the outbreak of war as early as 1939, or whether the
     emphasis ought not to have been laid, from the first,
     on the construction of U-boats.

     “If the opinion is voiced in the Officer Corps that the
     entire naval building program has been wrongly
     directed, and that, from the first, the emphasis should
     have been on the U-boat weapon and, after its
     consolidation, on the large ships, I must emphasize the
     following matters:

     “The building up of the Fleet was directed according to
     the political demands, which were decided by the
     Fuehrer. The Fuehrer hoped, until the last moment, to
     be able to put off the threatening conflict with
     England until 1944-45. At that time the Navy would have
     had available a fleet with a powerful U-boat
     superiority and a much more favorable ratio as regards
     strength in all other types of ships, particularly
     those designed for warfare on the high seas.

     “The development of events forced the Navy, contrary to
     the expectation even of the Fuehrer, into a war, which
     it had to accept while still in the initial stage of
     its rearmament. The result is that those who represent
     the opinion that the emphasis should have been laid,
     from the start, on the building of the U-boat arm,
     appear to be right. I leave undiscussed, how far this
     development, quite apart from difficulties of
     personnel, training and dockyards, could have been
     appreciably improved in any way in view of the
     political limits of the Anglo-German Naval Treaty. I
     leave also undiscussed, how the early and necessary
     creation of an effective Air Force slowed down the
     desirable development of the other branches of the
     forces. I indicate, however, with pride the admirable
     and, in spite of the political restraints in the years
     of the Weimar Republic, far-reaching preparation for U-
     boat construction, which made the immensely rapid
     construction of the U-boat arm, both as regards
     equipment and personnel, possible immediately after the
     assumption of power.” (C-155)

This letter shows no trace of reluctance in cooperating with
the Nazi program. On the contrary, it is evident that Raeder
welcomed and became one of the pillars of the Nazi power.

(2) Conversion of the Navy into a tool of the Nazi
conspiracy. Raeder, more than anyone else, was responsible
for securing the unquestioned allegiance of the German Navy
to the Nazi movement — an allegiance which Doenitz was to
make even more firm and fanatical.

Raeder’s approval of Hitler was shown particularly clearly
on 2 August 1934, the day of Hindenburg’s death, when Raeder
and all the men under him swore a new oath of loyalty with
considerable ceremony, this time to Adolf Hitler and no
longer to the Fatherland (D-481). The new oath ran as
follows:

     “I swear this holy oath by God that I will implicitly
     obey the Leader of the German Reich and people, Adolf
     Hitler the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces and
     that, as a
     brave soldier, I will be willing to stake my life at
     any time for this oath.” (D-481)

For his fatherland, Raeder substituted the Fuehrer.

There is no need to elaborate upon the step by which the
German Navy was progressively drawn into the closest
alliance with the Nazi Party. The facts of history — such
as the incorporation of the swastika into the ensign under
which the German Fleet sailed, and the wearing of the
swastika on the uniform of naval officers and men — these
facts speak for themselves.

The Nazis, for their part, were not ungrateful for Raeder's
obeisance and collaboration. His services in rebuilding the
German Navy were widely recognized by Nazi propagandists and
by the Nazi press. On his 66th birthday, the Chief Party
Organ, the “Voelkischer Beobachter,” published a special
article about him, which summed up Raeder’s contribution to
Nazi development:

     “It was to Raeder’s credit to have already built up by
     that time a powerful striking force from the
     numerically small fleet, despite the fetters of
     Versailles.

     “With the assumption of power through National
     Socialism began, too, the most fruitful period in the
     reconstruction of the German Fleet.

     “The Fuehrer openly expressed his recognition of
     Raeder’s faithful services and unstinted cooperation,
     by appointing him General Admiral on 20 April 1936".

                           *******

     “As a soldier and a seaman, the General-Admiral has
     proved himself to be the Fuehrer’s first and foremost
     naval collaborator.” (D-448)

(3) Raeder’s political activities and responsibilities.
Raeder’s personal part in the Nazi conspiracy arises from
the fact that, from the time of the Nazi seizure of power,
he became increasingly involved in responsibility for the
general policies of the Nazi State.

Long before he was promoted to General-Admiral in 1936, he
had become a member of the secret Reich Defense Council,
joining it when it was founded, on 4 April 1933. Thus, at an
early date, he was involved, both militarily and
politically, in the Nazi conspiracy. These facts are
contained in a document which contains the classic Nazi
directive:

     “Matters communicated orally cannot be proven; they can
     be denied by us in Geneva.” (EC-177)

On 4 February 1938, Raeder was appointed to be a member of a
newly formed Secret Advisory Council for Foreign Affairs
(2031-PS). Three weeks later, a decree of Hitler’s stated
that as well as being equal in rank with a Cabinet Minister,
Raeder was also to take part in the sessions of the Cabinet
(2098-PS). It is thus clear that Raeder’s responsibility for
the political decisions of the Nazi State was steadily
developed from 1933 to 1938, and that in the course of time
he had become a member of all the main political advisory
bodies. He was a member of the inner councils of the
conspirators.

As an illustration, Raeder was present at two of the key
meetings at which Hitler openly declared his intention of
attacking neighboring countries. The first of these was
Hitler’s conference at the Reichs Chancellory on 5 November
1937, concerning matters which were said to be too important
to discuss in the larger circle of the Reich Cabinet. The
minutes of this meeting establish conclusively that the
Nazis premeditated their crimes against peace (386-PS). The
second meeting which Raeder attended was Hitler’s conference
on 23 May 1939 (L-79). This was the conference at which
Hitler confirmed his intention to make a deliberate attack
upon Poland at the first opportunity, well knowing that this
must cause widespread war in Europe.

In addition to those two key conferences, Raeder was also
present at many others, where he placed his knowledge and
professional skill at the service of the Nazi war machine.
Raeder’s promotion of the military planning and preparation
for the Polish campaign is discussed in Section 8 of Chapter IX.

                                                  [Page 854]

(4) The “Athenia Case". Once the war was underway, Raeder
also showed himself to be a master of one of the
conspirators' favorite techniques — deceit on the grand
scale. His handling of the case of the “Athenia” is a case
in point.

The “Athenia” was a passenger liner which was sunk in the
evening of 3 September 1939, when she was outward bound to
America. About one hundred lives were lost.

On 23 October 1939, the Nazi Party paper, the “Voelkischer
Beobachter,” published in screaming headlines the story,
"Churchill sank the Athenia” (3260-PS). The scale on which
this deliberate lie was perpetrated is indicated by the rest
of the “Voelkischer Beobachter” for that day; on the front
page, with large red underlining, were the words: “Now we
indict Churchill” (3260-PS). An extract from the third page
of this issue of the “Voelkischer Beobachter” refers to
photograph of the ship and reads as follows:

     “Churchill sank the 'Athenia'. The above picture shows
     the proud 'Athenia', the ocean giant, which was sunk by
     Chur-

                                                  [Page 855]

     chill’s crime. One can clearly see the big radio
     equipment on board the ship. But nowhere was an SOS
     heard from the ship. Why was the 'Athenia' silent?
     Because her captain was not allowed to tell the world
     anything. He very prudently refrained from telling the
     world that Winston Churchill attempted to sink the
     ship, through the explosion of an infernal machine. He
     knew it well, but he had to keep silent. Nearly fifteen
     hundred people would have lost their lives if
     Churchill’s original plan had resulted as the criminal
     wanted. Yes, he longingly hoped that the one hundred
     Americans on board the ship would find death in the
     waves so that the anger of the American people, who
     were deceived by him, should be directed against
     Germany as the presumed author of the deed. It was
     fortunate that the majority escaped the fate intended
     for them by Churchill. Our picture on the right shows
     two wounded passengers. They were rescued by the
     freighter, 'City of Flint', and as can be seen here,
     turned over over [sic] to the American coast guard boat
     'Gibb' for further medical treatment. They are an
     unspoken accusation against the criminal Churchill.
     Both they and the shades of those who lost their lives
     call him before the Tribunal of the world and ask the
     British people, 'How long will the office, one of the
     richest in tradition known to Britain’s history, be
     held by a murderer?'” (3260-PS)

Contrary to these Nazi allegations, the “Athenia” made
repeated wireless distress signals, which were in fact
intercepted and answered by His Majesty’s ships “Electra”
and “Escort,” as well as by the Norwegian steamship “Knute
Nelson” and the Swedish yacht “Southern Cross.” In fact, the
"Athenia” was sunk by the German U-boat U-30. So
unjustifiable was the torpedoing of the “Athenia,” however,
that the German Navy embarked on a course of falsification
of their records and on other dishonest measures, in the
hope of hiding the guilty secret. Meanwhile the Nazi
propagandists sought to shift the responsibility the
British. The Captain of U-boat 30, Oberleutnant Lemp, was
later killed in action, but some of the original crew of the
30 have survived to tell the tale as prisoners of war. An
affidavit by a member of the crew of the U-30 establishes
the truth of this episode and reveals the Nazis' attempt to
conceal the true facts (D-654). The affidavit

     “I, Adolf Schmidt, Official Number N 1043-33T,

     “Do solemnly declare that:

     “I am now confined to Camp No. 133, Lethbridge,
     Alberta.

     “That on the first day of war, 3 September 1939, a ship
     of

                                                  [Page 856]

     approximately 10,000 tons was torpedoed in the late
     hours of the evening by the U-30.

     “That after the ship was torpedoed and we surfaced
     again, approximately half an hour after the explosion,
     the Commandant called me to the tower in order to show
     me the torpedoed ship.

     “That I have seen the ship with my very eyes, but that
     I do not think that the ship could see our U-boat at
     that time on account of the position of the moon.

     “That only a few members of the crew had an opportunity
     to go to the tower in order to see the torpedoed ship.

     “That apart from myself, Oberleutnant Hinsch was in the
     tower when I saw the steamer after the attack.

     “That I observed that the ship was listing.

     “That no warning shot was fired before the torpedo was
     launched.

     “That I myself observed much commotion on board of the
     torpedoed ship.

     “That I believe that the ship had only one smoke stack.

     “That in the attack on this steamer one or two
     torpedoes were fired which did not explode but that I
     myself heard the explosion of the torpedo which hit the
     steamer.

     “That Oberleutnant Lemp waited until darkness before
     surfacing.

     “That I was severely wounded by aircraft 14 September
     1939.

     “That Oberleutnant Lemp, shortly before my
     disembarkation in Reykjavik 19 September 1939, visited
     me in the forenoon in the Petty Officers quarters where
     I was lying severely wounded.

     “That Oberleutnant Lemp then had the Petty Officers'
     quarters cleared in order to be alone with me.

     “That Oberleutnant Lemp then showed me a declaration
     under oath according to which I had to bind myself to
     mention nothing concerning the incidents of 3 September
     1939 on board the U-30.

     “That this declaration under oath had approximately the
     following wording: 'I, the undersigned, swear hereby
     that I shall shroud in secrecy all happenings of 3
     September 1939 on board the U-30, regardless whether
     foe or friend, and that I shall erase from my memory
     all happenings of this day.'

     “That I have signed this declaration under oath, which
     was drawn up by the Commandant in his own handwriting,
     with my left hand very illegibly.

                                                  [Page 857]

     “That later on in Iceland when I heard about the
     sinking of the 'Athenia,' the idea came into my mind
     that the U-30 on the 3 September 1939 might have sunk
     the 'Athenia,' especially since the Captain caused me
     to sign the above-mentioned declaration.

     “That up to today I have never spoken to anyone
     concerning these events.

     “That due to the termination of the war I consider
     myself freed from my oaths” (D-654)

Doenitz’s part in the “Athena” episode is described in an
affidavit which he has sworn, in English (D-68). At the end
of the affidavit four words are added in Doenitz's
handwriting, the significance of which will be adverted to
shortly. Doenitz states:

     “U-30 returned to harbor about Mid-September. I met the
     captain, Oberleutnant Lemp, on the dockside at
     Wilhelmshafen, as the boat was entering harbor, and he
     asked permission to speak to me in private. I noticed
     immediately that he was looking very unhappy and he
     told me at once that he thought he was responsible for
     the sinking of the 'Athenia' in the North Channel area.
     In accordance with my previous instructions, he had
     been keeping a sharp lookout for possible armed
     merchant cruisers in the approaches to the British
     Isles, and had torpedoed a ship he afterwards
     identified as the 'Athenia' from wireless broadcasts,
     under the impression that she was an armed merchant
     cruiser on patrol. I had never specified in my
     instructions any particular type of ship as armed
     merchant cruiser nor mentioned any names of ships. I
     despatched Lemp at once by air to report to the SKL at
     Berlin; in the meantime, I ordered complete secrecy as
     a provisional measure. Later the same day or early on
     the following day, I received a verbal order from
     Kapitaen zur See Fricke [head of the Operations
     Division of the Naval War Staff] that:

     “1. The affair was to be kept a total secret.

     “2. The OKM considered that a court martial was not
     necessary as they were satisfied that the captain had
     acted in good faith.

     “3. Political explanations would be handled by the OKM.

     “I had had no part whatsoever in the political events
     in which the Fuehrer claimed that no U-boat had sunk
     the 'Athenia.'

     “After Lemp returned to Wilhelmshafen from Berlin, I
     interrogated him thoroughly on the sinking and formed
     the impression that although he had taken reasonable
     care, he

                                                  [Page 858]

     had still not taken sufficient precautions to establish
     fully the identity of the ship before attacking. I had
     previously given very strict orders that all merchant
     vessels and neutrals were to be treated according to
     naval prize law, before the occurrence of this
     incident. I accordingly placed him under cabin arrest,
     as I felt certain that a court-martial could only
     acquit him and would entail unnecessary publicity'
     [whereat Doenitz has added the words, “and too much
     time"] (D-638)

Doenitz’s suggestion that the captain of the U-30 sank the
"Athenia” in mistake for a merchant cruiser must be
considered in the light of Doenitz’s order of 22 September
1939, that

     “the sinking of a merchant ship must be justified in
     the War Diary as due to possible confusion with a
     warship or an auxiliary cruiser.” (C-191)

The U-30 returned to Wilhelmshaven on 27 September 1939. On
that date another fraudulent entry was made in the War Diary
of the Chief of U-Boats:

     “U-30 comes in. She had sunk: 'S.S. BIairlogie'; 'S.S.
     Fanal Head'.” (D-659)

There is no reference at all to the sinking of the
"Athenia.”

Perhaps the most elaborate forgery in connection with this
episode was made on the log book of the U-30, which was
responsible for sinking the “Athenia” (D-662). The
Prosecution submits that the first page of that log book is
a forgery which shows a curiously un-German carelessness
about detail. It is clear on the original document that the
first page of the text is a substitute for pages that have
been removed. The dates in the first column of that page are
in Arabic numerals. On the second and more authentic-looking
page, and throughout the other pages of the log book, they
are in Roman numerals.

Furthermore, all reference to the sinking of the “Athenia”
on 3 September is omitted. The log book shows that at 1400
hours on 3 September 1939 the position of the U-30 is given
as AL 0278, which is one of the few positions quoted at all
upon that page, and which was some 200 miles west of the
position where the “Athenia” was sunk. The recorded course
(due south) and the recorded speed (10 knots)those entries
are obviously designed to suggest that the U-3 was- well
clear of the “Athenia's” position on 3 September. (D-662)

Finally, the original shows Lemp’s own signature upon the
page dealing with 3 September differs from his other
signature in the text. The difference appears in the final
letter of his name. The signature in question shows a Roman
"p", whereas on the

                                                  [Page 859]

other signatures there is a script “p.” The inference is
that either the signature is a forgery or it was made by
Lemp at some other and probably considerably later, date. (D-
662)

The story of the “Athenia” establishes that the German Navy
under Raeder embarked upon deliberate fraud. Even before
receiving Lemp’s reports, the German Admiralty had
repeatedly denied the possibility that a German U-boat could
be in the area concerned. The charts which showed the
disposition of U-boats and the position of sinking of the
"Athenia” (discussed in Section 14 on Doenitz) have shown
the dishonesty of these announcements. The conclusion to be
drawn is this; Raeder, as head of the German Navy, knew all
the facts. Censorship and information control in Nazi
Germany were so complete that Raeder, as head of the Navy,
must have been party to the falsification published in the
"Voelkischer Beobachter,” which was an attempt by the Nazi
conspirators to save face with their own people and uphold
the myth of an infallible Fuehrer backed by an impeccable
war machine.

(5) The Attack on Norway and Denmark. Truth mattered little
in Nazi propaganda, and Raeder’s camouflage was not confined
to painting his ships or sailing them under the British
flag, as he did in attacking Norway or Denmark. Raeder's
proud comment upon the invasions of Denmark and Norway, in
which he played a leading part, (see Section 9 of Chapter IX
on aggression against Norway and Denmark), is contained in a
letter of Raeder’s to the Navy, which stated in part:

     “The operations of the Navy in the occupation of Norway
     will for all time remain the great contribution of the
     Navy to this war.”

(6) The Attack on the U.S.S.R. With the occupation of Norway
and much of Western Europe safely completed, Hitler turned
his eyes towards Russia. Raeder was against the attack on
Russia and tried his best to dissuade Hitler from embarking
upon it. Raeder approached the problem with cynicism. He did
not object to the aggressive war on Russia because of its
illegality, its morality, its inhumanity. His only objection
to it was its untimeliness. He wanted to finish England
first before going further afield.

The story of Raeder’s part in the deliberations upon the war
against Russia is told in extracts from a German compilation
of official naval-notes by the German Naval War Staff (C-
170). The first entry, dated 26 September 1940, shows that
Raeder was advocating to Hitler an aggressive Mediterranean
policy, in which

                                                  [Page 860]

the Navy would play a paramount role, as opposed to a
continental land policy. The entry reads:

     “Naval Supreme Commander with the Fuehrer: Naval
     Supreme Commander presents his opinion about the
     situation: the Suez Canal must be captured with German
     assistance From Suez advance through Palestine and
     Syria; then Turkey in our power. The Russian problem
     will then assume a different appearance. Russia is
     fundamentally frightened of Germany. It is questionable
     whether action against Russia from the North will then
     be still necessary.” (C-170)

The entry for 14 November reads:

     “Naval Supreme Commander with the Fuehrer: Fuehrer is
     still inclined to instigate the conflict with Russia.
     Naval Supreme Commander recommends putting it off until
     the time after the victory over England since there is
     heavy strain on German forces and the end of warfare is
     not in sight. According to the opinion of the Naval
     Supreme Commander, Russia will not press for a conflict
     within the next year, since she is in the process of
     building up her Navy with Germany’s help — 38 cm.
     turrets for battleships, etc.: thus, during these years
     she continues to be dependent upon German assistance.”
     (C-170)

And again, the entry for 27 December states:

     “Naval Supreme Commander with the Fuehrer: Naval
     Supreme Commander emphasizes again that strict
     concentration of our entire war effort against England
     as our main enemy is the most urgent need of the hour.
     On the one side England has gained strength by the
     unfortunate Italian conduct of the war in the eastern
     Mediterranean and by the increasing American support.
     On the other hand, however, she can be hit mortally by
     a strangulation of her ocean traffic which is already
     taking effect. What is being done for submarine and
     naval air force construction is much too little. Our
     entire war potential must work for the conduct of the
     war against England; thus for Navy and air force every
     fissure of strength prolongs the war and endangers the
     final success. Naval Supreme Commander voices serious
     objections against Russia campaign before the defeat of
     England.” (C-l 70)

The entry for 18 February 1941 reads as follows:

     “Chief, Naval Operations (SKL) insists on the
     occupation of Malta even before 'Barbarossa'.” (C-170)

The 23 February entry reads:

     “Instruction from Supreme Command, Armed Forces

                                                  [Page 861]

     (OKW) that seizure of Malta is contemplated for the
     fall of 1941 after the execution of 'Barbarossa'.” (C-
     170)

The entry for 19 March 1941 shows that by March 1941 Raeder
had begun to consider what prospects of naval action the
Russian aggression had to offer. The entry states:

     “In case of 'Barbarossa', Supreme Naval Commander
     describes the occupation of Murmansk as an absolute
     necessity for the Navy. Chief of the Supreme Command,
     Armed Forces, considers compliance very difficult.” (C-
     170).

In the meantime, the entries show that Mussolini was crying
out for a more active Nazi Mediterranean policy. The entry
for 30 May reads:

     “[Duce] demands urgently decisive offensive Egypt-Suez
     for fall 1941; 12 divisions are needed for that; 'This
     stroke would be more deadly to the British Empire than
     the capture of London'; Chief Naval Operations agrees
     completely.” (C-170)

Finally, the entry for 6 June indicates the strategic views
of Raeder and the German Navy at that stage:

     “Naval Supreme Commander with the Fuehrer: Memorandum
     of the Chief, Naval Operations. Observation on the
     strategic situation in the Eastern Mediterranean after
     the Balkan campaign and the occupation of Crete and
     further conduct of the war.”

                           *******

     “The memorandum points with impressive clarity to the
     decisive aims of the war in the Near East. Their
     advancement has moved into grasping distance by the
     successes in the Aegean area, and the memorandum
     emphasizes that the offensive utilization of the
     present favorable situation must take place with the
     greatest acceleration and energy, before England has
     again strengthened her position in the Near East with
     help from the United States of America. The memorandum
     realizes the unalterable fact that the campaign against
     Russia would be opened very shortly; demands, however,
     that the undertaking 'Barbarossa', which because of the
     magnitude of its aims naturally stands in the
     foreground of the operational plans of the armed forces
     leadership, must under no circumstances lead to an
     abandonment, diminishing delay of the conduct of the
     war in the Eastern Mediterranean.” (C-170)

Thus Raeder, throughout, was seeking an active role for his
Navy in the Nazi war plans.

Once Hitler had decided to attack Russia, Raeder sought a
role

                                                  [Page 862]

for the Navy in the Russian campaign. The first naval
operational plan against Russia was characteristically Nazi.
The entry for 15 June 1941 in the notes of the German Naval
War Staff reads:

     “On the proposal of Chief Naval Operations, use of arms
     against Russian submarines, south of the northern
     boundary of the Poland warning area is permitted
     immediately; ruthless destruction is to be aimed at.”
     (C-170)

Keitel provides a typically fraudulent pretext for this
action in his letter dated 15 June 1941 (C-38):

     “Subject: Offensive action against enemy submarines in
     the Baltic Sea.

     “To: “High Command of the Navy — OKM (SKL)

     “Offensive action against submarine south of the line
     Memel southern tip of Oeland is authorized if the boats
     cannot be definitely identified as Swedish during the
     approach by German naval forces.

     “The reason to be given up to B-day is that our naval
     forces believed to be dealing with penetrating British
     submarines.” (C-38).

This order was given on 15 June 1941, although the Nazi
attack on Russia did not take place until 22 June 1941.

(7) Instigation, of Japanese aggression. In the meantime,
Raeder was urging Hitler, as early as 18 March 1941, to
enlarge the scope of the world war by inducing Japan to
seize Singapore. Raeder’s views at his audience with Hitler
on 18 March were as follows:

     “Japan must take steps to seize Singapore as soon as
     possible, since the opportunity will never again be as
     favorable (whole English Fleet contained;
     unpreparedness of USA. for war against Japan;
     inferiority of U.S. Fleet vis-a-vis the Japanese). Japan
     is indeed making preparations for this action, but
     according to all declarations made by Japanese officers
     she will only carry it out if Germany proceeds to land
     in England. Germany must therefore concentrate all her
     efforts on spurring Japan to act immediately. If Japan
     has Singapore all other East Asiatic questions
     regarding the USA. and England are thereby solved
     (Guam, Philippines, Borneo, Dutch East Indies).

     “Japan wishes if possible to avoid war against USA. She
     can do so if she determinedly takes Singapore as soon
     as possible.” (C-152)

                                                  [Page 863]

By 20 April 1941 Hitler had agreed with Raeder’s proposition
to induce the Japanese to take offensive action against
Singapore. The entry in the notes of the German Naval War
Staff, for 20 April 1941, reads:

     “Naval Supreme Commander with the Fuehrer: Navy Supreme
     Commander asks about result of Matsuoka’s visit, and
     evaluation of Japanese-Russian pact. Fuehrer has in-
     formed Matsuoka, 'that Russia will not be touched if
     she behaves friendly according to the treaty.
     Otherwise, he reserves action for himself.' Japan-
     Russia pact has been concluded in agreement with
     Germany, and is to prevent Japan from advancing against
     Vladivostok, and to cause her to attack Singapore.” (C-
     170).

The real purpose of Hitler’s words to Matsuoka is revealed
in another description of their conversation:

     “*** At that time the Fuehrer was firmly resolved on a
     surprise attack on Russia, regardless of what was the
     Russian attitude to Germany. This, according to reports
     coming in, was frequently changing. The communication
     to Matsuoka was designed entirely as a camouflage
     measure and to ensure surprise.” (C-66)

The Axis partners were not even honest with each other. This
is typical of the jungle diplomacy with which Raeder
associated himself.

                                                  [Page 863]

C. RAEDER’s PART IN THE CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT WAR CRIMES.

(1) Instigation of the Navy to Violate the Rules of Warfare.
Raeder throughout his career showed a complete disregard for
any international rule or usage of war which conflicted with
his intention of carrying through the Nazi program of
conquest. Raeder has himself summarized his attitude in a
long memorandum compiled by Raeder and the German Naval War
Staff and dated 15 October 1939, only a few weeks after the
war started UK-65). The memorandum, which concerns the
intensification f the war at sea, reads in part as follows:

     “I. Military requirements for the decisive struggle
     against Great Britain.

     “Our naval strategy will have to employ all the
     military means at our disposal as expeditiously as
     possible. Military success can be most confidently
     expected if we attack British sea-communications
     wherever they are accessible to us with the greatest
     ruthlessness; the final aim of such attacks is to

                                                  [Page 864]

     cut off all imports into and exports from Britain. We
     should try to consider the requirements. It is
     desirable to base all military measures, taken on
     existing International Law; however measures which are
     considered necessary from a military point of view,
     provided a decisive success can be expected from them,
     will have to be carried out, even if they are not
     covered by existing International Law. In principle
     therefore, any means of warfare which is effective in
     breaking enemy resistance should be used on some legal
     conception, even if that entails the creation of a new
     code of naval warfare.

     “The supreme War Council will have to decide what
     measures of military and legal nature are to be taken.
     Once it has been decided to conduct economic warfare in
     its most ruthless form, in fulfilment of military
     requirements, this decision is to be adhered to under
     all circumstances and under no circumstances may such a
     decision for the most ruthless form of economic
     warfare, once it has been made, be dropped or released
     under political pressure from neutral powers; that is
     what happened in the World War to our own detriment.
     Every protest by neutral powers must be turned down.
     Even threats of further countries, including the US
     coming into the war, which can be expected with
     certainty should the war last a long time, must not
     lead to a relaxation in the form of economic warfare
     once embarked upon. The more ruthlessly economic
     warfare is waged, the earlier will it show results and
     the sooner will the war come to an end. The economic
     effect of such military measures on our own war economy
     must be fully recognized and compensated through
     immediate re-orientation of German war economy and the
     re-drafting of the respective agreements with neutral
     states; for this, strong political and economic
     pressure must be employed if necessary.”

Those comments of Raeder are revealing and show that as an
active member of the inner councils of the Nazi state up to
1943, Raeder must share responsibility for the many war
crimes committed by his confederates and underlings in the
course of their wars.

(2) The Navy’s Crimes at Sea. Apart from this over-all
responsibility of Raeder, certain war crimes were
essentially initiated or ordered through the naval chain of
command by Raeder himself.

(a) Attacks on neutral shipping. The minutes of a meeting

                                                  [Page 865]

between Hitler and Raeder on 30 December 1939 read in part
as follows:

     “The Chief of Naval War Staff requests that full power
     be given to the Naval War Staff in making any
     intensification suited to the situation and to the
     means of war. The Fuehrer fundamentally agrees to the
     sinking without warning of Greek ships in the American
     prohibited area in which the fiction of mine danger can
     be upheld, e.g., the Bristol Channel.” (C-27)

At this time Greek ships also were neutral. This is another
demonstration that Raeder was a man without principle. This
incitement to crime was a typical group effort, since a
directive effectuating those naval views was issued on 30
December 1939 by the OKW, and signed by Jodl (C-12). This
directive reads:

     “On 30 December 1939, according to a report of Ob.d.M.,
     the Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces
     decided that:

     “(1) Greek merchant ships in the area around England
     declared by USA. to be a barred zone are to be treated
     as enemy vessels.

     “(2) In the Bristol Channel, all shipping may be
     attacked without warning — where the impression of a
     mining incident can be created.

     “Both measures are authorized to come into effect
     immediately.” (C-12)

A pencilled note at the foot of this directive reads:

     “Add to (1) Attack must be carried out without being
     seen. The denial of the sinking of these steamships in
     case the expected protests are made must be possible.”
     (C-12)

Another example of the callous attitude of Raeder’s Navy
towards neutral shipping is found in an entry in Jodl's
diary for 16 June 1942 (1807-PS). This extract reads as
follows:

     “The operational staff of the Navy (SKL) applied on the
     29th May for permission to attack the Brazilian sea and
     air forces. The SKL considers that a sudden blow
     against the Brazilian naval and merchant ships is
     expedient at this juncture (a) because defense measures
     are still incomplete; (b) because there is the
     possibility of achieving surprise; and (c) because
     Brazil is to all intents and purposes fighting Germany
     at sea.” (1807-PS).

This was a plan for a kind of Brazilian “Pearl Harbor,”
although war did not in fact break out between Germany and
Brazil until the 22 August 1942.

                                                  [Page 866]

Raeder also caused the Navy to participate in war crimes
ordered by other conspirators. A single example will
suffice.

(b) The order to shoot commandos. On 28 October 1942 the
head of the Operations Division of the Naval War Staff
promulgated to naval commands Hitler’s order of 18 October
1942 requiring the shooting of commandos. The effect of this
order was to deny the protection of the Geneva Convention to
captured commandos. The document dated 28 October 1942
reads:

     “Enclosed please find a Fuehrer Order regarding
     annihilation of terror and sabotage units.

     “This order must not be distributed in writing by
     Flotilla leaders, Section Commanders or officers of
     this rank.

     “After verbal distribution to subordinate sections the
     above authorities must hand this order over to the next
     highest section which is responsible for its
     confiscation and destruction.” (C-179).

It will be difficult to conceive of clearer evidence than
this, that Raeder appreciated the wrongfulness of Hitler's
commando order.

One example will show that this order was executed by the
German Navy during the period when Raeder was its Commander.

A certain commando operation of December 1942 had as its
objective an attack on shipping in Bordeaux harbor. The
Wehrmacht account of this incident states that six of the
ten participants in that commando raid were arrested, and
that all were shot on 23 March 1943 (UK-57). On this
particular occasion the Navy under Raeder had implemented
Hitler’s order much more expeditiously. This fact appears in
extracts from the war diary of Admiral Bachmann, who was the
German Flag Officer in charge of Western France (C-176). The
entry for 10 December 1942 reads:

     “About 1015. Telephone call from personal
     representative of the Officer-in-charge of the Security
     Service in Paris, SS Obersturmfuehrer Dr. Schmidt to
     Flag Officer-in-charge s Flag Lieutenant, requesting
     postponement of the shooting, as interrogation had not
     been concluded. After consultation with the Chief of
     Operations Staff the Security Service had been directed
     to get approval direct from Headquarters. “1820.
     Security Service, Bordeaux, requested Security Service
     authorities at Fuehrer’s headquarters to postpone the
     shooting for three days. Interrogations- continued for
     the time being.” (C-176)

The entry for the next day, 11 December 1942, reads:

     “Shooting of the two prisoners was carried out by a
     unit

                                                  [Page 867]

     (strength 1/16) belonging to the naval officer in
     charge Bordeaux, in the presence of an officer of the
     Security Service, Bordeaux, on order of the Fuehrer.”
     (C-176)

A note in green pencil in the margin opposite this entry
reads:

     “Security Service should have done this. Phone Flag
     Officer in Charge in future cases.” (C-176)

This provision for “future cases” was in fact an order that
commandos should be handed over to the Security Service to
be shot.

It is therefore evident from Admiral Bachmann’s war diary (C-
176) that the first two men to be shot from the Bordeaux
operation were actually put to death by a naval firing party
on 1 December 1942.

The Naval War Staff had this comment to make upon that
shooting:

     “The Naval Commander, West France, reports that during
     the course of the day explosives with magnets to stick
     on, mapping material dealing with the mouth of the
     Gironde, aerial photographs of the port installations
     at Bordeaux, camouflage material and food and water for
     several days were found. Attempts to salvage the canoe
     were unsuccessful. The Naval Commander, West France,
     has ordered that both soldiers be shot immediately for
     attempted sabotage, if their interrogation, which has
     begun, confirms what has so far been discovered. Their
     execution has, however, been -postponed in order to
     obtain more information.

     “According to a Wehrmacht report, both soldiers have
     meanwhile been shot. The measure would be in accordance
     with the Fuehrer’s special order, but is nevertheless
     something new in international law, since the soldiers
     were in uniform.” (D-658)

That last sentence shows clearly that the Naval High Command
under Raeder accepted allegiance to the Nazi conspiracy as
of greater importance than any question of moral principle
or professional honor. The shooting of commandos was not an
act of war, but simple murder.

D. RAEDER’s ASSISTANCE TO THE CONSPIRACY THROUGH HIS
POLITICAL ACTIVITIES.

Raeder was not just a military puppet carrying out political
orders. Before the Nazis came to power he had worked
actively rebuild the German Navy behind the back of the
Reichstag. When the Nazis seized power, he unreservedly
joined forces with them. He was the prime mover in
transferring the loyalty of

                                                  [Page 868]

the German Navy to the Nazi Party. He himself was as much a
member of the inner councils of the Nazis as any other
defendant. He accepted membership in their main political
advisory bodies.

He was well aware of the designs of the Nazis and assisted
in their realization not only as a military technician, but
also as a mendacious politician. And he furthered brutal
methods of warfare. And yet of all the conspirators Raeder
was one of the first to fall from his high position. It is
true that the extension of the war beyond the boundaries of
Poland came as a disappointment to him. His vision of a Nazi
Armada mastering the Atlantic reckoned without Ribbentrop's
diplomacy and Hitler’s ideas of strategy.

In a memorandum dated 10 January  1943, just before his
retirement, entitled, “The Importance of German Surface
Forces for the War by powers signatory to the Three Power
Pact,” Raeder stated:

     “It was planned by the leaders of the National
     Socialist Reich to give the German Navy by 1944/45 such
     a strength that it would be possible to strike at the
     British vital arteries in the Atlantic with sufficient
     ships, fighting power and range.

     “In 1939, the war having begun five years earlier, the
     construction of these forces was still in its initial
     stages.” (C-161).

This memorandum shows how completely Raeder was cheated in
his ambitious plans by miscalculation as to when his high
seas fleet would be required. Raeder made a great effort to
recover some of his lost glory with his attack on Norway. He
made many efforts to liven up the war at sea, both at the
expense of neutrals and also of the customs and laws of the
sea. His further schemes, however, were disregarded by his
fellow conspirators, and in January 1943 he retired, and
thereafter was a leader in name only.

The record, in Raeder’s handwriting, of his interview with
Hitler on 6 January 1943, which led to Raeder’s retirement,
states in part:

     “If the Fuehrer was anxious to demonstrate that the
     parting was of the friendliest and wished that the name
     Raeder should continue to be associated with the Navy,
     particularly abroad, it would perhaps be possible to
     make an appointment to General Inspector, giving
     appropriate publicity in the press, etc. But a new C.
     in C. Navy with full responsibility for the office must
     be appointed. The position of General

                                                  [Page 869]

     Inspector, or whatever it was decided to call it, must
     be purely nominal.

     “Hitler accepted this suggestion with alacrity. The
     General Inspector could perhaps carry out special tasks
     for him, make tours of inspection, etc. The name of
     Raeder was still to be associated with the Navy. After
     C. in C. Navy had repeated his request, the Fuehrer
     definitely agreed to 30th January as his release date.
     He would like to think over the details.” (D-655)

This was Raeder’s twilight, different from the period of his
ascendancy in 1939, when on 12 March he spoke on the
occasion of the German Heroes' Day (D-653). In that speech,
during the celebration of “freedom to rearm,” Raeder stated,
in the presence of Hitler and representatives of the Party
and Armed Forces:

     “*** National Socialism, which originates from the
     spirit of the German fighting soldier, has been chosen
     by the German people as its ideology. The German people
     follow the symbols of its regeneration with the same
     great love and fanatical passion. The German people has
     had practical experience of National Socialism and it
     has not been imposed, as so many outside critics
     believe. The Fuehrer has shown his people that in the
     National Socialist racial community lies the greatest
     and invincible sources of strength, whose dynamic power
     ensures not only peace at home, but also enables to
     make use of all the Nation’s creative powers:” (D-653).

After eulogies of Hitler, Raeder continued as follows:

     “This is the reason for the clear and unsparing summons
     to fight Bolshevism and international Jewry, whose race-
     destroying activities we have sufficiently experienced
     on our own people. Therefore, the alliance with all
     similar-minded Nations who, like Germany, are not
     willing to allow their strength, dedicated to
     construction and peaceful work at home, to be disrupted
     by alien ideologies as by parasites of a foreign race.
     *** If later on we instruct in the technical handling
     of weapons, this task demands that the young soldier
     should also be taught National Socialist ideology and
     the problems of life. This part of the task, which
     becomes for us both a duty of honor and a demand which
     cannot be refused, can and will be carried out if we
     stand shoulder to shoulder and in sincere comradeship
     to the Party and its organization. The armed forces and
     the

                                                  [Page 870]

     Party thus became more and more united in attitude and
     spirit.”

                           *******

     “Germany is the protector of all Germans within and
     beyond our frontiers. The shots fired at Almeria are
     proof of that.” (D-653)

(The reference is to the bombardment of the Spanish town of
Almeria, carried out by a German naval squadron on 31 May
1937 during the course of the Spanish Civil War.) After
further panegyrics on the Fuehrer and his leadership, Raeder
hinted of what was to come:

     “They all planted into a younger generation the great
     tradition of death for a holy cause, knowing that their
     blood will lead the way towards the freedom of their
     dreams.” (D-65)

That speech of Raeder’s illustrates his deep personal
involvement in the Nazi conspiracy. There is the mixture of
heroics and fatalism that led millions of Germans to
slaughter. There are boasts of the violence used on the
people of Almeria. There is the lip service to peace by a
man who planned conquest. “Armed forces and party have
become more and more united in attitude and spirit” — there
is the authentic Nazi voice. There is the assertion of
racialism. Finally, there is the anti-Semitic gesture,
Raeder’s contribution to the outlook that produced Belsen.
Imbued with these ideas, he became an active participant on
both the political and military level in the Nazi conspiracy
to wage wars of aggression and to wage them ruthlessly.

                                                  [Page 870]

           LEGAL REFERENCES AND LIST OF DOCUMENTS
                  RELATING TO ERICH RAEDER

Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Article 6.
Vol. I, Pg. 5

International Military Tribunal, Indictment Number 1,
Section IV (H); Appendix A. Vol. I, Pg. 29, 67

                                                  [Page 871]

[Note: A single asterisk (*) before a document indicates
that the document was received in evidence at the Nurnberg
trial. A double asterisk (**) before a document number
indicates that the document was referred to during the trial
but was not formally received in evidence, for the reason
given in parentheses following the description of the
document. The USA series number, given in parentheses
following the description of the document, is the official
exhibit number assigned by the court.]

*386-PS;  Notes on a conference with Hitler in the Reich
Chancellery, Berlin, 5 November 1937, signed by Hitler's
adjutant, Hossbach, and dated 10 November 1937. (USA 25) .
Vol. III, Pg. 295

*498-PS;  Top Secret Fuehrer Order for killing of commandos,
18 October 1942. (USA 501) . Vol. III, Pg. 416

*503-PS;  Letter signed by Jodl, 19 October 1942, concerning
Hitler’s explanation of his commando order of the day before
(Document 498-PS). (USA 542) . Vol. III, Pg. 426

*798-PS;  Hitler’s speech to Commanders-in-Chief, at
Obersalzberg, 22 August 1939. (USA 29) . Vol. III, Pg. 581

*1807-PS;  Extract from Jodl Diary, 16 June 1942, concerning
attack on Brazilian sea and air forces. (GB 227) . Vol. IV,
Pg. 377

                                                  [Page 872]

*2031-PS;  Decree establishing a Secret Cabinet Council, 4
February 1938. 1938 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 112. (GB
217) . Vol. IV, Pg. 654

*2098-PS;  Decree relating to Status of Supreme Commanders
of Army and Navy, 25 February 1938. 1938 Reichsgesetzblatt,
Part I, p. 215. (GB 26) . Vol. IV, Pg. 725

*2194-PS;  Top secret letter from Ministry for Economy and
Labor, Saxony, to Reich Protector in Bohemia and Moravia,
enclosing copy of 1938 Secret Defense Law of 9 September
1938. (USA 36) . Vol. IV, Pg. 843

2879-PS;  Extracts from The Archives. Vol. V, Pg. 542

*2888-PS;  Certificate of positions held by Raeder, 14
November 1945. (USA 13) . Vol. V, Pg. 553

*3260-PS;  “Churchill Sank the Athenia", published in
Voelkischer Beobachter, 23 October 1939. (GB 218) . Vol. V,
Pg. 1008

*C-12;  OKW directive, signed Jodl, 20 December 1939,
concerning conduct of U-Boat warfare on Merchant shipping
against England. (GB 226) . Vol. VI, Pg. 818

*C-21;  Extracts from file on Intensification of U-boat
warfare. (GB 194) . Vol. VI, Pg. 825

*C-23;  Unsigned documents found in official Navy files
containing notes year by year from 1927 to 1 on
reconstruction of the German Navy, and dated 18 February
1938, 8 March 1938, September 1938. (USA 49) . Vol. VI, Pg.
827

*C-27;  Minutes of Meeting between C-in-C Navy and the
Fuehrer. (GB 225) . Vol. VI, Pg. 829

                                                  [Page 873]

*C-29;  Directive of 31 January 1933 by Raeder for German
Navy to support the armament industry. (USA 46) . Vol. VI,
Pg. 830

*C-32;  Survey report of German Naval Armament after
conference with Chief of “A” Section, 9 September 1933. (USA
50) . Vol. VI, Pg. 833

*C-38;  Letter, 13 June 1941, requesting decision on action
against enemy submarines and Order to attack Soviet
submarines, 15 June 1941. (GB 223) . Vol. VI, Pg. 855

*C-64;  Raeder’s report, 12 December 1939, on meeting of
Naval Staff with Fuehrer. (GB 86) . Vol. VI, Pg. 884

*C-66;  Memorandum from Raeder to Assman, 10 January  1944,
concerning “Barbarossa” and “Weseruebung". (GB 81) . Vol.
VI, Pg. 887

*C-105;  Extract from German Naval War Diary, 21 December
1940, p. 252. (GB 455) . Vol. VI, Pg. 913

*C-115;  Naval deception and camouflage in invasion of
Norway taken from file of naval operation orders for
operation “Weseruebung". (GB 90) . Vol. VI, Pg. 914

C-116;  Extract from German Naval file, 9 August 1941,
concerning Order to blockade Norwegian ships. Vol. VI, Pg.
915

C-117;  Extract from German Naval file, 13 June 1941,
concerning preparations for laying of minefield near the
Bosphorus. Vol. VI, Pg. 915

*C-120;  Directives for Armed Forces 19394) for “Fall
Weiss", operation against Poland. (GB 41) . Vol. VI, Pg. 916

*C-122;  Extract from Naval War Diary. Questionnaire on
Norway bases, 3 October 1939. (GB 82) . Vol. VI, Pg. 928

                                                  [Page 874]

C-124;  Secret letter, 29 September 1941, concerning future
of St. Petersburg. Vol. VI, Pg. 931

*C-126;  Preliminary Time Table for “Fall Weiss” and
directions for secret mobilization. (GB 45) . Vol. VI, Pg.
932

*C-135;  Extract from history of war organization and of the
scheme for mobilization. (GB 213) . Vol. VI, Pg. 946

*C-141;  Order for concealed armament of E-boats, 10
February 1932, signed by Raeder. (USA 47) . Vol. VI, Pg. 955

*C-152;  Extract from Naval War Staff files, 18 March 1941,
concerning audience of C-in-C of Navy with Hitler on 18
March 1941. (GB 122) . Vol. VI, Pg. 966

*C-155;  Memorandum, 11 June 1940, signed by Raeder. (GB
214) . Vol. VI, Pg. 969

*C-156;  Concealed Rearmament under Leadership of Government
of Reich, from “Fight of the Navy against Versailles 1919-
1935". (USA 41) . Vol. VI, Pg. 970

*C-161;  Memo by Raeder, 10 January  1943, entitled:
Importance of German Surface forces for conducting of war by
powers signatory to Three Power Pact. (GB 230) . Vol. VI,
Pg. 976

*C-166;  Order from Command Office of Navy, 12 March 1934,
signed in draft by Groos, concerning preparation of
auxiliary cruisers. (USA 48) . Vol. VI, Pg. 977

*C-170;  File of Russo-German relations found in OKM files
covering period 25 August 1939 to 22 June 1941. (USA 136) .
Vol. VI, Pg. 977

*C-176; Extracts from War Diary of Admiral Bachmann,
concerning shooting of commandos in Bordeaux. (GB 228) .
Vol. VI, Pg. 1011

*C-179;  Hitler’s second decree, 18 October 1942, regarding
annihilation of terror and sabotage units. (USA 543) . Vol.
VI, Pg. 1014

*C-189;  Conversation with the Fuehrer in June 1934 on
occasion of resignation of Commanding Officer of
"Karlsruhe". (USA 44) . Vol. VI, Pg. 1017

*C-190;  Memorandum of conversation with Hitler on financing
Naval rearmament and assembling six submarines, 2 November
1934. (USA 45) . Vol. VI, Pg. 1018

*C-191;  Demands by defendant Doenitz on sinking of merchant
ships, 22 September 1939. (GB 193) . Vol. VI, Pg. 1018

*D-448;  Announcement of birthday celebration of Doenitz in
Voelkischer Beobachter, 25 April 1942. (GB 216) . Vol. VII,
Pg.  58

*D-481;  Law regarding the swearing in of officials and
soldiers of Armed Forces, 20 August 1934. 1934
Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 785. (GB 215) . Vol. VII, Pg.
66

*D-638;  Affidavit of Doenitz concerning sinking of Athenia,
17 November 1945. (GB 220) . Vol. VII, Pg. 114

*D-653;  Raeder speech, 12 March 1939, published in The
Archive, March 1939, pp. 1841-1846. (GB 232) . Vol. VII, Pg.
153

*D-654;  Affidavit of Adolf Schmidt, 9 August 1945. (GB 219)
. Vol. VII, Pg. 156

*D-655;  Raeder interview with Hitler on .January 1343. (GB
231) . Vol. VII, Pg. 158

*D-658;  Extract from SKL War Diary, 9 December 1942. (GB
229) . Vol. VII, Pg. 164

*D-659;  Extract from War Diary of Chief of U-boats, 27
September 1939. (GB 221) . Vol. VII, Pg. 164

*D-662;  War Diary of Commanding Officer of U-boat U-30. (GB
222) . Vol. VII, Pg. 169

*D-663;  Operation Order “Atlantic” No. 56 for U-boats in
Atlantic, 7 October 1943. (GB 200) . Vol. VII, Pg. 170

*EC-177;  Minutes of second session of Working Committee of
the Reich Defense held on 26 April 1933. (USA 390) . Vol.
VII, Pg. 328

*L-79;  Minutes of conference, 23 May 1939, “Indoctrination
on the political situation and future aims". (USA 27) . Vol.
VII, Pg. 847

*UK-57;  Keitel directives, 4 January 1944 and 21 April
1944, concerning counteraction to Kharkov show trial. (GB
164) . Vol. VIII, Pg. 539

*UK-65;  Report by Raeder to Hitler, 16 October 1939, and
memorandum regarding intensified naval war against England,
15 October 1939. (GB 224) . Vol. VIII, Pg. 545

Statement I;  The Laconia Case and German Submarine Warfare,
by Karl Doenitz, Nurnberg, 7 and 19 October 1945. Vol. VIII,
Pg. 657

Statement VII;  The Development of German Naval Policy  1933-
1939, by Erich Raeder, Moscow, fall 1945. Vol. VIII, Pg. 684

Statement VIII;  The Breakthrough in the Channel Early in
1942, by Erich Raeder, Moscow. Vol. VIII, Pg. 701

Statement IX;  My Relationship to Adolf Hitler and to the
Party, by Erich Raeder, Moscow, fall 1945. Vol. VIII, Pg.
707