4. Wilhelm Keitel

A. POSITIONS HELD BY KEITEL.

Chief of the Armed Forces Department in the Reichs Ministry
of War (Wehrmachtsamt in Reichskriegsministerum), 1 October
1935 to 4 February 1938. 3019-PS)

Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces (Chief of
OKW), equal in rank to a Reichs Minister. (1915-PS)

Member of the Secret Cabinet Council, 4 February 1938 to 194
(2031-PS)

Member of Ministerial Council for the defense of the Reich,
30 August 1939 to 194. (2018-PS)

Member of Reichs Defense Council, 4 September 1938 to 1945.
(2194-PS)

Field Marshal, July 1940 to 1945. (3020-PS)

B. FUNCTIONS OF KEITEL.

As Chief of the Wehrmachtamt in the Ministry of War, Keitel
was Chief of Staff for von Blomberg, who was both Minister
of War and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces.

On 4 February 1938 Hitler abolished the Ministry of War,
assumed direct command of the Armed Forces himself, and
created the OKW (Oberkommando der Wehrmacht). The OKW
advised Hitler on the most important military questions, and
prepared and transmitted directives to the Armed Forces.
Thus it exercised great influence on the formation of the
German military policy and the conduct of military affairs.

Keitel was made Chief of the OKW, with rank equal to that of
Reichsminister. He was also given authorities of the former
Minister of War, and continued to perform the administrative
duties of that position. (1915-PS; 1954-PS; 3704-PS)

In addition to its ministerial functions, the OKW was
Hitler’s military staff. Its most important duty was the
development of strategic and operational plans. Such plans
were worked out by the OKW Operation Staff in broad outline,
and then in more detail by the commanders and chiefs of
staff of the Army, Navy, and Air Force. After Hitler had
approved the plans they were transmitted by the OKW to the
respective military authorities. (3705-PS; 3702-PS; 3707-
PS).

C. KEITEL’s PART IN THE CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT CRIMES AGAINST
PEACE.

Keitel’s conspiratorial activities started immediately after
the Nazis came to power. As early as in May 1933, when
Germany was still a member of the League of Nations, Keitel
gave directives for deceiving “Geneva” in rearmament
matters.

At the second meeting of the Working Committee of the
Councillors for Reich Defense on 22 May 1933, Colonel Keitel
emphasized that the supreme-consideration guiding the work
of the committee was to be secrecy. “No document", he said,
"ought to be lost, since otherwise it may fall into the
hands of the enemy’s intelligence service. Orally
transmitted matters are not provable; they can be denied by
us in Geneva.” He requested that written documents not be
sent through the mails, or, if it was absolutely necessary
to do so, that they be addressed, not to a government agency
or office (where they might be opened by the mail clerks)
but to the recipient personally. (EC-177)

The fact that Keitel was a member of the Nazi conspiracy in
good standing is apparent from his statement that he held
the Golden Party Badge, and that consequently the Party
considered him a member as from the autumn of 1944, when the
law against military personnel being members of the Party
was changed (1944 RGBl. I, 317). His political convictions
were those of National Socialism, and he was a loyal
follower of Hitler. (1954-PS)

At the second meeting of the Working Committee of the
Councillors for Reich Defense held on 26 April 1933, the
chairman Colonel Keitel, pointed out the necessity and
desirability for the creation of the Reich Defense Council
which had been determined on by a cabinet decision of 4
April 1933. He said that a general program for the creation
of a war economy had already been completed, but that it
would take a long time to carry out the Program He explained
that it was the purpose and objective of the Working
Committee of the new Defense Council to overcome these
difficulties. (EC-177)

On 6 December 1935 General Major Keitel, chairman of the
eleventh meeting of the Reich Defense Council, pointed out
that the mobilization year was to begin on 1 April and to
end on 31 March of the following year. For the first time, a
"Mobilization Book for Civilian Agencies” was to be issued
on 1 April 1936. Keitel said that this day, to the extent
possible, should find the nation ready and prepared. He
declared that, according to the will of the Fuehrer, the
economic management of the country should put the
enhancement of military capacity above all other national
tasks. Keitel emphasized that it was the function of all
members of the Reich Defense Council to use all available
resources economically and to ask for only such funds and
raw materials as were absolutely and exclusively needed for
the defense of the Reich.

In the presence of Keitel, Colonel Jodl said that the
"Mobilization Book for the Civilian Agencies” constituted
the unified basis for the carrying out of mobilization
outside of the Army. (EC-406)

The twelfth meeting of the Working Committee of the Reich
Defense Council, held on 14 May 1936, was opened by Field
Marshal von Blomberg, War Minister and Supreme Army
Commander. He stressed the necessity for a total
mobilization, including the drafting of the necessary laws,
preparations in the re-militarized Rhineland zone, financing
and rearmament. Lt. General Keitel, in his capacity as
chairman of the Working Committee of the Reich Defense
Council, again stressed the necessity for secrecy.
Ministerial Director Wohlthat pointed out that, in order to
guarantee rearmament and an adequate food supply, an
increase in production and utmost economy were necessary, a
postulate that had led to the special mandate given by the
Fuehrer to Minister President Goering. (EC-407)

Keitel participated also in the activities of the
conspirators to re-militarize the Rhineland. At that time he
was Chief of the Wehrmachtsamt under von Blomberg and
signed, on the latter’s behalf, the order for naval
participation in the operation. (C-194)

Keitel also took part in the war-planning activities of the
Reich Cabinet, of which he was a member. The cabinet
consulted by meetings, and by the circulation of decrees
among its members for their approval or disapproval. (See
generally Section 3 of Chapter XV on the Reich Cabinet.)
Keitel was a member of the Secret Cabinet Council, which has
been described as “a select committee” of the cabinet for
deliberation on foreign affairs. (1774-PS)

A Reich Defense Council was established by the ordinary
cabinet in 1933. It was a war-planning group, and Keitel
took part in the meetings of its working committee. (EC-177;
EC-406; EC-407)

On 4 December 1938 a Secret Defense Law was passed, which
defined the duties of the Reich Defense Council. As Chief of
OKW, Keitel was a member of the council, and he also
presided over the Council’s Working Committee
(Reichsverteidigungsausschuss). (2194-PS)

The Secret Defense Law of 1938 provided for a
Plenipotentiary for Economy, whose task was to “put all
economic forces into the service of the Reich defense, and
to safeguard economically the life of the German nation",
and for a Plenipotentiary for Administration, whose duties
were to take over “the uniform leadership of the non-
military administration with exception of the economic
administration” upon the declaration of a “state of
defense". Certain ministries were, in peace-time, bound by
the directives of the plenipotentiaries. The latter were
bound, in turn, under certain conditions, together with the
ministries subordinate to them, to take directions from the
Chief of OKW. Keitel could also, in a state of defense,
issue orders to the Minister of Transport and the Minister
of Posts. In addition, he presided over the Council's
Working Committee, which prepared the Council’s decisions,
saw that they were executed, and obtained collaboration
between the armed forces, the chief Reich offices, and the
Party. Keitel regulated the activities of this committee and
issued directions to the plenipotentiaries and certain Reich
ministries to assure uniform execution of the council's
decisions. (2194-PS)

The two plenipotentiaries and the OKW formed what was known
as a “Three Man College” (2608-PS). This system of three man
college functioned as follows, from a legislative point of
view: The Plenipotentiary for Economy was empowered by
paragraph 4 of the Secret Defense Law of 4 September 1938 to
issue laws within his sphere, with the consent of the OKW
and the Plenipotentiary for Administration, which differed
from existing laws. Similarly, the Plenipotentiary for
Administration was empowered by paragraph 3 of the same law
to issue laws within his sphere, with the concept of the OKW
and the Plenipotentiary for Economy, which differed from
existing laws.

In the spheres of the Reich Minister of Posts, the Reich
Minister of Transport and of the General Inspector for
German roads (Generalinspektor fuer die Strassenwesen), the
Chief of the OKW had the right, under paragraph 5 of the
same law, to issue laws,
in agreement with the Plenipotentiaries for Administration
and Economy, which differed from existing laws. (2194-PS)

The legislative function of the three man college, prior to
9 September 1939 was one of drafting decrees to be used in
time of war.

The Council of Ministers for the Defense of the Reich was
established by a decree of Hitler on 30 August 1939. It was
formed out of the Reich Defense Council, and included among
its members the two plenipotentiaries of the council and the
Chief of OKW.

The Council had the power to pass decrees with the force of
law, and to legislate for the occupied Eastern Territories
1939 RGBI, I, 2077). Decrees of the council were circulated,
before enactment, among all the members by written
communication from Dr. Lammers, who was also on the Council.
(2231-PS)

Frick has referred to the Council of Ministers as “the
highest permanent organ of the Reich with comprehensive
jurisdiction, responsible only to the Fuehrer". “The
composition of the Ministerial Council for the Defense of
the Reich", he added, “shows the real concentration of power
in it". He said also that Keitel was liaison between the
council and the armed forces, it being primarily his duty to
coordinate the measures for civilian defense in the area of
administration and economy with the genuine military
measures for the defense of the Reich. (2608-PS)

[TEXT MISSING]

D. KEITEL’s PART IN PLANNING AND LAUNCHING
WARS OF AGGRESSION.

(See "F" 1 through 7, infra, where the joint responsibility of
Keitel and Jodl for these activities is discussed.)

[TEXT MISSING]

E. KEITEL’s PART IN THE CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT
WAR CRIMES AND CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY.

[TEXT MISSING]

That Keitel knew of the appalling treatment of Russian pris-
oners of war, and the high death rate among them, appear
from the statements in a letter sent to him by Rosenberg on
28 February 1942. The letter stressed the need for better
treatment of the Russians, so that they would be well
impressed by the Germans. (081-PS)

An order of Keitel’s OKW provided that escaped officers and
non-working non-commissioned officers other than Americans
and British were to be turned over to the SIPO and SD upon
recapture. The SIPO and SD, upon instructions from their
chief, would then transport the men to the Mauthausen
concentration camp under operation “Kugel” (L-158). Such
prisoners were executed at Mauthausen upon arrival (2285-
PS). Americans and British who were recaptured might be
turned over to the SIPO and SD, upon decision of the
"W.Kdos” from the OKW/ o.i c. (L-158)

(4) Killing of hostages. Keitel’s criminal activities are
shown be the following two documents. On 16 December 1941 he
signed an order stating that uprisings among German troops
in occupied territories must be considered as inspired by a
communist conspiracy, and that the death of one German
soldier must mean death for fifty or one hundred communists.
(829-PS)

Keitel also signed an order (received by the OKH on 1
October 1941) specifying that hostages should be well known,
and that they should come from Nationalist, Democrat, or
Communist political factions. After each act of sabotage
hostages belonging to the saboteur’s group should be shot.
(1590-PS)

(5) Plunder of public and private property. The looting of
cultural property was carried on chiefly under Rosenberg by
the Einsatzstab Rosenberg, an organization established for
that purpose' In the West he was to act in his capacity as
Reichsleiter, and in the East in his capacity as
Reichsminister. Keitel’s OKW cooperated with Rosenberg, and
directions for carrying out the order were to be issued by
the Chief of the OKW in agreement in Rosenberg (149-PS).
Keitel ordered the military authorizes to cooperate in this
program (137-PS; 138-PS). A memorandum of 17 May 1944 in the
Rosenberg Ministry states that the Wehrmacht was one of the
principal agencies engaged in removing treasures from
Russia. (1107-PS)

Keitel was also responsible for the removal of machine
tools, foodstuffs, and other materials from occupied
territories. (1161-PS; 743-PS)

(6) The exaction of collective penalties. Collective
penalties
were exacted from the population for acts of individuals for
which it could not be held responsible. Keitel advocated
such measures. This appears from correspondence on acts of
sabotage in the shipbuilding yards. (C-48; 870-PS; 871-PS)

(7) Germanization of Occupied Territories. On 16 July 1941
Keitel was present at a meeting with Hitler where the policy
was announced of exploiting occupied Russian territory and
making it part of the Reich. (L-221)

In order to promote a racially valuable German heritage an
order signed by Hitler, Lammers, and Keitel provides for
payment of subsidies to Norwegian or Dutch women who had
borne children of German soldiers. The Chief of OKW was
authorized to extend its application to other occupied
territories. (2926-PS)

(8) Persecution of minorities. Keitel’s responsibility for
the persecution of minorities in Germany appears from the
fact that, with Hitler, Goering, and Lammers, he signed a
decree on 7 October 1939 which provided that the harmful
influence of foreigners must be eliminated from Germany;
that Germans could be resettled by the Reichsfuehrer SS; and
that the Reichsfuehrer SS could perform “all necessary
general and administrative measures” to discharge this duty.
(686-PS)

Keitel’s responsibility for the criminal treatment of Jews
is apparent from his own statement that the struggle against
Bolshevism necessitated a ruthless proceeding against the
Jews; the Wehrmacht was not to use them for any service, but
they could be placed in labor columns under German
supervision. (878-PS)

F. JOINT RESPONSIBILITY OF KEITEL AND JODL FOR PLANNING AND
LAUNCHING WARS OF AGGRESSION, AND FOR THE LYNCHING OF ALLIED
AIRMEN.

(1) Aggression against Austria. In June of 1937 von Blomberg
ordered preparations for “Case Otto” — armed intervention
in Austria in event of a Hapsburg restoration (C-175). New
plans were made in 1938 under the same name. German policy
in 1938 was to eliminate Austria and Czechoslovakia, and
there was a campaign to undermine Austria’s will to resist,
by pressure on the government, by propaganda, and by fifth
column activity. (1780-PS)

Keitel was present at Berchtesgaden when Schuschnigg visited
Hitler there in February 1938. Schuschnigg was subjected to
political and military pressure, which resulted in such
concessions to the Nazis as the reorganization of the
Austrian cabinet
(1780-PS). Keitel and Jodl and Canaris were instructed to
keep p the military pressure against Austria by simulating
military measures until 15 February. (1780-PS) The OKW
submitted proposals to Hitler regarding the Austrian
campaign; these included suggestions of false rumors and
broadcasts. A note in Jodl’s handwriting states that Hitler
approved the memorandum by telephone and that Canaris was
informed. (1775-PS)

Hitler ordered preparation of “Case Otto” — mobilization of
army units and air forces (1780-PS). Hitler’s directive for
"Case Otto” was initialled by Keitel and Jodl. Jodl issued
supplementary instructions (C-102; C-10). Jodl initialled
Hitler’s order or the invasion of Austria. (C-182)

2) The Execution of the plan to invade Czechoslovakia. On 21
April 1938 Hitler and Keitel met and discussed plans for the
taking of Czechoslovakia. They considered a military attack
after a period of diplomatic friction, or as the result of a
created incident, such as the assassination of the German
ambassador at Prague. (388-PS)

After the invasion of Austria, Wehrmacht planning was
devoted to “Case Green,” the operation against
Czechoslovakia (1780-PS). Case Green was first drafted in
1937, when it was thought that a “probable warlike
eventuality” would be “war on two fronts with the center of
gravity in the southeast.” A surprise attack on
Czechoslovakia was considered possible (C-175). Through the
late spring and summer of 1938 Case Green was revised and
modified. The memoranda and correspondence are frequently
signed or initialled by Keitel, and it is clear that he knew
of Hitler’s intention to use force against Czechoslovakia
and made the plans to carry out that intention. (388-PS;
1780-PS; 2353-PS)

There were many meetings on Case Green in September 1938,
some with Hitler, some with Keitel and Jodl. The timing of
troop movements was discussed; the question of advance
notice to OKH; preparations of railroads and fortifications;
even propaganda to counteract the anticipated violations of
International Law which the invasion would entail (388-PS;
1780-PS; C-2). Assistance was given by OKH to the Sudeten
German Free Corps, an auxiliary military organization which
operated under Henlein to create disorder in Czechoslovakia.
(1780-PS; 388-PS)

In October 1938 Hitler addressed to the OKW four specific
questions about the time and the forces that would be
required to break Czech resistance in Bohemia and Moravia,
and Keitel submitted the answers prepared by the OKH and
Luftwaffe (388-PS).
On 21 October 1938 Hitler signed an order (and Keitel
initialled it) requiring the Wehrmacht to make preparations
to take the remainder of Czechoslovakia. (C-136)

Two months later Keitel issued a supplement to this order,
stating that on the order of the Fuehrer preparations for
the liquidation of Czechoslovakia were to continue, and
stressing the importance of having the attack well
camouflaged and unwarlike in appearance. (C-138)

Keitel was present at the interview between Hitler and Hacha
at the Reich Chancellery on 15 March 1939, when the Czech
representatives delivered their country to Hitler, after
hours of duress, which included the threat of immediate
bombing of Prague. (2798-PS;

(3) Aggression against Poland. On 25 March 1939 — four days
after Ribbentrop pressed new demands for Danzig on the
Polish Ambassador — Hitler told von Brauchitsch, Commander-
in-chief of the Army, that he did not intend to- solve the
Polish question by force for the time being but requested
that plans for that operation be developed. (R-100)

On 3 April 1939 Keitel, as Chief of the High Command of the
Armed Forces, reissued over his signature the directive for
the Uniform Preparation for War by the Armed Forces for
1939/40. The directive, noting that the basic principles for
the sections on “Frontier Defense” and “Danzig” remained
unaltered, stated that Hitler had added the following
directives to “Fall Weiss":

     “1. Preparations must be made in such a way that the
     operation can be carried out at any time from 1
     September 1939 onwards.

     “2. The High Command of the Armed Forces has been
     directed to draw up a precise timetable for “Fall
     Weiss” and to arrange by conferences the synchronized
     timing between the three branches of the Armed Forces.

     “3. The plans of the branches of the Armed Forces and
     the details for the timetable must be submitted to the
     OKW b 1 May 1939.” (C-120)

It is noteworthy that, even in April of 1939, the tentative
timetable called for the invasion of Poland to be carried
out at any time from 1 September 1939 onwards.

About a week later, an order signed by Hitler was circulated
to the highest commands of the Army, Navy and Air Force.
This confirmed Keitel’s directive to prepare for three
eventualities: “Frontier Defense", “Fall Weiss", and the
Annexation of Danzig. Annex II contained further
instructions for “Fall Weiss". In the first paragraph,
headed “Political Hypotheses and Aims", it was
stated that should Poland adopt a threatening attitude
toward Germany, a “final settlement” would be necessary
notwithstanding the pact with Poland. “The aim is then to
destroy Polish military strength …”

It was further stated that the Free State of Danzig would be
incorporated into Germany at the outbreak of the conflict,
at the latest. The directive continued: “Policy aims at
limiting the war to Poland, and this is considered possible
in view of the internal crisis in France and British
restraint as a result of this.”

The general political background against which the Armed
Forces were to work having thus been set down, the later
paragraphs outlined the tasks and operational objectives of
the three branches of the Armed Forces. It was also decreed
that a “camouflaged or open ('general' added in ink)
mobilization will not be ordered before D-Day 1 at the
latest possible moment", and further that the “preparations
for the opening of operations are to be made in such a way
that — without waiting for the planned assembly of
mobilized units — positions can be taken up immediately by
the first available troops.” (C-120)

On 10 May an order signed by Hitler promulgated his
instructions for the seizure of economic installations in
Poland and directed the commanders-in-chief of the three
branches of the armed forces to report by 1 August 1939 on
the measures taken in consequence of these instructions. (C-
120)

On 23 May 1939 Hitler called a meeting of his military
leaders at the Reich Chancellery. Keitel was at the meeting;
Jodl was not, but Warlimont (also from the Planning
Department of OKW) was. Hitler announced the necessity of a
war against Poland, not over Danzig, but in order to acquire
living space in the East. He recognized the possibility that
this would provoke a war against France and England, but the
Wehrmacht was instructed to prepare detailed plans.

A directive dated 22 June 1939, signed by Keitel as Chief of
the OKW, indicates an advanced stage of preparation. On the
basis of particulars already available from the Navy, Army,
and Air Force, he stated, he had submitted to Hitler a
"preliminary timetable” for “Fall Weiss.” The Fuehrer was
reported to be in substantial agreement with the intentions
submitted by the three branches; he had also made
suggestions with regard to the need to camouflage the
scheduled maneuvers “in order not to disquiet the
population,” and had commented on the disposition of an SS
Artillery Regiment. (C-16)

Two days later, Keitel issued instructions for further study
on two specific problems: the capture, in undamaged
condition, of bridges over the Vistula; and the possible
adverse effect of Navy mining in Danzig Bay on the element
of surprise in the Army’s attack against the bridge at
Dirschau, southeast of Danzig. (C-120)

On 22 August 1939, Hitler called together at Obersalzberg
the Supreme Commanders of the three branches of the armed
forces, as well as the lower ranking Commanding Generals
(Oberbefehlshaber), and announced his decision to attack
Poland near dawn on 26 August. Keitel was at this meeting.
(L-; 798-PS; 1014-PS)

Three documents reporting this meeting have been uncovered:
the text of one, overlaps the contents of the other two, 798-
PS and 1014-PS; the latter two appear to be complementary,
798-PS being a record of a morning speech, and 1014-PS of an
afternoon speech. Violent and abusive language appears in
both L-3 and 798-PS. That Hitler made, at a minimum, the
following points, appears from all of them:

1. The decision to attack Poland was made last spring. (1798-
PS)
2. The aim of the war in Poland is to destroy the Polish
armed forces, rather than to reach a fixed line. (L-3; 1014-
PS)
3. The attack will start early Saturday morning, 26 August
(L-3; 1014-PS)
4. A spurious cause for starting the war will be devised by
German propaganda. It is a matter of indifference whether it
is plausible or not. The world will not question the victor
(L-3; 1014-PS). The text in L-3 further describes the
pretext to be used to start the war: “I'll let a couple of
companies, dressed in Polish uniforms, make an assault in
Upper Silesia or in the Protectorate.”

A handwritten entry in the diary of Jodl, at that time Chief
of the Operations Department of the OKW, confirms that the
time for the attack on Poland had been fixed for 0430 on 26
August 1939. (1780-PS)

(4) Aggression against Norway and Denmark. On or about 12
September 1939 Hitler ordered the OKW to start preparations
for the occupation of Norwegian bases early in 1940. (1546-
PS)

The possibility of using Quisling was discussed with Hitler
on 12 December 1939, in a conference at which Raeder,
Keitel, and Jodl were present. Hitler agreed with Raeder's
suggestion that, if he was favorably impressed with
Quisling, the OKW should
be authorized to prepare for the occupation either with
Quisling’s assistance, or by force. (C-64)

In January of 1940 the Navy was ordered to concentrate
barges for the invasion, and further preparations were to be
conducted under the code name “Weserubung” (C-6). The
general directive for the invasion was issued by Hitler on 1
March 1940. (C-174; 1809-PS)

(5) Aggression against Belgium, the Netherlands, and
Luxembourg. At a conference with Hitler on 23 May 1939 it
was determined that the occupation of the Low Countries was
necessary to the successful conduct of the war against
England. A small planning staff was formed at OKW with
responsibility for further planning of the invasion, and
complete secrecy was invoked. Keitel was at this meeting. (L-
79)

On 9 October 1939 it was stated in a general directive for
the conduct of the war in the West that the invasion should
be started soon, in order to protect the Ruhr and to provide
air bases for use against England. A copy of this directive
was distributed to OKW. (L-52)

In October and November of 1939 a number of military orders
was issued concerning the invasion of the Low Countries
"Fall Gelb". Questions of how far the troops should advance
under the plan were clarified (C-62; 440-PS). Instructions
were issued concerning the deployment of troops,
communications systems, crossing of the borders, and the
administration and pacification of the countries to be taken
(2329-PS). Provisions were made for special operations by
the 7th Flieger Division near the Belgian-French border. (C-
10)

Between 7 November 1939 and 9 May 1940 seventeen orders were
issued setting and postponing the day for starting
operations. These delays were caused by the weather. One of
the orders, dated 11 January 1940, shows that all the others
were concerned with the action against the Low Countries,
and that the 7th Flieger Division (see C-10) was involved.
All these orders were signed either by Keitel or Jodl. (C-
72)

The development of the plans, and the various questions
which came up for consideration are shown in the entries in
Jodl’s diary. At one point the Foreign Office did not regard
the prepared justification for the attack as satisfactory,
but Jodl thought it was sufficient. His diary shows the
existence of the plan against the Low Countries and the
steps taken to put it into execution. (1809-PS)

(6) Aggression against Greece and Yugoslavia. On 12 November
1940 Hitler issued orders to the Army to prepare for the
occupation of the Greek mainland (444-PS). On 13 December
1940 a Hitler order stated that the invasion of Greece was
planned and would start as soon as the weather became
favorable. The composition of combat teams and their routes
of march were given. When the Greek operation was concluded,
the mass of the troops involved were to be employed for a
new task. This order was distributed to the OKW, as well as
to the-three armed services. (1541-PS)

On 11 January 1941 Hitler ordered preparation for armed
intervention in Albania, to assist the Italians against
Greece. The order was initialled by Keitel and Jodl (448-
PS). On 20 January  1941 Jodl reported, in notes of a
meeting between Hitler and Mussolini, that Hitler stated
that one of the purposes of German troop concentrations in
Rumania was for use in his plan for the operation against
Greece. This was four months prior to the attack. (C-134)

On 19 February 1941 an OKW order signed by Warlimont gave
decisions for carrying out the Greek campaign, providing
that pontoon building would commence on 26 February, and
that the Danube would be crossed on 2 March. (C-59)

On 18 March 1941 Raeder, in the presence of Keitel and Jodl,
asked for confirmation that the whole of Greece would have
to be occupied even in the event of a peaceful settlement,
and Hitler replied that complete occupation was a
prerequisite to any settlement. (C-167)

At a meeting on 27 March 1941, attended by both Keitel and
Jodl, Hitler outlined the proposed operations against
Yugoslavia and Greece. The actual plan for military
operations, Directive No. 25, was issued on the same day.
(1746-PS)

(7) Aggression against the U.S.S.R. On 12 November 1940
Hitler issued a directive in which, among other things, it
was stated that preparations for the East already verbally
ordered should be continued, regardless of the outcome of
current political discussions for the clarification of
Russia’s attitude. The directive was initialled by Jodl.
(444-PS)

The original directive for preparation of the attack on
Russia — case “Barbarossa” — was signed by Hitler on 18
December 1940 and initialled by Keitel and Jodl (446-PS). On
3 February 1941 Hitler held a meeting to discuss the
intended invasion. Keitel and Jodl were both present (872-
PS). On 1 March 1941 an OKW map was prepared to show the
intended division of occupied
Russian territory. The distribution list shows that Keitel
and Jodl received copies. (1642-PS)

In March of 1941 Keitel wrote to Reich Minister Todt to give
him detailed instructions about camouflaging the coming
invasion. The letter was initialled by Jodl. (874-PS)

On 13 March 1941 Keitel issued an operational supplement to
Hitler’s Barbarossa order (446-PS). This order defined the
area of operations and established the relationship between
political and military officers in those areas (4.47-PS). On
1 June 1941 there was issued, with Hitler’s approval, a
timetable for the invasion, showing the disposition and
missions of the Army, Navy, and Air Force. This paper was
signed by Keitel (C-39). On 14 June 1941 an order was issued
for final reports on Barbarossa to be made in Berlin by
Army, Navy, and Air Commanders. (C-78)

While the foregoing preparations were being made, planning
for the production of armaments and supplies was being
conducted by one of Keitel’s subordinates, General Thomas,
Chief of the Wirtschaft Ruestungsamt in OKW. (2353-PS)

By a Fuehrer order dated 20 April 1941 Rosenberg was
appointed “Deputy for a Centralized Treatment of Problems
concerning the Eastern Territories". Jodl and Warlimont were
appointed Keitel’s representatives with the Rosenberg office
(865-PS). A preliminary report by Rosenberg on his work up
to the time of the invasion mentions Keitel and Jodl as
having consulted and worked with him in those preparations.
(1039-PS) A memorandum written by General Thomas on 20 June
1941. states that Keitel had confirmed to him Hitler's
policy on raw materials — that it took less manpower to
seize territories containing raw materials, than it did to
make synthetic substitutes. (1456-PS)

(8) War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity — Crimes against
Military Personnel — Lynching of Allied Airmen. On 21 May
1944 Keitel received a note from WFST to the effect that
Hitler had decided that enemy fliers who had been forced
down should be shot without court-martial, if they had
engaged in “acts of terror". Keitel wrote on the note
"Please arrange for order to be drafted. K". (731-PS)

By 4 June 1914 Jodl and Warlimont were ready to go ahead
with formulating the plans. Goering was to be asked what
actions of enemy fliers should be punishable by death; the
Airmen’s Reception Camp at Oberursel was to be told which
fliers should be delivered to the SD; and the Foreign Office
was to be kept advised. (737-PS)

At subsequent conferences Keitel and Jodl raised question
about the difficulty of establishing general rules in such a
matter. The “Acts of Terror” were:

1. Low level attacks on civilians.
2. Shooting German fliers in parachutes.
3. Attacks on civilian passenger planes.
4. Attacks on Red Cross hospitals or trains. (735-PS)

On 17 June 1944 Keitel wrote to the Foreign Office to ask
their approval of the proposed measure and the agreed
definition of “Acts of Terror” (730-PS). On the same day
Keitel wrote to Goering to ask for his approval of the
definitions of “Acts of Terror", and also to ask that he
give verbal instructions to the Commandant of the camp at
Oberursel to hand over fliers guilty of such acts to the SD.
Both Keitel and Jodl initialled this letter (729-PS).
Goering replied that fliers not guilty of acts of terror
must be protected, and suggested that such matters be
handled by the courts. (732-PS)

A draft of a Foreign Office letter dated 20 June 1944
expresses misgivings about the Geneva Convention, and
concern about the publicity that would be involved. (728-PS)

On 26 June 1944 Goering’s adjutant telephoned the WFST to
say that Goering agreed to the procedures suggested. (733-PS)

On 29 June Warlimont was informed that Ribbentrop had
approved the Foreign Office draft (728-PS), but wished to
obtain Hitler’s approval before communicating his own final
written approval to Keitel. (740-PS)

The general political background against which the Armed
Forces were to work having thus been set down, the later
paragraphs outlined the tasks and operational objectives of
the three branches of the Armed Forces. It was also decreed
that a “camouflaged or open ('general' added in ink)
mobilization will not be ordered before D-Day 1 at the
latest possible moment", and further that the “preparations
for the opening of operations are to be made in such a way
that — without waiting for the planned assembly of
mobilized units — positions can be taken up immediately by
the first available troops.” (C-120)

On 10 May an order signed by Hitler promulgated his
instructions for the seizure of economic installations in
Poland and directed the commanders-in-chief of the three
branches of the armed forces to report by 1 August 1939 on
the measures taken in consequence of these instructions. (C-
120)

On 23 May 1939 Hitler called a meeting of his military
leaders at the Reich Chancellery. Keitel was at the meeting;
Jodl was not, but Warlimont (also from the Planning
Department of OKW) was. Hitler announced the necessity of a
war against Poland, not over Danzig, but in order to acquire
living space in the East. He recognized the possibility that
this would provoke a war against France and England, but the
Wehrmacht was instructed to prepare detailed plans.

A directive dated 22 June 1939, signed by Keitel as Chief of
the OKW, indicates an advanced stage of preparation. On the
basis of particulars already available from the Navy, Army,
and Air Force, he stated, he had submitted to Hitler a
"preliminary timetable” for “Fall Weiss.” The Fuehrer was
reported to be in substantial agreement with the intentions
submitted by the three branches; he had also made
suggestions with regard to the need to camouflage the
scheduled maneuvers “in order not to disquiet the
population,” and had commented on the disposition of an SS
Artillery Regiment. (C-16)

Two days later, Keitel issued instructions for further study

on two specific problems: the capture, in undamaged
condition, of bridges over the Vistula; and the possible
adverse effect of Navy mining in Danzig Bay on the element
of surprise in the Army’s attack against the bridge at
Dirschau, southeast of Danzig. (C-120)

On 22 August 1939, Hitler called together at Obersalzberg
the Supreme Commanders of the three branches of the armed
forces, as well as the lower ranking Commanding Generals
(Oberbefehlshaber), and announced his decision to attack
Poland near dawn on 26 August. Keitel was at this meeting.
(L-; 798-PS; 1014-PS)

Three documents reporting this meeting have been uncovered:
the text of one, overlaps the contents of the other two, 798-
PS and 1014-PS; the latter two appear to be complementary,
798-PS being a record of a morning speech, and 1014-PS of an
afternoon speech. Violent and abusive language appears in
both L-3 and 798-PS. That Hitler made, at a minimum, the
following points, appears from all of them:

1. The decision to attack Poland was made last spring. (1798-
PS)
2. The aim of the war in Poland is to destroy the Polish
armed forces, rather than to reach a fixed line. (L-3; 1014-
PS)
3. The attack will start early Saturday morning, 26 August
(L-3; 1014-PS)
4. A spurious cause for starting the war will be devised by
German propaganda. It is a matter of indifference whether it
is plausible or not. The world will not question the victor
(L-3; 1014-PS). The text in L-3 further describes the
pretext to be used to start the war: “I'll let a couple of
companies, dressed in Polish uniforms, make an assault in
Upper Silesia or in the Protectorate.”

A handwritten entry in the diary of Jodl, at that time Chief
of the Operations Department of the OKW, confirms that the
time for the attack on Poland had been fixed for 0430 on 26
August 1939. (1780-PS)

(4) Aggression against Norway and Denmark. On or about 12
September 1939 Hitler ordered the OKW to start preparations
for the occupation of Norwegian bases early in 1940. (1546-
PS)

The possibility of using Quisling was discussed with Hitler
on 12 December 1939, in a conference at which Raeder,
Keitel, and Jodl were present. Hitler agreed with Raeder's
suggestion that, if he was favorably impressed with
Quisling, the OKW should
be authorized to prepare for the occupation either with
Quisling’s assistance, or by force. (C-64)

In January of 1940 the Navy was ordered to concentrate
barges for the invasion, and further preparations were to be
conducted under the code name “Weserubung” (C-6). The
general directive for the invasion was issued by Hitler on 1
March 1940. (C-174; 1809-PS)

(5) Aggression against Belgium, the Netherlands, and
Luxembourg. At a conference with Hitler on 23 May 1939 it
was determined that the occupation of the Low Countries was
necessary to the successful conduct of the war against
England. A small planning staff was formed at OKW with
responsibility for further planning of the invasion, and
complete secrecy was invoked. Keitel was at this meeting. (L-
79)

On 9 October 1939 it was stated in a general directive for
the conduct of the war in the West that the invasion should
be started soon, in order to protect the Ruhr and to provide
air bases for use against England. A copy of this directive
was distributed to OKW. (L-52)

In October and November of 1939 a number of military orders
was issued concerning the invasion of the Low Countries
"Fall Gelb". Questions of how far the troops should advance
under the plan were clarified (C-62; 440-PS). Instructions
were issued concerning the deployment of troops,
communications systems, crossing of the borders, and the
administration and pacification of the countries to be taken
(2329-PS). Provisions were made for special operations by
the 7th Flieger Division near the Belgian-French border. (C-
10)

Between 7 November 1939 and 9 May 1940 seventeen orders were
issued setting and postponing the day for starting
operations. These delays were caused by the weather. One of
the orders, dated 11 January 1940, shows that all the others
were concerned with the action against the Low Countries,
and that the 7th Flieger Division (see C-10) was involved.
All these orders were signed either by Keitel or Jodl. (C-
72)

The development of the plans, and the various questions
which came up for consideration are shown in the entries in
Jodl’s diary. At one point the Foreign Office did not regard
the prepared justification for the attack as satisfactory,
but Jodl thought it was sufficient. His diary shows the
existence of the plan against the Low Countries and the
steps taken to put it into execution. (1809-PS)

(6) Aggression against Greece and Yugoslavia. On 12 November
1940 Hitler issued orders to the Army to prepare for the
occupation of the Greek mainland (444-PS). On 13 December
1940 a Hitler order stated that the invasion of Greece was
planned and would start as soon as the weather became
favorable. The composition of combat teams and their routes
of march were given. When the Greek operation was concluded,
the mass of the troops involved were to be employed for a
new task. This order was distributed to the OKW, as well as
to the-three armed services. (1541-PS)

On 11 January 1941 Hitler ordered preparation for armed
intervention in Albania, to assist the Italians against
Greece. The order was initialled by Keitel and Jodl (448-
PS). On 20 January  1941 Jodl reported, in notes of a
meeting between Hitler and Mussolini, that Hitler stated
that one of the purposes of German troop concentrations in
Rumania was for use in his plan for the operation against
Greece. This was four months prior to the attack. (C-134)

On 19 February 1941 an OKW order signed by Warlimont gave
decisions for carrying out the Greek campaign, providing
that pontoon building would commence on 26 February, and
that the Danube would be crossed on 2 March. (C-59)

On 18 March 1941 Raeder, in the presence of Keitel and Jodl,
asked for confirmation that the whole of Greece would have
to be occupied even in the event of a peaceful settlement,
and Hitler replied that complete occupation was a
prerequisite to any settlement. (C-167)

At a meeting on 27 March 1941, attended by both Keitel and
Jodl, Hitler outlined the proposed operations against
Yugoslavia and Greece. The actual plan for military
operations, Directive No. 25, was issued on the same day.
(1746-PS)

(7) Aggression against the U.S.S.R. On 12 November 1940
Hitler issued a directive in which, among other things, it
was stated that preparations for the East already verbally
ordered should be continued, regardless of the outcome of
current political discussions for the clarification of
Russia’s attitude. The directive was initialled by Jodl.
(444-PS)

The original directive for preparation of the attack on
Russia — case “Barbarossa” — was signed by Hitler on 18
December 1940 and initialled by Keitel and Jodl (446-PS). On
3 February 1941 Hitler held a meeting to discuss the
intended invasion. Keitel and Jodl were both present (872-
PS). On 1 March 1941 an OKW map was prepared to show the
intended division of occupied
Russian territory. The distribution list shows that Keitel
and Jodl received copies. (1642-PS)

In March of 1941 Keitel wrote to Reich Minister Todt to give
him detailed instructions about camouflaging the coming
invasion. The letter was initialled by Jodl. (874-PS)

On 13 March 1941 Keitel issued an operational supplement to
Hitler’s Barbarossa order (446-PS). This order defined the
area of operations and established the relationship between
political and military officers in those areas (4.47-PS). On
1 June 1941 there was issued, with Hitler’s approval, a
timetable for the invasion, showing the disposition and
missions of the Army, Navy, and Air Force. This paper was
signed by Keitel (C-39). On 14 June 1941 an order was issued
for final reports on Barbarossa to be made in Berlin by
Army, Navy, and Air Commanders. (C-78)

While the foregoing preparations were being made, planning
for the production of armaments and supplies was being
conducted by one of Keitel’s subordinates, General Thomas,
Chief of the Wirtschaft Ruestungsamt in OKW. (2353-PS)

By a Fuehrer order dated 20 April 1941 Rosenberg was
appointed “Deputy for a Centralized Treatment of Problems
concerning the Eastern Territories". Jodl and Warlimont were
appointed Keitel’s representatives with the Rosenberg office
(865-PS). A preliminary report by Rosenberg on his work up
to the time of the invasion mentions Keitel and Jodl as
having consulted and worked with him in those preparations.
(1039-PS) A memorandum written by General Thomas on 20 June
1941. states that Keitel had confirmed to him Hitler's
policy on raw materials — that it took less manpower to
seize territories containing raw materials, than it did to
make synthetic substitutes. (1456-PS)

(8) War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity — Crimes against
Military Personnel — Lynching of Allied Airmen. On 21 May
1944 Keitel received a note from WFST to the effect that
Hitler had decided that enemy fliers who had been forced
down should be shot without court-martial, if they had
engaged in “acts of terror". Keitel wrote on the note
"Please arrange for order to be drafted. K". (731-PS)

By 4 June 1914 Jodl and Warlimont were ready to go ahead
with formulating the plans. Goering was to be asked what
actions of enemy fliers should be punishable by death; the
Airmen’s Reception Camp at Oberursel was to be told which
fliers should be delivered to the SD; and the Foreign Office
was to be kept advised. (737-PS)

At subsequent conferences Keitel and Jodl raised question
about the difficulty of establishing general rules in such a
matter. The “Acts of Terror” were:

1. Low level attacks on civilians.
2. Shooting German fliers in parachutes.
3. Attacks on civilian passenger planes.
4. Attacks on Red Cross hospitals or trains. (735-PS)

On 17 June 1944 Keitel wrote to the Foreign Office to ask
their approval of the proposed measure and the agreed
definition of “Acts of Terror” (730-PS). On the same day
Keitel wrote to Goering to ask for his approval of the
definitions of “Acts of Terror", and also to ask that he
give verbal instructions to the Commandant of the camp at
Oberursel to hand over fliers guilty of such acts to the SD.
Both Keitel and Jodl initialled this letter (729-PS).
Goering replied that fliers not guilty of acts of terror
must be protected, and suggested that such matters be
handled by the courts. (732-PS)

A draft of a Foreign Office letter dated 20 June 1944
expresses misgivings about the Geneva Convention, and
concern about the publicity that would be involved. (728-PS)

On 26 June 1944 Goering’s adjutant telephoned the WFST to
say that Goering agreed to the procedures suggested. (733-PS)

On 29 June Warlimont was informed that Ribbentrop had
approved the Foreign Office draft (728-PS), but wished to
obtain Hitler’s approval before communicating his own final
written approval to Keitel. (740-PS)

LEGAL REFERENCES AND LIST OF DOCUMENTS RELATING
TO WILHELM KEITEL

Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Article 6.
Vol. I, Pg. 5

International Military Tribunal, Indictment Number 1,
Section IV (H); Appendix A. Vol. I, Pg. 29,66

[Note: A single asterisk (*) before a document indicates
that the document was received in evidence at the Nurnberg
trial. A double asterisk (**) before a document number
indicates that the document was referred to during the trial
but was not formally received in evidence, for the reason
given in parentheses following the description of the
document. The USA series number, given in parentheses
following the description of the document, is the official
exhibit number assigned by the court.]

081-PS;  Letter from Rosenberg to Keitel, 28 February 1942,
concerning mistreatment of Soviet prisoners of war. Vol.
III, Pg.  126

*137-PS;  Copy of Order from Keitel to Commanding General of
Netherlands, 5 July 1940, to cooperate with the Einsatzstab
Rosenberg. (USA 379). Vol. III, Pg. 185

138-PS;  Copy of Order from Keitel to Commanding General of
France, 17 September 1940, to cooperate with the Einsatzstab
Rosenberg. Vol. III, Pg. 186

*149-PS;  Hitler Order, 1 March 1942, establishing authority
of Einsatzstab Rosenberg. (USA 369) Vol. III, Pg. 190

*375-PS;  Case Green with wider implications, report of
Intelligence division, Luftwaffe General Staff, 25 August
1938. (USA 84) Vol. III, Pg. 280

*388-PS;  File of papers on Case Green (the plan for the
attack on Czechoslovakia), kept by Schmundt, Hitler's
adjutant, April-October 1938. (USA 26). Vol. III, Pg. 305

*440-PS;  Directive No. 8 signed by Keitel, 20 November
1939, for the conduct of the war. (GB 107). Vol. III, Pg.
397

*444-PS;  Original Directive No. 18 from Fuehrer's
Headquarters signed by Hitler and initialled by Jodl, 12
November 1940, concerning plans for prosecution of war in
Mediterranean Area and occupation of Greece. (GB 116). Vol.
III, Pg. 403

*446-PS;  Top secret Fuehrer Order No. 21 signed by Hitler
and initialled by Jodl, Warlimont and Keitel, 18 December
1940, concerning the Invasion of Russia (case Barbarossa).
(USA 31). Vol. III, Pg. 407

*447-PS;  Top Secret Operational Order to Order No. 21,
signed by Keitel, 13 March 1941, concerning Directives for
special areas. (USA 135). Vol. III, Pg. 409

*448-PS;  Hitler Order No. 22, initialled by Keitel and
Jodl, 11 January 1941, concerning participation of German
Forces in the Fighting in the Mediterranean Theater of
Operations. (GB 118). Vol. III, Pg. 413

*498-PS;  Top Secret Fuehrer Order for killing of commandos,
18 October 1942. (USA 501). Vol. III, Pg. 416

*503-PS;  Letter signed by Jodl, 19 October 1942, concerning
Hitler’s explanation of his commando order of the day before
(Document 498-PS). (USA 542). Vol. III, Pg. 426

*508-PS;  OKW correspondence, November 942, about shooting
of British glider troops in Norway. (USA 545). Vol. III, Pg.
430

*509-PS;  Telegram to OKW, 7 November 1943, reporting
"special treatment” for three British commandos. (USA 547).
Vol. III, Pg. 433

*512-PS;  Teletype from Army Commander in Norway, 13
December 1942, concerning interrogation of saboteurs before
shooting; and memorandum in reply from OKW, 14 December
1942. (USA 546). Vol. III, Pg. 433

*531-PS;  OKW memorandum, 23 June 1944, citing inquiry from
Supreme Command West about treatment of paratroopers. (USA
550). Vol. III, Pg. 435

*537-PS;  Order signed by Keitel, 30 July 1944, concerning
treatment of members of foreign “Military Missions",
captured together with partisans. (USA 553). Vol. III, Pg.
439

*551-PS;  Order signed by Keitel, 26 June 1944, concerning
treatment of Commando participants. (USA 551). Vol. III, Pg.
440

*553-PS;  Order signed by Keitel, 4 August 1942, regulating
treatment of paratroops. (USA 500). Vol. III, Pg. 441

*556-2-PS;  Order initialled by Keitel, 8 September 1942,
for civilians to work on “West Wall". (USA 194). Vol. III,
Pg. 443

*656-PS;  Letter, undated, from Bormann to Political
leaders, enclosing Order of Supreme Command of the
Wehrmacht, 29 January 1943, relating to self-defense against
prisoners of war. (USA 339). Vol. III, Pg. 470

666-PS;  Directives issued by the Fuehrer and Supreme
Commander of the Armed Forces signed by Keitel, 7 December
1941, for prosecution of offenses against the Reich. Vol.
III, Pg. 474

*668-PS;  Letter from Chief of the SIPO and SD and OKW
letter, 24 June 1942, concerning prosecution of punishable
offenses against the Reich or occupation forces in occupied
territories. (USA 504). Vol. III, Pg. 476

*686-PS;  Decree of the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor to
strengthen German Folkdom, 7 October 1939, signed by Hitler,
Goering, Lammers and Keitel. (USA 305). Vol. III, Pg. 496

695-PS;  OKW Order signed by Reinecke, 24 March 1942,
concerning treatment of Soviet prisoners of war. Vol. III,
Pg. 498

*728-PS;  Letter of Foreign Office to Chief of Supreme
Command of Armed Forces, 20 June 1944, concerning treatment
of enemy terror aviators. (GB 152). Vol. III, Pg. 526

729-PS;  Handwritten note initialled Keitel, 14 June 1944,
concerning treatment of enemy terror aviators. Vol. III, Pg.
529

730-PS;  Draft of letter to Foreign Office, attention
Ambassador Ritter, 15 June 1944, concerning treatment of
enemy aviators. Vol. III, Pg. 530

731-PS;  Memorandum initialled by Jodl, 22 May, concerning
measures to be taken against Anglo-American air crews in
special instances. Vol. III, Pg. 531

732-PS;  Letter from Feske to Keitel, 19 June 1944,
concerning treatment of enemy terror aviators. Vol. III, Pg.
532

733-PS;  Telephone memorandum, 26 June 1944, concerning
treatment of terror aviators. Vol. III, Pg. 533

*735-PS;  Minutes of meeting, 6 June 1944, to fix the cases
in which the application of Lynch Law against Allied airmen
would be justified. (GB 151). Vol. III, Pg. 536

737-PS;  Conference Notes, 4 June 1944, concerning treatment
of enemy terror aviators. Vol. III, Pg. 537

*740-PS;  Letter from Warlimont, 30 June 1944, concerning
treatment of enemy terror aviators. (GB 153). Vol. III, Pg.
539

743-PS;  Order signed by Keitel, 8 September 1944,
instructing the Armed Forces to support Koch in the
exploitation and evacuation of Baltic territories. Vol. III,
Pg. 539

*795-PS;  Keitel’s conference, 17 August 1939, concerning
giving Polish uniforms to Heydrich. (GB 54). Vol. III, Pg.
580

*798-PS;  Hitler’s speech to Commanders-in-Chief, at
Obersalzberg, 22 August 1939. (USA 29). Vol. III, Pg. 581

829-PS;  Order signed by Keitel, 16 December 1941, for
ruthless suppression of uprisings in occupied territories.
Vol. III, Pg. 597

833-PS;  Instructions by Admiral Canaris, Head of the
Abwehr, 2 February 1942, concerning prosecution of crimes
against the Reich or occupying forces in the occupied
territories. Vol. III, Pg. 600

*865-PS;  Correspondence between Keitel, Rosenberg and
Lammers, April 1941, concerning appointment of Jodl and
Warlimont as OKW representatives with Rosenberg. (USA 143).
Vol. III, Pg.  621

870-PS;  Report of December 1944 from Terboven to Hitler
concerning sabotage in Oslo, with marginal comment by Keitel
approving suggestion to shoot relatives of saboteurs. Vol.
III, Pg. 623

*871-PS;  Teletype from Keitel to Lammers, 6 December 1944,
agreeing that reprisals must be ruthless. (GB 322). Vol.
III, Pg. 626

*872-PS;  Memorandum of Discussion between the Fuehrer and
the OKW, concerning case “Barbarossa” and “Sonnenblume”
(African operation). (USA 134). Vol. III, Pg. 626

874-PS;  Draft letter to Todt, initialled K, J, and W, 9
March 1941, concerning Deception measures. Vol. III, Pg. 634

878-PS;  Draft of Order signed by Keitel, 12 September 1941,
providing that Jews may be put in labor-columns. Vol. III,
Pg. 636

*1014-PS;  Hitler’s speech to Commanders-in-Chief, 22 August
1939. (USA 30). Vol. III, Pg. 665

*1039-PS;  Report concerning preparatory work regarding
problems in Eastern Territories, 28 June 1941, found in
Rosenberg’s “Russia File". (USA 146). Vol. III, Pg. 695

1107-PS;  Office memorandum, 17 May 1944, in Rosenberg
Ministry concerning the Wehrmacht’s function in removing
treasures from the USSR. Vol. III, Pg. 789

1161-PS;  OKW, 31 May 1940, setting up economic
reconnaissance teams to procure all important stocks of raw
materials, machinery, etc. in Belgium, Holland and Northern
France. Vol. III, Pg. 816

*1292-PS;  Memorandum of conference with Hitler, 4 January
1944, concerning | allocation of labor, 1944. (USA 225).
Vol. III, Pg. 866

*1456-PS;  Thomas memorandum 20 June 1941; Keitel consulted
about resources of USSR. (USA 148). Vol. IV, Pg. 21

*1519-PS;  Circular from Bormann, 30 September 1941,
containing text of OKW of 8 September 1941 on treatment of
Soviet prisoners of war. (GB 525). Vol. IV, Pg. 58

*1538-PS;  Report from German Military Attache in Tokyo to
Office Foreign Intelligence, 24 May 1941. (USA 154). Vol.
IV, Pg. 100

*1541-PS;  Directive No. 20, Operation Marita, 13 December
1940. (GB 117). Vol. IV, Pg. 101

1546-PS;  Raeder memorandum, 9 April 1940, concerning
occupation of Norway. Vol. IV, Pg. 104

1590-PS;  Order received by OKH signed by Keitel, 1 October
1941, containing regulations for the shooting of hostages.
Vol. IV, Pg. 127

1642-PS;  Distribution list, 1 March 1941, for secret map of
Soviet Union. Vol. IV, Pg. 154

*1666-PS;  Decree appointing Sauckel General Plenipotentiary
for Manpower, 21 March 1942 and decree of Goering conferring
certain powers on Sauckel, 27 March 1942. 1942
Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, pp. 179-180. (USA 208). Vol. IV,
Pg. 182

*1746-PS;  Conference between German and Bulgarian Generals,
8 February 1941; speech by Hitler to German High Command on
situation in Yugoslavia, 27 March 1941; plan for invasion of
Yugoslavia, 28 March 1941. (GB 120). Vol. IV, Pg. 272

*1774-PS;  Extracts from Organizational Law of the Greater
German Reich by Ernst Rudolf Huber. (GB 246). Vol. IV, Pg.
349

*1775-PS;  Propositions to Hitler by OKW, 14 February 1938.
(USA 73). Vol. IV, Pg. 357

*1780-PS;  Excerpts from diary kept by General Jodl, January
1937 to August 1939. (USA 72). Vol. IV, Pg. 360

*1809-PS;  Entries from Jodl’s diary, February 1940 to May
1940. (GB 88). Vol. IV, Pg. 377

1915-PS;  Decree concerning leadership of Armed Forces, 4
February 1938. 1938 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 111. Vol.
IV, Pg. 552

1954-PS;  Deposition of Keitel, 3 August 1945, on his
official functions and relation to Nazi Party. Vol. IV, Pg.
592

*2018-PS;  Fuehrer’s decree establishing a Ministerial
Council for Reich Defense, 30 August 1939. 1939
Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 1539. (GB 250). Vol. IV, Pg.
650

*2031-PS;  Decree establishing a Secret Cabinet Council, 4
February 1938. 1938 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 112. (GB
217). Vol. IV, Pg. 654

2039-PS;  Decree concerning the conditions of employment of
Eastern workers, 30 June 1942. 1942 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part
I, p. 419. Vol. IV, Pg. 655

*2194-PS;  Top secret letter from Ministry for Economy and
Labor, Saxony, to Reich Protector in Bohemia and Moravia,
enclosing copy of 1938 Secret Defense Law of 4 September
1938. (USA 36). Vol. IV, Pg. 843

2231-PS;  Excerpt from von Stutterheim, “Die Reichskanzlei”
(1940), pp. 19-34. Vol. IV, Pg. 873

*2285-PS;  Affidavit, 13 May 1945, by two French officers,
about shooting of prisoners at Mauthausen. (USA 490). Vol.
IV, Pg. 991

*2329-PS;  Order by Commander in Chief of the Army, 7
October 1939. (GB 105). Vol. IV, Pg. 1037

*2353-PS;  Extracts from General Thomas' Basic Facts for
History of German War and Armament Economy. (USA 35). Vol.
IV, Pg. 1071

*2608-PS;  Frick’s lecture, 7 March 1940, on “The
Administration in Wartime". (USA 714). Vol. V, Pg. 327

2746-PS;  Decree concerning organization of Criminal
Jurisdiction against Poles and Jews in Incorporated
Territories, 4 December 1941. 1941 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part
I, pp. 759-761. Vol. V, Pg. 386

*2798-PS;  German Foreign Office minutes of the meeting
between Hitler and President Hacha of Czechoslovakia, 15
March 1939. (USA 118; GB 5). Vol. V, Pg. 433

2926-PS;  Decree concerning the care of children begotten by
members of the Wehrmacht Personnel in Occupied Territories,
28 July 1942. 1942 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 488. Vol.
V, Pg. 592

*2943-PS;  Documents Numbers 55, 57, 62, 65, 66, 73, 77 and
79 in the French Yellow Book. Excerpts from eight dispatches
from M. Coulondre, the French Ambassador in Berlin, to the
French Foreign Office, between 13 March 1939 and 18 March
1939. (USA 114). Vol. V, Pg. 608

*3012-PS;  Order signed Christiansen, 19 March 1943, to all
group leaders of Security Service, and record of telephone
conversation signed by Stapj, 11 March 1943. (USA 190). Vol.
V, Pg. 731

3019-PS;  Announcement of Keitel as Chief of Wehrmacht,
published in The Archives, Vol. 18, p. 860. Vol. V, Pg. 737

3020-PS;  Fuehrer’s speech in Reichstag on 19 July 1940,
published in The Archives, Vol. 76, p. 386. Vol. V, Pg. 737

**3047-PS;  File notes on conference in Fuehrer’s train on
12 September 1939; report on execution of Jews in Borrisow;
and entries from diary of Admiral Canaris. (USA 80)
(Referred to but not offered in evidence.) Vol. V, Pg. 766

*3702-PS;  Affidavit of Colonel-General Franz Halder, 7
November 1945. (USA 531). Vol. VI, Pg. 411

*3704-PS;  Affidavit of Field Marshal Werner von Blomberg, 7
November 1945. (USA 536). Vol. VI, Pg. 414

*3705-PS;  Affidavit of Field Marshal Walter von
Brauchitsch, 7 November 1945. (USA 535). Vol. VI, Pg. 415

*3707-PS;  Affidavit of Colonel-General Franz Halder, 13
November 1945. (USA 533). Vol. VI, Pg. 419

*3786-PS;  Stenographic transcript of a meeting in the
Fuehrer’s Headquarters, 27 January 1945. (USA 787). Vol. VI,
Pg. 655

*C-2;  Examples of violations of International Law and
proposed counter propaganda, issued by OKW, October 1938.
(USA 90). Vol. VI, Pg. 799

C-6;  Order by Keitel for intensified sea and air measures
in connection with Fall “Gelb", 30 December 1939. Vol. VI,
Pg. 816

*C-10;  OKW directive, 28 November 1939, signed by Keitel,
subject: Employment of 7th Flieger Division. (GB 108). Vol.
VI, Pg. 817

*C-39;  Timetable for Barbarossa, approved by Hitler and
signed by Keitel. (USA 138). Vol. VI, Pg. 857

C-48;  Order signed by Keitel, 30 November 1944, concerning
sabotage in Norway and Denmark. Vol. VI, Pg. 870

*C-50;  Covering letters and Order of 13 May 1941, signed by
Keitel on ruthless treatment of civilians in the USSR for
offenses committed by them. (USA 554; GB 162). Vol. VI, Pg.
871

C-51;  Order signed by Keitel, 27 July 1941, for destruction
of all copies of Order of 13 May 1941 (document C-50)
without affecting its validity. Vol. VI, Pg.875

*C-52;  Order signed by Keitel, 23 July 1941, to abandon
legal prosecution and punishment in USSR and use terrorism
instead. (GB 485). Vol. VI, Pg. 876

*C-59;  Order signed by Warlimont for execution of operation
"Marita", 19 February 1941. (GB 121). Vol. VI, Pg.879

*C-62;  Directive No. 6 on the conduct of war, signed by
Hitler, 9 October 1939; directive by Keitel, 15 October 1939
on Fall “Gelb". (GB 106). Vol. VI, Pg. 880

*C-63;  Keitel order on preparation for “Weseruebung", 27
January 1940. (GB 87). Vol. VI, Pg. 883

*C-64;  Raeder’s report, 12 December 1939, on meeting of
Naval Staff with Fuehrer. (GB 86). Vol. VI, Pg. 884

*C-72;  Orders postponing “A” day in the West, November 1939
to May 1940. (GB 109). Vol. VI, Pg. 893

*C-75;  OKW Order No. 24 initialled Jodl, signed Keitel, 5
March 1941, concerning collaboration with Japan. (USA 151).
Vol. VI, Pg. 906

*C-78;  Schmundt’s Order of 9 June 1941, convening
conference on Barbarossa on 14 June. (USA 139). Vol. VI, Pg.
909

*C-102;  Document signed by Hitler relating to operation
"Otto", 11 March 1938. (USA 74). Vol. VI, Pg. 911

*C-103;  Directive signed by Jodl, 11 March 1938, on conduct
towards Czech or Italian troops in Austria. (USA 75). Vol.
VI, Pg. 913

*C-120;  Directives for Armed Forces 193940 for “Fall
Weiss", operation against Poland. (GB 41). Vol. VI, Pg. 916

*C-126;  Preliminary Time Table for “Fall Weiss” and
directions for secret mobilization. (GB 45). Vol. VI, Pg.
932

*C-134;  Letter from Jodl enclosing memorandum on conference
between German and Italian Generals on 19 January  1941 and
subsequent speech by Hitler, 20 January  1941. (GB 119).
Vol. VI, Pg. 939

*C-136;  OKW Order on preparations for war, 21 October 1938,
signed by Hitler and initialled by Keitel. (USA 104). Vol.
VI, Pg. 947

*C-137;  Keitel’s appendix of 24 November 1938 to Hitler
Order of 21 October 1938. (GB 33). Vol. VI, Pg. 949

*C-138;  Supplement of 17 December 1938, signed by Keitel,
to 21 October Order of the OKW. (USA 105). Vol. VI, Pg. 950

*C-148;  Keitel Order, 16 September 1941, subject: Communist
Insurrection in Occupied Territories. (USA 555). Vol. VI,
Pg. 961

*C-152;  Extract from Naval War Staff files, 18 March 1941,
concerning audience of C-in-C of Navy with Hitler on 18
March 1941. (GB 122). Vol. VI, Pg. 966

*C-167;  Report of meeting between Raeder and Hitler, 18
March 1941. (GB 122). Vol. VI, Pg. 977

*C-174;  Hitler Order for operation “Weseruebung", 1 March
1940. (GB 89). Vol. VI, Pg. 1003

*C-175;  OKW Directive for Unified Preparation for War 1937-
1938, with covering letter from von Blomberg, 24 June 1937.
(USA 69). Vol. VI, Pg. 1006

*C-182;  Directive No. 2 from Supreme Commander Armed
Forces, initialled Jodl, 11 March 1938. (USA 77). Vol. VI,
Pg. 1017

*C-194;  Orders by Keitel and Commander-in-Chief of Navy, 6
March 1936, for Navy cooperation in Rhineland occupation.
(USA 55). Vol. VI, Pg. 1019

*D-39;  Telegrams relating to activities against partisans
in Italy. (GB 275). Vol. VI, Pg. 1023

*D-569;  File of circulars from Reichsfuehrer SS, the OKW,
Inspector of Concentration Camps, Chief of Security Police
and SD, dating from 29 October 1941 through 22 February
1944, relative to procedure in cases of unnatural death of
Soviet PW, execution of Soviet PW, etc. (GB 277). Vol. VII,
Pg. 74

*D-730;  Statement of PW Walther Grosche, 11 December 1945.
(GB 279). Vol. VII, Pg. 177

*D-731;  Statement of PW Ernst Walde, 13 December 1945. (GB
278). Vol. VII, Pg. 183

*D-735;  Memorandum of conference between German Foreign
Minister and Count Ciano in presence of Keitel and Marshal
Cavallero, 19 December 1942. (GB 295). Vol. VII, Pg. 190

*D-763;  Circular of OKW, 18 August 1944, regarding penal
jurisdiction of non-German civilians in Occupied
Territories. (GB 300). Vol. VII, Pg. 222

*D-764;  Circular of OKW, 18 August 1944, concerning
combatting of “terrorists” and “saboteurs” in Occupied
Territories and jurisdiction relative thereto. (GB 299).
Vol. VII, Pg. 223

*D-765;  Directives of OKW, 2 September 1944, regarding
offenses by non-German civilians in Occupied Territories.
(GB 302). Vol. VII, Pg. 225

*D-766;  Circular of OKW, 4 September 1944, regarding
offenses by non-German civilians in Occupied Territories.
(GB 301). Vol. VII, Pg. 226

*D-767;  Memorandum, 13 September 1944, on offenses by non-
German civilians in Occupied Territories. (GB 303). Vol.
VII, Pg. 228

*D-769;  Telegram signed by Gen. Christiansen, 21 September
1940, relative to application of capital punishment in
connection with Railway strike in Holland. (GB 304). Vol.
VII, Pg. 229

*D-770;  Circular, 24 September 1944, on offenses of non-
German civilians in Occupied Territories. (GB 305). Vol.
VII, Pg. 229

*D-774;  Directive of Chief of OKW to German Foreign Office
at Salzburg, on treatment of Allied “Terrorist"-flyers, 14
June 1944. (GB 307). Vol. VII, Pg. 231

*D-775;  Draft of directive, 14 June 1944, from OKW to
Supreme Commander of “Luftwaffe", regarding treatment of
Allied “Terrorist"-flyers. (GB 308). Vol. VII, Pg. 232

*D-776;  Draft of directive of Chief of OKW, 15 June 1944,
to German Foreign Office at Salzburg, concerning treatment
of Allied “Terrorist"-flyers. (GB 309). Vol. VII, Pg. 233

*D-777;  Draft of directive, 15 June 1944, from OKW to
Supreme Commander of “Luftwaffe” concerning treatment of
Allied “Terrorist"-flyers. (GB 310). Vol. VII, Pg. 234

*D-779;  Letter from Reichsmarshal to Chief of OKW, 19
August 194, regarding treatment of- Allied “Terrorist"-
flyers. (GB 312). Vol. VII, Pg. 235

*D-780;  Draft of communication from Ambassador Ritter,
Salzburg, to Chief of OKW, 20 June 1944, on treatment of
Allied “Terrorist"-flyers. (GB 313). Vol. VII, Pg. 236

*D-781;  Note of OKW to Supreme Commander of “Luftwaffe", 23
June 1944, regarding treatment of Allied “Terrorist"-flyers.
(GB 314). Vol. VII, Pg. 239

*D-782;  Note from German Foreign Office, Salzburg, 25 June
1944, to OKW. (GB 315). Vol. VII, Pg. 239

*D-783;  Note of a telephone communication, 26 June 1944,
with regard to treatment of “Terrorist"-aviators. (GB 316).
Vol. VII, Pg. 240

*D-784;  Note from Operation Staff of OKW signed Warlimont,
30 June 1944, concerning treatment of Allied “Terrorist"-
flyers. (GB 317). Vol. VII, Pg.240

*D-785;  Note from OKW to Supreme Commander of “Luftwaffe",
4 July 1944, concerning “Terror"-flyers. (GB 318). Vol. VII,
Pg. 241

*D-786;  Note, 5 July 1944, on “Terror"-flyers. (GB 319).
Vol. VII, Pg. 242

*EC-177;  Minutes of second session of Working Committee of
the Reich Defense held on 26 April 1933. (USA 390). Vol.
VII, Pg. 328

*EC-194;  Secret memorandum of Keitel concerning use of
prisoners of war in the war industry, 31 October 1941. (USA
214). Vol. VII, Pg. 336

*EC-286;  Correspondence between Schacht and Goering, March-
April 1937, concerning price control. (USA 833). Vol. VII,
Pg. 380

EC-338;  Memorandum of 15 September 1941 from Canaris to
Keitel concerning an OKW Order regulating the treatment of
Soviet prisoners of war. Vol. VII, Pg. 411

*EC-406;  Minutes of Eleventh Meeting of Reichs Defense
Council, 6 December 1935. (USA 772). Vol. VII, Pg. 455

*EC-407;  Minutes of Twelfth Meeting of Reichs Defense
Council, 14 May 1936. (GB 247). Vol. VII, Pg. 462

**L-3;  Contents of Hitler’s talk to Supreme Commander and
Commanding Generals, Obersalzberg, 22 August 1939. (USA 28)
Referred to but not offered in evidence.). Vol. VII, Pg. 752

*L-52;  Memorandum and Directives for conduct of war in the
West, 9 October 1939. (USA 540). Vol. VII, Pg. 800

*L-79;  Minutes of conference, 23 May 1939, “Indoctrination
on the political situation and future aims". (USA 27). Vol.
VII, Pg.847

*L-90;  Fuehrer decree, February 1942, concerning
prosecution of offenses in Occupied Territory; “First
Ordinance” signed by Keitel for execution of the directive;
memorandum of 12 December 1941, signed by Keitel. (USA 503).
Vol. VII, Pg. 871

*L-158;  Circular letter from SIPO and SD Commander of Radom
District, 28 March 1944, concerning measures to be taken
against escaped officers and non-commissioned officer PWs.
(USA 514). Vol. VII, Pg. 906

L-179;  Letter from RSHA to police officials, 5 November
1942, concerning criminal procedure against Pole and members
of Eastern people. Vol. VII, Pg. 976

*L-211;  OKW circular entitled Direction of War as Problem
of Organization, 19 April 1938. (GB 161). Vol. VII, Pg. 1043

*L-221;  Bormann report on conference of 16 July 1941,
concerning treatment of Eastern populations and territories.
(USA 317). Vol. VII, Pg. 1086

*R-100;  Minutes of instructions given by Hitler to General
von Brauchitsch on 25 March 1939. (USA 121). Vol. VIII, Pg.
83

*UK-20;  Keitel Order on treatment of supporters of De
Gaulle who fight for Russians, 26 May 1943. (GB 163). Vol.
VIII, Pg. 538

*UK-57;  Keitel directives, 4 January 1944 and 21 April
1944, concerning counteraction to Kharkov show trial. (GB
164). Vol. VIII, Pg. 539

*UK-66;  Report of British War Crimes Section of Allied
Force Headquarters on German reprisals for partisan activity
in Italy. (GB 274). Vol. VIII, Pg. 572

Affidavit A;  Affidavit of Erwin Lahousen, 21 January 1946,
substantially the same as his testimony on direct
examination before the International Military Tribunal at
Nurnberg 30 November 1945 and 1 December 1945. Vol. VIII,
Pg. 587

Affidavit I;  Affidavit of Leopold Buerkner, 22 January
1946. Vol. VIII, Pg. 647

Statement III;  The Origin of the Directives of the Supreme
Command of the Armed Forces, by Wilhelm Keitel, Nurnberg, 15
September 1945. Vol. VIII, Pg. 669

Statement IV;  The Position and Powers of the Chief of the
OKW, by Wilhelm Keitel, Nurnberg, 9 October 1945. Vol. VIII,
Pg. 672

Statement V;  Notes Concerning Actions of German Armed
Forces During the War and in Occupied Territory, by Wilhelm
Keitel, Nurnberg, 19 October 1945. Vol. VIII, Pg. 678

Statement: VI;  The Relationship Between Canaris and Keitel,
by Erwin Lahousen, Nurnberg, 23 October 1945. Vol. VIII, Pg.
682

Statement IX;  My Relationship to Adolf Hitler and to the
Party, by Erich Raeder, Moscow, fall 1945. Vol. VIII, Pg.
707

**Chart No. 7;  Organization of the Wehrmacht 1938-1945.
(Enlargement displayed to Tribunal.). Vol. VIII, Pg. 776